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ART. I.—THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW.

1. *Erreurs et Mensonges Historiques*. Par M. CH. BARTHÉLEMY, Membre de l'Académie de la Religion Catholique de Rome. Paris: Ch. Blériot. 1863.
2. *Le Correspondant*. 1843. *La Saint-Barthélemy et le XVIII^e Siècle*.
3. *Revue des deux Mondes*. 1845. *Monographies Politiques, Henri IV*.

AT a time when the religious revolution effected by Luther and Calvin had invaded every province of European Christendom—when further ravages on the fold of the Church were imminent, in consequence of the growing power of Elizabeth and the increasing strength of the Huguenots in France—when the reformatory influence of the Council of Trent and the reaction anticipated from the activity of religious orders, particularly that of the Society of Jesus, had not yet had time to develop—when the conquests awaiting the Catholic faith in the far East and the New World had but begun their march—an event occurred in the history of France which, though it afforded to many Catholics an occasion of temporary triumph, was calculated in the highest degree to damage their cause and bring it into disrepute with those whom they desired to conquer or convert. This was the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. The object of this article will be neither to justify nor to palliate that atrocious transaction, but to point out the causes which provoked it and the motives which actuated it; to show that the principal agents in it were very different from those commonly represented; that the Church, in short, neither advised nor wrought it; and that to lay the blame of it on her would be as untrue to history as injurious towards religion.

The stream of history is by no means clearest near the fountain head. On the contrary, it is for the most part a turbid and shallow brook, which clears and deepens as it runs. State trials, diplomatic correspondence, private memoirs, and

a variety of other witnesses start up as time rolls on, and correct or confirm original statements. ~~X~~More than twenty years have passed since the researches of M. de Falloux and M. de Carné, in two of the leading French Reviews, threw light on the history of St. Bartholomew's Day; and M. Charles Barthélemy has recently followed up the work they had begun. Two causes had conspired to weaken the authority of previous accounts,—the party spirit of Calvinistic historians, and those who leaned to their side, and the readiness with which Catholic writers accepted current reports in their eagerness to repel the suspicion of approving the massacre.

Of all the histories of that event previous to this century, none, perhaps, can be found more succinct and fair than that which is contained in the continuation of Fleury; yet even this requires to be examined by the light of recent research, because the authors from whose works it is compiled laboured under the disadvantage of living too near the times of which they wrote. De Thou was over-indulgent to the Calvinists, and his history is on the Index; Mézeray is severe, careless, and little to be trusted; Dupleix deals very hardly with Margaret de Valois, though she had been his benefactress; Matthieu's histories were as badly written as his tragedies; Brantôme was attached to the court of Charles IX., but was a lively biographer rather than a grave historian. Davila's "Civil Wars from 1559 to 1598" are universally esteemed, yet he is charged with partiality for Catharine de Médicis; the "Memoirs" of Tavannes are highly curious, for his father was one of the King's generals, and concerned in the St. Bartholomew. We shall in the first place follow, with some reserve, the guidance of these writers, and give, on their authority, an outline of the history of that dreadful carnage, and then offer such remarks as appear to us most likely to rectify mistakes respecting it, and clear the Catholic religion of unmerited reproach.

The civil war, in which the Protestants of France were headed by the Prince de Condé, had been brought to a close; the rebels had been defeated at Dreux by the Duke de Guise (1562), at St. Denis by the Constable de Montmorency (1567), at Jarnac and at Moncontour by the Duke d'Anjou, afterwards Henry III. (1569). Peace had been concluded at St. Germain (1570), and the marriage of the King's sister, Margaret de Valois, with a Protestant Prince of Navarre, afterwards Henry IV., seemed a guarantee for the prevention of future hostilities. ~~X~~On the 14th of May, 1572, the Queen of Navarre, with her son, arrived in Paris to celebrate a wedding of so great importance on political and religious

grounds. But she died in her forty-fourth year, in less than a month after her arrival, and in the house of Guillard, Bishop of Chartres, who secretly inclined to the Calvinist doctrine. On the 13th of August the bridal morning woke with merry peals from tower and belfry; but there were those in the royal palace who whispered that more blood than wine would be spilt at the celebration.

The chiefs of the Calvinist party were now in the capital, and preparations were already made for their destruction. They were suspected of being still disloyal at heart, and Admiral de Coligny in particular, who had been Condé's lieutenant-general, though received at court with outward show of friendship, was regarded with intense aversion as a renegade, a conspirator, and a spy. He was, therefore, the first victim marked out for slaughter. It is impossible to ascertain precisely when the dark idea of assassinating him and his adherents first entered the King's mind, and it is but fair to that unhappy youth to say that he seems throughout to have been the tool of his mother. Between the days of the marriage and the massacre many councils were held in his presence and in that of Catharine, in which the means of executing some cruel project were discussed. It was, however, only in Catharine's presence that the most diabolical measures were proposed.

The first act in the tragedy took place on the 22nd of August. Admiral Coligny was more busy in advising the King to declare war against Spain than in providing for his personal safety. He had not indeed any suspicion that his life was in danger, though his friends warned him, and he knew how little his reconciliation with the Duke de Guise was worth. A former page of this nobleman, named Maurevert, already famous as an assassin, fired an arquebuse at the Admiral as he was walking slowly to his lodgings along the cloister of St. Germain l'Auxerrois. One of the three balls discharged carried away the second finger of his right hand, and another severely wounded him in the left elbow. He evinced great courage and resignation, and attributed the blow without hesitation to the Duke de Guise. The King exhibited much concern, and visited the Admiral. He vowed vengeance against the authors of the deed, but the assassin had already escaped towards the gate St. Antoine on a horse which was waiting for him. If Coligny had sunk under his wounds, it is possible that the proposed massacre would have ended with the death of the chief; but, as the physicians gave hopes of his recovery, Catharine concerted further measures with her council, and the butchery of the entire faction was pro-

bably—so far as the royal consent was regarded—decided on only a few hours before its execution.*

The Calvinist nobles and gentlemen assembled in Paris took the alarm when the Admiral was wounded, met together for consultation, and were all of opinion that the sooner they departed the better. A rumour had spread abroad that they menaced the lives of the Dukes de Guise, who accordingly requested leave of the King to retire from Paris if their services were no longer needed. Charles IX. told them they might go if they liked, but that he should know where to find them if they had connived at the Admiral's death. They mounted their horses as if for the journey, but it was all a feint, and they were known to remain within the city walls.

It was after dinner, on the 23rd of August, that Catharine led the King, the Duke d'Anjou, the Duke de Nevers, Tavannes, and Count de Retz into the garden of the Tuileries, and unfolded to them her plan for the *coup d'état*. The time, she said, was ripe: 8,000 Huguenots in the city were breathing vengeance, but were as yet unarmed; the King of Navarre and the Prince de Condé were in the Louvre and could not escape; the admiral was in bed and unable to move; their enemies were caught in the toils, and in one hour the whole race of Calvinists might be abolished. They ought, therefore, no longer to resist the will of God, but give the reins to popular fury; when once the deed was accomplished reasons enough for it could be found, or the entire blame be thrown on the Princes de Guise. De Retz protested loudly but was overruled, and the king swore in a towering rage that not only Coligny and his staff, but every Huguenot in France should be slain.† The King of Navarre and the Prince de Condé were alone exempted from the general proscription.

The council in the garden dispersed, but not before the conduct of the massacre was intrusted to the Duke de Guise, Coligny's mortal foe. Arquebusiers surrounded every house where Protestants lodged, and the names of all were taken. The King and the Queen-mother were appealed to for protection, but they replied that these precautions were intended to prevent a tumult. When all the arrangements were completed the Duke de Guise exhorted the colonels and Swiss captains to make the best use of the glorious opportunity now

* Appendix to Lingard's History of England, vol. vi. p. 341.

† Account of the Duke d'Anjou (Henry III.).

afforded them. Never before had victory been so easy; the enemies of God and the King might fall at a stroke, and all they had suffered during the civil wars be avenged. Booty there would be in abundance, and little risk run by securing it.

The sheriffs and other municipal authorities co-operated with the troops, and at midnight the Hôtel de Ville was filled with armed men. Strict orders were given that no one should be allowed to escape. The tocsin would sound at day-break from the palace, and the porcelain bell of St. Germain l'Auxerrois would repeat the signal. A white kerchief tied round the left arm, and a white cross in the hat, would distinguish friends from foes, and the utmost possible tranquillity was to be observed in executing the orders which were given by the *Prévôt des Marchands* in the King's name.*

It was a little after midnight when the queen mother entered Charles's room to fortify him in his resolve. She knew that he wavered notwithstanding his show of violence. She was attended by those who had been with her a few hours before in the garden as well as by Chancellor Biraque. Every argument they could adduce was employed to overcome his scruples, and it was not till Catharine reproached him with weakness in throwing away the finest opportunity God could give him of relieving the State that he gave the final order. Not a moment was lost. The Duke de Guise, de Nevers, d'Angoulême, d'Aumale, Cosseins, and Maurigon hastened to their posts. The second of these would have stationed the cavalry outside the walls of Paris to prevent the escape of fugitives, but to this measure he could not obtain the royal consent. We would willingly throw a veil over these hideous details, but that they are the necessary text of the comments we have to make presently. Every Catholic writer, with hardly an exception, recounts them with horror, and the idea of their having at any time been sanctioned by the Church is quite preposterous. A few, indeed, there were, like Guy de Faur, Bellieve, and Charpentier, who feebly endeavoured to excuse what they knew to be indefensible, but their writings met with little acceptance even among their own people.† The only hypothesis on which anything could be urged in its defence is precisely that which the King put forward, namely, that his life and the safety of the government were actually menaced at the very moment by the secret machinations of

* Archives Curieuses, tome vii.

† Continuation of Fleury, An. 1572, xlix.

the Calvinist leaders, enraged at the attempted assassination of Coligny.*

The Admiral, of course, was the first victim. The Duke de Guise, his personal enemy, remained below in the court, while armed men, conducted by Cosseins, made their way to his chamber. The pain of his wounds had prevented his sleeping, and an attendant had been reading to him Calvin's Commentary on the Book of Job. Hearing the doors burst open with great violence, he sprung from bed and leaned against the wall to pray. He also called on the minister, Merlin, to recommend his soul to God, sank into his arm-chair, and calmly awaited his end. "You will not shorten my life much," he said to Behem, the Duke's servant, who first entered the room. Scarcely had the words passed his lips when the murderer pierced him through with his sword, and others who followed stabbed him to death with poignards. The Chevalier d'Angoulême, who stayed below with the Duke, would not be satisfied till he had seen the corpse. It was, therefore, flung from the window, and ruffian nobles wiped the blood from the face of the dead Admiral to remove every doubt whether he were really no more.† An Italian servant of the Duke de Nevers cut off the head, and carried it to the king and queen, while the people, severing the hands and feet from the trunk, dragged it for three days through the streets, and finally hung it up at Montfaucon in iron chains. The house was sacked, the papers were seized, and all the domestics slain. The slaughter so "happily" commenced was urged forward with redoubled fury by the Duke de Nevers, Montpensier, and Tavannes, and in every street a declaration was published to the effect that the Admiral and those of his religion, not excepting the King of Navarre and the Prince de Condé, had formed a conspiracy against the royal family, and proposed setting up a republic.

The King's name was freely used to instigate the people to rise in a mass, and slay without distinction all who professed the suspected doctrines; and at the same time they were encouraged to regard their property as lawful spoil. Unfortunately there were too many who revered the King as if he were their conscience, and the loyalty of the wicked knew no bounds when it served their own passions and interests. To them it was pleasant enough to "extirpate the accursed breed of contagious serpents," when those serpents

* *Mémoires de la Reine Marguerite (de Valois).*

† *Vie de Gaspard de Coligny. Cologne: 1686, p. 401.*

were found to have laid golden eggs. It would be an ill service, indeed, to religion to extenuate the guilt of this sanguinary outbreak, "the work," as the Abbé de Ségur justly observes, "of hatred and fanaticism, which religion blames, and in which not a single priest took part."*

The morning advanced and with it the remorseless carnage. Neither old men, infants, nor women with child were spared. The Count de Rochefoucault, who had passed part of the previous evening with the King, and was particularly liked by him, fell. The order to save him came too late; and Nompart de Caumont was slain in bed with a child whom he tenderly loved, while another, creeping under his father's corpse, saved his life only by feigning to be dead.

The work of death was carried into the Louvre also, and the apartments of the King of Navarre. Many gentlemen of his household were smitten by the sword, and the galleries and staircases were strewn with corpses. The unfortunate sufferers were pursued even into the princesses' apartments, and the King of France himself is said to have been present at several of these onslaughts. The Seigneur de Piles, who had distinguished himself at the defence of St. Jean d'Angély, being surrounded by a troop of assassins, cried aloud in Charles's hearing: "Is this the King's faith? Are these his promises? But Thou, O God, defend the cause of the oppressed, and avenge, as a just Judge, this great perfidy and horrible inhumanity!" He was soon struck down with a halberd by one of the archers, who, on seeing him fall, cried: "In this way we must deal with all who wanted to kill the King." A species of panic had been excited among the assailants, and it is evident that many of them slew for fear of being slain. De Beaumont was killed in bed, where the gout had long detained him. De Grammont, de Duras, Rouhaut and Bouchavannes, were exempted from death by the King's order, promised to be faithful to him, and kept their word.

When the first fury of the storm had subsided, Charles IX. sent for the King of Navarre and the Prince de Condé. He explained to them how, "by God's grace," he had discovered the means of putting an end to civil wars and rebellious plots, and exhorted them under pain of his just vengeance to embrace the Catholic religion, for he was determined, he said, that no other should have footing in the kingdom. The King and Prince, in reply, professed devoted loyalty to Charles, but exhorted him to remember the alliance with his sister, which had just been contracted and to respect the tenderness of

* *Réponses Courtes*, &c., p. 101.

consciences embued in childhood with the principles of the Protestant faith. The Prince de Condé spoke more boldly than the King of Navarre, and declared that he would render account of his creed to none but God, and was quite willing to die rather than disavow his own convictions. At this speech Charles was greatly enraged, and threatened to have the Prince put to death, if he did not change his mind within three days. It cannot be supposed that religion had much to do with Charles IX.'s exhortations: the passionate youth was eager to maintain his own authority, and if he and his mother had been influenced by religious motives in the sense in which Protestant writers allege, they would not so easily have given Margaret de Valois to a Huguenot Prince, and have negotiated a marriage first for the Duke d'Anjou, and afterwards for the Duke d'Alençon,* with Elizabeth of England. It was the world and not the Church which stirred in their hearts and guided their conduct. Religion

Among those who perished in the carnage were many Catholics. To have money, to hold a situation which others coveted, or to be heir to property which others wished to inherit, was sufficient to bring the most orthodox into the category of those doomed to destruction. Long standing feuds and recent brawls were alike paid off with hasty reckoning in those fearful days. Learning proved no title to respect. Notwithstanding the reputation Peter Ramus had acquired in logic and mathematics, he was barbarously murdered, and thrown, like Coligny, from a window—his entrails were strewed about the street, and his corpse was dragged to and fro by the students of the University, and treated with every mark of contempt. He was obnoxious to them as a foe to Aristotle, a Calvinistic iconoclast, and a correspondent of Theodore de Beza.

A pleasing instance of generosity occurred amid the horrors of the scene. A mortal enmity had existed for years between two gentlemen of Quercy—de Vezins, one of the King's provincial lieutenants, a man of rough exterior and rude habits, and Reignier, a Calvinist, attached to the service of the King of Navarre, whose character was wholly different. The former was on the point of leaving Paris, when he heard the signal-bell of St. Germain l'Auxerrois, and witnessed the beginning of the massacre. Fearing for his enemy's life, he rode to Reignier's lodgings, broke open the door, and entered the Calvinist's bed-room with his sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. Reignier, thinking his end was come, threw him-

* Miss Strickland's *Queens of England*: Queen Elizabeth, Chaps. vi. and vii.

self on his knees to pray, when de Vezins, instead of killing him as he expected, sternly commanded him to dress, mount a horse which he had brought, and follow him. The Huguenot obeyed, and de Vezins rode with him at his side as far as his château at Quercy, without speaking one word. Then breaking silence, he avowed that he had always respected Reignier's virtues, and that a sense of honour had constrained him to save his adversary. Henceforward, he added, he would always be ready to meet him in fair field to settle their differences as became gentlemen. In vain Reignier protested that de Vezins' generous conduct had closed all bitter feelings, and that he should never have courage to lift a hand against him. He would have embraced his benefactor; but de Vezins replied haughtily, put spurs to his horse, and left behind that one on which Reignier had ridden. The animal was sent back to him, but he refused to receive it or its value in money.

X Our readers must not forget the pains taken by the King and his partisans to propagate a completely false view of this horrible transaction. The people long continued under the impression that a great deliverance had been wrought, and that the Catholic party had but providentially anticipated the sanguinary projects of its foes. A supposed miracle increased their ardour. A hawthorn in the cemetery of the Holy Innocents, though leafless and half-dried up, broke forth into blossom on the day of the massacre. Many persons supposed that this was a mark of the favour of Heaven; confraternities made processions to the spot; and the King himself would see the tree. Terrified at the thought of the entire blame of the massacre falling on himself, the King wrote on the 25th to all the Governors of provinces, declaring that it arose without his knowledge, and sprang out of an old feud existing between the houses of Guise and Coligny. The Guises, he said, having discovered that the Admiral's friends were about to take vengeance on those whom they supposed to have advised the attempt on his life, determined to be beforehand with them, and to secure their own lives by putting an end to those of their enemies. His edict of pacification was in no way broken by this private outbreak, and he intended that it should still be religiously observed. He commanded that the massacre should cease, and that all loyal citizens should keep peaceably in their own houses. The Queen wrote in the same terms to the respective Governors, and to the Swiss Republic, and by the King's order, her letters were dispersed through England and the provinces of Germany.

But the King and his mother did not long continue

in this story. When his first couriers had departed, and he wished to dismiss the Dukes de Guise as the alleged authors of the crime, Catharine opposed the measure, and said that things were in such a state that, if he continued to dissimulate, he would be in danger of losing his reputation and his crown. She and the Duke d'Anjou then produced a forged letter, found, as they said, among Teligny's papers, in which Marshal de Montmorency vowed to avenge the Admiral's wounds as zealously as if they had been inflicted on himself. If the party of the Guises were expelled from Paris, they would never lay down their arms, the Protestants would gather around Montmorency, and civil war would be renewed. The only way to prevent it, would be for Charles to take the responsibility of the massacre on himself. By this means, Montmorency and the Guises alike would lose their pretext for continuing in arms.

Convinced by these reasons, Charles IX., having first sent some of his guards to Châtillon to bring back Coligny's wife and family, went down to the Parliament with his brothers and the King of Navarre. There was a full assembly, and in the presence of them all he explained his conduct. He had, he said, been compelled to take violent measures to prevent the outbreak of a conspiracy, the object of which was no less than to kill him, his mother, brothers, and even the Protestant King of Navarre, and to place the Prince de Condé on the throne as a *locum-tenens* until Coligny should be able to enthrone himself. It was very much against his will, that he had resorted to so severe a remedy; but the heads of the conspiracy having now been cut off, he ordered that all pillage and massacre should cease.

u It is remarkable how rarely the name of any ecclesiastic comes before us in reading the history of the massacre. The King and Queen carefully abstained from taking priest or bishop into their counsels. An edict was published conformable to the King's speech in parliament, but it is observable that in neither the one nor the other did he attempt to excuse himself on the ground of the religion professed by his enemies. Political motives only were assigned for his conduct; and rebellion, not heresy, was punished in them.* It is important, for the drift of our argument, to bear this distinction in mind. The clergy of Paris, no doubt, threw open their churches, and offered the sacrifice of praise as for a national deliverance, but

* "Non religionis odio, sed ut nefariæ Colineii et sociorum conjurationi obviam iret."—Thuanus, *Historia mei Temporis*.

they did so because, like the people who assembled within the sacred walls, they were deceived into the belief that *trains* had been darkly laid beneath their feet, and that clemency or delay would have been fatal to the throne, the Church, and society. The despatches sent to foreign courts after the King's appearance in Parliament were in strict accordance with his edict, and even the astute Elizabeth was partly deceived by the representations of de la Motte Fenelon,* the French ambassador in London. In Catholic countries the prevailing feeling on the occasion was joy, and Charles IX. appeared to them to have acted in self-defence, not as an aggressor. In Spain a panegyric on the event was pronounced in presence of Philip the Second, and it was called the triumph of the Church militant.

During seven days, blood continued to be shed in Paris, and then, in spite of the royal proclamation to the contrary, various provincial towns began to follow the odious example. On Monday, the 25th of August, the throats of many Huguenots were cut at Meaux, and many were flung into the Marne. The mutual hatred of the two parties, the ills which the Catholics had suffered at the hands of Calvinists, private animosities, love of plunder, and the fury with which the demon of civil war had inspired a people naturally humane, sufficed for the work of destruction without any instigation on the part of the authorities. Indeed, after the first blow had been struck in Paris, the King wanted means to restrain the carnage rather than to extend it. The presence of François de Montmorency, Governor of the Isle of France, at Chantilly, prevented any outbreak at Senlis, but La Charité was the scene of horrors on the 26th, and the 27th proved a terrible day of retribution to the Calvinists at Orleans. They had on former occasions twice taken possession of the place, and the ruin in which they had laid the sacred edifices now provoked the people to vengeance. Retributive providence is always at work, and marks its eternal procedure by locality and other outward signs not easy to mistake. Almost all the cities of France, excepting Nismes, where the Huguenots had committed most cruelty, were precisely those in which they fared the worst in the massacre of St. Bartholomew's.

Angers and Saumur followed the example of Orleans on the 29th, and on the 30th a great slaughter was effected at Lyons. François de Mandelot was Governor at the time, and in no-wise favoured the outbreak. The soldiers of the garrison refused to be made the executioners of their fellow-citizens,

* Lingard, vol. vi. p. 138.

and the rioters were not slow in reddening their own hands with blood. In no part of the kingdom were greater crimes committed; and three hundred of the principal Calvinists having taken refuge in the palace of the Archbishop, the gates were forced, and the refugees first plundered, and then slain without mercy. Those who had been confined in the prisons of Roüane were treated with the same inhumanity, and Gaudimel, who had set to music the psalms translated by Marot and Beza, was among the victims. The inhabitants of Troyes, of whom Coligny had not long before complained to the king, when they heard of the doings in Paris, posted guards at the city-gates to prevent any escape, put all suspected persons in prison on the 30th, and killed them five days after, by order of Anne de Voudray, bailiff of Troyes. At Bourges the like outrages took place on the 11th of September, and François Hotman and Hugues Doneau, distinguished professors of civil law, would have suffered death if they had not been rescued by their pupils. At Rouen there was a massacre on the 17th, at Romans on the 20th of September, and at Bordeaux on the 3rd of October. At Toulouse, five councillors were hung, in their red robes, from an elm in the palace-yard. The length of time over which the violence extended certainly argues remissness or connivance of some members of the Government. It is impossible to believe that, with a well-ordered army, peace could not have been more easily restored.

Among the Catholics who suffered in these mournful days, were a priest, slain in prison at Bordeaux; the wife of Captain Landas, poignarded at La Charité; the governor at Vic, in Messina; Bertrand de Villemor, a high functionary, and Jean Rouillard, Canon of Notre-Dame, in Paris, incurred the same fate. The Governor of Bordeaux ransomed Catholics and Protestants alike, and had those put to death who had the means to ransom them but not the will.*

In Provence, where the Count de Tende commanded, and in Dauphiné, where de Gordes was the king's lieutenant, the temper of the assailants was more subdued. When Joseph Boniface de Mole brought an order to the first of these, purporting to be from the King, and directing him to exterminate the Calvinists, he replied, that this command must have issued from some foe to public peace, and was contrary to instructions he had previously received. He therefore preferred adhering to the orders which best bespoke his prince's clemency. The Count de Garces, the King's lieutenant in Provence, imitated

* *Histoire des Martyrs*, p. 724.

de Tende's good example, and by his remonstrances obtained more equitable directions. Happily for the honour of our kind, the darkest events in history are dashed with light, and amid the wildest roar of passion some voice is heard which speaks the tenderness of man for his brother man.

In Dauphiné, de Gordes suppressed the earliest attempts on Protestant lives; and Saint Harem, governor of Auvergne, who, like the merciful governors above-mentioned, was attached to the Montmorencies, on receiving cruel orders, replied that he would not obey them even if they came from the King himself. Though the clergy had been severely treated by the Huguenots, they nevertheless did their utmost to screen them from violence in various quarters. The Bishop of Lisieux, who had worn the habit of St. Dominic, vigorously opposed any extreme measures, and interceded with the lieutenant for those who were exposed to death like beasts in a gladiatorial show. "I will never," he said, "consent to your executing the orders you have received. I am the pastor of the Church of Lisieux, and the sheep you would slaughter are of my flock. It is true they have gone astray, but I do not despair of one day bringing them back to the fold of Jesus Christ. I cannot find in the Gospel that the shepherd ought to suffer the blood of his sheep to be shed; on the contrary, I read there that he is obliged to lay down his life for them. Go back, therefore, with this order, which shall never be executed while God preserves me alive. He has lengthened my days only that I may spend them in promoting the spiritual and temporal welfare of my flock."

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The lieutenant was surprised at the bishop's firmness, and asked if he would give him his refusal in writing. The prelate replied that he would do so willingly, that he was convinced of the King's goodness, and that in this matter his majesty had been taken unawares. He believed that Charles would approve his conduct, but, whatever might be the result, he was resolved to abide by what he had said. The blessing of God rested on his noble resistance. The lieutenant sent his refusal to the King, who, far from being enraged, was evidently affected by it, revoked the orders that had been given in regard to the diocese of Lisieux, and the faithful shepherd so won the people whose lives he had saved, by his instructions and prayers, that almost all of them returned to the bosom of the Church.

If the question of this famous massacre had come before Pope Gregory XIII. in the same form in which it presented itself to Jean Hennuyer, the good Bishop of Lisieux, there can be no doubt that his decision would have been substantially the same. For who and what was Gregory XIII.? Consider

for a moment the conduct and character of the pontiff whom Protestant historians would represent as little better than a tiara'd Caligula or Nero. The Popes in all ages have had to bear the reproach of crimes of which they were guiltless, and it will be no wonder if we find on examination that the successor of S. Pius V. was incapable of sanctioning atrocities of any kind. He did not spend his days in blessing daggers to be plunged into the hearts of Huguenots; and Cardinal Lorraine, whom a Voltairian poet describes as thus occupied at Paris on St. Bartholomew's day, happened to be at that very time in Rome. Gregory XIII.'s reputation had been such that he filled important offices under Leo X. and his immediate successors, as well as under Paul III., and under Julius III., who made him apostolic secretary, and sent him to the Council of Trent as a lawyer. Paul IV. raised him to a bishopric; and Pius IV., having sent him a second time to the great Council, afterwards created him cardinal, and employed him as legate in Spain. In this last capacity he acquitted himself so well that S. Pius V. appointed him Brief-subscriber. He was elected to the Papal chair by the unanimous voice of the cardinals, and his elevation was extremely acceptable to the Roman people.

Now is it to be conceived that an ecclesiastic whose antecedents had been so honourable, whom Pope after Pope considered so trustworthy, should, in his 70th year, be found to hold and to teach that law and justice may be set at defiance, and assassination be laudably practised, if only the Church's enemies can be extirpated thereby? Yet the charges brought against him by many Protestant writers, on the score of his pretended approval of the massacre of St. Bartholomew amount to nothing less.

Old as he was, his pontificate lasted thirteen years. Was there anything during this period which confirmed the idea of his applauding assassination and massacre? Macaulay was not likely to be a partial witness in his favour, yet he speaks of him as "exerting himself not only to imitate but to surpass Pius in the severe virtues of his sacred profession."* Ranke speaks of him in terms altogether similar. Was he not zealous in promoting the reformation of morals inculcated by the Council of Trent? Was he who afterwards canonized S. Norbert, translated the relics of S. Gregory Nazianzen, established the Congregation of the Oratory, and meekly allowed himself to be advised and directed by

* Essays.

S. Charles Borromeo when the latter visited Rome, was he likely to hold the detestable doctrine that the end justifies the means, and to teach practically that to immolate women, children, and aged men, to tear them in pieces, dash them on the stones, and toss them in the river, because they are heretics, is an action pleasing to God?

The reason which has ordinarily led Protestants to entertain so wild a notion is truly singular: viz., that "persecution is the creed of a Catholic." Unquestionably we are the last to deny that under certain circumstances of society, and in certain periods of history, the Church has approved the judicial infliction of capital punishment on certain heretics; and we would on no account shrink from any doctrine which such a fact legitimately involves. But to argue from this that she can ever have viewed with other feelings than those of abhorrence so foul a deed as the St. Bartholomew really was, is the same absurdity as to suppose that, because the English law visits murder with death, it approves or tolerates the wholesale infliction of Lynch-law on reputed murderers.

In fact we have direct evidence of the light in which a devout Catholic of the period would view the real circumstances of the transaction; for we have before us the despatches of Salviati, the Papal nuncio at Paris, written in those very days. He wrote them in cipher, fearing lest they should fall into the hands of agents of the French government. He described in them the Queen-mother's state of mind, the jealousy she entertained towards Admiral Coligny in consequence of the ascendancy he had gained over the King; how she resolved to rid herself of his control by assassination; and, in concert with the Duke of Anjou and the Duke of Guise, engaged an assassin. He showed how, when the Admiral did not die of his wounds, she was exposed to great danger and alarmed *by her own conscience*, and by the threatening speeches of the Huguenots; how she endeavoured in vain to convince them that the arquebuse had been discharged by a bravo employed by the Duke of Alva; and how, having failed in this piece of deception, she had recourse to the King, and exhorted him to consent to the general massacre which ensued. Thus, in the nuncio's first despatch, the carnage of St. Bartholomew is ascribed to the jealousy of a crafty and murderous woman, who, failing to assassinate one man whom she hated, resolved, with a guilty conscience, to surmount the danger she had provoked by assassination on a larger scale. The document breathes not a syllable of justification, but on the contrary, by its allusion to Catharine de Médicis' conscience, plainly indicates profound moral reprobation.

In reply to this letter, the Cardinal Secretary at Rome put several questions respecting the cause, the authors, and the circumstances of the massacre. Salviati, in return, wrote two notes bearing the date of the 22nd of September. In the first of them he assures the Cardinal of the exact truth of what he had previously written, and of the great difficulty he had in obtaining correct information. Time will show, he says in the second, which was in cipher, whether any accounts that differ from his in regard to the Admiral's death, have any foundation. "Had he died immediately, no one else would have perished." But he did not die; and they began to expect some great evil; wherefore closeting themselves in consultation with the King, they determined to *throw shame aside* (*di buttare la vergogna di banda*), and to cause him to be assassinated together with the others; a determination which was carried into execution that very night.

Is there in these words the smallest appearance of approval? Is there any attempt to excuse the massacre, or to prove it justifiable homicide? Is it not called by its right name—*assassination*; a term big with associations of cowardice, hatred, fanaticism, and revenge? Is not the project and execution withered and blasted by the blame implied in *throwing shame aside*? Does not this expression represent it not only as the blackest but also the most audacious of crimes?

But this very letter of Salviati's may be ingeniously turned against our own argument. "After having received so explicit an account of the truth," it may be asked, "how can the Pontiff plead ignorance? How comes it, then, to pass that the Pope, so far from expressing any horror at the massacre in question, celebrated it by a solemn procession to San Luigi;* proclaimed a jubilee;† and caused a medal to be struck, on which the Pope himself appears on one side, and on the reverse an angel, with a cross in one hand and a sword in the other, exterminating the heretics, and the Admiral in particular.‡ Explain to us, if you can, we had almost said if you dare, how the Pontiff came to have a picture of the event painted by Vasari, and exposed in the vestibule of the Sixtine Chapel, with an inscription, which remains to this day—*Pontifex Colignii necem probat*, The Pope approves the death of Coligny."§

There could never have been any difficulty in replying to

* Ranke's Popes, ii., p. 70. Russell, Modern Europe, ii., 457.

† Ch. Barthélemy, *Erreurs, &c.*, p. 171.

‡ Continuation of Fleury, 1572.

§ Martin, *Hist. de France*, ix., 343.

this objection, if controversialists on both sides had kept steadily before their mind the real question at issue. It is simply this. Were the Catholics of that period so minded, that the massacre, if presented to them in its true colours, would have provoked universal horror and indignation? Or were they, on the contrary, so minded, that they would have considered it an admirable effusion of religious zeal? Our opponents maintain the latter, and we the former. Every Catholic, indeed, who has been instructed in the rudiments of his religion, knows how absolutely impossible is the latter alternative. But as we are contending against non-Catholics, we must argue the matter on grounds purely historical. We say, then, briefly this: by assuming a most obvious and probable hypothesis, every known fact will be found in harmony with the former alternative; whereas there are three prominent and salient features in the case, not one of which can be reconciled by any violence with the latter.

The "obvious and probable hypothesis" which we assume is, that the Pope believed that story which the King solemnly assured him was true. Every one knows what that story was, and we have already mentioned it. Even so late as the 8th of February in the following year he repeated it in a letter intended to deceive the English court. In writing on that date to La Motte Fenelon he said, "In regard to what has occurred in these latter days, Sieur Walsingham must have seen how it happened by the fault of the chiefs who remained in Paris; for when the late Admiral was treacherously wounded, he knew the affliction it threw us into (fearful that it might occasion great troubles in this kingdom), and the diligence we used to verify judicially whence it proceeded; and the verification was nearly finished, when they were so forgetful as to raise a conspiracy, to attempt the lives of myself, my lady and mother, and my brothers, and endanger the whole state; which was the cause, that to avoid this, I was compelled to my very great regret to permit what happened in this city; but as he witnessed, I gave orders to stop as as soon as possible this fury of the people, and place every one in repose. . . . Finding myself in such imminent peril, and the conspiracy raised against me and mine and my kingdom ready to be executed, *I had no time to arraign and try in open court as much as I wished, but was constrained to my very great regret to strike the blow.*"

Now it is a certain fact that the French ambassador entered into explanations on the subject before the Pope ordered the solemn thanksgiving, nor, of course, can it be doubted that

his story was accordant with his master's.* *Salviati* had himself confessed the great difficulty of obtaining accurate information on the subject; and certainly there was no kind of improbability in the supposition, that a plot so diabolically cunning as that ascribed to the Huguenots should have concealed itself from his cognizance in its true and alarming significance. The atrocious cruelties so characteristic of the same party, and to which we shall presently advert, would invest the story with much plausibility; and we may add (as we shall point out more at length in a later part of our article), that an undue or intemperate zeal for religion was the very last thing of which the Pope would have dreamed of suspecting either Catharine or Charles. Nothing, then, can in itself be more likely than that the Pope believed Charles's assurances; and if this is once conceded, all the rest follows as a matter of course. A set of bloodthirsty miscreants, enemies alike to the French Church and State, who had been devising a dark scheme of midnight assassination, had been detected in that scheme almost at the moment of its outbreak, and at a time when no other means of repression was possible except the meeting irregular violence by measures equally abnormal.† Both Church and State had been delivered from a fearful peril, and the chief conspirator had expiated his crime by condign punishment. "The Pontiff approves the death of Coligny" as the well-deserved penalty of his atrocious crime.‡

* The learned Pagi shows that the Pope considered the conduct of Charles IX., after it had been explained to him by the French ambassador, as a necessary act of self-defence against the alleged plot of Coligny and the Huguenots. "Actis publicè Deo gratiis de periculo à Colinii conjuratione evitato." *De Gest. Rom. Pont.* vol. vi. p. 729.

† We are giving almost the words of Muret (who preached at Rome on the occasion), as quoted in Alzog's "Church History" (French translation), vol. iii. p. 154. "They did not shrink," he says, "from conspiring against the person and life (*caput et salutem*) of that king by whom, after so many atrocious crimes, they had not only been pardoned, but mercifully and lovingly received. In which conspiracy, *about that very time which had been fixed and dedicated for the perpetration of their crime*, that very doom was inflicted on those wicked and perfidious men which they were planning against the king and almost the whole royal house and family. O memorable night, which by the death of a few traitors delivered the king from present danger of destruction, and the kingdom from the constant fear of civil wars." Alzog refers for this to Muret's 22nd oration in p. 177 of Ruhnken's edition of his works.

‡ In an early number of this REVIEW (July, 1838, p. 47), attention was drawn to a passage from Raffles, "Annals of Gregory XIII.," a work which, according to Ranke, contains the most authentic materials for that Pontiff's life.

"At this time, the Pope was personally informed by the Cardinal of

On the other hand, Protestants maintain that the massacre, as it really happened, was most acceptable to contemporary Catholics, as an exhibition of laudable religious zeal. We have said that there are three prominent and salient facts, not one of which can by any violence be reconciled with this alternative.

Firstly, Salviati's letters. If Catholic contemporary opinion were such as Protestants represent, how was it that this prelate took a view of the case so extremely opposite? How was it that the Papal nuncio was "on a level with the very Protestants" in the purity of his moral doctrine, while the Pope his master, and his co-religionists in general, were still the low and degraded admirers of perfidy and assassination?

Secondly, the King's persistence in laborious hypocrisy. If the act, as it really happened, was such as to win for him the Pope's blessing and his fellow Catholics' sympathy, why did he take such anxious pains to prevent the true circumstances from being known? That he should have tried to deceive the "spotless and evangelical" Elizabeth of England, is intelligible; but why such pains, *e.g.*, with his "brother in approval of assassination," the King of Spain; nay, with his very "instructor in that bloody creed," the Supreme Pontiff? Was it a holy hatred of human praise which prompted him to conceal from the Pope, from Catholic princes, from the whole Catholic world, an act which would have won from them unanimous honour and gratitude? Or rather, is not this constant misrepresentation of the facts an irrefragable proof, that had they known his act to be what it really was, they would have regarded it with detestation and horror?

Thirdly, the reason assigned for the Papal thanksgiving. "Thanks being publicly given to God for the avoidance of that danger which had arisen from Coligny's conspiracy." If the wholesale slaughter of the Huguenots as such had been regarded by Gregory XIII. as so pleasing to God, why did he not thank God expressly on that account? It could not be from any fear of offending public opinion, because, on the Protestant hypothesis, all Catholics of that time loved a good massacre of heretics as heartily as he did.

Lorraine, that King Charles, for his own security and the peace of his kingdom, had put to death the Admiral (Coligny), who was the head and the principal supporter of the Huguenots. And, although he had been thus freed from great trouble, the Pope did not show signs of more than ordinary gratification, *as if a member of his body had been amputated by a painful operation.* He returned thanks to the divine goodness at home, and on the following day went publicly in solemn procession from S. Mark's to the church of S. Louis."

We have already observed that there was everything in the antecedents of Calvinism to make the King's story probable. For more than thirty years the Pope had been anxiously watching its progress. He had seen the gloomy iconoclasts of Geneva everywhere sowing the seeds of disunion and disorder, beating down the doctrine of human responsibility, and resolving all our actions into the decrees of fate. He regarded them as forerunners of Antichrist, preparing the way for universal indifference and unbelief. Their labours tended not only to overthrow the sacred hierarchy of the Church, but the ancient political order of society. Disloyalty and rebellion in them were inseparable from religious innovation. They substituted, wherever they could, the rule of absolute princes for the dominion of the Church, by which kings and emperors were kept in check, and the liberties of the people defended. In England, Holland, Switzerland, and France, they scrupled not to persecute whenever they had the power; and the blood of Catholic martyrs was crying against them on all sides. Under Francis I., Henry II., and Francis II., they were kept down by the strong hand of the law; but, during the reign of the last of these princes, they formed the conspiracy of Amboise, under the secret instigation of the Prince de Condé. Its object was to carry off the King, to proclaim Condé lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and, by this means, to obtain liberty of action for the new religion. But the conspirators were betrayed, and perished miserably in their foolish enterprise. Their attempt only served to kindle the first flame of civil war. From that time they were called Huguenots—an epithet difficult to explain, but probably adopted from a saying of the women about Amboise, who, despising the sectarians as a vulgar set, declared that they were not worth a *huguenot*, or small piece of money of the time of Hugues Capet.* The name had no connection with religious ideas, and shows, therefore, that it was not as Calvinists that they were chiefly obnoxious to the people. In other countries they fared even worse, and the Huguenots of France were the *gueux*, or "beggary scoundrels" of the Netherlands. In the Pope's view, their religious character would naturally be most observable, for theological error is, in his eyes, the most tremendous of evils, as being the prolific source of all calamities.

While Coligny was manœuvring in their favour at court, the Huguenots continued to agitate in the provinces, and disseminate such wild and pernicious doctrines as called for the interference of magistrates. The Queen of England fostered

* Castelnau, Mémoires, liv. i. ch. 7.

religious and political divisions everywhere, and gave heresy a helping hand both in Scotland and France. Plots and intrigues menaced the government on all sides, and the disaffected were encouraged by the examples of Condé and the King of Navarre. Francis II. died after a lamentable reign of two years, and the Huguenots interpreted his death as a mark of Heaven's favour, and a prognostic of their speedy triumph. Charles IX. was proclaimed King at the age of ten years. Catharine de Medicis ruled in his name, and strove to conciliate the opposing factions. Her want of religious principle is apparent from the fact of her not only approving the colloquy of Poissy in 1561, between Catholic and Protestant divines, but from her replying, in answer to objections made by the Pope and bishops, that the re-establishment of Catholic unity throughout the world was at hand, and that concession both in doctrine and discipline might be made to the new religion.* The conference passed over without any result, for to Catholics unaccustomed to doctrinal novelties, the mere statement of Huguenot tenets appeared like an outrage.

At this point the Queen's policy changed. Having endeavoured in vain to suppress the malcontents, she now published edicts in their favour. By this means she thought to obviate violence, but she only provoked it. Sedition started up with a bold front in various provinces, and Paris itself was the scene of riots. The Calvinists fell on the church of S. Medard, and defiled it with every sort of sacrilege. The bonds of morality were discarded by those who gloried in resisting the control of the Church, and unheard-of excesses were committed in the first transports of "religious freedom." At Vassy the soldiers of the Duke of Guise, irritated by the Huguenots, who persisted in interrupting the Mass with their psalmody, wounded a preacher, and slew many of his flock. This outbreak was the tocsin of war, and nothing was heard but imprecations and blessings on the respective leaders of the hostile parties. De Guise stood face to face with Coligny and Condé, while Catharine for a while persisted in neutrality. Now came the tug of war. Orleans was delivered up to Condé, by means of Dandelot, Coligny's brother, and wherever the Huguenots triumphed, the churches were pillaged, and the sacred vessels and images broken in pieces or sold. A number of cities rose in arms and filled the streets with blood. Blois, Tours, Poitiers, Angers, Bourges, Rouen, Mâcon, La Rochelle, Lyons, Grenoble,

* Laurentie, *Histoire de France*, iv. 190. Compare Sarpi, *Istoria del Conc. Trident.*, viii. 58.

and a multitude besides, signalized their zeal for Calvin by horrible massacres and impiety. The haughty conditions of peace, which they offered, were such as the Government could not accept. Fresh troops were now enlisted on the royalists' side, and the tide of events turned. The rebels sought for aid from Germany, but no auxiliaries arrived. The penalties inflicted on them by the parliament were severe, and some of Condé's reprisals were cruel in the extreme. Having seized several of the King's envoys, who were on their way to Spain, he caused two of them—the Abbé de Trois and Councillor Sapin—to be hung. Nor was this the chief crime of the head of the Huguenot faction. His treaty with Elizabeth of England was highly treasonable. She was to occupy Havre, supply 3,000 men to swell his army, 100,000 gold crowns, and subsequent reinforcements, on condition of Calais being ceded to her, when peace should be concluded. Admiral Coligny also consented to this traitorous league.

The perfidy of the Calvinist chieftains inspired the defenders of the Government with fresh courage. Rouen was wrested from the rebels, and the whole of Normandy appeased. The Huguenots then threatened Paris, but retired, pillaging the country on their march, were followed by the royal army, and defeated at Dreux with great slaughter. The loss of lives was equal on both sides, but the Catholics remained masters of the field, and a multitude of prisoners were taken, with artillery and baggage. Tumultuous joy filled Paris, and success, which weak mortals so devoutly worship, brought many of the wavering over to the side of the Duke de Guise. Condé was captured, and subsequently released, while a pacification resembling a treaty was concluded, in which certain advantages were conceded to the rebels.*

But the flame of civil discord was far from being quenched, and the Calvinists strained every nerve to repair their disasters. The picture given of the times by Castelnau in his memoirs, deserves to be quoted, and throws still further light on the rejoicings that took place at Rome when the period of religious strife in France was supposed to be at an end. "The worst of it was," he says, "that in this war the arms taken in defence of religion destroyed religion and piety, and produced as it were a putrid body teeming with vermin, and the plague of innumerable atheists; for the churches were sacked and demolished, ancient monasteries destroyed, the monks driven away, and the nuns violated; and what had been built up in

* Ranke, *Civil Wars in France*, vol. i. p. 327.

four hundred years was laid low in a day, without sparing even the sepulchres of kings and the tombs of our fathers.”*

Among the barbarians whose cruelties marked this sad period was one Baron des Adrets, who, having quarrelled with the Duke de Guise, embraced Calvinism, took several cities, and being made governor of Lyons, amused himself by seeing Catholics flung by the hundred from the summit of the towers. Report says that he bathed his two sons in a tub full of Catholic blood.† On the other hand, Lieutenant-General Montluc was called by the Huguenots “the Royalist butcher,” and has left in his commentaries many accounts of his own cruelty recorded with the utmost naïveté. The “Churches,” on one occasion, having sent one of their ministers to him as an envoy, he thus addressed the trembling preacher: “I don’t see what is to prevent my hanging you myself from this window, you wanton fellow (paillard), for I have strangled with my own hands twenty better men than you!” A Calvinist minister was the last man to find favour in Montluc’s eyes, for he regarded Huguenotism simply as an impious rebellion, which all the preachers had in Synod pronounced justifiable.

It was in 1563, during the siege of Orleans, that a Protestant fanatic, commonly called Poltrot, fired three balls at the Duke de Guise from behind a hedge, and wounded him mortally. The assassin, betrayed by his own terror, was brought before the dying hero, and asked why he had done thus. “Through zeal for my religion, of which you are the enemy,” replied the sectarian. “Well then,” said De Guise, “if your religion teaches you to kill one who never harmed you, mine commands me to forgive you. Go, I set you at liberty.”‡ In seven days he died like a great and good man. But Poltrot was taken to Paris, and cut in quarters. His crime occasioned another. It lay at the root of the attempt on Coligny’s life which failed, and consequently at the massacre of S. Bartholomew’s itself, for Henri De Guise saw his father fall before the walls of Orleans, and vowed vengeance on the Calvinists, which he executed fatally.

In 1667, ambitious leaders again made religion a pretext for

* Mr. Buckle is pretty sure not to say without the strongest ground anything which can tell in favour of Catholics. Yet what is his testimony? “The crimes of the French Protestants . . . were as revolting as those of the Catholics, and quite as numerous relatively to the number and power of the two parties.”—(*Civilization*, vol. i. p. 407, note) And this, while of course he counts the S. Bartholomew as one of these Catholic crimes.

† Brantôme : *Père Maimbourg* ; cited by *Laurentie*.

‡ *Le Père Daniel. Laurentie*, iv. 213.

civil war. At the Conference of Bayonne, two years before, Catharine de Medicis and the Duke of Alba were supposed to have concerted the destruction of the Calvinists; and this afforded Condé and Coligny grounds for throwing the country once more into a state of anarchy. The battle of St. Denis was disastrous both to the victors and the vanquished, and what was wanting to the Huguenot forces in equipment was made up by the gold and military stores furnished by Queen Elizabeth, and by the growing influence of the King and Queen of Navarre and the promising young Prince, who was afterwards to hold so proud a place among the kings of France. In 1569, a sanguinary battle, which lasted seven hours, was fought at Jarnac; on the banks of the Charente. The Duke d'Anjou commanded in person; Condé was slain; and Coligny, with his brother, was compelled to fly. The Queen of Navarre received the fugitives with the warmest sympathy, and brought before them her son Henry, then sixteen years of age, with the promise that he should be their future chief.

In the meanwhile Coligny took the command, and the Pope, alarmed by the progress of his party, procured reinforcements from Italy for the royal army. Cosmo de Medicis, Ascanio Sforza, and the Duke of Alva, were active in the same cause, and Castelnau, an able envoy, sought aid from the Catholic princes of Germany. To ward off part of the odium attendant on rebels in arms, Coligny proposed that the differences between the Huguenots and the Royalists should be referred to a Council, and cleared up by the light of Scripture. This favourite device of heretics produced no effect, and the partial successes of the Huguenot captains were signalized by atrocities, which three centuries have not effaced from the memory of men. In Bearn, the name of Jeanne d'Albret is not protected from abuse by the renown of her son, Henry IV.; for to this day the people tell of Montgomery and his fanatic followers, how they broke a treaty of capitulation, and massacred the royalist gentlemen taken in the fortress of Orthez. The signal defeat of the Calvinists at Montontour completely ruined their designs, and issued in the peace of 1570, which was, on both sides, one of the most perfidious that history records. Each party required suspension of hostilities to recruit its strength, and each submitted to it, intending to unsheath the sword as quickly as possible.

But the marriage proposed between Margaret of Valois and Henry of Navarre seemed to offer a fair prospect of healing the breach. Grim-visaged war was to smooth his wrinkled front, and even the bitterness of theological hatred was to be sweetened with nuptial cakes and bridal songs. There are

those who maintain that the marriage contract and the celebration of the event in Paris were devised by Catharine as the means of entrapping the Huguenot chiefs, and executing by one fell stroke the design she had long meditated.* Nor is this all. Attempts have been made to implicate the Court of Rome in the hateful project. Had the Pope, however, been privy to any such plot on the part of Catharine, it is clear that he would not have refused, as he did, a dispensation to Margaret of Valois, who, on account of her relationship to Henry, and in consequence of his religion, was embarrassed by a two-fold disqualification. How far the wicked designs of Catharine may have reached in the proposed marriage, and at what moment she and her secret council adopted the resolution of massacring the Huguenots in a body, it is impossible to know with perfect certainty; but, after carefully examining the evidence before us, we are brought to the probable conclusion that it was formed subsequently to the failure of the attempt on Coligny's life. "It results positively, from the letters of Salviani," says Chateaubriand, who first brought them to light, "that the S. Bartholomew was not premeditated."†

These, then, are the leading events in the history of the Huguenots, which Gregory XIII. had for many years been pondering with painful interest. They had doubtless deepened in him his original abhorrence of sectarianism, and his solicitude for the welfare of France and Christendom could hardly have been diminished by the marriage of Charles IX.'s sister with a Calvinist king. We have not dwelt on the misdeeds of the Huguenots, whether prompted by ambition or fanatic zeal, in order to extenuate the guilt of the massacre in which Catholic resistance culminated, but simply because they help to set that outbreak before us in its true light, and prove also how natural it was for the Holy Father to credit Charles's accusation against the party. In his view the result was simply a providential deliverance. The angel of the Lord had spread his wings on the blast, and breathed in the face of the foe. The lightning down of his arm was bared on the medal struck in Rome, and the host of conspirators were represented in the person of Coligny, whom he was striking to the ground. The language of the Pope on the occasion must have been identical with that of the Jesuit Strada, sixty years later:—"It was a punishment well deserved by a faction conspiring against the king." (*Meritum conjuratæ in*

* See Mackintosh, History of England, iii. 217. Anderson's History, vol. ii. 304.

† *Mélanges Littéraires.*

regem factioni supplicium.) Cardinal Orsini celebrated mass in the Pontiff's presence at San Luigi, and said that "the prayers and vows of Gregory XIII. and the members of the Sacred College might now be seen to have produced prodigious effects."* It is certain the cardinal did not mean that Gregory XIII. had prayed for perfidy, assassination, and a massacre of the innocents; and it is no less certain that the Pope rejoiced only in what he had prayed for,—the triumph of the Catholic cause and the discomfiture of the enemies of order and religion. The jubilee which he appointed was in the same spirit as his prayers and thanksgivings; for in it he exhorted all Christian people to commend religion and the King of France to the mercy and favour of the Supreme Ruler.†

There is another passage, however, in Salviati's despatches on which an able opponent of the views here maintained lays particular stress; and the correspondence of Cardinal d'Ossat is also adduced to prove, not only that the massacre was planned before the marriage of Marguerite, but that the Papal legate of S. Pius V. was an accomplice in the plot. In a letter dated September 22nd, 1599, the cardinal, writing to Villeroy, Henry IV.'s Secretary of State, declares that he had heard from Pope Clement VIII. the following particulars:—When Cardinal Alessandrino, who was sent by his uncle, S. Pius V., as legate to the French court, was doing all in his power to dissuade Charles IX. from marrying his sister to Henry of Navarre, the King took him one day by the hand and said,—“All you urge is good. I am sensible of it, and thank you and the Pope, and if I had any other means of avenging myself on my enemies I would not suffer this marriage; but I have none besides.” The Pope added, that when the news of the S. Bartholomew reached Rome, Cardinal Alessandrino exclaimed, “Praised be God, the King of France has kept the promise he made me.”

Now, first, as to this latter anecdote. The inference which some Protestants have attempted to draw from it is so suicidal, that nothing but the extremest prejudice can have blinded them to its absurdity. They have argued from the cardinal's words that the marriage of Henry and Margaret had been concerted between the Pope and the King as a means for bringing about the S. Bartholomew; and that Alessandrino saw in that event the fulfilment of an old promise. But they marvellously contrive to forget that the Pope in question

* Anderson's History of France under Charles IX., vol. ii. 344.

† “Indicto jubileo christiani orbis populos provocavit ad Gallias religionem et regem supremo numini commendandos.”—Bonanni Numism. Pont. Rom.

(S. Pius V.) not only gave no sanction to that marriage, but during his whole life successfully opposed it. It is very easy, then, to see what the cardinal's speech could not possibly have meant, and what no men except blundering fanatics could have understood it to mean.

In order to see what it did mean, we must advert to a consideration on which we have not hitherto insisted, but which is absolutely essential to a right appreciation of the time. Protestants often speak as though Charles and Catharine were among the Church's most loyal and devoted children; looking up to the Supreme Pontiff with simple docility, and in return enjoying his unreserved trust and approval. Of course, such a theory gives them an invaluable polemical weapon; for by means of it they impute the atrocity of S. Bartholomew to obedient and zealous Catholics. But no supposition can be more unfounded, as all are aware who have thoroughly examined the history of the period. The Holy See, in accordance with the Church's unfailing tradition, was keenly alive to the unspeakable blessing of national unity in religion, and was most earnest against the toleration of heretical worship. S. Pius V. had viewed the edict of pacification with profound disapproval; and Gregory XIII., no less than his predecessor, well knowing the character both of the King and of the queen mother, was always ready to suspect them of sacrificing the kingdom's spiritual welfare to supposed interests of state. On the other hand, all good Catholics were zealous against the edict; and the fervour of their thanksgivings to God in those memorable days of August was not caused chiefly by Charles's deliverance (as they fancied) from a bloody conspiracy, but still more by their confident expectation that the legal toleration of Calvinism was now for ever at an end.

These circumstances once understood, nothing can be more obviously and simply intelligible than the words of Cardinal Alessandrino. When the marriage was projected, S. Pius V. regarded it but as another sign of that indifference to religious truth which was so characteristic of the French royal family. Charles assured the legate that such was not the case. "I cannot make head against the heretics," he said in effect, "so long as Henry is on their side; if he can be detached from them, I shall be free to act. Rely on me, I will withdraw those measures of toleration to which you so justly object, even with the certainty of thereby renewing the civil war." Now, it is probable from the nature of things, that the first news of the S. Bartholomew which reached Rome, would abstract from all the circumstances of

lawlessness, perfidy, butchery, from all which made it characteristically a "massacre;" and would convey merely the impression, that civil war had again broken out, and that the heretics had suffered a bloody defeat. Or we may suppose, again, that the earliest version received in Rome of what had taken place was identical with Charles's story to the Pope: on which supposition, the mere fact of the Huguenots having organized so desperate a conspiracy, would be an irrefragable proof that the King had finally broken with them. In either case there could not be more reasonable cause for earnest thanksgiving to Almighty God.

The same considerations will also explain that sentence of Salviati to which we just now referred. It occurs in the first of those letters to which we drew attention in the earlier part of our article, and was written on S. Bartholomew's day itself.

"The Queen in process of time," says Salviati, "intends not only to recall the edict of pacification, but to restore, by means of penal justice, the Catholic faith in its ancient observance (and it seems to her no one ought to doubt this, now that they have put to death the Admiral and so many men of weight), in accordance with conversations held with me, when at Blois, treating of the marriage of Navarre and other things which were matters of discussion at that period. The truth of this I can testify to his Holiness and all the world."

Now, some Protestants have been absurd enough to infer from the words which we have put into a parenthesis, that the massacre had been at Blois a matter of conversation between Catharine and Salviati. If it is worth while to honour so ridiculous a charge with a grave answer, we may point out such circumstances as these. From other parts of Salviati's despatches we gather that the King himself was ignorant of the attempt on Coligny's life. If Catharine kept her own son so much in the dark, is it likely she would have revealed her secrets to a foreign envoy? Besides Davila—a credible witness, because favourable to Catharine—expressly states that though the design existed, *it was concealed from Salviati*, through extreme care to prevent discovery.* Charles and Catherine communicated with the Pope, on whatever matter, not through Salviati, but through their ambassador Ferralz, or a special envoy. The nuncio's despatches are those of a diplomatist who, instead of sharing, was ever labouring to penetrate the designs of the Court.† He complained of the difficulty he had in getting correct information; it is from him in particular

* Davila, 1st, lib. v. Mackintosh, iii. 235.

† Ibid.

that we learn that the massacre was not premeditated; and Mackintosh himself, or rather the continuator of his history, assures us that he was *not in the confidence of the parties who contrived it.**

But, at last, the letter itself refutes such an interpretation more effectually than any external argument can refute it. Salviati had no love for Catharine, nor did he write of her to the Pope with any kind of sympathy. This our readers have already seen. Gregory XIII. was no less profoundly distrustful of her than was Salviati; and this distrust (now that she had hopelessly embroiled herself with the Huguenots) she was very desirous of removing. She calls on Salviati to testify (which he does) that at Blois she assured him she had the full intention of re-establishing Catholicism in its due exclusiveness; and she points to the death of Coligny and the rest, as proofs that she has broken definitively with the Calvinistic party. As to the circumstances of those deaths, there is no reason whatever to suppose that she intended to give the Pope any different account of them, than that of which he was afterwards assured by the King himself.

Salviati, no doubt, had more means of knowing these circumstances than had the Pope. And it might be not unplausibly inferred from the above sentence that he regarded the massacre with some indulgence; were not such an inference most obviously negatived, both by other parts of the present letter, and still more by the letters of September which followed it, and from which we have already quoted (p. 296). But as regards the particular use to which some Protestants would put this letter and the preceding anecdote—as a proof that the S. Bartholomew had been planned in concert with S. Pius V. and Gregory XIII.—with all our experience of Protestant credulity, we are amazed that such an allegation can have been accepted by any man of ordinary common sense; we had almost said of ordinary sanity. No one will suspect Henri Martin of any leaning to the Papal side. Yet he distinctly rejects, as a piece of Italian boasting, the assertion to be found in Capilupi and some obscure and passionate writers, that the Pope knew all about the massacre beforehand. It gave him, he says, the more satisfaction, because it was unexpected. “Neither the Pope nor the King of Spain had taken seriously the vague promises and mysterious words of Catharine. The nuncio and the Spanish ambassador had been excluded from the privy councils of the queen-mother.”†

* Vol. iii. 234.

† *Histoire de France*, tome ix. 343-4, and note.

Barthol If, in short, we adopt, with Hume, Lingard, and Capefigue,* the opinion, to which humanity and religion, no less than recent historical researches, incline us, that the S. Bartholomew was resolved on only a few hours before it was executed, then we are relieved of the difficulty of accounting for so many horrors having been secreted so long in the hearts of those who had resolved on them without being betrayed either by indiscretion, the force of conscience, or the promptings of compassion. Then poison, perfidy, and premature deaths, vanish from our view, and a multitude of our fellow-creatures, whose memories are charged with crime, are absolved from half their sins. Then Marshal Vieilleville was not poisoned because he opposed the murderous resolution; Ligueroles was not assassinated because he was in the secret; De Tende did not perish by a beverage for having refused to aid in its execution; and the abscess in the side, of which the Queen of Navarre, Henry IV.'s mother, died, is no longer the result of gloves poisoned by a Milanese. Then the marriage of the King of Navarre with Marguerite de Valois, and the fêtes which attended it, were not a toil spread for the Calvinist princes and nobles. Then the regiment of guards ordered into Paris was brought there only to prevent tumult and conflict. Then Maurevert, the old servant of the Duke of Guise, may have been armed by other hands than those of his master. Then the Duke may have retired to his hotel to find safety there after the assassination, without being its author. Then the gates of Paris were closed (all but two) after the arquebuse was fired at Coligny, with the intention of arresting the assassin. Then the letters written by the secretaries of state to the governors of provinces, to inform them of the Admiral's wounds, and assure them that the King would expect "good, speedy, and rigorous justice" in the matter, were not a feint and a game, as D'Aubigné asserts.† Then Charles IX. may have said to Coligny sincerely: "Father, the wound is yours but the pain is mine." Then the King, not knowing who fired the arquebuse, might suspect the Duke of Guise; and, not yet having before him the Admiral's treasonable papers‡ by which to justify himself, he might, in the interim, throw the blame of the excesses committed on the hostility between the two houses, without being altogether untruthful. Then the fifty men commanded by the colonel of the Guards, and sent by Charles to Coligny, who had by means of Cornaton requested

* *La Réforme et la Ligue*, 1844, pp. 311, 361, 394.

† *Hist. Universelle*, 1550—1601, tome ii. liv. 1.

‡ *Barthélemy*, pp. 177, 178.

to have them,* were intended not for his destruction, but for his security. Then it was not, as De Thou maintains, to be themselves the stronger party, that a few Swiss only, belonging to the King of Navarre, were stationed near the Admiral; for, indeed, it did not depend on the Huguenot party to fill Coligny's house with trusty guards. Then Charles IX. was the most unfortunate and least culpable of all the accomplices, and might say with truth to his sister Margaret, that he would never have consented to give the order, if they had not told him it was all over with his life and his kingdom unless he did so.

The rage for "whitewashing" has in our day gone to extravagant lengths; and when Richard III., Henry VIII., Nero, and Judas Iscariot, have found their respective apologists in Sharon Turner, Froude, the *Cornhill Magazine*, and De Quincy, it will not be surprising if many persons feel suspicious of any endeavour to prove that the S. Bartholomew was improvised. Yet the object in this attempt has never been to clear the character of Catharine. Craft and cruelty will always be inseparable from her name. Her crimes arose, not, as Protestant historians represent, from excess of zeal for her religion, but from ignorance of the first principles of Catholic morality. Such rulers are the shame and the scourge of the Church, and they have abounded since the Reformation, which taught kings and people alike to make light of the authority of the vicar of Christ, and forget the links that bind the throne to the footstool of S. Peter's chair. Yet there is some satisfaction in believing that even Catharine de Medicis' inscrutable counsels were not so dark as they have been described.

At all events, certain it is, and on this we are mainly anxious to insist, that the massacre of which she was the undoubted authoress, sprang from political, not from religious causes. Neither as motive, adviser, nor agent, was religion concerned in it; and the proof of this may be found in the conduct of the Calvinists, the declarations of Charles IX., and the decisions of parliaments. The real provocation consisted in long years of rebellion, enterprises to carry off two kings, cities seduced from obedience to the government, sieges sustained, foreign troops brought into the country, and four pitched battles with the royal forces. These were the things that irritated the monarch, and made the Huguenots odious in his eyes. "It was impossible for me to put up with them any longer," he wrote to Schomberg, his ambassador in Germany, after the

* Barthélemy, p. 200, note.

S. Bartholomew; but the question of religion did not enter into his account.*

His impatience for the conversion of Henry of Navarre, was not so much to attach him to the true Church as to detach him from the Huguenot faction. The youth who amused himself by braining rabbits, and beheading pigs and asses with his sword,† spiced his conversation with coarsest ribaldry and fearful oaths,‡ and declared that "if Mr. Pope did not mend his ways, he would give away Margery himself in full conventicle,"§ was not likely to have much righteous abhorrence of schism, or real anxiety for his brother-in-law's spiritual welfare. We learn from the Calvinist martyrologist, that when the murderers pointed to the weltering corpses of their victims, they said: "These are the men who would have forced us to kill the King."|| Conspiracy, we see, real or presumed, not Calvinism, brought them to their end. No sooner had the massacre broken out, than counter-orders were issued for the security of persons of the Reformed religion, and couriers were despatched to all the governors commending the dissident religionists to their protection.¶ Pious Catholics, as we have seen, everywhere** sheltered the persecuted; at Nismes they were more merciful to the Huguenots than the Huguenots had been to them; in Paris itself, the Dukes of Guise, d'Aumale, Biron, and Bellièvre joined with Walsingham, the English ambassador, in protecting their lives, and Italians, mounted and armed, rode through the city and faubourgs, to tell the affrighted fugitives that in their houses they might be safe from the destroyer.†† The assassins, with a crucifix in one hand and a dagger in the other, produce a fine effect in a poem of Voltaire's, or a popular opera; but history chases the ghastly figures from her page, back into the false darkness whence they came.

Perhaps it may be objected, that Coligny, the head of the faction, was brave, honest, loyal, and pardoned by the royal Edict, and that his adherence to Calvinism was his only offence at the time of the outbreak. This objection requires a distinct answer. As to Coligny's military virtues, his courage and patience deserve our praise; but the question here con-

* Barthélemy, p. 169. Laurentie, iv. 259, 263.

† Brantôme; Papirius Masso, Vita Caroli IX.; Mackintosh, iii. 213.

‡ Ibid.

§ *Si Monsieur le pape fait trop la beste, je prendrai moi-même Margot par la main, et je la meneray espouser en pleine prière.*

|| Histoire des Martyrs pour l'Evangile, p. 713.

¶ Barthélemy, pp. 170-72.

** Ibid. p. 175.

†† La Popelinière, Histoire de France de 1550 à 1577.

cerns his loyalty. The papers, which were seized after his death, were produced also in the Council and in parliament. They contained projects and arrangements, which, if they had been formally proved, would have sufficed to bring him to the scaffold. He had established, it seems, sixteen provinces in the kingdom, governors, generals, and a certain number of councillors charged to retain his people in arms, and assemble them at his earliest command. He levied from the Calvinists large sums of money, to the great inconvenience of the poorer sort.* These were undoubtedly treasonable acts; and of these the King complained bitterly in his letter to Schomberg already referred to.

Bellièvre is not the only writer who speaks disparagingly of Coligny's loyalty. The Memoirs of Brantôme, of Tavannes, of Montluc, and the address of the Bishop of Valence to the Poles, are full of such reproaches based on facts. One saying especially of the Admiral's rankled in their minds. He was bent on persuading the King to aid the Flemings, and make war on Philip II. of Spain. It manifestly suited his purpose to involve France in a struggle with a Catholic power, and enlist her on the side of "Protestantism. "Declare war, Sire, against the Spaniards," he said, in full council, "or we shall be obliged to declare it against you." The arrogance of this speech, as Charles afterwards declared to some courtiers, made his hair stand on end. Nor was Coligny less audacious when he offered the King ten thousand men for the war in the Low Countries. What a proposal coming from a subject lately pardoned for rebellion! Had not the Parliament condemned him to death three years before, and had not 50,000 gold crowns been promised to any one who should arrest him?† Well might Tavannes remind his royal master, that the man who had thus offered what was not his but the King's, deserved to lose his head.‡

As it is difficult to determine how far Catharine and Charles IX. shared respectively in the design and execution of the S. Bartholomew, so also, with regard to Coligny's character, it is not easy to speak with assurance. There are very suspicious circumstances connected with the assassination of Duke de Guise by Poltrot, which point to the Admiral as the accomplice or instigator of the deed.§ And if he really descended to so foul a crime, to bring about what he called, in a letter to the Queen, "the greatest good that could have happened to the kingdom and the Church of God, to the King

* Bellièvre apud Barthélemy. † Arrête du 13 et du 28 Septembre, 1569.

‡ See his Memoirs, edit. 1574, p. 407.

§ See Barthélemy, pp. 184-6.

personally and to all the house of Coligny," he was suitably punished for it by his own violent end.

As the main object of this paper has been to rebut the charge of complicity in the massacre often brought against the Catholic religion and its ministers, our space will not allow us to enter fully into the secular questions that arise out of the subject. We have touched on that of non-premeditation, for instance, only so far as it is connected with our chief scope, without even pretending to consider it in detail. In like manner we shall, before coming to a close, offer a few observations on the extent of the King's prescription and the number of those who fell, because they will serve to show how much persons ought to be on their guard in reading popular histories of the event. While these in general use all their art to represent the slaughter as concerted years before, while several Protestant writers, whom De Thou himself is cautious enough not to follow, trace it up to the journey to Bayonne, Queen Margaret assures us in her *Memoirs*, that it arose out of the threats of the Calvinists consequent on Coligny's wounds, and that the queen-mother had the greatest difficulty in persuading her son to give the fatal order. Tavannes also treats as ignorant persons all who suppose that the massacre was resolved before the marriage of the King of Navarre, and adds that the assassination of the Admiral was proposed by the Queen, and approved by Marshal Tavannes, his father. The testimony of a daughter who incidentally criminales her mother, and of a son who does so by his own father, cannot be reasonably suspected of insincerity. The Duke of Anjou, when tossing on a couch of sleepless remorse,* sent for his physician Miron, and told him how the queen, maddened by jealousy, and he by hatred, had taken Mme. de Nemours into their counsels, and planned the murder of Coligny; and how, the day after, finding that the balls had not pierced his vital parts, they wrought the King into a frenzy of fear and rage by declaring that the Admiral's captains had already started for the provinces to raise insurgents, and that ten thousand Germans and as many Swiss were ordered to march to Coligny's aid. To this they added, that the Catholics were arming against the Calvinists without his commands, and that thus he would be left without authority, both by royalists and rebels. For these evils there was but one remedy—to slay the Admiral and some of the chiefs; and to this, at last, Charles assented and swore, with his most terrible oath, that the whole race of Huguenots should be

* Recit du Duc d'Anjou, Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi, t. iii.

rooted out. Such were the revelations which conscience forced from the lips of the Duke d'Anjou on his way to Poland to take possession of the throne. The evidence of one who accuses himself, and has no interest in deceiving those whom he addresses, cannot easily be impeached.*

Brantôme speaks of the Admiral's speeches against the Queen as the cause of the massacre;† La Popelinière brings forward all the arguments adduced by Catholic or Protestant writers to prove that the design was or was not preconceived, and plainly inclines to the same belief as Brantôme, that the S. Bartholomew arose out of the unsuccessful attempt on Coligny's life.‡ Mathieu heard the same from Henry IV., who relied on the word of secretary Villeroy and Catharine de Medicis, that the affair was unpremeditated.§ The first witness was a gentleman in favour with Charles IX.; the second a Protestant historian, who shortly before his death embraced Catholicism; and the third the historiographer of Henry IV. of France.

But did the King's impetuous order extend beyond Paris? We confidently answer, No. There are but two letters that could lead us to suppose it—one addressed by the Viscount d'Orthey, Governor of Bayonne, to Charles IX., and the other by Catharine de Medicis to Strozzi. The first of these contains the words so often quoted: "I have found in my garrison many good citizens and brave soldiers, but not one executioner;" and those who have been long accustomed to repeat with enthusiasm the viscount's noble reply, will doubtless learn with some regret that the letter is altogether spurious. It is recorded by D'Aubigné|| only, a Protestant writer of little veracity, remarkable, as Sully says, for his slanderous tongue, and so bitter against kings, that the Parliament of Paris caused his history to be burnt. No contemporary mentions the letter, and De Thou, notwithstanding his leaning to the Calvinists, does not venture to cite it.

What if it were genuine? It would only prove that an order, purporting to be from the King for the massacre of Huguenots, had been received at Bayonne. The Count de Tende, governor of Provence, received such a one; so did Mandelot at Lyons, and Mareuil at Bourges; and so also did the governors of Orleans and Bordeaux. But they all emanated from those

* De Cavairac's Dissertation, 1758, and Barthélemy, pp. 189—196.

† Dames Illustres : Catherine de Medicis.

‡ Histoire de France de 1550 à 1577.

§ Histoire de France sous Henri IV. liv. vi.

|| Histoire de Sieur d'Aubigné, 1618, v. 28.

who despatched the messengers, and not from Charles IX. His mother and her counsellors had decided on the death of some chiefs, and of the most factious only, and the order the King had given was frightfully exceeded. In vain he endeavoured on the Sunday evening to recall the whirlwind he had let loose. It would not obey. Scarcely did his counter-orders influence the raging multitude in Paris, and the reports of their violence, which reached the provinces, armed many lawless bands against the Calvinists, before his couriers arrived with strict injunctions to the governors to suppress all massacre and tumult.* A double fear now possessed the King—lest the Huguenots, where they were strongest, should take revenge on the Catholics for the Admiral's wound; and lest the Catholics, hearing of the massacre, should imitate the example set in Paris.

If such, then, were the disposition and commands of his majesty, how came it to pass that so many Protestants and others fell victims to the fury of their fellow-citizens all over France? Through the interference of evil-minded persons, such as Rubus, the King's procurator, who misconstrued some expressions of the Queen, carried verbal messages of destruction, or forged letters to further their own ends.† If the Viscount d'Orthez really received the alleged order from the King to make away with the Huguenots, is it conceivable that his neighbour Montluc, the governor of Guyenne, who was devotedly attached to Catharine de Medicis, should have had no instructions to the same effect? He speaks freely enough of the whole affair in his Commentaries, yet he says not a word of any such commands. His character, as we have already seen, was such that he was not likely to conceal any part which he may have had in the transaction. His silence on this head is a negative proof that none of the governors received a royal command to lay violent hands on the Calvinists. Is not the memory of Charles IX. already sufficiently stained without laying to his account this wickedness also? He was a hard-hearted and violent-tempered youth, but not a wild beast "red with raven in tooth and claw."

The part which Catharine de Medicis took in the massacre was undoubtedly larger than that of her misguided son, yet her letter to Philip Strozzi has no more claim on our belief than the answer of Orthez to the King. The latter could be nothing but a reply to some verbal commands brought by a La Mole, a Marueil, or a Perat, while the former has hardly the appearance of an authentic document. It runs thus:—

* *Istoria de Francia di Homero Tortora.*

† Barthélemy, pp. 205-6.

Strozzi, I have to inform you that to-day, August 24, the Admiral and the Huguenots here have been killed. Take good care, therefore, to make yourself master of La Rochelle, and do to the Huguenots who fall into your hands what we have done to them here. Beware of failure, as you would answer to the King my son, and to me. Signed, CATHARINE.

This letter, we are told, was written several months in advance of its date, and was to be opened on the 24th, the day of the massacre. It is adduced in support of the theory of premeditation, and to prove that the outbreak was to have been simultaneous in all parts of France. Can anything be more incredible and absurd? No French historian mentions the letter, and Brantôme himself, who was then at Brouage with Strozzi, ignores it. One suspicious writer alone reports it, and without any proof. Who, indeed, can read it and not see through its flimsy mask? Would the astute Catharine commit herself months beforehand to a murderous order, the execution of which depended on a thousand contingencies? Could she foresee that Jeanne d'Albret would consent to Henry's marriage with Marguerite de Valois—that she would come to a capital where the Guises were popular and the Huguenots hated—that S. Pius V., who refused the dispensation, would die—that Gregory XIII. would see reasons for granting what his predecessor denied—that Coligny and his adherents would be so senseless as to trust the King's profession of friendship—that the Admiral would turn a deaf ear to the warnings that reached him from La Rochelle and other provinces—that an awkward assassin would anticipate events and well nigh mar the plot—that the arquebuse fired would not excite the Huguenots to take arms or flight—that Teligny would scorn the wise counsel of the vidam of Chartres, and refuse to have his father-in-law removed to the faubourg St. Germain, whence he might have escaped being massacred—and that the letter written so long before the event would not fall into the hands of the Huguenots either by chance, imprudence, disloyalty, or the death of Strozzi?

One word respecting the number of victims, though it bears on our argument less directly than the question of premeditation. There is nothing about which historians are more discrepant. For a long time there was a constant tendency among them to swell the number. Thus Papyre Masson reckoned the slain at 10,000; the Calvinist martyrologist at 15,000; La Popelinière at more than 20,000; De Thou, the defender of the Huguenots, at rather less than 30,000, and Péréfixe, Louis XIV.'s tutor, at 100,000. Of these Masson, who died in 1611, is certainly the most worthy of credit, and by no means inclined to palliate the deed. A close scrutiny

has been made by Barthélemy into the details given by Calvinist martyrologists. It is too long and intricate to follow in this place, but the conclusion at which this learned critic arrives is, that about 2,000 persons only fell in Paris and the provinces. He rejects as a fiction also the common account of Charles IX.'s firing on the Calvinists. He traces its origin to Brantôme, who at the time of the massacre was more than three hundred miles from Paris. The Duke d'Anjou, who stood in the same window with the King, is silent respecting it, and so also is De Thou, though he calls Charles an *enragé*.

If in any part of this discussion we have fallen unconsciously into a too positive and dogmatic tone on matters really doubtful, we sincerely regret it. We are fully sensible of the difficulties which beset the subject; nor, indeed, do we know of any page in history which, in some of its details, is more perplexing and full of contradictions. We have done our best to reconcile and explain them; and, in doing so, we have carefully avoided ascribing dishonest motives to those writers whose conclusions differ from ours. The violence of party-spirit has happily subsided in the department of history, and inquirers on all sides seem bent on arriving at facts without reference to their individual theories.

Our argument may be summed up briefly. In reference to the S. Bartholomew, we cordially repeat those lines of Statius so frequently on the lips of President de Thou,—“Perish that day from our annals; bury it in silence, nor let future ages credit it.”* Yet we would also repudiate with no less warmth the monstrous idea, that so atrocious a crime was perpetrated on religious grounds, or by Catholics loyal and devoted to the Church; and still more that in that, or in any other period, the Holy See could have approved of such means for extirpating the plague of heresy.

* *Excidat illa dies ævo, nec postera credant
Sæcula, nos certè taceamus.*

ART. II.—MR. OXENHAM AND THE "DUBLIN REVIEW."

The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement: an Historical Inquiry into its Development. With an Introduction on the Principle of Theological Developments. By HENRY NUTCOMBE OXENHAM, M.A. London: Longman.

Letter addressed to the "*Tablet*" of July 15, 1865. By HENRY NUTCOMBE OXENHAM.

WE would beg our readers, before they enter on this article, to peruse the notice of Mr. Oxenham's work which appeared in our last number, pp. 265—270. In reference to this notice, Mr. Oxenham has addressed to us the following letter:—

To the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW.

SIR,—The notice of my book on the "Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement," which has just appeared in the DUBLIN REVIEW, is, in many respects, so manifestly unfair, that I cannot doubt you will recognise the justice of my claim to point out to your readers the strange mistakes (to use no harsher term) into which my critic has fallen: and this I will do in the fewest words I can.

Of the many civil epithets bestowed on me and my book, I shall, of course, say nothing, because that is a matter on which opinions may differ; though I venture to think that most persons who have read the book will question their correctness. But misstatements and misrepresentations are a graver matter.

1. Far the greater part of the notice (three pages out of four and a half) are taken up with a letter from "A Correspondent," combating my assertion that the Lord's Prayer was in use among the Jews. The correspondent, who is scarcely less liberal in polite epithets than the Reviewer, tells us that he has searched in vain through "a tolerably large biblical library" to find any statement so "bold," "extravagant," "ludicrous," &c., as mine. And the Reviewer sums up his correspondent's criticism by saying that "*after this exposure* it will be impossible for reasonable readers to accept any one statement of Mr. Oxenham's *simply on his authority*"—a remark again repeated a page later as to "*facts and quotations*," though no single instance of misquotation is even alleged. Will it be believed that all this elaborate "*exposure*," occupying three-fourths of the entire notice, is based on a purely incidental statement occupying just *one line* in a volume of 250 pages, which, so far from being made on my own "*authority*," is part of a passage taken in substance, and almost in words, from a book so familiar to the merest tyro in Catholic theology as Möhler's "*Symbolism*," the reference to the *passage being*

given at the bottom of the page? The Socinians, according to Möhler, forgot that our Lord had "only sanctioned a form of prayer already in use among the Jews." Whether he was right or wrong I need not stay to discuss; his authority is at least enough to shelter a statement, casually introduced into a passage about the Socinians, and having no bearing whatever on the general structure and argument of my book.

2. My critic proceeds to lay down three propositions about the "fundamental doctrines of Christianity"—viz. (1), the immediate inspiration of the apostles; (2) the adequate teaching of the Ecclesia Docens in every age; (3) the scientific analysis of dogma in the Church: and then gravely asserts that I have either "ignored" or "denied" the two former. I sincerely hope, when he made this monstrous assertion, he had not read my "Introduction on Theological Developments," which he is here professing to criticise; for if he had, the emphatic enunciation of what he accuses me of ignoring or denying must have stared him in the face. I have most carefully discriminated the "divine and human elements" in the process, and included under the former head what I am said to have ignored. I will quote but one passage out of many here, which, as it is given at the beginning as a kind of definition of what I mean by development, it was the less excusable in my critic to have either overlooked or suppressed.

"What is meant is simply this—that the Christian revelation once, and once for all, delivered to the saints, through the Incarnation of the Eternal Word, and from the lips of His inspired servants, though fully apprehended from the first for all necessary ends, has grown and was intended to grow, by degrees on the consciousness of the Church, illumined by the abiding presence of the Divine Comforter." It would be difficult to express more distinctly what I am said to ignore or deny: the only grounds alleged for the accusation being two short passages, of which one is a simile, the other—though my Reviewer omits to say so—a quotation from a book of Dr. Dollinger's!

3. His next and last attempt at criticism is to take me very severely to task for omitting an examination of the New Testament teaching on the Atonement, without which the whole plan of my work is, he adds, with his habitual courtesy, "simply absurd and unmeaning;" and he can only account for my "evading" it by my being "dimly conscious of" my "incompetence." It does not seem to have occurred to him that to have prefaced my treatise by a critical discussion of the New Testament doctrine on the subject—however useful or desirable in itself—would not only have at least doubled the size of the volume, but have materially enlarged its scope, and certainly rendered a change of title necessary. Biblical criticism is one thing, theological development is another. It had certainly occurred to me, before reading this extraordinary comment, that I might perhaps, at some future time, extend my inquiry to this phase of the question also; but it had not occurred to me that a writer, who had just attacked me for ignoring the immediate inspiration of the Apostles, would next attack me for not including in an "inquiry into the development of" a particular doctrine "in the Church" what cannot properly enter into such an inquiry if they were inspired. It is precisely because the New Testament writings do not (except in a much

wider sense) form part of the record of theological development in the Church, but are a very main part of the revealed data it is based upon, that they require a totally different treatment from the writings it was my professed object to examine in this volume.

If I wished for a still clearer proof of the thoroughly captious tone of this whole notice, I might find it in the concluding sneer at my "impertinence and affectation" for saying that the "Summa" of St. Thomas is "no mean performance:" my critic omitting to observe that I am answering a supposed—and very common—objection to the value of the scholastic theology altogether, and am simply using one of the commonest figures of speech in such cases to denote high commendation! He says he wishes he could "honestly say more in praise of" my volume; perhaps it would at least have been equally honest not to say what he has said in dispraise.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

HENRY NUTCOMBE OXENHAM.

New University Club, July 10, 1865.

About the same time Mr. Oxenham forwarded another letter to the *Tablet* newspaper, which we will also insert.

To the Editor of the "Tablet."

SIR,—You will much oblige me if you can find room in your columns for the following reply to a so-called "Notice" of my book on the "Atonement," which has just appeared in the DUBLIN REVIEW. Of the writer's *animus*, which is sufficiently conspicuous throughout, I shall, of course, say nothing. Nor is any comment required on his charges of "random and foolish talk," "entire absence of careful, prolonged, and accurate thought," "incompetence," "intellectual poverty," "disgusting pretentiousness," "impertinence and affectation," &c. &c., charges which I am quite content to leave to the judgment of all impartial readers of my book. But nearly all the four pages of the "Notice" are occupied with two criticisms, the first founded on one line, the second on four lines of the book; and it is only due to myself to point out how these ingenious criticisms have been arrived at.

1. The first three pages of the "Notice" consist of a letter from some unnamed correspondent, attacking as "scandalous," "bold," "careless," "extravagant," "absurd," "ludicrous," &c., a statement which occurs quite incidentally in my observations on the Socinian view of the Atonement, that the Lord's Prayer "was already in use among the Jews." The anonymous correspondent informs us that he has "been at some pains to search through a tolerably large Biblical library, to discover any so bold a statement which Mr. Oxenham may have unwittingly borrowed, but in vain." And the reviewer sums up his correspondent's letter with the remark, "After this exposure, it will be impossible for reasonable readers to accept any one statement of Mr. Oxenham's, simply on his authority." Very good. But will it be believed, that the statement which the learned correspondent could not discover in his "tolerably large library," and which the cautious and candid reviewer declines to accept "simply on" my "authority," is taken almost *verbatim* from a book familiar to every tyro in Catholic theology, and that

the reference is given at the foot of the page ! Here is Kingsley on Newman again, as far as honesty is concerned. I subjoin the passage referred to from Möhler's "Symbolism," vol. ii. p. 336 (Eng. Tr.):—"And had they (the Socinians) known that the Saviour found this form of prayer already existing, and only strongly recommended it, then their account of the peculiar services of the Envoy of God would have occupied a totally imperceptible space." The authority of one of the first of modern Catholic divines is at least shelter enough for an incidental statement in my book which forms no part of its argument. "After this exposure"—to use my reviewer's language—his correspondent may be left to settle with Möhler, not with me, his charges of "absurdity," "extravagance," &c., while I venture to think that "it will be impossible for reasonable readers to accept any one statement of the reviewer's" himself, "simply on his authority !"

2. Most of the fourth page of the "Notice" is devoted to charging me with "ignoring," or more probably "denying," the "immediate inspiration of the Apostles," and the "adequate teaching" of Christian doctrine by the Church "in every age." As the contrary is obvious to the most casual reader of my book on its very surface, I might have left his gratuitous falsehood to refute itself, but for the proof by which it is supported, where a precisely similar trick is played as in the former instance. The proof consists exclusively of one quotation of three lines, and another of one line. The former is a simile, obvious as soon as it is stated to any one who accepts the theory of development at all ; the latter, which is the more important, speaks of the original deposit of "facts, principles, dogmatic germs, and intimations." My critic has again carefully omitted to state that these words are distinctly marked as a quotation, the reference being given at the foot of the page, to one of the best known of Dr. Döllinger's works, "Christenthum und Kirche in der Zeit der Grundlegung !" He may therefore settle as he pleases with that distinguished prelate and divine the charge of "ignoring" or "denying" the first elements of Christianity and Church History.

And now your readers will be in a position to appreciate the intellectual and moral value of a criticism of my book, which deals almost exclusively (where it does not merely consist of calling names) with two passages making five lines in all, and is based in either case on a deliberate perversion of facts. The most charitable hypothesis would be that my reviewer has not read the book.

I am sending a duplicate of this letter to the *Church Times* for the benefit of such Anglicans as may be readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW,

And remain, dear Sir, your obedient servant,

HENRY NUTCOMBE OXENHAM.

Ash Grove, Pontypool, July 4, 1865.

To these letters our original correspondent makes the following reply :—

SIR,—You have forwarded to me a letter addressed to you by Mr. Oxenham, purporting to be a reply to the notice of his work which appeared in the DUBLIN REVIEW. In this letter, and in a similar one written to the *Tablet*

newspaper, Mr. Oxenham refers to the letter written by me, which formed a part of that notice, and contained a criticism upon his extraordinary statement regarding the origin of the Lord's Prayer. He bitterly complains of that criticism as unfair and even dishonest. I should be obliged, therefore, if you would allow me briefly to recur to the subject.

It is important to observe, that Mr. Oxenham nowhere attempts to dispute the accuracy of my comments, as far as they concern the real point at issue—the authorship of the Pater Noster. He contents himself with ridiculing my remark, that I had failed to discover "in a tolerably large Biblical library any so bold a statement which Mr. Oxenham may have unwittingly borrowed:" seeing that, as he now asserts with an air of triumph, he had indeed actually so borrowed it, "almost verbatim," from Möhler's "Symbolism," and even referred to that well-known work at the foot of the page. I am thereupon defiantly asked "to settle with Möhler," and not with him, my charges of "absurdity," "extravagance," &c.

It is well, however, that the question itself at issue should be first of all clearly answered; and as a great deal has been said upon the subject in one way or another by "Sacerdos" in certain letters to the *Tablet*, writing under the mistaken idea that he is defending Mr. Oxenham's thesis, I will deal with that point first.

Was, then, the Pater Noster "already in use among the Jews" before our Lord's time, or was it not? Mr. Oxenham distinctly affirms that it was. It is this statement which I censured as "extravagant" and "absurd," and no other. It is this question also which is put by "Sacerdos," and his answer to it singularly coincides with my own. He refers to the same authorities, he quotes the very words already given by me in the DUBLIN REVIEW, and finally arrives at substantially a very similar conclusion. He even goes beyond me in stating that "it is nowhere asserted that the Lord's Prayer existed as a form before our Lord." He adds, "Its petitions did and were in use among them (the Jews), and in substance it was well known to them. More than this is not asserted by Möhler, nor any other I am aware of." "Sacerdos" elsewhere admits that he neither read Mr. Oxenham's work, nor the criticism upon it, which he censures.

Is it, however, even accurate to say, that the several petitions, of which the prayer is composed, are to be found at least in detached forms among the ancient writings of the Jews? Here again "Sacerdos" will be found apparently to agree with me (although he is on this point somewhat self-contradictory), and thereby practically to condemn the exaggerations of such an eminent scholar as Wetstein, who affirms that "the whole prayer" may be thus made up. For although "Sacerdos," in the sentence above quoted, states without qualification that "its petitions were in use, and in substance it was well known,"—he had in his first letter more correctly excepted one clause; a most important exception, and one which cannot fairly be so slurred over. In fact neither "Sacerdos" nor any other writer has been able to produce a single Rabbinical sentence, with the slightest claim to antiquity, which can bear a comparison with that which may be called the most essential and characteristic clause of the Our Father—"Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us." Until that is done, even supposing

the other parallels adduced to be far more striking than they are, it would be unfair to speak thus generally of the whole prayer being in substance known to the Jews or its petitions in use.

As to remaining "parallels"—vague and far-fetched as some of them appear to be—I cannot agree with "Sacerdos" as to the antiquity he ascribes to them; nor do I think it in the least improbable that the Jews may have borrowed them indirectly from Christian sources. That the Jews borrowed from the Church, even during the Middle Ages, improvements in the liturgical services of their synagogues—the use of litanies, &c.—is (according to Etheridge—"Hebrew Literature," p. 367) a fact even acknowledged by Dr. Zunz: and why may not Christian sayings have been appropriated by their wise men, perhaps through Ebionite channels, at an earlier date? The proof of the antiquity of these sentences advanced by "Sacerdos" is at least a strange one. They are recorded in the Talmud, composed at various times from two to five centuries after the Christian era—they are some of them anonymous, but for the most part attributed to such famous Rabbis as Judah, Eliezer, and others who flourished in the second century or thereabouts. The argument of "Sacerdos" then amounts to this. Rabbi Eliezer, who lived several generations after our Lord, is reported in the Talmud to have said, "What is the short prayer? Do thy will in heaven, and give quietness of spirit to them that fear thee beneath." This Talmud, we are told, faithfully represents the ideas and traditions of a much earlier age; and consequently the petition of the Pater Noster, which bears a resemblance to this saying of Eliezer, was actually "in use" among the Jews at the time of Christ! Another prayer is ascribed to Judah the Saint, of the time of Antoninus Pius: a long petition much condensed, and thereby improved for his purpose by "Sacerdos," in which the Rabbi prays to be delivered from every conceivable evil, from an "impudent man" to "Satan the Destroyer." Therefore, as the Talmud is a most trustworthy document, we are to ascribe it *not* to Judah, as the Talmud expressly does, but to the Rabbis of a century or two earlier.

The true state of the case, then, is briefly this: The Talmud contains a vast number of wise or pious sayings, maxims, or prayers. Among these have been selected some bearing a more or less close resemblance to certain petitions of the Pater Noster. The verbal coincidences are greater in the first part of the prayer than in the latter part. To one clause there is no parallel whatever to be discovered. A few of such Rabbinical sentences are attributed to authors who lived after the Christian era,—others are anonymous. The precise date of either the one class or the other must always remain uncertain. It is upon no better ground than this, that Mr. Oxenham has formed the unqualified conclusion, that the Lord's Prayer was "already in use among the Jews" before taught to His disciples by our Blessed Lord. It is this assertion which I described as an absurd exaggeration; and which, considering the confident, off-hand way in which it was propounded, and the character of the subject, I deemed to be "scandalous:"—whether justly or not I must now, sir, leave it to my readers to judge.

With regard to Mr. Oxenham's defence—that he quoted from Möhler,—and his complaint against me on that score, I can only reply by fairly acknowledging that until I read his letter I shared the error of "Sacerdos," and

could not have believed that any writer before him had fallen into so gross an exaggeration. I must, however, remind Mr. Oxenham, that in no sense would that author's work form part of a "Biblical library;" that Möhler is no authority himself upon the matter in dispute, and that, moreover, he gives no proofs for his opinion. Möhler's *ipse dixit* cannot alter facts. It is to be regretted that he committed such a blunder; and that his admirer so blindly followed him without investigation or proof. Finally, it is to be noticed that the foot-note quoting the "Symbolism," in Mr. Oxenham's book, is *not* appended to the sentence criticised by me (probably through some error of the printer), but to the following sentence, which contains no reference whatever to the Lord's Prayer. It could not therefore have occurred to me that by consulting the passage of Möhler to which reference is made, I should find anything to the purpose.

August 22, 1865.

So far our correspondent. We must now say our own say on the editorial notice of Mr. Oxenham's work; and according to the laudable custom which prevails in such cases, we must begin by making whatever retractation or *amende* is rendered necessary by fuller information. Our correspondent has pointed out, that by some error of the printer Mr. Oxenham's asterisk was misplaced; and that as the page stands, no note whatever is appended to the sentence which speaks of the Lord's Prayer. It appears, however, that Mr. Oxenham intended to make his statement simply on Möhler's authority, and to quote that divine in corroboration at the foot of his page. Such a course was certainly open to no kind of censure. Far less could it afford any ground for our inference, that henceforth "it will be impossible for reasonable readers to accept any one statement of his simply on his authority;" and that "no reasonable man can now" trust the accuracy of "Mr. Oxenham's facts and quotations." We retract, therefore, absolutely and *ex animo*, these imputations, and beg our readers to treat them as though they had never been made.

We cannot, however, generally *apologize* for them; because we think that everything we intended to say was quite borne out by that aspect of the case which came before us. It was no fault of ours that Mr. Oxenham's asterisk was misplaced; nor had we any means of guessing that Möhler had preceded that gentleman in his statement.* The statement itself, was, to say

* The present writer was a little surprised, at first, that he should have so totally forgotten Möhler's advocacy of this most extraordinary thesis. He has now, however, found the explanation of this circumstance. He read the "Symbolism" in a French translation; and it appears that the French translator gives a totally different turn to the sentence. These are his words:—"Mais s'ils avoient su que le fond de cette prière étoit déjà connu parmi les

the least, most startling. A disciple said to our Lord, "Teach us to pray;" and Mr. Oxenham would have us believe that Jesus answered by merely reciting a form of prayer "already in use among the Jews." Moreover, this statement, as it is most startling, so also is most certainly and indubitably erroneous. Yet, as it appeared, from some extraordinary misconception, the author spoke of this most startling falsehood as of a well-known and established fact. Such a circumstance would have evidenced so grave a fault of memory, so curious an inaccuracy of thought, that no reasonable man could have been thenceforth prepared to accept any general fact whatever on Mr. Oxenham's authority. He says, indeed, truly, that even on our original supposition we should have had no right to impugn the accuracy of his "quotations"; for the word "quotations" (we were writing in great haste) was inaptly chosen to express our meaning. Actual quotations occupy a comparatively small part of his volume; those portions of it which we intended to express by that word, are the summaries which he so frequently gives of the various theological views, advocated respectively by this or that individual or school. Had the supposition been true on which our remarks proceeded, no reasonable man would have attached the slightest value to these summaries; proceeding (as they would then have proceeded) from so singularly puzzle-headed and inaccurate a thinker. We must express, however, our sincere apology for having used the word "quotations," which was a very inaccurate expression of our thought.

Mr. Oxenham complains of our having occupied so large a portion of our notice, with a criticism of one line in a volume of 250 pages. But it is really difficult so to arrange an adverse criticism, as to satisfy the criticised party. Is an unfavourable "short notice" in itself permissible? The reply will hardly be in the negative: yet whatever line it takes there is an opening for objection. If we dwell on individual passages, complaint is made that we neglect the pervading spirit: if we animadvert on the pervading spirit, it is alleged that we confine ourselves to vague generalities. We incline to think that our notice of this volume approached the happy mean. The editorial notice referred to it as a whole; the correspondent's communication to one amazing statement in particular. The fact is simply this. We had read the work carefully through, and many parts of it more than once, and we had sketched in our

juifs, que seulement notre Divin Maître en a montré l'esprit, l'a dégagée de toute superstition, l'éloge," &c., &c. The Italian translator of the "Symbolism" has similarly modified the passage.

mind the notice we should give. Quite unexpectedly, a priest, who gives his chief study to Biblical inquiries, proposed to send us a criticism on the statement concerning which so much has now been said. We accepted the proposal with great pleasure for two reasons:—(1) the matter itself is one of much interest and importance: and (2) it had a very close bearing on the value of the work; for so extraordinary a misconception as that into which its writer seemed to have fallen, was calculated greatly to disparage its historical value. When the communication reached us, we were still more pleased that we had accepted it; for its execution seemed admirable. Mr. Oxenham's own letter, indeed, affords an indirect testimony to the unanswerable force of that argument which it draws out; for although he does not abandon his thesis, yet he "will not stay to discuss" its truth, nor will he even in passing express his own continued belief of it. It turns out, indeed, that Mr. Oxenham's statement does not injure his own historical credit: yet in another respect the importance is even greater than we supposed of encountering it; for if so considerable a writer as Möhler was deluded by the extravagant falsehood in question, it was high time that the truth should be clearly affirmed and proved. Meanwhile our own editorial notice was substantially unaffected. It extends over nearly two pages, which is surely a most sufficient allowance; and (except in its incidental reference to our correspondent's communication) it is not by one line either shorter or longer, than it would have been had that communication never appeared.

From the dimensions of our notice, we proceed to its substance. Our criticisms on the volume were these: (1) "It shows throughout real sincerity of purpose." (2) "It shows occasionally much devotional feeling." (3) "Various incidental remarks, especially on devotional subjects, are original and forcible." (4) "The collection of facts and quotations is extremely interesting." (5) "No reasonable man," however, "can now trust the accuracy" of these. (6) "As a work of thought and combination, it is certainly below par." (7) Its tone is disgustingly pretentious throughout. Of these criticisms, we have now absolutely retracted the fifth; and we suppose the author makes no complaint of the first four: we have, therefore, to vindicate only the two last. But their very enumeration will have been to some a matter of surprise. To read Mr. Oxenham's letter, it would be supposed that our notice had been one mass of indiscriminate invective; whereas four comments out of seven were favourable. The author may say, indeed, that we dwelt at very much greater length on the faults, than on the excellences, which we ascribed to his

work : but our reply is obvious ; viz., that it is far more incumbent on a critic to give grounds for his blame than for his praise.

For a reason which will presently appear, we begin with our seventh criticism ; and we here repeat at length the passage which conveyed it :—

In company with this intellectual poverty is to be found throughout a pretentiousness of tone—a claim of superior enlightenment and exceptional impartiality—which no one can help observing ; and at which no right-minded person, when he does observe it, can help being disgusted. This sad self-exhibition culminates perhaps in his condescending expression of opinion, that "the Summa of S. Thomas is no mean performance : " a remark, which, considering the writer's age and position, will hardly be matched for impertinence and affectation.

It is impossible, of course, to support by definite argument the general opinion expressed in this extract : the ultimate appeal must be to the judgment of sober and right-minded Catholics, who read the book. But as we speak of "this sad self-exhibition" as "culminating" in one particular instance, we may, at all events, explain and defend our general judgment, by dwelling a little on this one instance. Mr. Oxenham's whole passage, containing the quoted words, runs thus : the italics are our own :—

The scholastic age, of which S. Anslem is the pioneer, attained its zenith in the thirteenth century with the seraphic and angelic doctors, as they are called, Bonaventure and Aquinas, and may be said to last till the Reformation, though it has no great names to show after the close of the fourteenth century. That was a period when history, criticism, and *philosophy* were almost unknown. Latin was the common tongue of the learned, and for the most part they understood no other except their own. They had little knowledge of the past experience of the Church, and little anticipation of her future. All this was a serious drawback to theological study. On the other hand, the whole speculative intellect of Europe was concentrated upon it, for as yet it had no rival in the world of thought ; and this could not but lead to a great expansion and development of theological ideas within a certain range, and be productive of permanent results. But it followed also from so large an expenditure of intellectual energy on so narrow a field, and *from the one-sidedness of its analytical method*, that many trifling or incongruous questions would be mooted, there would be much mere playing with edged tools, and many an elaborate edifice would be reared on the sand, which the advancing tide of sounder knowledge must inevitably sweep away. Still, with whatever shortcomings, it cannot be denied that scholasticism is an important chapter in the history of the human mind, and one which requires to be studied *in tracing the development of doctrine*. If the then condition of European society imposed restrictions on the progress of theological science, which were

not the fault but the misfortunes of its votaries, if many who pursued it were little better than triflers or sophists, we must never forget that it also commanded the service of the acutest intellects, and the devotion of the most saintly hearts. *The Summa of S. Thomas is no mean performance*, though much of the Aristotelian philosophy on which it is based may have since become obsolete, and *he has made lasting contributions to the science of Christian Ethics*; whatever, again, may be thought of the supplementary details of S. Bonaventure's *Life of Christ*, none will dispute the spirit of ardent piety which breathes in every page (pp. 74-5).

With this passage we may profitably collate one found in the preface:—

It is of the last importance that, at this supreme crisis of her history, her children should be closely united, and well equipped to meet the coming foe, *not with the blunted or misshapen implements of a ruder warfare and a coarser age*, but with weapons forged and polished *fresh* in the armoury of wisdom, of justice, and of truth (p. xlix).

Now it has no bearing on our present task to vindicate the scholastic theology against these aspersions; but all who read the above passages, and he also who wrote them, must agree with us, that they express at least the following opinion. "The method and principles by which the ancient scholastics cultivated theology, are not suitable to the necessities of our times and to the progress of the sciences." They contain, indeed, a good deal more than this; but no one will say that they contain less. The author, however, cannot possibly be ignorant, that within the year this proposition in these precise terms (Syllabus, prop. xiii.) has been condemned by the Holy Father, as one among "the chief errors of our age;" as one among the symptoms of that "dire plague," which he warns his "most dear children," "altogether to abhor and avoid:" nor can he be ignorant that the whole Episcopate has accepted this pronouncement.* That the decisions of this Encyclical and Syllabus are infallible in the strictest sense, is no private fancy of our own. The French bishops, to go no further, "regard such infallibility as an elementary and familiar portion of Christian doctrine," "contained in the very catechism;" our own Bishop of Shrewsbury doubts whether he can even give

* We may here repeat an explanation which we have already made twice in this *Review*. A Catholic is required by the Church to deny that the scholastic theology is obsolete, and unsuited to these times; but he is by no means required to deny that there are other kinds of theological study eminently serviceable and even indispensable. He must not regard scholasticism as "the blunted or misshapen instrument of a ruder warfare and a coarser age;" but he may quite admit—as, indeed, who can doubt?—that it will not suffice in these days by itself for necessary purposes, whether of defence or attack.

the name of Catholic to those who question this infallibility; the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, writing under the Pope's own eyes a pastoral address to the Pope's own diocese, says that the Encyclical and Syllabus "are to be received as the very word of God," on pain of losing Heaven.*

But even this is not all. No Catholic can be so shameless as to say, that so solemn a pronouncement has no significance whatever; that the Pope's spiritual children may proceed, both in thought and act, just as though it had never been issued. Consequently, even the most disloyal admit in theory that it binds to "respectful silence;" that no one is at liberty openly to contradict it. Yet this, and no less, is what Mr. Oxenham has done. He has treated this solemn instruction of the whole *Ecclesia Docens*, as though it did not exist; as an empty breath; as an unmeaning impertinence. In daring interiorly to dissent from this instruction, he has disintitiled himself to all confidence on the part of sound believers; but in publishing this dissent—in arguing for it without reserve and without shame—he has placed himself in an attitude of flagrant rebellion against his divinely-appointed teachers, which would justify a Catholic reviewer in any treatment of him except only misrepresentation.

We now approach the point at which we have been aiming. There are two different courses open to a spiritual rebel. Some of the class adopt a passionate and violent line of opposition; they declaim passionately and violently against the decree which condemns them, and fly off to the very opposite extreme in sheer defiance. Others, among whom we must rank our author, adopt a patronizing tone. "It is true," he says in effect, "that those whom God has appointed to teach me are narrow, imbecile, and retrograde in their ideas: but I will not on that account imitate their intellectual feebleness; I will not on that account rush into an opposite view, no less narrow and one-sided than theirs. My mind is philosophical and impartial. I should scorn as much the being betrayed into one extreme by antipathy to my teachers, as the being betrayed into another by docility to them. When the Church decrees that scholasticism is suitable to the necessity of our times and the advance of science, she says what is too absurd to need refutation. The scholastic theologians knew neither history, criticism, nor philosophy; while their analytical method was incurably onesided. Yet the Church's absurd doctrine about them shall not drive me into an opposite doctrine equally absurd; it shall not make me

* *Dublin Review* for July, pp. 125, 129, note, and 131.

"unjust to those writers, who have been admired with such exaggeration. Their defects at last were rather their misfortune than their fault, and there is much more excuse for them than for those who nowadays extol them. Their intellects were often of the acutest, and their piety of the warmest. S. Thomas has been cried up as the Church's greatest systematic theologian; and there are absurd stories afloat as to the reverence in which he was held by the Fathers of Trent. Very little notion had these good Fathers what theology really means: yet I will not be led by their uncritical simplicity into an injustice. I will preserve my superior enlightenment and my exceptional impartiality; and I will candidly say that the *Summa* at last 'is no mean performance.' Its dogmatical statements, indeed, cannot maintain their ground, penetrated as they are by an obsolete Aristotelism; and much even of its ethical system will not bear consideration. Yet S. Thomas has really made some 'lasting contributions' to this latter science; and I (who am not like other men) will not go the length of saying that his whole work is worthless for all permanent purposes."

It may or may not be true, that the "violent and passionate" line of spiritual rebellion is the more morally censurable; but there can be no doubt that the "candid and patronizing" attitude is far more trying to an ordinary man's patience, and (to repeat our former expression) far more disgusting. It would be disgusting, if assumed by a writer of mature years, vast learning, established character; what then shall we say of it when adopted by one of Mr. Oxenham's "age and position"?

We can now then explain a circumstance on which Mr. Oxenham lays great stress: viz., our harsh and uncourteous language. We should be ashamed of using such language towards any loyal and humble Catholic, however great might be the intellectual defects of his publication; but towards one who writes after our author's fashion, we consider that we should use much plainness of speech: we will always aim, by God's help, (1) at representing him fairly, and (2) at speaking of him harshly and severely. If we notice a work of his at all, we are bound to notice (according to the best of our judgment) its excellences no less than its defects; and our reader has seen that in this instance we are far from having neglected this duty. We ended with the remark, which was most true, that, "if we could honestly say more than we have said in praise of his volume we should have been glad to do so."*

* We regret that it did not occur to us to praise the writer's style and

But when we have honestly to express intellectual disparagement of such a writer, we will not wrap up our meaning in implications and circumlocutions, but we will express it in all straightforwardness and unreserve.

Our disgust at the pretentiousness of his tone was even increased by the remembrance, that he of all writers in the world—so poor a thinker, so weak a reasoner, so shallow a philosopher,—had less right than another to assume such airs. His volume, we said too mildly, "as a work of thought and combination is certainly below par;" or, to speak more plainly, it is deplorably deficient in intellectual and philosophical power. To our mind this is visible in every page. Seldom have we met a book on so noble a theme, which was, intellectually speaking, so poverty-stricken and meagre; and we cannot but think that if the author, instead of "candidly and dispassionately" appreciating the scholastics, had applied himself to their study with that reverence and docility which the Church inculcates, he might have acquired at least some little power of analysis and combination. We had no room, however, to illustrate our criticism from all those successive pages, which give us abundant ground for our remark; and being obliged, therefore, to make a selection, we thought that "we could not act more fairly than by illustrating it, firstly, from the general argument of his Introduction; and, secondly, from the general argument of his treatise."

As to the former—his treatise on the principle of development—we told the exact truth when we said, in our notice, that we had opened it with high expectations and closed it in blank disappointment. The author merely recounts in it those obvious common-places of the subject, which are familiar to all who even dabble in such matters; while as to the real difficulties which beset the question, he displays a blissful unconsciousness, which one might almost envy. What is the intellectual objection which, more than all others put together, indisposes a thoughtful inquirer to the development theory? Notoriously that which concerns *the fulness of Apostolic knowledge*. This is the very difficulty on which F. Newman laid so much stress when writing against Catholics.* "The

command of language, which are admirable. Our only misgiving is, whether his singular power of expressing himself in beautiful English, does not sometimes lead him to mistake exquisiteness of expression for vigour and originality of thought.

* For instance, "Let us come to the plain question, Does the Church, according to Romanists, know more than the Apostles knew?"—*British Critic* for January, 1840, p. 50.

Apostles," we said in our notice, "having received their knowledge of these doctrines by immediate inspiration, apprehended them with immeasurably greater fulness and keenness than are obtainable by an ordinary uninspired Catholic of that or of any later period." If this be admitted—and he would be a bold man who should question it*—how can we account for the fact (if fact it be) that those who were taught immediately by the Apostles, knew so much less of dogma than Catholics know at the present day? Our readers will be amazed at the statement which we are going to make, but which nevertheless is literally true. From the beginning to the end of his treatise on development, the author has not a syllable which would show, that this most obvious and elementary of difficulties has even occurred to him. Nay, so unfamiliar is it to his thoughts, that now we have drawn his attention to it he fails to understand us. Our words above quoted, one would think, are plain enough; but, in his letters, he declares that we have accused him of ignoring (not the fulness of Apostolic knowledge, but) "the immediate inspiration of the Apostles." This would certainly have been a "monstrous assertion" on our part; but we never thought of making it.

We proceeded further. We said that his language would give us too much warrant for maintaining, that he not only ignores this fulness of Apostolic knowledge, but even denies it; and we quoted two sentences of his which in their obvious

* "That the later doctors of the Church were wiser than the Apostles in faith, or possessed *more explicit faith* than the Apostles, . . . is [a proposition] commonly reprobated by theologians *even as temerarious*: for to these Jesus Christ specially promised 'He shall teach you all things, and shall remind you of all which I have said to you;' and again, 'All things which I know from the Father I have made known to you;' . . . And reason seems to show this; for they were the teachers of the faith of the New Testament, and therefore the Church's faith is said to be founded on the Apostles: it cannot, therefore, be greater in the Church than it was in them."—(Suarez, *De Fide*, d. ii. s. 6, n. 10). "We may distinguish a twofold order of propositions, which, as time advances, are explicitly believed. For some belong, as it were, to the substance of the mysteries: as in the mystery of the Incarnation, that Christ had two wills; and in the mystery of the Eucharist, that the substance of bread does not remain after the consecration. And concerning matters of this kind, it is to be believed, that they were known by the Apostles *not implicitly only but explicitly*: for they had excellent understanding of the Scriptures, and of all mysteries appertaining to the tradition of faith. But there are other contingent propositions which, in the Apostles' time, had never come to pass; as, that this is the true Pontiff, that this is a true Council, and the like: and it was not necessary that these propositions should be known to the Apostles explicitly, but only in the general; because it was not necessary that all future things should be revealed to them."—*Ib.* n. 18.

sense contain such denial. In addressing ourselves, Mr. Oxenham does not refer to these sentences: but in his letter to the *Tablet* he does; and does not even allege that we have misunderstood their meaning. On the latter of these two sentences he remarks, that it contains "a simile obvious as soon as stated to any one who accepts the theory of development at all." What shallow recklessness! Every one, then, "who accepts the theory of development at all," must hold that "the knowledge of dogma possessed by S. Peter or S. Paul was as inferior in its reach to that obtainable by" a modern Catholic "as the size of an acorn is inferior to the size of an oak, and as the extent of mathematical axioms is inferior to the whole extent of mathematical science." We need hardly say that if this were indeed the case, the theory of development should be profoundly abhorred by every devout Christian.*

On the former of the two sentences quoted by us from his Essay, he remarks, that it is taken from Dr. Döllinger (of which we were of course well aware, because he had said so), and that "may settle as we please with that distinguished prelate and we divine the charge of ignoring or denying the first elements of Christianity and Church history." The drift of which remark seems to be, that Dr. Döllinger is so undeniably orthodox, that whatever he says must be considered by docile Catholics, quite as a matter of course, to be consistent with sound doctrine. In other words, Mr. Oxenham claims a far more unreserved degree of interior assent for Dr. Döllinger's teaching, than for the solemn pronouncements of the whole *Ecclesia Docens*; since these (as we have seen) he has no scruple whatever in flatly contradicting. He would seem, indeed, as blissfully unconscious on the estimation in which Dr. Döllinger is held by good Catholics, as he is on the theological matters to which we just now alluded. In reply, however, to his remark, we need only make the obvious answer, that if we were criticising "that distinguished prelate and divine," we should no doubt do our best to "settle" the

* How widely different is F. Newman's language! "The spontaneous process which goes on within the mind itself is *higher and choicer* than that which is logical. . . . Thus the Holy Apostles would *know* without words all the truths concerning the high doctrines of theology, which controversialists after them have piously and charitably reduced to *formulae*. . . . Thus S. Justin or S. Irenæus might be without any *digested ideas* of Purgatory or Original Sin, yet have an *intense feeling* which they had not *defined* or *located* both of the fault of our first nature and the liabilities of our nature regenerate. . . . Thus S. Ignatius Loyola, while yet an *unlearned neophyte*, was favoured with *transcendent perceptions* of the Holy Trinity during his penance at Manresa."—*Essay on Development*, p. 83.

matter with *him*; but that our present concern is with Mr. Oxenham, who has appropriated Dr. Döllinger's sentiment as his own.

Nothing indeed is more curious, in one so rebellious against those teachers whom God has set over him, than his self-abandoning submission to those whom he has set over himself. Möhler, *e.g.*, puts forth an astonishing and unheard-of statement about the Lord's Prayer, and Mr. Oxenham swallows it with a ready faith which it is marvellous to contemplate. Suppose some unfortunate scholastic had made this egregious blunder: when should we have heard the last of his "uncritical spirit," his "incompetence for Biblical investigation," "the injury done by such men to a good cause," and the other commonplace familiar to Dr. Döllinger's school?

Returning, however, to the question of Apostolic knowledge, we will quote two further passages from the Treatise on Development. In page xxviii. we have the following:—

There was an expectation of Christ's speedy return, which, for wise reasons doubtless, the *Apostles were suffered to entertain*. It was not till this belief died out, that room was left for the doctrine of Purgatory to occupy men's thoughts. S. Paul had spoken of the fire that should try every man's work, four centuries before the full significance of his words began to be apprehended.

One cannot gather from this most confused sentence whether, according to our author, "the doctrine of Purgatory" did or did not "occupy" S. Paul's "thoughts." A syllogism might thus be constructed from Mr. Oxenham's premisses:—"Those who expected Christ's speedy return had no room left for the doctrine of Purgatory to occupy their thoughts." Major. "But S. Paul, 'for wise reasons, doubtless, was suffered to' expect Christ's speedy return." Minor. What is the legitimate conclusion from these two premisses? That S. Paul's mind had no room for the doctrine of Purgatory; and, though many of his disciples died in a state of grace, that he knew less than we do what immediately became of them. Yet in his very next words the author speaks as though S. Paul *did* know about Purgatory, and spoke of it as of "the fire which should try every man's work." Let it be observed once for all, that we are not here attempting to solve these truly arduous questions: we are criticising Mr. Oxenham's essay, not writing one of our own; and what seems to us (intellectually) so pitiable a feature in the essay before us is, that (after the fashion of shallow and random writers) its author sees but one class of facts, but one set of principles; and is as blind as any bat to all difficulties and to all necessary qualifications.

Then, in p. xlv. he quotes these words from Mr. Jowett:—"To attribute to S. Paul or the Twelve the abstract notion of Christian truth which afterwards sprang up in the Church, is the same sort of anachronism as to attribute to them a system of philosophy." And he comments on them by adding, "This may be true." Good God! What is that "notion of Christian truth" which "afterwards sprang up in the Church," and which Mr. Oxenham implies to be a just and accurate notion, but which is altogether alien to the Apostles' mind, and cannot be ascribed to them without "anachronism"?

But there is also a second great objection, commonly adduced against the development theory, of which the author seems no less profoundly unconscious than of that which we have just considered. "The Ecclesia Docens," we observed in our notice, "has in every age taught" certain fundamental "doctrines truly and adequately to the Christian flock;" and it is asked by many, how this fact can be reconciled with the supposition that she but gradually apprehended them. Let us take in order some of these doctrines, and see how far Mr. Oxenham has guarded himself against this very obvious and reasonable objection. We will begin with the foundation of all, the Blessed Trinity.

All impartial judges, on either side, are now agreed that Petavius is right as to the heterodox language, *implying often heterodox notions*, about the Holy Trinity, which many ante-Nicene writers use. The fact that, in an elaborate treatise on the Holy Ghost, written expressly against heretics, S. Basil studiously refrains from giving him the name of God (which was first done by the Council of Alexandria in 363) would alone indicate this. So again, Justin Martyr makes the Son inferior to the Father, in His divine nature. Athenagoras and Theophilus of Antioch use language about His Eternal Generation, which sounds thoroughly Sabellian. . . .

Many Fathers, both Greek and Latin, in arguing with the Arians, treat the unity of Persons in the Holy Trinity as specific rather than numerical. It would be easy to multiply similar examples (pp. xxvi-vii).

Now in the ante-Nicene, no less than in the following centuries, either the Ecclesia Docens taught truly and adequately the doctrine of the Trinity, or she did not. If she did not, Christ's promises have failed, and the Church has failed also. If she did, how can it have happened that "many ante-Nicene writers" had "heterodox notions" on the subject? that the language of S. Justin Martyr was Arian? of Athenagoras and Theophilus, Sabellian? of many even post-Nicene Fathers, Tritheistic? What objection can call more loudly for a reply than this? Yet to the author's mind it seems not even to have occurred; so narrow is he, and so incapable of looking at

the matter from any point of view but his own. S. Justin Martyr "makes the Son inferior to the Father in His divine nature"! Why, what worse did Arius do? For we need not point out that that is no Divine Nature, which is inferior to another; and as to the word "God," it was applied to the Son by Arius himself.* How could it have been that S. Justin said with impunity in the third century, what excited the horror of all Christendom when said by Arius in the fourth? Was the ante-Nicene Church then tolerant of Arianism? These are the very questions which our author was called on to face, if he chose to write on development at all.† What shall be said of the Catholic, who passes them over without even the profession of an answer, without even a transient mention?

And as such a treatment is intellectually contemptible, so it shows the strangest deficiency in Catholic instincts and loyalty. We do not for a moment suspect that Mr. Oxenham writes with any intention of stealthily injuring the Church, and of bringing on her disrespect and obloquy: on the contrary, as we said in our notice, his volume "shows throughout real sincerity of purpose." But what is the certain effect of such language as we have quoted? The author makes certain statements, of which there is but one obvious sense; viz., that the Church before Nicæa tolerated the Arian and Sabellian heresies, and even after Nicæa tolerated or encouraged Tritheism. And he does not utter one syllable to defend her against so obvious and so absolutely fatal an accusation.

Next on the Incarnation:—

Origen, who first brings out the reality of our Lord's Human Soul, teaches also its preëxistence, and the final absorption of His human nature into the divine; Hilary and Epiphanius deny the union of His divine nature with His Body during the period between death and resurrection; S. Ambrose, relying on a mistaken reading of Col. ii. 15, also denies its union with the Human Soul; though both are implied in the Apostles' Creed (p. xxvi).

We are not denying these statements, any more than we deny those previously quoted, in every sense which they may bear. But as Mr. Oxenham has chosen "to rush in where" men much abler than he "fear to tread," we have a right to claim of him a direct answer to such questions as these. (1) Did the Ecclesia Docens teach from the first the possession by our Lord of a human soul, which had no existence previous to His

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for June, 1845, pp. 341, 2.

† See F. Newman's very thoughtful and considerate language quoted in a former note (p. 334).

conception? (2) By what means did she practically inculcate this truth on the minds of her children? (3) How is the fact of such inculcation compatible with Origen's error, and with the silence of earlier Christians on the subject? We may look through the essay in vain for the attempt of an answer to these, or to any other really important questions.

We proceed to Original Sin:—

The doctrine of original sin was first *distinctly laid down* by S. Augustine in controversy with the Pelagians in the fourth century; whence it is obvious that Mary's exemption from the general doom could not be *taught* earlier than that (p. xxii).

Does the author mean to say that Original Sin was *in no sense* taught by the Ecclesia Docens, before S. Augustine's time? or only that it was not "*distinctly laid down*"—i.e. taught by the *particular method* of formal and scientific statement? He cannot possibly mean the former, and we assume, therefore, that he means the latter. But then, how can it be "obvious" that the Immaculate Conception might not also have been taught from the first, by methods similar to those whereby the Church taught, from the first, Original Sin? We are not at all saying that it *was* so taught. We are not writing an essay on development; we are only commenting on Mr. Oxenham's hopeless confusion of thought.

Lastly, on Grace, Free Will, Justification and Merit.

Later on [*i.e.*, after A.D. 787], and in the West, the subjective questions of grace and free will, first mooted by S. Augustine, and their mutual relations in the justification of man (involving the doctrine of "merit," so strangely misunderstood afterwards) presented themselves to the mind of the Church.

The author cannot really intend to deny that the Ecclesia Docens from the very first taught her children, by some method or other, some doctrine or other, on grace, free will, justification and merit. Yet he makes no mention whatever of this fundamental and vitally important fact; and merely says, that about the beginning of the ninth century, these "questions" first * "presented themselves to her mind." How can they have first "presented themselves to her mind" in the ninth century, if she taught a certain practical doctrine about them in the first? He was called on to explain this, and has not attempted so to do.†

* The author's precise statement is that these questions were first "mooted" by S. Augustine, and that after A.D. 787 they "presented themselves to the mind of the Church."

† Here again contrast F. Newman's well-weighed and cautious exposition

As if to crown the whole, he announces (p. xix.) that if "the radical principle" of development be denied, we shall find ourselves sooner or later compelled to surrender, not only later definitions, but *almost every belief which discriminates Christianity from the higher forms of natural religion.*" Here, again, we do not deny that in a certain sense, which it was Mr. Owenham's business carefully to explain and guard, these words express a truth. But as they stand, they really seem to imply that the "undeveloped" dogma of the Apostolic age excluded "almost every belief which discriminates Christianity from the higher forms of natural religion." Of course, he did not mean this; and it is very far from clear to our mind, that he meant anything. We are commenting on a method of exposition, which intellectually is so narrow and imbecile, while morally it is so reckless, rash, and crude.

In one word. The question of development is of extreme importance: we do not think that Mr. Owenham has at all exaggerated its momentousness at the present period. It is for this very reason, that we are indignant at such a handling as he has given to it. The question is among the most difficult of our time, no less than among the most important; and requires for its due treatment a rare union of opposite qualifications. We are intensely provoked, when we find it thus trivially and feebly touched (as it were) on the surface, without one particle of robust, vigorous, and manly thought.

Let us sum up our argument and see where it stands. We said in our original notice, that "as a work of thought and combination," Mr. Owenham's volume "is certainly below par." We proceeded to illustrate this "firstly, from the general argument of his Introduction,"—i.e. his Essay on Development,— "and secondly, from the general argument of his treatise." We have now vindicated our former illustration, and will at once proceed to the latter. Our comment was the following.

of the doctrine with Mr. Owenham's one-sided extravagance. The Catholic Church, he says, "is the organ and oracle, and nothing else, of a supernatural doctrine which is independent of individuals, given once for all, *coming down from the first ages, and so deeply and intimately embosomed in her, that it cannot be clean torn out of her, even if you were to try; but gradually and majestically comes forth into dogmatic state, as time goes on and need requires.*" Again, "Though the creed of the Church has been one and the same from the beginning, yet it has been so deeply lodged in her bosom as to be held by individuals *more or less implicitly*; instead of being delivered from the first in those special statements or what are called definitions, under which it is now presented to us, and which preclude mistake or ignorance. These definitions are but the expression of portions of the dogma *which has ever been received by the Church.*"—*Lectures on Anglican Difficulties.*

He professes an historical inquiry into the development in the Church of the Catholic doctrine of the Atonement; and the first step of such an inquiry must, of course, be a careful examination of what the inspired writers have themselves taught on the said doctrine. Without this the whole plan of the work is simply absurd and unmeaning. Mr. Oxenham, however, does not attempt any such examination.

We think that the drift of this comment was sufficiently plain; but as the author has failed to apprehend it, we will express it still more clearly. Suppose you saw a work, which professed to contain an historical inquiry into the growth of Copernicanism in the scientific world; and suppose, on opening it, you found it to begin with the discoveries of Galileo. You would say firstly, that the work wholly fails to justify its title; and you would say secondly (which is far more important) that there cannot be a satisfactory history of Copernicanism, which does not begin with Copernicus. Now to apply this. The Apostles may be considered the sources of Christian Truth as such; having been taught by the Holy Ghost to remember fully, and to understand rightly, our Lord's whole teaching. The first step, then, in the history of any doctrine, must be an investigation of the particular form in which the Apostles taught that doctrine to their immediate disciples; and any attempt at its historical treatment, proceeding on some other basis, is ipso facto "absurd and unmeaning." But the New Testament, if rightly studied, furnishes abundant materials for obtaining the desired information; such a study, therefore, of the New Testament was the only legitimate basis of Mr. Oxenham's work. All later statements of doctrine were developed from the original Apostolic statements. To ignore the latter, then, is to attempt building an edifice without having laid the foundation.

We are far from implying, indeed, that the treatise has at all suffered from the "lacuna" in question; neither from that, nor from any other "lacuna," could it possibly suffer. Indeed, where there is no continuous argument, it is almost unmeaning to speak of a "lacuna." This is the very censure which we have been expressing throughout. The volume is a mere assortment of interesting facts, without any scientific connection whatever; and just as a collection of anecdotes would retain its characteristic value, though half a dozen of them might accidentally slip through, so also in the case before us.

Mr. Oxenham, indeed, in his letter to us, maintains that the absence of all Scriptural treatment is no such vital defect in his work; but his argument is manifestly founded on a one-sided impression of the results obtainable from Scripture study. The matter is one of some little interest and impor-

tance ; and we will, therefore, explain our meaning as clearly as we can.

The Apostles' apprehension of the Atonement—as of any other doctrine—was keener, more definite, more precise, than any which human words can possibly convey ; it was the Holy Ghost's direct impress on their intellect and their heart. They expressed it, however, in words, as best it could be expressed. Here, however, occurs the distinction on which we lay stress. In communicating the doctrine to their immediate disciples, they would (as all good teachers do) pay special attention to the antecedents, circumstances, acquirements, temperament, of those disciples. It is one question, what form of words *is in itself* the more appropriate, the less inadequate, to convey some sacred idea ; it is quite another question, what words would most effectively convey it *to this or that particular disciple or body of disciples*. A carefully directed examination of the Apostolic epistles will throw most important light on two inquiries altogether distinct. It will assist the student to discover in a constantly increasing degree, (1) what was the full doctrine held by the Apostles, and (2) what was the particular form in which they communicated that doctrine to their immediate disciples. Now this latter inquiry, on its own account, is an indispensable preliminary to the treatise before us. But it is surely most unsatisfactory to study the Apostles' form of teaching, without at the same time investigating the full sense in which they used that form. Both these kinds, therefore, of Scriptural inquiry were essential pre-requisites for Mr. Oxenham's task.

Here we close the vindication of our original criticism. We have never denied, but in July we said, that the work contains a number of most interesting facts very interestingly told. On that account we regret the more, that it is so eminently unsatisfactory, so grossly defective, as an intellectual treatment of the great themes with which it is conversant. Most of all, we regret that, in company with this intellectual poverty, is found so anti-Catholic a spirit ; so wearisome and disgusting an affectation of being more large-minded, impartial, and enlightened, than those whom God has commissioned to teach him. If the author would but sit at the feet of the Church instead of sitting at the feet of Dr. Dollinger—he could not, indeed, probably, produce a work remarkable for originality or depth—but he might at least, in a somewhat humbler sphere of thought, do real service to his fellow Catholics.

We must not omit all reference to his imputations on our honesty and good faith. "Here is Kingsley on Newman again, as far as honesty is concerned." In consequence of

such dishonesty, "it is impossible for reasonable readers to accept any one statement of the reviewer's simply on his authority." One of our allegations is a "gratuitous falsehood," and in making it we have played "a precisely similar trick as in the former instance." Our whole criticism is built on "a deliberate perversion of facts." "The most charitable hypothesis would be that the reviewer has not read the book." It will be seen that in such charges he does far more than retaliate on our unfavourable criticisms: for these have all expressed a conviction of his perfect honesty and straightforwardness; whereas he taxes us outright with mendacity and unblushing knavery. Our extracts are from his letter to the *Tablet*. He has not indeed repeated the invectives in his letter to ourselves; but this was, we suppose, because he feared we might use them as a pretext for refusing his letter insertion. However this may be, they have given us no pain whatever: yet we hope, for, his own sake, that he will see the propriety of retracting them.

It remains only to notice a line of apology, which has been attempted in Mr. Oxenham's favour, and which must have surprised him no less than it has surprised ourselves: a kind of appeal "*ad misericordiam*." One correspondent of the *Tablet* bespeaks mercy for him as for "a young and defenceless writer." Another suggests that he is "young, a convert, a brilliant scholar, who relinquished his friends and prospects for conscience' sake, and is now 'hit hard' by those who, in more senses than one, ought to know better."* Now if there were ever an aggressive work in the world, Mr. Oxenham's is such. To mention only a few particulars. He prefaces it by a dedication to Dr. Döllinger. He does what even that learned theologian has not (so far as we know) ventured to do, in repeating the same censure on scholasticism which Dr. Döllinger had already expressed, now that the Church has solemnly condemned that censure. He expresses the most startling opinions on development, in the most confident and

* This latter correspondent, who signs himself "*Sacerdos*," has not read, it appears, either Mr. Oxenham's work, or our own notice; neither does he profess himself to have received a satisfactory account of the work from any trustworthy authority. His language, therefore, comes in effect to this; that no brilliant scholar, who is a young man, and has made worldly sacrifices by his conversion to the faith, should be spoken of severely; however objectionable a volume he may publish. In the very same paragraph he makes the singular statement, that "in the general controversy between Mr. Oxenham and the DUBLIN REVIEW" he "ranges himself neither on one side nor the other." Surely, when he says that we "ought to know better" than to attack Mr. Oxenham, he "ranges himself" on the "side" adverse to ours.

undoubting language. His tone throughout is that of one claiming an exceptional clear-sightedness and impartiality; as well as no slight superiority in wisdom over those, from whom it was his business humbly to learn. Surely to claim for a work like this exemption from straightforward criticism, is an amazing claim. "Don't hit him hard; he is young and defenceless; he is a convert; he is a brilliant scholar." How strange an appeal! Whatever else we may think of Mr. Oxenham, he shows no deficiency in pluck and courage; nor are his letters those of one unable or unwilling to inflict quite as heavy blows as he may receive. And we do him the justice of fully believing, that no one will be more indignant than himself at the pleas thus put forward by indiscreet friendship.

We should, perhaps, apologize to our readers, for having carried them through a number of details which must have been somewhat wearying. Our defence is this. No one, we suppose, will have entirely acquiesced in the full justice of Mr. Oxenham's strictures on us; yet several may have derived from them the impression, that, for one reason or other, we entertained towards him a certain antipathy, and resolved consequently to write him down; that we used for that purpose the facilities afforded by the very form of a short notice; and that accordingly we expressed certain general comments, which we should not be able, when duly challenged, to defend in detail. There is no kind of charge, from which it more behoves a Catholic reviewer to purge himself, than from this; and there was no other way of purging ourselves from it, except by defending at length the various accusations which we had made in brief. The present writer is extremely far from being infallible, or from so thinking himself; and it is abundantly possible that he has erred widely in his intellectual estimate of Mr. Oxenham's labours. But he assures that gentleman that he has been conscious from the first of no other wish, than to appreciate the volume fairly and justly; and to express that appreciation as precisely, as his very limited command of language might enable him to do.

Since the preceding was in type, the September number of the *Union Review* has appeared in due course, and we find it to contain an article replete with most severe strictures on ourselves. It is closely connected with the matter on which we have been just writing; for its immediate object is to criticise the review of Mr. Ffoulkes, and the notice of Mr. Oxenham, which appeared in our last number: this, therefore, will be the most convenient place for replying to its animadver-

sions. It is quite a remarkable paper; as remarkable for what it does not contain as for what it does.

In the article on which it comments, we adduced arguments to show, that the very idea of externs praying for union with Roman Catholics on the basis of Roman Catholic doctrine, is suicidal and self-contradictory (p. 145); that the attempts at historical justification of such a course are preposterous (p. 146); that a Roman Catholic member of the A. P. U. C. "is, in effect—whether he intends it or no—a traitor to his faith, and a deserter of his religion" (p. 149). Such arguments then, if valid, are absolutely fatal to the whole unionist movement; and one might reasonably have expected that if the *Review* noticed our article at all, these are the points to which it would have applied itself. But no. "We are not here concerned," says the writer coolly (p. 496), "with the comments on ourselves, or on the A. P. U. C.;" and he contents himself therefore with calling them "a prolonged howl of impotent bigotry." Such reticence will suggest a shrewd suspicion, that our arguments are far more easily ignored than answered.

Now as to the affirmations of the article; and chiefly note this: "Ultramontanism" is, "next to infidelity, the chief enemy of God and His Truth in modern Europe."* A greater enemy to God, therefore, than Calvinism, Unitarianism, or the spirit of worldliness and secularity. Hitherto, writers in the *Union Review* have striven to load us with all the onus of "bigotry" and "intolerance," and to represent themselves as burning to comprehend every phase of Roman doctrine. They have now thrown off the mask. They are to the full as intolerant of our doctrines as we of theirs; they are as anxious to destroy all which we most dearly prize, as we are to retain it; they are our avowed enemies, à l'outrance. Be it so: such in their legitimate position, and we are extremely glad that they have openly assumed it. The question between us is in no sense a question between "narrowness" and "comprehension;" for they have no more wish to comprehend us in their "Christian union" than we to comprehend them. Or rather, the "narrowness" is emphatically on their side. We uphold, as divinely revealed, doctrines which are so regarded by the Holy Father, and by the enormous majority of bishops and priests in his communion; they contend for certain tenets

* "It becomes of some importance to those who regard Ultramontanism as, next to infidelity, the chief enemy of God and His Truth in modern Europe, to take note from time to time of its principles and its tactics" (p. 496).

which have been invented within the last few years by a small knot of eccentric thinkers.

The next most observable feature in the article is its faithful imitation of Mr. Oxenham* in flinging about evil imputations. Our notice of Mr. Oxenham is "about as scandalous and contemptible an exhibition of literary immorality as" the writer "remembers to have come across" (p. 499). We are destitute of "honesty," and "even decency," being guilty of "deliberate and systematic misrepresentation." (p. 501).† To cap the whole, we "lie most impudently" (p. 503). Now, let our readers observe this innovation on the established rules of civilized controversy. We have expressed ourselves most severely on various tenets advocated respectively by Mr. Ffoulkes and Mr. Oxenham; and we hope so to express ourselves in future on every suitable occasion: but we have never whispered a hint to the disparagement of their honesty and good faith. True, indeed, that we have not been tempted to do so; for (however great their other faults) two more transparently honest writers never came before our notice. Our present critic by no means exhibits such clear evidence of these qualities; and, certainly, we doubt whether we ever met with a paper, which in so short a space contained so many misstatements of fact. We include, of course, under this head, not only actual statements which are erroneous (though these also are abundant), but those obvious and undeniable implications which are of the same character. On these we shall make no other comment, than that of simply correcting them. It will be found that the attack on ourselves is so indissolubly bound up with them that, they being once put right, nothing further is necessary for our defence. We will recount these misstatements in the order in which they occur.

1. The writer states that Mr. Ffoulkes and Mr. Oxenham have placed us in a "peculiarly galling" difficulty, because they are "Roman Catholic writers of undoubted orthodoxy" (p. 496). The context shows this to mean, that we felt ourselves in a difficulty, because we could not venture to call these gentlemen's orthodoxy into question. Yet later on (p. 502)

* We much regret that we accidentally omitted in July to bear testimony, as we had intended, to the extremely temperate and charitable tone consistently maintained by Mr. Ffoulkes.

Since the above was written and in type, the *Weekly Register* has been authorised by Mr. Ffoulkes to express regret, as far as he is concerned, for the article before us. This is no more than we might have expected.

† There is a theory indeed, the writer says, which would exempt us from that charge; viz., that of our not having read the book which we criticised. Does our critic then think that such a course would not involve "deliberate and systematic misrepresentation?"

the writer says that we make against Mr Oxenham "a round-about insinuation of heresy." And though this is simply a second misstatement, it is undeniable that in July we distinctly charged Mr. Ffoulkes with (at least material) heresy; and that in our present number we have no less distinctly charged Mr. Oxenham with spiritual rebellion and theological unsoundness.

2. Certain letters have appeared in the *Union Review*, purporting to be from Catholic priests, attacking the Church's discipline on clerical celibacy. The article before us says, that on a former occasion, we "had the temerity on our own authority to deny" their genuineness (p. 496, note). Our words were these: "We should require conclusive proof before we could resign ourselves to the belief" that they are genuine (April, 1864, p. 311). This is not to "deny" the fact; and still less to deny it "on our own authority."

3. The *Review* implies that our doubts on the matter involved a "gross insinuation" against its editor (*ib.*). They implied no insinuation against him at all; for he had not at that time guaranteed their genuineness, and he might have been easily deceived by a designing correspondent.

4. The *Review* further implies (*ib.*) that, having once expressed this doubt, we are unreasonable in now speaking otherwise. Our reason for doing so is, that in the interim its editor has testified of his own knowledge to the genuineness of these letters. It is not we who love to call in question an opponent's veracity.

5. The *Review* implies (p. 497, note) that the reason why our article on Galileo has not hitherto appeared, has been the difficulty which we experienced in treating that question. Not at all. In January we expressed our intention of doing so in an early number; and at the time of our writing we had substantially in our mind that whole view of the case which in the present number we place before our readers. We then hoped to publish this in April; but, meanwhile, the Encyclical and Syllabus appeared, and more urgently claimed our attention. Before the next quarter began, Mr. Ffoulkes's volume and Dean Stanley's essay had begun to excite much attention, and peremptorily required a careful comment. It has not been, therefore, till the present quarter, that we have had leisure to draw out in words what was already in our thoughts on the matter of Galileo.*

* In the same note appears another comment. We have been lately engaged in advocating the infallibility of those Papal instructions, *ex cathedrâ*, which are not definitions of faith. Our critic objects that "there is a Papal Brief asserting 'the tradition of the instruments' to be essential to valid ordination," in such sense that wherever this ceremony does not exist there is

6. The *Review* says (p. 497) that we charged a certain anonymous writer with spiritual rebellion, "because he wishes Roman Catholics to go to Oxford." The reason which we gave was, because he said, that a Catholic's "spiritual guides" had no business to interfere in the question, and that all such interference should be resisted by the laity (p. 134).

7. The *Review* says (*ib.*) that we charged the same writer with spiritual rebellion, because he "prefers using the Anglican version of the Bible to the Douay." The reason which we gave was, because he "rebelliously" indulges in that preference; because he declares that no ecclesiastical authority shall prevent him from using the heretical translation.* If this be not spiritual rebellion in a Catholic, we shall be glad to know what is.

8. The *Review* says (*ib.*) that the Douay "is so notoriously unreliable, that it is seldom read at all." Every English Catholic knows that such a statement has not the vestige of a foundation.

9. The *Review* says (*ib.*) that we represent the same writer's "national vanity" as "ludicrous," "because he prefers the English character to the Italian." The reason which we gave was, because "he speaks as though an unmanly, feeble, and indecisive character might be influential enough among French or Italians; but that it is the high prerogative of Englishmen to estimate it at its true value" (p. 134).

10. We said that "this writer's ignorance of Catholic dogma is truly remarkable." The *Review* implies (*ib.*) that we said this without giving a reason; but we gave as our reason his strange and almost incredible ignorance of so rudimental a doctrine, as the distinction between actual and habitual grace.

11. The *Review* says (p. 498) that we regarded this writer's "belief in Anglican orders as too irrational to need comment." What we regarded as too irrational to need comment, was his resting that belief, not on argument, but on "the glow of pure happiness," which "passed over him," when he was ordained by the Bishop of Oxford (p. 135).

12. The *Review* says (*ib.*) that we charged the same writer with not having practised his religion; as though we meant

no true Christian ordination. We hail with pleasure the attempt (so rare in the *Union Review*) to meet argument by argument, and not by vituperation. Let us have then the name of the Brief, by whom it was issued, at what date, under what circumstances. We earnestly hope that the writer will not let this matter drop; all we desire is fair and straightforward argument.

* These are his words, as quoted by us: "*I will never part with my Anglican Bible for any other in the same language till I can be supplied with one*" equally idiomatic.

that he had been spiritually sluggish and neglectful. What we did say was (p. 138), "that no man holding his opinions can have any more conception of what Catholicism really is, than a man born blind can have a true idea of colour."

13. The *Review* says (*ib.*) that we charged the same writer with showing his characteristic ignorance and mistiness, "because he failed to recognise the propriety of referring to Rome every detail affecting the English Roman Catholic communion, instead of having it settled on the spot." We said that he showed his characteristic ignorance and mistiness, by not seeing that "the whole question turns solely and absolutely on the nature and extent of Papal infallibility" (p. 138).

14. We said that Mr. Ffoulkes's recent work contains not merely unsoundness but heresy; and that, not on a merely subordinate matter, but on one "pervading the whole texture of his treatise" (p. 143). The *Review* implies that we said this without giving any reason: on the contrary, we stated expressly that tenet of Mr. Ffoulkes which we denounced as heretical, and our reason for so denouncing it (pp. 140, 142).

15. The *Union Review* had spoken (very absurdly) of the "candour" with which Mr. Ffoulkes admits the corruption of the Roman Church. To this we answered thus: "We really cannot be surprised at the 'candour' of a heretic—we sincerely hope and believe a merely material heretic—in denouncing that Church to whose faith he is an alien." The *Review* now alleges this to mean, that we disparage candour as "no saintly virtue, and very appropriate to a poor heretic who knows no better." Our meaning was surely very obvious and unmistakeable, viz., that there is no such very laudable candour in a heretic "admitting" that the Church has been greatly in fault.

16. "Mr. Ffoulkes is profoundly ignorant on the most elementary doctrines of that religion which he believes himself to have embraced." The *Review* implies that this again we said without giving any reason for it. We gave two reasons for it. We showed him to be profoundly ignorant on the Catholic doctrine of Papal supremacy (pp. 139—143), and also on the Catholic doctrine concerning the Rule of Faith (pp. 150, 151). Are not these among "the most elementary" of Catholic doctrines?

17. The *Review* states, (p. 499) that we have expressed abhorrence of itself. We have expressed (p. 170) abhorrence of its principles, not of itself. And since it regards ultramontaniam as so terrible an "enemy of God and His Truth," it cannot without disgrace do otherwise than abhor our principles in return.

18. The *Review* states (*ib.*) that that "cause [of religious unity] which was the subject of our Redeemer's dying intercession," is "the subject of the DUBLIN's most bitter and continuous execration." Our Blessed Lord, not indeed when He was dying, but shortly before His death, prayed that all who should believe in Him through the word of the Apostles, might be one, as the Father in Him, and He in the Father: so that the world might know Him to have been sent by God." (John xvii. 20, 21). The *Review* states that the fulfilment of this prayer is "the subject of our most bitter and continuous execration." It cannot be necessary for us to make any reply.

19. The *Review* states (*ib.*) that in commenting on Mr. Ffoulkes we were "too passionate" to remember "that scrupulous fairness in dealing with our enemies," which is "a principle alike of the code of gentlemanly honour and of Gospel morality." Such is not the fact. We are a little surprised, however, that our critic is so confident of his own "scrupulous fairness" in controversy.

20. The *Review* draws attention (p. 500) to the fact that the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *John Bull* expressed admiration for Mr. Oxenham's work, and implies that we could not, therefore, have been perfectly sincere in expressing so low an estimate of its intellectual merits. With all due deference to such eminent theological authorities, we sincerely differ from their judgment in this particular.

21. The *Review* states (*ib.*) that, "with characteristic disingenuousness," we "censure Dean Stanley for ranking Dr. Dollinger with" the authors of "Essays and Reviews." Far from it. We consider the spirit of Dr. Dollinger and his disciples to be in many respects extremely similar to that of the well-known rationalistic volume. But he would himself, of course, earnestly protest against such an opinion; and we said, therefore (p. 153, note), that "Dr. Dollinger will not thank the Dean" for implying it.

22. The *Review* implies (*ib.*) that our allegations against Mr. Ffoulkes rest on "garbled extracts and rhetorical flourish." Our extracts are in no respect "garbled," but most fairly selected; we volunteered to print a continuous letter of two pages (pp. 140—142), which Mr. Ffoulkes had sent merely for our private perusal; and as to our "rhetorical flourish," the present writer heartily wishes he had the literary power requisite for such a purpose.

23. The *Review* states (p. 501) that we gave to Mr. Oxenham's work a "notice" instead of a "review," in order that we might inflict on it "a pretty intelligible snub." Our

reason was that our number already contained a controversial review of more than fifty pages. On the other hand, if we had passed over the work in total silence, it would have appeared that we were afraid to face it. The only remaining alternative was a short notice.

24. The *Review* states that we wished to "strangle" the book instead of "criticising" it. On the contrary, as regarded the deplorable essay on development, we heartily wished we had had more space for doing condign justice to its demerits.

25. The *Review* states (*ib.*) that Mr. Oxenham gave his statement concerning the Lorú's Prayer not on his own authority, but on Möhler's. He intended (no doubt) to do so; but his asterisk was accidentally misplaced, as our critic would have seen if he had looked.

26. The *Review* states (*ib.*) that our notice was "obviously intended" to mislead those who did not read the book. On the contrary, it was intended to assist those who did.

27. "So undisguised is the reviewer's animus throughout," says our critic (*ib.*), "that one would almost imagine he had a personal rancour against" Mr. Oxenham. On the contrary, personally the present writer much likes him, so far as he has the pleasure of his acquaintance.

28. "Another passage," says the *Review* (p. 502), "quoted expressly from Dr. Dollinger, is treated by" us as "a statement of Mr. Oxenham's own." Mr. Oxenham heartily appropriated that statement as his own, and, of course, therefore, made himself responsible for (at least) its substantial truth. Has he ever denied—does he now deny—that he intended to express his full concurrence with it? Nay, does our present critic himself deny this?

29. The *Review* states (*ib.*) that we have accused Mr. Oxenham "of ignoring, if not denying, the divine, as distinguished from the human element, in the process of doctrinal development." *There is not one word of the kind in our whole notice; not one sentence which, by any imaginable interpretation, can be so understood.* We challenge our critic to quote, if he dares, one passage of which he will even allege that such is its legitimate sense. It is this imaginary statement of ours which leads him to say, "*mentiris impudentissimè.*" To whom are the words rather applicable?

30. The *Review* states (p. 503) that we have accused Mr. Oxenham "of ignoring or denying the inspiration of Apostles." We answer precisely as in the last case: we never dreamed of so accusing him.

There is another misconception of our meaning, into which our critic has fallen, quite as complete as any of the preceding,

but very far more natural and pardonable. In page 149 of our July number this sentence occurs :—

An association starts up of which far the larger portion is non-Catholic ; and these non-Catholics, as members of the association, give themselves to prayer that the "divided branches of the Catholic Church" may be "re-united."

Certain words were here put between inverted commas, to express that it is non-Catholics, and not *we*, who think that the Church can have divided branches. Our critic (p. 496) has understood us to mean that we were quoting the programme of the A. P. U. C. Nothing, however, was further from our intention ; as, indeed, the context will show to any one who carefully reads it.

The thirty misstatements, above corrected, occur in an article of nine pages. We will conclude then in the very words in which our critic concludes :—"What must be the character of a system which can only be defended by such weapons, and of the advocates who can stoop to employ them ?" (p. 504).

ART. III.—CATHOLICISM IN GENEVA.

Histoire de M. Vuarin et du Rétablissement du Catholicisme à Genève. Par M. l'Abbé F. Martin, Missionnaire Apostolique, Chanoine Honoraire de Belley, et M. l'Abbé Fleury, Aumônier du Pensionnat de Carouge. 2 vols. Paris: Tolra & Haton. 1862.

GENEVA has been called the Protestant Rome. She earned this title by the central position she assumed from becoming early the hot-bed and focus of the new doctrines, and the theatre upon which the "Reform," in the person of Calvin, made the experiment of a Protestant theocracy. The polity established by him on this basis was guarded, as is well known, by every severe and rigid precaution which could secure to it such an endurance as is not the appanage of any authority of human origin, however respectable that authority may be, and however admirably adapted to promote the well-being of its subjects and endear itself to their affections; a merit which certainly could not be predicated of the sombre tyranny inaugurated by the ambitious heresiarch of Noyon. The attempt, moreover, to bottle Protestantism, so to say, and preserve and transmit it in its doctrinal integrity, as it issued from the brain of the most uncompromising of the "Reformers," proved a patent failure. The repressing and excluding cork did not save the new religion from those decomposing influences which have been at active work on the system elsewhere; on the contrary, Protestant Geneva, the Geneva which burned Servetus, was notorious for its Socinianism long before most of the other sectarian bodies, which date their existence from Calvin's brother heresiarchs, had lapsed to so great an extent from that measure of Christian truth which they retained at their separation. This is a circumstance commonly known; but, possibly, there is less general acquaintance with the fact that not only was Protestantism wholly indebted to violence for its establishment in Geneva, but that the struggle to extirpate Catholicism was a long one and never entirely successful.

The collection of the *procès-verbaux* of the sittings of the Consistory of Geneva, preserved amongst the archives of that body, fill a hundred and ten goodly volumes, which form the record of its proceedings during three centuries. These important documents are still inaccessible to the public, but

some precious specimens of their contents have come forth to light in a work which M. Cramer, a member of the old Genevese aristocracy, printed for very limited circulation in the year 1857, and which is now scarcely to be met with. Always distributed with discretion, it was speedily judged more discreet to withdraw it altogether from the curious eye of the public. The introduction, entitled: "*Coup d'œil dans les Mémoires et Documents publiés par la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève*," has, however, been published separately by M. Cramer. Couched in an apologetic form, it contains, nevertheless, valuable admissions; but care has been taken to modify and weaken the most compromising passages which had figured in the original. The extracts contained in the suppressed work of M. Cramer from the journal kept by the "Venerable Company," which ruled Church and State in the model Protestant republic, thus afford us a glimpse behind the scenes; and the revelation is truly curious. Written while the matters chronicled had still the freshness of the hour, by men who had neither purpose nor fear that their private diary would ever be made public, not only does this register display their prejudice, injustice, and fanaticism without cloak or disguise, but it has preserved most self-condemnatory facts, daguerreotyped, as it were, with a *naïveté* which would be astonishing under any other circumstances. The authors of the valuable work whose title we have prefixed to this article, have ransacked these documents and every other available contemporary authority calculated to throw light upon the subject of which they treat, and four points seem now to be abundantly proved:—1. That the Reform was established at Geneva by violence. 2. That even by the help of violence it was not able to strike root without the importation of foreign elements. 3. That for a whole century both the Reform and its promoters were the objects of the profoundest disgust and aversion to the indigenous population. 4. That Catholicism, which had a very sensible existence within the walls of Geneva for a long period subsequent to the Reform, was never wholly extinguished.

There is, perhaps, no country in Europe which possesses so few memorials anterior to the epoch of the Reform as the basin of the Leman, thanks to the Bernese troops, whose assistance was invoked to force the new religion on an unwilling population. These ruthless bands did their work by the help of fire and sword. A hundred and forty castles were burnt to the ground, not to speak of the utter destruction of churches, convents, and every monument of Christian piety. Where these bloody auxiliaries of Calvinism had

passed, the smoke of conflagration they had kindled went up as a thick cloud, blotting out the fair landscape, veiling the bosom of the lake, and shutting out the mountains from view; while before them whole bodies of the inhabitants took to flight, as men of old fled at the irruption of the barbarian hordes into the Roman empire. To slay, to pillage, and to burn—such was in fact the exclusive occupation of these champions of the new gospel during their progress through the devoted land. Their aid was no less needed in the city. The great bulk of the Genevese population—so favourable in the first instance to a cause affecting to be that of national independence—when they found that under the pretext of vindicating political franchises they were to be robbed of their best treasure, the faith of their fathers, energetically protested and stoutly resisted. So indomitable was their opposition, that for fifty years the active intervention of the Bernese militia could not be dispensed with. But during the process the town became half depopulated, although, to fill the places left vacant by the persecution, a crowd of adventurers was invited to settle within its walls. These men were the scum of Europe, such as society in a state of convulsion always throws to its surface, and who in periods of religious ferment make capital of heretical tenets, just as demagogues bandy revolutionary doctrines in times of political and social disturbance,* in order to serve their own selfish purposes. The city was hedged in by strong fortifications, and still more effectually isolated from all influences obnoxious to the dominant party by the jealous system which it succeeded in establishing. We shall not stop here to more than recall the general features of the government which imposed itself upon Geneva. The instrument of Calvin's tyranny was the Consistory, a body half ecclesiastic half lay. No power which the most excited anti-Catholic imagination ever attributed to that bugbear of Protestantism, the Spanish Inquisition, can be compared to that possessed by this politico-religious machine. It had full authority not only to punish, not only to receive information, but diligently to seek out offenders; and this was accomplished by domiciliary visits from which the humblest homes were not exempt. The inmates were subject to the most minute and searching questions, and obnoxious or suspected persons

* It has been calculated that no less than 13,000 foreigners (chiefly French Protestants) were admitted, the whole population numbering after the Reform but 2,200 souls. Thirty years later there is still not one Genevese name to be found among the ministers; all the first preachers of the "Reform" at Geneva were of foreign extraction.

handed over to the civil magistrate. That functionary, himself the mere agent of the company of ministers, had authority to chastise by the whip and other tortures, by confiscation, exile, prison, or death; all abstention from the public acts of the new religion being regarded as treason against the state. Moreover, not religion alone, but every thing was regulated by the state, and became the subject of legislation. Nothing was too minute to afford matter of suspicion and of scrutiny—neither manners, dress, meals, nor recreations, so that no one could move hand or foot, laugh or smile, if so be any who had a temptation to merriment, under the grim dictatorship of Calvin, without provoking irritation in the ruling power, and giving occasion for the tyrannical interference of the magistrates.

The acts of the Consistory contain abundant evidence of the detestation with which the indigenous population regarded their rulers and the immigrants who had usurped the position of the ancient aristocracy of the city. "These Frenchmen," say the "Children of Geneva," the name adopted by the old inhabitants, "are nothing better than hypocrites, who have made hypocrisy to flourish in Geneva more than in any other part of the world. If they had been good men, they would not have left their own country and renounced their God; and if all were hung that deserved it, there would not be citizens enough in Geneva to string them up." Again, they say that they have had enough of these foreigners; that they had long enough placed their foot on the neck of the people of the country; that these aliens had by no means all of them "brought their ears" with them; and much more in a similar strain. The language used in speaking, not only of the bulk of immigrants, but of their governors in particular, will not always bear recording; but the grossest epithets which the popular diction supplied, and which popular hatred applied to themselves, are retailed verbatim by these potentates in all their native coarseness, along with the cruel punishments which were inflicted in support of their authority or in the vindication of their insulted character.

Calvin comes in for the largest share of obloquy. The people regard him as a proud and tyrannical master, making all to bend, magistrates and his associated ministers included, to his own will. He is a man who only "preaches himself," and not sound doctrine. He is revengeful, implacable, cruel; exiling, torturing, putting to death all who differ from him in opinion. He is a calumniator, whose own conduct "gives scandal to more than ten thousand persons," as Dame Grant avers at her examination. Another woman tells him to his

face, that "she never met with any charity in him, nor got a word of comfort out of him; that he is hard and without bowels, and therefore she has always hated him." His religious supremacy revolts the minds of the Genevese; they cannot understand how he should claim infallibility for himself, after upsetting the Pope's authority, "making himself Pope, and M. Abel (another minister) cardinal," pushing pride so far as "to seek to have himself worshipped." Claude Clérichet declares he would rather go to Champel (the place of execution) than go and kiss Calvin's slipper. The nickname of *Pantoufle*, indeed, long popularly stuck to him, and even some of the ministers grumbled, and said they would not kiss the *pantoufle*. Men gave his name to their dogs in derision, and whispered to each other, that there were three devils in hell, and Calvin was one of them ("trois dyables en enfer, Calvin en est ung"), and that he was fetched thence to Geneva. Songs were even made upon this hideous theme. These uncomplimentary whispers and ribald songs have all found their way into the private State archives; and here, also, we find that Calvin's death was viewed by the people as a judgment; that he was reported to have invoked the devil in his mortal sickness; and that it was said that the ministers had therefore furtively withdrawn his body from the bier, and buried an empty coffin. These are but samples of the abuse of Calvin, which for twenty years forms a running popular comment on his rule in the acts of the Consistory.

Theodore Beza inherited all the concentrated odium which had been lavished on his predecessor, and of which the inferior ministers came in for their due share. From the date of 1565 the imputations on that body become more outrageous. Neither their doctrine nor their honour is spared. Such preachers, it is said, had better confine themselves to the simple text of Scripture, instead of each giving his own opinion, in order to magnify himself; their books are worthless; themselves sorcerers, usurers, drunkards, and profligates. Without supposing that every single accusation brought against these men was founded in truth,* we certainly have here irrefragable proof that never did an ecclesiastical ministry enjoy less respect and consideration than did the body of pastors at Geneva after the Reform, and that it derived its whole weight from the terror it inspired. From this date also, or a little earlier,

* Accusations of sorcery and immorality are frequent against the Protestant ministers from the first days of the Reform, and their truth is not always disavowed in the diary. Alluding to two acknowledged cases of this character, it is simply observed that it would not do to admit the guilt of the offenders publicly—"cela ne peut pas être mis en avant."

along with sayings and accusations similar to those quoted above, mingles an ever-increasing tone of brutal impiety, which bears witness to the progress which an ungodly spirit was making in Geneva.

But by far the most interesting subject of inquiry is the condition of Catholicity itself during this trying ordeal. The Reform, which at first craved only toleration, by one tiger-spring seized on the government, and from that instant pitilessly refused to Catholics all liberty of worship. It is the old and oft-told story, and has invariably marked the conduct of heresy in power. The era of the persecutions was renewed, the priests were banished, and those who remained at the peril of their lives to succour the faithful in secret, hunted down. Religion was pursued into its last sanctuary, the family, whose members were not permitted to pray together in peace. It is difficult, of course, to trace with any precision the fortunes of Catholicity during this period; ever and anon we meet with proof that it lives, and has still a powerful vitality; then, again, we lose sight of it, to find its traces further on. It is in the acts of the Protestant Consistory of Geneva that we have to seek almost all the materials now available for a history of Catholicism in that city during those days, and although it exists but in broken fragments, yet the facts are telling, and suggest irresistibly much which they do not tell.

The old Genevese population might be divided into three classes. First, those who, in spite of all the danger and suffering incurred, firmly adhered to their religion, and, like the martyrs and confessors of old, refused to participate in any act, direct or indirect, which might, by its condescension to Protestantism, be construed into an abjuration of their faith. Secondly, such as permitted themselves outwardly to take some part in Protestant worship, or comply with certain regulations, by which they hoped to elude penal consequences; all the time bitterly bewailing the constraint they endured, and experiencing a lively remorse for acts to which fear alone impelled them. The third class, and we may suppose it to have been by far the most numerous, comprising the great bulk of the indigenous population, had really abjured Catholicism and conformed to the new doctrine, but looked back with regret to the old faith. These were Calvinists by necessity—Catholics by conviction—and belonged to that common class who, when acting under the pressure of danger to life and goods, think that they have sufficiently exonerated themselves when they have alleged the to them unanswerable plea, "What could we do?" We will take a glance at each of these categories.

M. Cramer himself admits, that notwithstanding the peculiar

difficulties under which they laboured ("les difficultés du terrain"), a considerable number of the Genevese adhered steadfastly to their faith. The interrogatories before the Consistory, which are extremely frequent during the first century, furnish examples of the most explicit confessions of faith. For instance, on the 30th of March, 1542, Dame Jeanne Petermann, being questioned respecting her belief, replies that, "she believes in God and Holy Church, and has no other faith; that she says her Pater and Credo in the Roman tongue; that she believes as the Church believes; that she believes in the Holy Eucharist (la Sainte Cène), according as God had said, 'this is my Body;' that God's Word here spoken is true; that she will live and die in it; that she uses the sacraments, and the Word of God, and no other." Reproached with not being content with the Lord's Supper celebrated *in that city*, and with going *elsewhere*, she answers that "she goes where it seems good to her; that our Lord foretold there should be ravening wolves; that she does not recognize ravening wolves, who are false prophets; that she looks for pardon only from the merits of our Lord; that she is not a scholar like them (this we presume to be the meaning of the word *clergesse* employed by her), but that she is neither an idolatress nor a hypocrite; that the Virgin Mary is her advocate and the friend of God, at once a virgin and the mother of Jesus Christ (blasphemies on this subject were a favourite Protestant topic at Geneva); that she will live in the faith of Holy Church; that the 'sieur syndique' is a heretic (*hérèze*), and she does not choose to be so, but will keep the fasts, and not receive their 'cène.'" This confession is followed by many more. They all substantially resemble each other. Jacques Simon has found his account in praying to God and the Virgin Mary. He believes the angelic salutation to have come down from Heaven, and that it is no idolatry. François Droblière refuses to go to the Protestant cène. Jeannette Pernet says, that the old law was much better than the new; and that "since it came they had gained nothing thereby" ("nous n'avons gayre gagné"). On the vigil of Candlemas she buys tapers; she will live in her religion.

This persistence in keeping the Catholic feasts and fasts is one of the great matters of complaint before the Consistory. In 1546 we have women going to mass at Annecy, praying to S. Felix, fasting on his vigil, &c., and persisting in their determination to continue in these practices, denying that they are idolaters ("*s'obstinent grandement à ne pas s'avouer idolâtres*"). There are dying people who actually dare leave this world with the words "Jesus, Maria" on their lips,

in spite of the importunities of the ministers standing by; and women who will keep the Papistic hours with their husbands' connivance, rather than go and hear the "*prêche*." At the Grand Sacconnex almost the entire village is still Catholic. In 1554 a woman affirms that there are still many "altars in the city;" Catholic practices still prevail, especially by the bedside of the dying, into whose hands a blessed candle is put, the sign of the cross made over them, and the Blessed Virgin and St. Michael invoked. Then we have the wife of a burgess, Pierre Corajod, who is visited by a priest, receives rosaries from him, and declares that if she lived a hundred years she would do her best to keep to the Papal religion ("*faire le service de la papauté*"). But this whole Corajod house is papistical—mistress, servant, nurse, children—and it is the asylum of priests, and mass is said there. These may serve as specimens. At that period, also, vast numbers used to slip out of the town every Sunday, in order to hear mass in the neighbouring Catholic parishes.

Our readers are doubtless familiar with the touching incident of the servant girl at the inn, to whom S. Francis de Sales gave communion on the occasion of his adventurous visit to Geneva with the view of attempting the conversion of the heresiarch Beza. For years she had practised her religious duties secretly whilst in the service of a rich Calvinist, who used all his endeavours to pervert her from the faith; subsequently she sought the situation in which the saint found her with the view of succouring Catholics, especially priests and religious. This girl afterwards converted her mistress, and obtained for her the blessing of communion on her death-bed, by enabling the chaplain to the French Embassy, accidentally present in the hotel, to say mass in the cellar.

The number of those who sought by concessions to secure themselves from molestation, was much larger than of those who were true to their faith. These would go and hear sermons, and even occasionally partake of Protestant communion when they "could not help it;" that is, could not help it without danger of punishment, thinking sometimes to save their consciences by hiding in their bosoms the bread they received into their hands. But they dexterously availed themselves of every plausible pretext to stay away. They are denounced to the Consistory, beg pardon, give satisfaction, and recommence the same course. Nothing human, however, can long keep up its fervour and pristine activity; even bigotry flags and grows weary after a time; and so, in 1570, we find the inquisitorial zeal of the Consistory considerably abated; it is the signal for the compromisers to desert the Protestant temples,

where their absence leaves a very noticeable vacancy. The peevish complaints of the Consistory are incessant, but apparently, notwithstanding the assistance of the arm of the law to back their excommunications, they have small success. Amongst the class we are describing we find Catholic practices cherished in secret, and the dear old feasts of the Church which used yearly to bring joy to every home lamented even with tears. Rosaries and crucifixes are treasured up, or even a new image of the Redeemer bought mysteriously in some shop known only to the initiated; for such things took place in Geneva spite the Argus eyes of the Consistory and the Draconian severity of its laws. Occasionally, when danger was less threatening, these unhappy ones would contrive to escape from their embattled prison to some secluded village in the neighbourhood, embosomed in verdure and gladdened by the presence of its God, and refresh their sorrow-stricken spirits by hearing mass; or they would carry forth their young babes for baptism, or run to lay a sick child at the feet of S. Urban at Vétraz. Such incidents abound, and we must remember that we are cognisant only of those which the consistory detected.

But the mixed multitude—comprehending all that is ordinary or inferior, morally and intellectually, all the expediency-men, who in time of trial will endure little or nothing for religion or principle, comprising besides the ignorant, the feeble, the incapable, the easy, the credulous, all that leans on the external and has no initiative or self-sustaining power, with so many other classes who, for one reason or another, never make head against stream—is always the most numerous. It may be compared to the “*Plaine*” in the French Assembly of the Convention. Passively receiving the motive influence of others, it has effectively the most powerful action in times of disorder. It is the accession of the “*Plaine*” which enables violence to triumph. But deep regrets existed, as we have observed, even amongst the conforming multitude, so that it is from their ranks that some of the most abusive language against the Reformers or the Reform emanates. They prefer the mass to their present service, “the concoction of M. Calvin’s brain;” indeed, they privately assure each other that one day they shall have mass again; they say that “the *cène* is nothing but drunkenness, the preacher’s sermons a pack of lies, their boasted liberties a mockery.” One of them opines that after all it is not a bad plan to burn heretics “as they are doing at Chambéry,” and it would be well to rid Geneva of them; another detests Calvin and his acolytes and the foreigners, and would rather listen to three barking dogs than hear him preach. In these angry expres-

sions we recognize men seeking to relieve their hearts' bitterness. A more touching instance is that of Berthélier, who, contemplating his child singing (a high misdemeanour at that time in Geneva), exclaimed, "Go to, child, thou knowest more good and art wiser than all they of Geneva."—"Vaz, mon enfant, tu scaist plus de bien et es plus sage que tous ceulx de Genève." The words were overheard and reported, and the father was severely punished.

But another generation sprang up, and though Catholic traditions and regrets still lingered in many families, yet they necessarily tended both to diminish and to become feeble; and the young who had never witnessed anything but Protestantism, if they did not love it, were at least familiar with nothing else. The actual religious and political state of their country was with them, a fact which was accepted as such, and by habit became natural. But in proportion as the echoes of Catholicism wax faint, we meet with a growing contempt and indifference to religion and a rebellion against moral restraints. Condemned to abjure a faith they loved, and to profess and practise a worship they hated and despised, what wonder if impiety and immorality took root and flourished amongst this unhappy population, although, as the contemporary evidence of the historian Gregorio Leti shows, they were less rife amongst the old Genevese population than amongst the naturalized foreigners. The licentiousness of Geneva at the middle of the seventeenth century attained the most incredible height, and its streets and alleys were the scenes of unimaginable and unrecordable horrors. To do the Consistory justice, it strove with a hearty and even a savage energy for a time to make head against the increasing irreligion and unbelief, but it soon tired of the fruitless struggle. It shut its eyes and feigned not to see; it looked upon Catholicism as the more dangerous enemy. The Reform thus early evidenced its spirit of accommodation with the negations of Christianity, concentrating all its vigour on a truceless war with the Catholic Church. Against the frightful licentiousness prevalent the Consistory was not wanting in the most rigorous measures; from the first the Calvinistic heresy had been distinguished by the puritanical strictness and even whimsical prudery of its code, and from the first it was manifest how utterly nugatory were its laws for guarding purity of morals. In 1673, a chamber was established for the reformation of manners, but the task exceeded its strength, and it died a natural death within a few months.

The ancient Genevese race did not become so thoroughly amalgamated with Protestantism as not to retain throughout

the seventeenth century a certain leaning and attraction towards Catholicism. Hence the constant spiteful and almost ludicrous terrors of the Consistory; for Geneva, it must be remembered, was surrounded on all sides by Catholic villages and towns. The borders of the miniature state could not be fortified with bastions, and the zeal of Catholic priests could defy even bastions and sentinels, and penetrate into the citadel of Calvin itself, to confirm the faith of the little remnant of Catholics, nay, to exercise a certain propagandism within its walls.

Annecy, too, was near, and its bishops still claimed spiritual rule over Geneva; for years a succession of holy men, who had drunk deeply of the spirit of the great S. Francis, and inherited largely of his heart's yearning towards his ravished flock, occupied that see. Then the missions in the neighbourhood, the frequent entry of Capuchins into the city,* even the passage through it of some poor sisters of the Gex mission, nay, the mere distribution of alms by the French residents, all furnished occasions of spasmodic fits of alarm to the poor Consistory.

Strange to say, certain sympathies would crop up amongst the ministers themselves, adding notably, it may be imagined, to the distressing qualms of the body, and this movement becomes considerable at the close of the seventeenth century. We find, for instance, Michel Leger doubting the validity of his mission, and commending the deserters among his flock to the Catholic Church, giving as his reason that that church holds the fundamental articles of the Christian religion. Again, Gamaliel Vautier, another pastor, ever since his return from Paris no longer denounces the Catholic Church as idolatrous or calls the Pope Anti-Christ. In his sermons he confines himself to preaching reformation of morals and the practice of good works, and "hopes that God will bring him out of darkness." Other members of the Genevese clergy, occupying professorial chairs, actually venture to vindicate the antiquity of Catholic doctrines and practices, while Catholic books are privately published, and crosses, medals, and rosaries are extensively sold.

But worse things were in store, for the close of the seventeenth century was to see a permanent blister fixed in the very bosom of the city. The Catholic kings of France had always patronized the little Protestant republic. Political motives are apt to override

* The successors of S. Francis had surrounded Geneva with a kind of cordon of religious houses, chiefly Capuchins. The Jesuits, afterwards, were established in the vicinity.

every other consideration, and it was judged to be the interest of France to support the independence of Geneva against the dukes of Savoy. The French monarchs had long had a *chargé d'affaires* at Geneva, but hitherto this functionary had been a Genevese citizen. However, on the death of the then minister, in 1679, Louis XIV. manifested his intention of investing one of his own subjects with this office, and of giving him the public title of resident of France, with a suitable salary. It was a thunder-stroke to the Genevese authorities, for well they knew that a French resident must have the free exercise of his religion, and that implied a chapel and the celebration of mass. The mass, the idolatrous mass, in the very sanctuary of Protestantism! The mere idea sent a cold shiver through the bones of the Consistory, or, rather, put it in a hot fever of apprehension. But the Grand Monarque was too near a neighbour, and too powerful a patron, to offend; still, endeavours were privately used to engage him to depart from his purpose, but Louis was immovable, and pretended that it was an honour that he was about to confer on the little republic: it must needs be accepted therefore, although it ran counter to the whole system of repression and exclusion rigidly enforced up to that day against Catholic worship, with all its appurtenances—indeed, a severe law had but just been passed against the sale of crucifixes, crosses, medals, rosaries, &c., as well as of Catholic books of devotion. Henceforth there was to be a leak that could not be stopped, or, rather, a large hole in the fortification that could not be filled. An attempt was made to remedy the evil by providing for the resident's attendance at mass in some neighbouring parish. The Council of State offered to keep a handsome coach for him, and a liberal subscription was instantly forthcoming to meet the expense. It had reached a sum sufficient to realize a yearly allowance of 2000 livres, but the representative of France, M. de Chauvigny, was not to be thus balked of a purpose which was probably the main object of his mission. He is said to have acted with a want of moderation and discretion, but of this we have scarcely the materials now for forming a correct judgment. M. de Chauvigny had received the king's instructions, and was acting by the advice of the Bishop of Annecy, and in harmony with the desire of the surrounding population of Catholics. He knew that there were still many faithful in Geneva, and that unless he vindicated his right to make his chapel public, liberty of attendance would certainly be denied them. And, in fact, the next endeavour on the part of the government was to limit this privilege to the resident and his household; but Louis's envoy carried things with a high hand,

and gave the authorities to understand that entrance to his chapel was to be free to all. It was opened on the 30th November, 1679, when Geneva once more beheld mass publicly celebrated. From that day, notwithstanding all the efforts and the multiplied prohibitions of the government, every Sunday and feast-day saw the congregation increase; and, the hotel of the resident being in the Grande Rue, the number resorting to Catholic worship was matter of notoriety. A certain display, indeed, appeared rather to be courted than shunned; and when it was announced that the Bishop of Annecy, who still (as we have observed) kept the title of Bishop of Geneva, was coming to officiate, partial tumults began to occur, and acts of violence were committed. But the Genevese rulers knew that they were the weaker party, and were forced to condemn those with whom they sympathized, and to extend protection to what they dreaded and abhorred. They obtained, however, after a time, the substitution of a more conciliatory resident. Things went on more peaceably now, but not the less favourably for Catholics, although possibly, but for his predecessor's bold assertion of a position, M. Du Pré's moderation would have met with less success. As it was, the change was so welcome that he was received with quite a public ovation, and good harmony appeared to be established, when the revocation of the edict of Nantes came to retard, for a time, the progress of the cause of religion. The Genevese magistrates would willingly have given a hospitable welcome to their expatriated co-religionists, but to offend a monarch like Louis, then, at the height of his power, was not to be thought of. The passage of these exiled bands through Geneva must, however, have reanimated, by the spectacle of their misery, all the fierce enmity of Genevese Protestantism. Nevertheless, we may exaggerate its moral effect. The revocation of the edict of Nantes, while it inflamed the resentment of the "Reformed," and furnished them with a topic which has lasted to the present day, was not received by them exactly as it would be regarded now. Protestants, while eagerly claiming toleration for themselves and their doctrine, had not yet erected toleration into a dogma. How, indeed, could they well have appealed to any such principle at Geneva, where, in the very same year, was re-enacted a rigorous law against "apostates," depriving them of all rights, and banishing them from the city under pain of death?

But we must pass rapidly on. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the court of Turin had its resident also at Geneva, and the resident, as a matter of course, his chapel. In both these chapels two services were required on Sundays

or feast-days, and it has been computed from satisfactory data that the Catholics of Geneva at that period numbered from 1000 to 1200.

The eighteenth century brought with it a still further degeneracy of morals, while the authority of the pastors, and the censures of the Consistory—in short, the whole theocratic discipline of Calvin—had now fallen into complete discredit; the philosophic incredulity of the times had penetrated the masses, and the body of the pastors were still more deeply corrupted by the anti-Christian theories of Voltaire, D'Alembert, and Rousseau. The laws remained as before, but they were a dead letter; the shell of the system had no substance within; Christianity had been utterly eaten out of it. We cannot be surprised, therefore, if '89 and '93 reacted powerfully on a state of things thoroughly imbued with the modern ideas; and Geneva had neither frontiers nor barriers to shut out the Revolution when it burst forth in France, and these ideas became invested with all its terrible force. Jacobin clubs, democratic constitutions, proscriptions, scaffolds—Geneva had them all, and followed in the bloody wake of France for many years. It was plain from the very first that its national independence was threatened. The Revolution, which always raises the banner of liberty and nationality, very soon makes clear decks of both. It had prepared the way for invasion, and on the 15th of April, 1798, the incorporation of the Genevese with the French Republic was demanded by a portion of the inhabitants, and accomplished in spite of the opposition of the remainder. A new era was about to begin, which, notwithstanding its present threatening aspect, was, in fact, to facilitate the restoration of Catholicism in Geneva. It must be noted, to the credit of the kindness of the Genevese, that, during the terrors of the Revolution, the exiled and fugitive priests found frequent shelter and hospitality in their city; and although the government took occasional measures against them, private individuals still continued to show feelings of compassion towards the French clergy, reminding us of the generous sympathy they excited at the same period in Protestant England. From 1792 to 1798 there were constantly priests in Geneva, who, doubtless, often offered privately the Adorable Sacrifice. It is now that the remarkable character comes upon the stage who is the subject of the biography before us. M. Vuarin sums up in his person, as it were, the restoration of Catholicism at Geneva. Great events commonly gather round some one leading individual, from whom they receive their prime movement, or in whom they come to centre; but M. Vuarin was so entirely the agent

employed by Divine Providence in this wonderful work, that his life is its history.

Jean-François Vuarin was born of humble parents, in the little village of Collonges, at the foot of Mont Salève. The family was remarkable for its patriarchal manners and lively faith, recalling the good old times; and Jacques Vuarin, who appears to have possessed, along with moral and religious excellence, a very superior mind, and Antoinette Compagnon, his wife, a truly Christian woman, "of that grave and venerable type which Catholic Savoy can still exhibit, though it becomes more and more rare," were esteemed and respected by all their neighbours. Jacques Vuarin valued those intellectual advantages which he himself had not possessed, and liberally applied his modest savings to give his four sons a good education, and this not from worldly ambition, but chiefly from the hope of being able to consecrate one or more to God's special service. Two of them early manifested much love of study, combined with great piety and innocence of heart. The curé, their instructor, judged them to have a vocation (realized in the case of both), and conceived in particular a high opinion of Jean-François, the younger (born in 1769). "This one," he said, "will be indeed a man." Under the petulance, vivacity, and even occasional violence of temper which the child displayed, he discerned a rich moral soil, and re-assured the anxious father, whom his son's impetuosity somewhat disconcerted. But the good priest pointed out that the boy was recollected at church, loved prayer, and, above all, had an intense horror of every kind of sin. As an instance, we may mention that he prevailed on his father to dismiss a servant who habitually swore, and never rested till he had obtained this satisfaction to the outraged honour of God. This trait, observes his biographer, is characteristic of the future curé of Geneva.

Jean-François distinguished himself much at the college of Nantua, to which his parents sent him. He was endowed with those qualities of quick apprehension, lively imagination, and retentive memory which are sure, when combined with persevering application, to obtain for a youth a high place among his companions in study. His numerous writings in after life, composed almost all of them *currente calamo* to serve a present purpose, prove that he had received, and profited by, a solid grammatical and literary education, and especially that he had been well trained in translation. He knew the value of words, and never lacked them to express his meaning with force and accuracy. Every vacation he returned to the paternal roof to renew his intense love of his own native

country, there where it is best acquired in its purity, a home of austere and fervent traditional piety. The whole moral atmosphere was at that time charged with infidelity. The château of Ferney was visible from Vuarin's humble farmhouse. Hermance was near, and the fresh souvenirs of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who worked mischief more subtle, profound, and enduring than even the blaspheming Voltaire, made the banks of the lake classic ground to the sophists of the day and their infatuated disciples. Young Vuarin probably never opened their works, and he was certainly never tainted with a corruption which more or less affected the rising generation to so wide an extent.

At La Roche he completed his study of *belles lettres*; at Annecy he went through his course of philosophy; and withal his vocation grew and strengthened, and his piety increased—a piety deep and tender, such as some might judge to be hardly compatible with his energetic nature, of which action rather than loving meditation might have seemed the proper element. But “piety,” says his biographer, “had penetrated all the fibres of his heart, and was, so to say, kneaded with his very vitals.” Annecy was at that time a kind of oasis in the desert, thanks to the admirable fidelity of its clergy, who had trodden in the footsteps of its great saint and bishop. It was a city of benediction in the midst of a plague-stricken land. The young aspirant to the priesthood must have been powerfully impressed by the spectacle of the faithful population; and still more must the retirement and recollection of the seminary, and the near neighbourhood of the relics of S. Francis, have affected him. They fostered in him that interior life whence the priest derives all his force, and which is the secret of all his influence over others. Here, then, M. Vuarin had leisure to take long draughts of that ardent love for Christ and His Church which were to be the one absorbing passion of his life. So remarkable was his proficiency in theology that he was advised to follow the Sorbonne course, at which university he took his theological degree. But the Revolution had now broken out, and Savoy was one of the first lands over which the burning lava flowed. By the aid of a phantom of popular suffrage, with examples of which we have since become so familiar, Savoy was, in 1792, united to France, under the appellation of the department of Mont Blanc. The armies of the Republic, accompanied by the commissaries of the bloody Convention, the terror at once of the French generals and of the (so-called) enfranchised populations, brought with them the notorious Grégoire, the intrusive constitutional Bishop of Loir-et-Cher. The four bishoprics of

Savoy were in 1793 declared to be suppressed, and reduced to one; and the oath, decreed on the previous 10th of August, was imposed on the clergy, who, on refusal, became subject to the penalties by which it was enforced, banishment, and, in case of return, deportation or death. The chapter of Annecy, without waiting to have the oath proposed, made, with sublime courage, a public protest against the innovations, and a solemn profession of faith and attachment to the Sovereign Pontiff. Almost the entire clergy of Geneva followed their example; how inconsiderable was the number of those who accepted an oath condemned by the head of the Church, may be inferred from the fact that 632 of the secular clergy from the diocese of Geneva alone sought refuge in Piedmont.

These were not propitious times for entering the priesthood, and might have acted as a discouragement to many. The oath regarded priests alone, and young Vuarrin might have retired to quiet and security in the bosom of his family, but his decision had been made in the power of divine grace, and there was nothing even in his natural disposition to incline him to shrink from danger and struggle. Not being able as yet to take part in the sacred ministry, he devoted himself to the service of the confessors of the faith. He was their secretary, their courier, their sentinel, their intermediary with the faithful. It would form an interesting episode to follow him during these days of blood and terror, now as a simple wayfarer, now as a travelling merchant; sometimes even throwing over his shoulders the official cloak of a government agent, or donning the military costume of the time. He himself avers that this dress was as good to him as a passport. Beholding him with a large cockade on his hat, and mounted on a mettlesome horse, which he dextrously managed, no one dreamed of questioning that he was playing his genuine part in life. His personal appearance and bearing completed the illusion. His limbs formed in a mould of manly strength, his fine striking countenance, with its broad forehead, massive and smooth as that of a Grecian statue, surmounting dark brows, which veiled eyes full of the fire of energy, and remarkable for the rapid glance which precedes the prompt decision; but, above all, his bold, fearless air, and manners free from the slightest shade of embarrassment, not only sufficed to disarm suspicion, but carried with them an imposing *prestige* of authority. Thus one day coming out of an inn in the Chablais, accoutred à la *militaire*, he found two *gendarmes* at the door, who he felt confident were in search of him. His presence of mind never forsook him. The spirited horse he rode was ready at the door. "Citizen," he said to one of the soldiers, "do me the service

of holding his rein while I mount, he is as vicious as the devil." The man readily complied, the Abbé Vuarin vaulted into the saddle, and was off at a gallop. The men stood gaping admiringly after the brilliant cavalier till he was out of sight, then, remembering their commission, they turned and asked the woman of the inn after a certain *calotin* named Vuarin. "Why, that was he," she replied, "whom you just now so obligingly assisted." But it must have cost M. Vuarin little to personate a character of which he possessed the latent elements. Had he not been the "soldier of Christ," he might well have distinguished himself in secular warfare. He had, we conceive, innate military talents, or the talents which go to constitute military genius; nay more, he had the stuff in him of two or three great men, as the world judges greatness, and his career furnishes proof that he might have figured with celebrity as a diplomatist, or as a statesman, or as a man of business, and won earthly prizes and praises, had not his whole ambition been turned to advance God's glory. Much of his heroism and greatness was, therefore, unappreciable by the world, which has no eyes for the greatness of any one who does not "seek his own glory;" yet it could not be altogether hidden, and it obtained for him a certain respect even from his Protestant adversaries. The name of the "great curé," habitually given to him at Geneva, attests this fact. Men might hate, but they could neither ignore nor despise one who for years played so prominent a part in public affairs, and with whom they had themselves often unsuccessfully measured strength.

After the fall of Robespierre, when the violence of the persecution abated, many priests re-entered the country, where a faithful population was earnestly entreating their return, and promising protection and concealment; and M. Vuarin's office became still more important. He was the right hand of the vicars-general in those days of trial and of heroic self-devotion, yet he found time also for study, for he was a man who always knew how to economize time by turning to account the brief intervals which separate one employment from another in a busy life. In 1797 he was called to the priesthood, which at that period placed a man at once amongst the ranks of confessors and candidates for martyrdom. The generous soul of M. Vuarin could alike appreciate the glory and accept the sufferings and perils of the honour conferred on him. He was ordained at Fribourg by the Bishop of Lausanne, in the College of S. Michael, in a chapel known as that of Father Canisius; and from that chapel he came forth imbued with the spirit of the sainted Jesuit, and, like him, possessed with a firm resolve to

devote his life "to the defence of the altars of his fathers, or to the raising up of their ruins." That day he swore to serve the Church without repose by the entire sacrifice of himself, a pledge he faithfully redeemed. The missionary career of M. Vuarin and of his apostolic companions and superiors, particularly during the renewed severe persecution which broke out on the 18th Fructidor, but three months after his ordination, abounds with interest. The feeble Directory which ruled France seemed to possess energy only against religion and its ministers. Inheriting all the hatred of the infidel philosophers and of the bloody Terrorists against Christianity, it beheld with indignation the savage laws of its predecessors in authority falling gradually into desuetude, and a certain spirit of tolerance gaining ground. "Weary out their patience, trouble them by day, disgust them by night, give them no respite," were its first words to its agents, and for two years the experiment was made, by violence where possible, by vexation where other means failed; but all to no purpose. Inexhaustible as its source is the patience of men who work for God. The 18th Fructidor (4th September, 1797), which seemed to throw the Revolution back into its old track of unrelenting persecution, invested the Directory with discretionary powers to deport "all such as appeared likely to disturb public tranquillity." It is very clear who were the men against whom this measure was aimed; the same men who in Apostolic days were accused of "turning the world upside down." But we pass on from times worthy in themselves of special notice to make a few observations upon the great work of M. Vuarin's life.

The establishment of the Consulate, in 1800, once more allowed the Church to breathe, and even to enjoy a prospect of better things. By the incorporation of Geneva with France, in 1798, the nominal Catholic population had been doubled. The garrison, the administrators of government, and their officials, were Frenchmen and Catholics, or at least nothing else—men, it might be, tepid or indifferent, but who, upon any re-awaking of religious principle or feeling, had the faith and recollections of their childhood to fall back upon; while even the most careless were pledged, as Frenchmen, to uphold the honour of their country, implicated in any aggression of Calvinism on their rights. These combined circumstances made it possible to open a chapel so early as the Christmas of 1799. The first priest regularly appointed to the mission was M. Neyre, one of that small band who had never trodden the road of exile, but had remained to console and assist the faithful during the days of terror. He was a man in whom an

angelic sweetness was united with an austere resolve. The people adored him, and used to follow him armed for his protection. He was, however, arrested with M. Joquet, another young priest, in 1793; but was enabled, by the favour of one of his guards, to make his escape. This man made signs to the two prisoners, which M. Joquet did not remark or did not understand. M. Neyre was more fortunate, or more unfortunate, as he afterwards judged. Seizing a favourable moment he fled, pursued with fictitious zeal by his friendly guard, who took care to stumble or meet with some impediment when just about to overtake the fugitive. In a smothered voice he would then call out, "Right," "Left," "Here," "There," "Courage, you will soon be safe." M. Neyre ever regretted that he did not remain to share with his companion the martyr's crown; and not only regretted, but even reproached himself for availing himself of the means of escape, and inflicted on himself—he, so gentle to others—a strange, and, we think, unheard-of mortification: this was, to arise at once if roused from sleep, whatever might be the cause, and not return to his rest that night. This life-long penance he practised to the end. M. Vuarin was given him as a colleague in the Geneva mission. To the latter that city was familiar; it had been his head-quarters and centre of operations during the Revolution, and hither he now repaired with an invincible courage and with a strong presentiment that it was to be the scene of his life's labours.

Courage and perseverance were needed. The first difficulty was to procure some hole or corner where mass could be said; but as fast as the two priests hired a modest apartment, they were sure to be sent to the rightabout by their landlords on discovering the purpose to which it was intended to be applied, or from experiencing the annoyance to which they were subjected on account of their tenants. Great was the consternation of the Calvinists on that memorable Christmas, 1799, when the Holy Sacrifice was at last publicly offered, and the crowd of faithful worshippers could not find room within the walls. And so Catholicism, after all, was not dead in the city of Calvin! For some months the master of the house stood firm against the reproaches with which he was assailed; at last, alarmed by their angry pertinacity, he requested the two priests to seek another lodging. In their next quarters they were assaulted by a furious mob, whom the Protestant fanatics had excited against them. Bottles and paving-stones were hurled against the windows, accompanied with loud threats of bursting open the doors, and throwing the priests into the Rhine. The public authorities were compelled

to interfere with a considerable force for their protection. The most slanderous lies had been circulated by the provokers of this violence, to the effect that these priests, insinuating themselves into families, kidnapped little children in order to educate them in Catholicism, or purchased them from parents whose indigence laid them open to temptation. To make the story more credible—and what cannot be made credible to the credulous?—particular details were confidently added. People even knew the precise sum given a head for these babes—four *louis*. No one thought of asking where men, proscribed but yesterday and stripped of the very necessities of life, found this load of *louis-d'or*. Such difficulties are trifles to popular prejudice, which craves marvels, and to which absurdity serves even as a recommendation. The *préfet*, M. Eymar, a man indifferent to religion, but liberal and just, seconded a judicial inquiry, with a view of exploding the falsehood, and issued a proclamation attesting that, after the strictest investigation, it was discovered there was but one child missing in Geneva, who evidently had met with some accident. The propagators of these malicious calumnies were even threatened with punishment; but privately M. Eymar advised the priests to withdraw for a brief time. They complied; but were soon at work again, undiscouraged by the perpetual change of lodging to which they were subjected. At their sixth post they were able to maintain their ground, and religion made progress in spite of every opposition. Such is a specimen of the difficulties with which the faith had to contend even to win a footing and secure a basis for its operations in Geneva.

By the Concordat of 1802 the old diocese of S. Francis de Sales was swept away, and became merged, along with Geneva, in that of Chambéry. By the law of the 18th Germinal (8th of April) it was decreed to establish a *curé* at Geneva, and a decent place of worship for Catholics was the necessary complement of the legal restoration of Catholicism. M. Vuarin had lost no time in making a request to this effect, immediately on the promulgation of the Concordat, and he designated the church of S. Germain as a suitable building, and one which the Protestants could well spare, because of the vicinity of their large church of S. Pierre. M. Vuarin perfectly knew that the request would not be conceded; but he trusted to time, to pertinacity, to address, and to the vigour of an undying resolution for the attainment of his purpose. The reader may be surprised that since Geneva was now annexed to France, there should be any difficulty in a satisfactory arrangement of matters essential to the proper celebration of Divine worship; but it must be borne in mind that the wily repub-

licans had managed to obtain certain arrangements at the union by which the communal property should continue to belong to the great family of citizens, with full power to dispose of it at pleasure. In virtue of this stipulation, an "Economic Society" and a "Beneficent Society" had been instituted for its administration. Geneva had obtained other exceptional privileges, and preserved much of her ancient machinery of theocratic government. The Consistory, the Venerable Company, the Academy, and other Protestant bodies had been allowed to subsist, so that, while losing its political, the city had preserved its religious institutions. We cannot but accord some admiration to the patriotic determination of the little state to resist absorption by their powerful neighbour, and to cling to all which goes most strongly to constitute distinctive nationality; but, possibly, bigotry acted as powerfully as patriotism, and the Genevese were quite as much afraid of becoming Catholics as of becoming Frenchmen.

It was with the Economic Society, then, that M. Vuarin had to fight his battle. It may be supposed that it received the request with a very bad grace. It could not deny that Catholics were entitled to a place of worship, but it vehemently resisted the cession of any Protestant church for this purpose. It is amusing to follow the steps of this negotiation, and all the subterfuges by which the Economic Society sought delay, and endeavoured to put the Catholics off with some arrangement which might leave them absolutely in the shade. It occurred at last to a sage member of that body to suggest their occupation of certain underground storehouses, known as the Greniers de Rive. "Let our readers figure to themselves a vast subterraneous cellar, a kind of deep dungeon, divided into four compartments by three rows of columns, supporting a low or damp vaulted roof, blocked up on the left side by other buildings, and having an opening only on the right into two parallel streets, from which it borrowed through a door and some loop-holes a few scanty rays of light. Such was the place which the ingenious member recollected so opportunely." It was a happy thought: the Society at once seized on the idea. It would form quite a grand basilica, capable of containing 2,500 persons. It wanted light certainly, but windows could be broken into the side streets. True, greater part of the building must continue to be obscure; day could not penetrate the profound recesses, or find its way round the heavy pillars; but then it would be so cool in summer, and so warm in winter! "You will be delightfully comfortable there" (*délicieusement bien*), said one of the promotors of the project

to M. Vuarin. But M. Vuarin had no mind to return to the catacombs. Notwithstanding this derisive offer, the Society was prepared, on its refusal, to have allowed the Catholics the use of the Oratoire, a German temple, on hire, until they could build a church. But this M. Vuarin recommended M. de Merinville, the Bishop of Chambéry, with whom he was in constant communication, formally to decline. A provisional state, which could not in decent justice be acquiesced in for long, was far better than acceptance of a grant which was in no way satisfactory. The advantages of a patent grievance are manifest, and these would have been forfeited by acquiescing in the proposal. The Oratoire, which barely held 600 persons, had not the outward appearance of a church, and was by situation and otherwise very inconvenient. Nothing *would have been really gained, while nothing more could have been extorted*, because the claims of the Catholics, it would have been urged, had been adequately considered. The French *Ministre des Cultes*, M. Portalis, who had at first shown himself rather cool in the affair, was induced at last, through the influence (as it would appear) of Cardinal Fesch, to bestow serious attention on the Bishop of Chambéry's representations, and wrote a decided letter to the Economic Society, which brought about the desired cession of St. Germain, qualified as a loan for five years, with a nominal rent.* St. Germain had been the first church given up to the Protestants by its apostate curé, Pierre Vandel, in 1535; it was the first to be restored—naked and empty, it is true, of all the requisites of Catholic worship, but which the piety of the faithful was soon to supply. It is a remarkable circumstance that, while seeking at a stone-cutter's something to serve for a holy-water stoop, a large one, in the form of a marine shell, such as had been commonly used 300 years before, was found thrown by in the corner of his shop. It was taken to the church, and, wonderful to relate, precisely fitted the cavity formerly occupied by the "béni-tier;" or, rather, no wonder, for it was the self-same stoop which had fallen it in the old Catholic days.

The first curé appointed to Geneva was M. Lacoste, a priest of much merit, singular moderation, and possessed with a desire to live at peace with all. M. de Merinville, anxious to avail himself of the assistance of M. Vuarin's remarkable talents, summoned him near his person, where he filled

* The unwillingness of the Society to undergo any expense for repair led ultimately to an indefinite extension of the cession, the Catholics undertaking these charges while in the enjoyment of its use: their possession thus became permanent.

the position of secretary to the diocese, a very onerous and responsible charge. He acquitted himself admirably, and won the confidence, esteem, and affection of all the clergy. He was maintained in this situation by Mgr. de Solle, M. de Merinville's successor.

M. Lacoste was not as successful in his office. He was justly loved and respected by the Catholics, and he had vainly hoped to conciliate the Protestants, and disarm their hostility. He sought intercourse with them, and in return he met with much politeness and many fair words. He thought he had gained his point, but it proved to be an illusion. When it came to acts he could obtain nothing. All his requests were refused, all his projects thwarted, while popular intolerance and bigotry occasionally exhibited themselves in the form of insult, and even violence. *M. Lacoste was a good man, but his character wanted that strength and energy which the position demanded.* He committed, moreover, the error of believing himself not sufficiently supported by his bishop, the fact being that he had not adequately realized that the curé of Geneva must, in many respects, rely on himself, that he had a difficult post to defend, and that no episcopal support could avail where there must be a daily hand-to-hand contest. A man of iron was wanted; M. Lacoste was not such. He resigned, and M. Vuarin was appointed, after a vacancy, however, of nine months, not from any hesitation on Mgr. de Solle's part, but from the difficulty of obtaining the approbation of the Imperial Government, to whom men of M. Vuarin's stamp were not very acceptable. Add to which, when the Genevan aristocracy heard of the proposed nomination, they left no stone unturned to defeat it. They had had a taste of the man and his ways in the St. Germain affair; the very idea of his return was sufficient to make them regret their vexatious proceedings with the debonnair M. Lacoste. "*In verbo tuo laxabo rete,*" said M. Vuarin, as he rose from the episcopal parting benediction. To his successor in the secretaryship, at taking leave, he uttered these prophetic words,—"*My friend, when one is named curé of Geneva, one goes to remain there and die there.*" It was in March, 1806, that he was installed; it was in September, 1844, that he expired, never having laid down his arms during a battle of forty years, including his previous missionary labours.

But at this stage we must pause, and defer to a future opportunity our sketch of the great work accomplished by M. Vuarin, in what may be called the restoration of Catholicism at Geneva.

ART. IV.—DOCTRINAL DECREES OF A PONTIFICAL CONGREGATION.—THE CASE OF GALILEO.

Tractatus de Curia Romanâ. Auctore D. BOUIX. Paris : Lecoffre.

Galileo and the Inquisition. By RICHARD ROBERT MADDEN. London : Burns & Co.

Galileo and his Condemnation (*Rambler* for January, 1852). London : Burns & Co.

Notes on the Ante-Galilean Copernicans. By Professor DE MORGAN (*Companion to the Almanac* for 1855).

Motion of the Earth. Article in the *Penny Cyclopædia*, attributed to Professor DE MORGAN.

Histoire d'Urbain VIII (*Histoire des Souverains Pontifes*, tom. v.). Par M. le Chevalier ARTAUD DE MONTOR. Paris : Lecoffre.

"I HOLD firmly every doctrine defined by the Church as
 "of faith, and am therefore as fully a Catholic as any
 "one can be. Moreover, before I submitted to the Church, I
 "had understood that all Catholics admit the maxim, 'in
 "necessary things, unity; in doubtful things, liberty; in all
 "things, charity.' I have therefore extremely strong ground
 "of complaint. For whereas all tenets undefined by the
 "Church are emphatically 'dubia,' my 'liberty' in their
 "regard is seriously hampered, by the busy intermeddling
 "of certain Pontifical Congregations, for which no one claims
 "infallibility. Take one instance out of a thousand. I have
 "full right, as a Catholic, to hold that the Pope's civil prince-
 "dom is injurious to true religion. Yet if I publish this
 "opinion, my book is put on the Index; nay, if I am even
 "known to hold it, I am regarded by my brother Catholics
 "with deep suspicion and alienation. Many of my friends
 "assure me further, and I suppose correctly, that a doctrinal
 "decree of these Congregations imposes on me an obliga-
 "tion of silence; though, how the Church can be defended
 "for silencing that which at last may turn out to be the truth,
 "no one has attempted to explain. These tactics will, no
 "doubt, seriously injure the cause to which I adhere; yet
 "ultimately that cause, as being true, will prevail. Whenever
 "it does prevail—when all Catholics have come to embrace
 "that very tenet which they now denounce—the Church's
 "command of silence will be tacitly withdrawn and smuggled
 "out of sight; and Catholic controversialists will be eager

"in pointing out, that no one ever claimed infallibility for the mere decree of a Congregation. But I will venture to predict that neither those controversialists, nor yet the ecclesiastical authorities, will frankly express shame, or even regret, for that most unwarrantable interference with Catholic liberty of which the latter have been guilty; and which has so grievously retarded the triumph of truth. Or rather, why do I speak of the future, when we see the future in the past and present? These fallible but formidable Congregations condemned as heretical in his time that very Galileo, whom the Pope himself now admits to have taught truly. The Church did all she could to retain men in the darkness of Geocentricism; and at this very day seems to have learned no wisdom at all, from the disastrous consequences of her former usurpation.

"This case of Galileo, indeed, cannot be too constantly kept in view, as a *reductio ad absurdum* of various ultramontane notions; notions which are still expressed as confidently (I may say as shamelessly) as though Galileo's condemnation were not an established fact. We are told, forsooth, that a sound and loyal Catholic tries to be in harmony with the spirit of Rome, and to follow every indication of the Church's mind. Now if any utterance in the world can justly be taken as an exponent of the Church's mind, as an indication of the spirit of Rome, it is the solemn decree of a Pontifical Congregation, sanctioned and approved by the Pope himself. It would appear, then, that for the space of almost one hundred and fifty years, every sound and loyal Catholic would have opposed, on theological grounds, all scientific advocacy of the earth's motion. A good Catholic of 1865 is to be in direct theological opposition with a good Catholic of 1616. Then, again, Pope Zachary condemned all belief in the antipodes; and an ultramontane therefore of the time would have followed him in his absurdity."

Those who have been at all familiar with the *Home and Foreign Review*, and with the later numbers of the *Rambler*, will admit that we have here accurately expressed a line of argument, which was constantly recurring in their pages. Nor must we imitate the proverbial ostrich; and suppose that, because these reviews have ceased to exist, the school which animated them has ceased to think. There is no inconsiderable number, we fear, of educated Catholics, both here and abroad, who more or less fully sympathize with the view of things which we have just drawn out; and those therefore who believe more soundly, must not shrink from encountering it, unless they would abandon altogether the field of reasoning.

It is true, no doubt, that moral faults—pride, intellectualism, worldliness—are greatly at the root of all this disaffection, in the case of many who have imbibed the poison; but as in the more extreme case of heretics a similar fact does not abrogate the obligation of controversy, so neither in the instance before us. No doubt it rarely happens, that controversy produces at the moment any sensible effect; yet in the long run it tells and has its weight. Accordingly, in our three last numbers, we have been preparing our way for a full reply to this line of objection;* and we hope in our present article satisfactorily to conclude our argument.

Now firstly and chiefly, the foregoing effusion most singularly omits all reference to what is really the one critical point. It is persistently implied by these unsound Catholics, that there are but two kinds of ecclesiastical pronouncement to be taken into account: on the one hand those definitions of faith, which every Catholic admits to be infallible; and on the other hand those congregational decrees, for which no one claims that attribute. But the fact really is, that the whole question turns practically on a class of declarations which is intermediate between the two, and which (of late years at least) has been far larger in extent than either. We refer to those doctrinal instructions, which are not indeed definitions of faith, but which nevertheless are put forth, not by Congregations, but by the Pope himself as Universal Teacher; instructions which condemn every contradictory tenet, not as heretical, but as deserving some lesser theological censure. Now the various tenets to which our opponents are principally wedded, are condemned, not primarily by the Congregations, but by the Pope himself thus speaking *ex cathedrâ*. That doctrine, *e.g.*, on his civil principedom, which good Catholics maintain, has been taught by him in several of these utterances; and the Syllabus recites them all for our guidance. Those tenets again which claim for secular science entire exemption from ecclesiastical control, were not censured by a Congregation, but by the Fröhschammer and Munich briefs. Then the condemnation of Hermes and of Günther, which have closed to Catholics so large a number of philosophical questions, proceeded directly from Gregory XVI. and Pius IX. respectively. If such Papal pronouncements—accepted as they always are by the whole Episcopate—were not infallible, our mouth would be closed; we should find it impossible to deny, both that our opponents are most harshly treated, and that

* No. VII. pp. 41-58; No. VIII. pp. 443-449, 479-80; No. IX. pp. 121-132.

the interests of truth are indefensibly violated. It is on this account that we have argued so earnestly in recent numbers, both from authority and from theological reason, that these pronouncements are beyond all possible question infallible; and that no Catholic is at liberty, under pain of (materially at least committing) mortal sin, to doubt their truth. Our arguments are before the world. If our opponents reply to them, we will carefully consider and examine every such reply; but if they decline doing so, let them not complain (as they are somewhat fond of complaining) that they are censured but not answered.

However it is but reasonable to admit that arguments retain their own objective force; and are not refuted, by its being shown that they do not benefit the party adducing them. Moreover, the objections to Catholic truth, founded on Galileo's condemnation, are at first sight so plausible, that there is no anti-Catholic reasoning in the world which more imperatively demands an answer. "How could it be legitimate to claim interior assent for a decision, which was confessedly fallible, and which in fact, as all the world now admits, was grievously erroneous?" "How can it be always the more perfect course to follow the Church's spirit and guidance? since those who did so in the seventeenth century rejected as heretical that which all Catholics now admit to be true." In the second part of our article we will enter fully and unreservedly on this case, and vindicate everything which the Roman Congregations did. We may therefore reasonably claim from our readers, that our discussion on the general question—on the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation—be not frustrated from its due effect on their mind, through their preconceived impression on this particular case of the Florentine astronomer.

On the Pontifical Congregations, full information will be found in that work of Bouix's which we have named at the head of our article; and which we cannot too warmly recommend to those interested in such matters. We are here, however, only concerned with two; viz., those of the Inquisition and the Index: nor even with these, save as regards the doctrinal decrees which they issue from time to time.* Does any theologian claim infallibility for these? By infallibility is meant, not the mere fact of inerrancy, but the divine promise of inerrability; and this being supposed, we reply that infallibility is not ascribed to these decrees,

* It can hardly be necessary to explain that a "doctrinal" decree is one, the main purport of which is not to command or to prohibit, but to declare that this or that proposition is theologically sound or erroneous.

merely as such, even by their most earnest upholders. Bouix expresses very clearly the reason for such non-ascription. Whatever authority these Congregations possess, is delegated to them by the Supreme Pontiff; and he can delegate indeed his jurisdiction, but not his infallibility (p. 475).

Under these circumstances some Catholics, if we rightly understand them, have maintained that every doctrinal decree of either Congregation is purely disciplinary; that it is not intended by the Pope to have any other effect, than to forbid all public advocacy of the censured tenet; and that the yielding to it interior assent is neither commanded nor even counselled. But such an opinion cannot be maintained for a moment. In the case of Galileo, it is patent on the surface that interior assent was required both by Paul V. and by Urban VIII. to a doctrinal decree of the Index. But without dwelling on one particular case, consider this general fact:—It is a constant practice with the Congregation of the Index to say expressly of a condemned author, where it can be said with truth, "he laudably submitted himself" to the condemnation; and it is well known by all acquainted with facts, that the mere promise of silence will never suffice to obtain this eulogy. It is "laudable," therefore, that a Catholic writer, when condemned, shall assent to the justice of his condemnation; and far more certainly, therefore, must the Holy Father account it laudable, that every Catholic shall yield interior assent to a formal decree on doctrine, which the Congregation may put forth expressly and deliberately. Indeed, it is certain that (at all events), since the recent *Encyclical* and *Syllabus*, no Catholic is permitted to hold the opinion which we combat; for the recent *Encyclical* and *Syllabus* make it absolutely certain, that the Munich Brief was a dogmatic decision pronounced *ex cathedrâ*, and consequently infallible. But the Munich Brief rules as follows:—

And we also persuade ourselves that these men did not intend to declare that *that perfect adhesion towards revealed truths* which they acknowledged to be altogether necessary for obtaining true scientific progress and for confuting error, can be obtained, if faith and obedience be only rendered to dogmata expressly defined by the Church. For even if the question were concerning that subjection which is to be rendered by an act of divine faith, such subjection should not be limited, &c. &c. . . . But . . . the men of this Congress should admit that it is not enough for Catholic men of science to receive and venerate the above-named dogmata of the Church; but that it is also necessary that they submit themselves, as well to the *doctrinal decisions which are put forth by the Pontifical Congregations*, as also to those heads of doctrine, &c.

Now it is very plain that throughout this passage the question is not of "respectful silence," but of interior assent. It refers at starting to the due means of securing "perfect adhesion to revealed truths;" *i.e.*, of course, true and interior adhesion to them. Moreover, the Pope claims submission in one sentence (1) to these decrees, and (2) to those heads of doctrine recognized as absolutely certain, "by the common and consistent agreement of Catholics." Now, no one will doubt that the "submission" claimed for the latter is interior assent; hence the submission claimed for the former is interior assent also.

Here, then, we are in direct contact with the central difficulty of the question: the claim of interior assent to fallible decrees. Yet, before grappling with this difficulty, we must enter on one further inquiry. We have said that no doctrinal pronouncement of a Congregation is infallible "merely as such;" but can it ever happen that what, in form, is the doctrinal pronouncement of a Congregation, is in fact an utterance *ex cathedra* of the Supreme Pontiff? We shall approach this necessary inquiry at greater advantage, if we first complete in one particular that doctrine which we have been recently advocating, on the Pope's immediate doctrinal instructions. In our January number we thus expressed ourselves:—

Let us suppose the Pope to put out some declaration, which, whatever its form, is intended for publication (as is shown by the circumstances of the case), with the purpose of inculcating some doctrine on the whole Church as theologically certain, or of denouncing some tenet to the whole Church as theologically unsound. . . . We maintain that the doctrine so inculcated is infallibly true; and that the tenet so denounced infallibly merits that particular censure which has been expressed; and that the contrary opinion is theologically unsound (p. 46).

The question has been asked, how, in the case of any given Papal document, we can be certain that such is its purpose. Several declarations, for which we claim infallibility, are in form addresses to some individual pastor; and it may be even said that in a later passage we made an admission, which throws obscurity over the whole subject. "The Pope," we said, "may give some doctrinal decision as head of the Church, and yet not as Universal Teacher. Some individual may ask at his hands, and receive, practical direction on the doctrine to be followed in a particular case, while yet the Pope has no thought at all of determining the question for the whole Church and for all time" (p. 51). How can we possibly tell, inquires the objector, whether a letter to the Archbishop of Cologne or of Munich is intended as a doctrinal instruction for

the whole Church, or merely as a practical direction to that particular prelate? The question demands an answer, and we had purposely reserved our answer to this very place.

(1) The great majority of these infallible declarations are *not* addressed to any individual pastor or section of the Church: they are contained in allocutions, encyclicals, or other apostolic letters, which have not even the appearance of being intended for one Catholic rather than for another. In none of these cases does the difficulty arise. Whatever doctrinal declaration is contained in any one of these, is pronounced *ex cathedrâ* and infallibly.

(2) We must suppose that the inquirer is really docile, and desirous of imbibing the full lesson of doctrine which the Church dispenses. Several unsound Catholics seem to regard the infallible knowledge of truth, not as an inappreciable blessing, but as an almost intolerable burden. For such men we are not writing. If they choose to shut their eyes, it is their own fault that they lose their way. It is quite impossible, in their state of mind, that they can hold any Catholic truth Catholically, because their state of mind is essentially anti-Catholic.

(3) The Holy Father has not yet (so far as we know) expressly and clearly laid down any universal mark of distinction between those letters, addressed in form to individual bishops, which are, and which are not, *ex cathedrâ*. There will, therefore, probably be some few, of which it is really uncertain whether they are actually infallible or not. We see no kind of inconvenience in this admission. Even if not infallible, they possess the very highest authority short of infallibility; and no contemporary Catholic, possessing the most ordinary humility, will dream of dissenting from any doctrine which they teach.* On this head—for it is practically very important—we will repeat some remarks made in our January number:—

Meanwhile an objection has been urged against our whole view, which some thinkers regard as very serious. They consider that "the gulf is infinite which separates what is of faith from what is not of faith," and allege very truly that our theory presents Catholic doctrine in a most different aspect. To us, their objection appears as unphilosophical as it is untheological. Is it the case in secular science that a line can be broadly and sharply drawn, such that all on one side of that line is absolutely certain truth, while all on the other side is quite open and undetermined? Is not the opposite fact notorious? Some conclusions are absolutely established;

* Our meaning in this word "contemporary" will appear at the end of this article.

others nearly so ; others, again, under present circumstances, are much more probable than their contradictories, yet by no means sure not to be afterwards disproved ; and so, along a kind of graduated scale, we finally arrive at those on which, as yet, one side is not more probable than the other. So in theology. One class of doctrines unquestionably demands the assent of divine faith. Of a second class, it is quite certain that they are infallibly true, and probable that they are an actual part of the deposit. A third class are beyond all doubt infallibly true, yet with no pretensions to be strictly of faith. Of a fourth class, it is more or less probable that they are infallibly true. A fifth class are almost certainly true, though not infallibly determined. And so by degrees we arrive at those on which every well-instructed Catholic has full liberty to take one side or the other. Thus the pursuit of theological science becomes one sustained discipline of intellectual docility ; thus the student is constantly reminded that he thinks under the assiduous superintendence and direction of that Holy See, whose continuous infallibility is the abiding light of Catholic doctrine.

(4) The question, in regard to any given Papal letter, is simply this. Are the doctrinal declarations which it may contain intended as authoritative and final determinations for the whole Church ? Or are they intended, on the other hand, as mere practical directions to the individual addressed, as to the doctrine which he is to follow in a particular case ? Now, in the large majority of instances, a study of the document itself will show most unmistakably to which class it belongs. We should be glad, did our limits permit, to examine several in this respect ; but we must confine ourselves to one of each kind.

As our instance of the former class, we will take Pius IX.'s letter to the Archbishop of Cologne condemning Günther : " *Eximiam tuam*," June 15, 1857. We now, indeed, know for certain, from the Syllabus, that Pius IX. did intend this as an infallible instruction ; but we must maintain that even otherwise its internal evidence sufficed to render this fact indubitable. The Holy Father begins by referring to " the duty of his apostolic ministry," and the extreme importance of " preserving entire and inviolate the deposit of faith " wherewith he is entrusted. When he heard, therefore, he adds, that many propositions of Günther were theologically unsound, he at once commanded the Congregation of the Index to examine carefully all that philosopher's works, and report to him the result. This, therefore, the Congregation did ; it found in those works a large mass of error ; and put forth a decree condemning and interdicting them. This decree, says the Holy Father, " sanctioned as it was by our authority, and published by our command," was sufficient to let *all Catholics* know that Günther's doctrine " might not be regarded as

sound." Certain persons, however, the Pontiff implies, fancied that this decree did not carry with it full weight, because it did not note any definite propositions of Günther, nor express any special and determinate censure. These persons, he declares, are quite mistaken in thinking so lightly of the decree; and they are also extremely in error if they think there were no definite propositions which the Congregation found censurable. Pius IX. then proceeds to the main doctrinal content of his letter, and specifies various deplorable errors advocated by Günther. Now we will not say merely that no candid person,—but that no person, however uncandid, possessing ordinary common sense,—would account this letter as merely intended for giving doctrinal directions to a particular bishop. Its purport is this: that all Catholics were bound before he issued it to repudiate Günther's tenets; but that as some difficulty had been felt from the non-enumeration of special errors, such enumeration he here gives. The whole doctrinal portion of the letter bears on this one question, what all Catholics are required to hold and to reject.

With this letter let us contrast, as our instance of the other class, Pope Zachary's letter to St. Boniface, in which the antipodes are mentioned. At the end of our article we will show that no false doctrine at all is upholden in this letter; but it will show the unscrupulous carelessness with which anti-catholic controversy is often carried on, if we make clear how impossible it is, with the least show of plausibility, to represent this letter as intended to teach the universal Church any matter of doctrine. It may be found in Baronius' Annals, A.D. 748 nn. 3—12.

The Pope begins by saying that he had heard from (St.) Burchard of Boniface's great trials in preaching the Gospel, and that he earnestly prays God to give him grace and salvation. "But there were inserted," he adds, "in those communications of thine various particulars, on which *thou didst desire the judgment and advice and consolation of the Holy See.*" Here at once that very feature is conspicuously present, which in Pius IX.'s letter just considered was so conspicuously absent: the Pope is giving practical directions to an individual prelate on particular cases. Firstly, he refers to certain false doctrines on the sacrament of Baptism, which Boniface had mentioned (n. 4, 5); and next to certain false priests who had deluded many (n. 6). He exhorts the saint to courage in all his trials, and entreats him to encourage the rest (n. 7). He then condemns the extraordinary tenet, maintained by Sampson a Dutch priest, that a man may become a Christian without Baptism, by the laying on of episcopal hands (n. 8). He

praises warmly a volume written by Boniface "on the truth of the Catholic faith" (n. 9). He declines to send a priest to France and Gaul representing the Holy See, being thoroughly satisfied with Boniface as its representative. He exhorts him, however, to hold provincial councils (n. 9). He refers again to Boniface's book (n. 10) and then proceeds to the case of Virgil.* This man had fostered enmity between Boniface and Duke Otho, and had reported himself to have been appointed by the Pope successor to a certain deceased bishop. The Pope assures Boniface that this report is totally false (n. 10). The same Virgil had been denounced by Boniface, in the letter to which this is an answer, as holding "a certain perverse doctrine against God and his soul,"—the doctrine, viz., "that there exists under the earth another world, and other men, and another sun and moon." The Pope enjoins Boniface to degrade Virgil from the priesthood and excommunicate him, if he be convicted of this opinion; and promises that he will himself look into the matter (n. 11). Indeed, on the whole case, not of Virgil only, but of another priest, Sidonius, he acknowledges the receipt of Boniface's communication, and says he has already written to them with severity. He exhorts Boniface, at the same time, to endure such men with gentleness and patience (n. 11). Lastly, he entreats the saint not to resign his bishopric, but to choose a worthy coadjutor (n. 12).

We will speak at the end of our article on Virgil's view of the antipodes. But we have risked wearying our readers by giving a full analysis of the letter, that the very miscellaneousness of its contents might be seen abundantly to evidence the truth of our conclusion. This is the question. Was Pope Zachary's letter "intended to inculcate some doctrine on the whole Church as theologically certain?" Or was it intended to convey personal guidance and exhortation to St. Boniface? The question may really be said to answer itself.

5. We are inclined, however, to think, that the Pope does give a general test, whereby we may certainly know that some letter, addressed to an individual bishop, is intended as an instruction to the whole Church *ex cathedra*. We speak here with diffidence, as we are not aware of any theologian who has treated the question; but we observe that in the recent En-

* Some writers have identified this unhappy man with St. Virgil, bishop of Salzburg; but Pagi earnestly protests against this opinion, and Perrone thinks Pagi most certainly in the right. Apart from the historical inquiry, no one, we think, can read the Pope's letter, and believe that Virgil approached to sanctity ever so distantly.

cyclical Pius IX. unites all the apostolic letters from which the Syllabus is compiled, under the common category of "*having been published by him.*"* If the Pope writes to a bishop for his individual instruction, of course there is no secret in the matter, and the letter becomes universally known; yet its publication takes place by the mere force of circumstances. But if the Pope himself *commands* its publication and promulgation, by this very fact he seems to indicate, that the letter is not intended for the bishop alone, but as a public act affecting the whole Church. We shall see immediately that this view of the case receives great light, from a theological opinion held by many on the decrees of Pontifical Congregations; while reciprocally, if it be admitted, it will tend greatly to confirm that opinion.

It is now time to enter on a distinct but kindred inquiry. We have just seen that the Pope's letter to an individual bishop, is often, in fact, a doctrinal instruction addressed to the whole Church. May it not similarly happen, that what is in form the doctrinal decree of a Congregation, is in fact a doctrinal decree promulgated by the Pope as universal teacher? We must maintain that under particular conditions this is the fact. Bouix quotes the following judgment of that very eminent and learned theologian Zaccaria (p. 472). The italics are our own:—

Sometimes these decrees are issued expressly in the name of the Pope alone, the cardinals of the congregations being named therein only as examiners, who have given their judgments to his Holiness; as is seen in the decrees of Alexander VII., Innocent XI., and Alexander VIII. against certain propositions. At other times decrees are *published* in the names of the cardinals, but with the knowledge of the Pope, and *by his special order*. Some persons, it is true, will have it that in these two cases the Pope is to be considered not as head of the Church, but only as head and president of those congregations; and that, consequently, his infallibility does not inflow into such prohibitions: but it is also true, that the greater number have a different opinion on the subject, and maintain, *with much reason, that even in such cases the Pope acts as the infallible head of the Church.*" . . .

There remain those prohibitions of the congregations which are issued with the assent of the Pope, *but not by his particular command*. These are not strictly [veramente] *infallible*.

Zaccaria mentions here three different kinds of doctrinal decree:—1. Those which issue directly from the Pope, after

* "*Pluribus in vulgus editis Encyclicis, &c., errores damnavimus.*" We would submit whether the more natural translation of this would not be, "*by publishing Encyclicals, &c., we condemned,*" &c. But it is immaterial to our argument.

having consulted certain Congregations ; 2. those which issue from a Congregation, but of which the Pope himself has commanded the publication ; 3. those which issue from a Congregation with the Pope's assent, but which are not published by his particular command. The first kind does not here concern us : such doctrinal decrees can in no sense be called those " of a Pontifical Congregation," and they are but particular instances of that far larger class which we have been treating in earlier articles. That all decrees of this class are infallible, we have maintained in those articles to be beyond the possibility of question.*

Passing, then, to the two kinds of decree which do concern us, it is Zaccaria's doctrine, that decrees of a Pontifical Congregation, *which are published and promulgated by the Pope's express command*, are, in fact, his instructions *ex cathedrâ* and infallible. This doctrine, it seems to us, has received very great support from Pius IX.'s language in speaking of Günther's condemnation. " Which decree " [of the Index], he says, " sanctioned by our authority, and *published by our command*, ought plainly to suffice, in order, that the whole question be judged as *finally decided* [penitùs dirempta] ; and that all who boast of the Catholic profession should clearly and distinctly understand that complete obedience must be paid to it, and that the doctrine contained in Günther's books may not be considered sound [sinceram haberi non posse]." We do not see how the words " penitùs dirempta " can well imply anything less, than a final and absolute determination. It is so necessary, however, for the main purpose of our article, to make clear the distinction between the two kinds of decree, that at the risk of tediousness we will set down one or two rudimental truths on which that distinction depends.

The Pope exercises two different functions, not to speak of more—(1) that of the Church's Infallible Teacher ; and (2) that of her Supreme Governor. The former he can in no sense delegate ; but of the latter he may delegate a greater or less portion, as to him may seem good. Moreover, in either of these characters he may put forth a doctrinal decree ; but with a somewhat different bearing. If he put it forth as Universal

* We do not understand how any one can possibly have supposed that decrees addressed to the whole Church by the Pope, in his own name, are issued by him merely as head of a Congregation ; because it is admitted by every Catholic that if the episcopate adhere to such decrees, they become the utterance of the *Ecclesia Docens*. We conclude, therefore, that Zaccaria, by some inadvertence, applied to the *two first* kinds what he only meant of the *second*.

Teacher, he says, in effect, "I teach the whole Church such a doctrine;" and the doctrine is, of course, known thereby to be infallibly true. But if he put forth a general doctrinal decree as Supreme Governor, he says, in effect, "I shall govern the Church on the principle that this doctrine is true." That the doctrine so recommended has an extremely strong claim on a Catholic's interior assent, is the very thesis which we are presently to urge: but of course it is not infallibly true; because no Papal dicta have that characteristic, unless the Pope utters them in his capacity of Universal Teacher.

We now come to the immediate question. Zaccaria's doctrine in itself is, at least, very plausible: viz., that if some doctrinal decree, drawn up by a Pontifical Congregation, is promulgated and published by the Pope's express order, it is infallibly true; because he is in fact (by that very order), directly addressing the Universal Church as her Teacher.

But whether or no this can be maintained (which, at last, is of no very great practical moment), the latter part of Zaccaria's opinion is most indubitably true: viz., that no doctrinal decree of a Congregation is sanctioned by Papal infallibility, unless its promulgation is made expressly by Papal command. For such a decree in no sense comes to the Church immediately from the Pope; but from the Congregation, as his delegate. But in which capacity of his is the Congregation his delegate? Exclusively, as we have seen, in his capacity of Supreme Governor. Such a decree, therefore, is put forth by the Supreme Pontiff in this latter capacity; its doctrine has, no doubt, an extremely strong claim on a Catholic's interior assent, but it has not the promise of infallibility.

We are now to consider the interior assent due to these respective kinds of decree. And in regard to those which are infallible, of course the case is plain. Catholics are required to yield them a most unreserved interior assent, for that simple reason. The whole difficulty turns on those which are confessedly fallible. And here the reader should be reminded, that the question concerns doctrinal decrees expressly put forth, and nothing else whatever. As regards, *e.g.*, the Congregation of the Index, Catholics are not required to believe, as a matter of course, that any particular book really contains that particular tenet which the Congregation may ascribe to it; though probably there never was a tribunal, whether you consider its constitution or its established method of procedure, in which there was better security for a true conclusion being reached.* But all this is apart from our present subject.

* The *Weekly Register* of April 29, 1865, translates an admirable defence

It is commonly asked, then, how interior assent can be claimed for a pronouncement confessedly fallible. Of course no one is required, or even permitted, to accept such pronouncement with that absolutely unreserved and unquestioning assent, which is due to infallibility. But take such an illustration as this. I have never studied medicine systematically; but I am fond of experimentalizing in a quiet way, and have come to an opinion that a certain remedy would be serviceable for a certain disease. I publish my opinion, with its grounds; and find it repudiated by every one, young or old, who has gone through a medical education. All combine to assure me that I am quite mistaken, and that my reasoning is absurdly insufficient to establish my conclusion. No one alleges that God has endowed the medical profession with infallibility; and yet it would not be so much presumption as actual insanity, so soon as I am satisfied that they have really pondered what I have written, if I hesitated to abandon my own opinion in deference to theirs; and this, though I were wholly unacquainted with their reasoning, or could see no force in it. You cannot possibly allege, then, that the notion is in itself absurd, of interior assent being due to a fallible judgment. All that you can say is, that it is not legitimately claimed for

of the Index, published at Rome by Mgr. Nardi, in answer to the strictures of M. Rouland in the French Chamber. Bouix gives the following quotation from Zaccaria, on which we shall express some comment at the end of our article.

"And, generally speaking, when he (Arnauld) says that there may have been, or that there may be in future, unjust prohibitions of books at Rome (though not among those which emanate immediately from the Pope himself, *ex cathedra*, or from the Congregations [published] by his special order, and with his special approbation, for the entire Church), this author will not meet with much opposition from us; because into such judgments, if they are not supported by infallibility, (although coming to us from highly respected persons), through the fault of the revisors, or through the mistaken impression of some judge, who is either unfair, or prejudiced, or timid, sometimes obreption or subreption may be introduced; and sometimes that '*summum jus*,' which becomes '*injuria*.' Prohibitions are not different in their nature from dispensations, which, generally speaking, may sometimes be unjust.

"But in the first place, those injustices which may sometimes corrupt a decree of prohibition, if regarding doctrine, could at most, I think, only exist so far as there is attributed to an author some proposition which he really did not mean to advance, or which he certainly did not mean in the unsound sense which the censors attributed to him. But I do not believe this ever occurs with respect to doctrine, at least if it be theological or sacred; for I am convinced that it appertains to Providence not to permit that Rome, even apart from cases where the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*, should condemn as erroneous a doctrine which is not so. Experience confirms my assertion: because it will be found that since the Congregations of Cardinals have been instituted, they have never, in any book, condemned a doctrine which did not deserve the censure."

that particular class of fallible judgments which we are now considering. We maintain that it is legitimately claimed for them; and on this alternative issue is now to be joined.

We must first, however, state clearly what is the kind and degree of interior assent for which we contend. So much as this. Supposing some preconceived opinion of mine is condemned by a Pontifical Congregation: I should at once abandon all interior belief in the truth of that opinion; I should take for granted the correctness of the decree; and I should reconsider my grounds of conviction, with the full expectation of finding myself to have been quite in the wrong. More than this, we believe, is not expected; less than this, we are sure, is not reasonable. We will give three different reasons for our conclusion, either of which, we believe, would alone suffice.

(1) We have argued at length, in several recent numbers, for the doctrinal infallibility of an extremely large range of Papal declarations, which are not definitions of faith; and we have admitted throughout, that our present argument entirely depends on the truth and certainty of this doctrine. Now such infallibility being assumed, even a slight acquaintance with the Papal documents in question will convince any man of one fact. Whoever heartily accepts them as infallible,—and has applied himself to studying them with that vigour and intentness which alone are reasonable on that hypothesis,—will have his mind imbued with a vast body of infallible truth, to which ordinary Catholics are comparatively strangers. It further follows from the same doctrine, that one only course is reasonable, in the case of any Catholic who (as the Munich Brief expresses it) “applies himself to the speculative sciences that he may confer new benefits on the Church by his writings.” He should study most carefully all those infallible pronouncements, which bear directly or indirectly on his theme; submit his intellect most unreservedly to these, as being guaranteed to be true by God Himself; and conduct his whole argument with constant reference to their teaching. Putting aside the case of Galileo, which is “*sui generis*” and shall be separately considered, we entirely disbelieve that any person who has so acted has ever found himself, or ever will find himself, in conflict with a Congregational decree. The question therefore concerns the Catholic writer, who has not thus studied the relevant Pontifical declarations. Possibly he may not think these infallible: in that case, here is the whole root of the mischief; yet we admit that, while holding this unhappy error, he does not (so far as we can see) add to his fault by withholding assent from a mere Congregational decree.

There remains then the supposition, that he admits the infallibility of this Papal teaching; that he knows, or easily may know, the large extent of ground which it covers; and that he is conscious of having given it no careful study. Well: a body of men, who make it their business and profession to master it methodically, and who from position and association are singularly free from all sinister or non-Papal influence, decide that he has contravened it. It would surely be the extremity of unreason, if he did not yield to such a decision that full measure of assent which we have claimed for it.

(2) Such a decree further claims his assent on a totally different ground, as being the exponent of Roman tradition. "In which [Roman Church] always remains the infallible magisterium of the faith, and in which, therefore, *Apostolic Tradition has always been preserved*" (Encyclical "*Nostis et nobiscum*"). "In which [Roman Church] alone religion has been inviolably preserved, and from which all other Churches must borrow the tradition of faith" (Bull "*Ineffabilis*"). So authoritative is the endemic and pervasive tradition of the Roman Church. Now of that tradition, the various officials of the Pontifical Congregations, acting as they always do under the Pope's immediate supervision and direction, are the special depositaries and guardians. Where they speak, the voice of Rome is heard.*

(3) There is a third reason for our conclusion, more directly supernatural than either of the preceding: viz., God's special watchfulness over the Church's purity of doctrine. Take as an instance, all which Catholics of our day remember to have occurred on the Immaculate Conception. Pius IX. did not address the Church on this doctrine as Universal Teacher, before the memorable 8th of December, 1854: all the preliminary proceedings were enjoined by him in his character of Ruler. Yet as this series of commands had a special reference to purity of doctrine, what Catholic doubts that they were the

* "The strength and authority of the judgments of Roman theologians are derived not from (so to speak) their personal learning and ability; but chiefly from the circumstance that those judgments may most justly be regarded, if not with absolute certainty, yet with great probability, as expressing the mind and sense of that Church, which is the mother and mistress of all Churches, and which (according to the condemnation of the proposition of Peter of Osma) cannot err. 'Since the Roman See has been occupied by all S. Peter's successors, and by them alone, on this ground there accrues to this Church in comparison with others, even without reference to the reigning Pontiff, the greatest brilliancy and the greatest authority; inasmuch as it retains and represents that pure doctrine which it has received from the continued series of Peter's successors.'—Delahogue." Murray, de Ecclesiâ, d. 17, n. 79.

very special concern of Divine Providence? What Catholic doubts that from the moment when Pius IX.'s active preparations for a definition commenced, a moral certainty arose—different in kind from any which previously existed—that the doctrine was really definable as of faith, and contained therefore in the Apostolic Deposit? In like manner the doctrinal decree of a Pontifical Congregation, sanctioned by the Supreme Pontiff, is itself, indeed, put forth by him in his capacity, not of the Church's Teacher, but of her Ruler. Yet its bearing on doctrinal purity is so close and indissoluble, that we may well share Zaccaria's confidence,* and believe that no real mistake will ever be permitted.

These arguments, we really think, are so cogent, that no loyal Catholic would have felt one moment's difficulty in the matter, had it not been for Galileo's condemnation. To a consideration of this, then, we now proceed.

On the matter before us, there are two altogether separate inquiries: firstly, the legitimacy and due effect of the condemning decrees at the time when they were put forth; and secondly, their legitimacy and due effect during the interval of time which subsequently elapsed, until their suspension by Benedict XIV. We will entirely conclude the former of these inquiries, before we enter at all on the latter. And we must make two preliminary explanations of our terminology. (1) It will be necessary, for purposes of convenience, to use the word "science," and its derivatives, in the sense which Englishmen so commonly give to it; as expressing physical and experimental science to the exclusion of theological and metaphysical. (2) When we speak of a theory as "scientifically unlikely," we mean that the scientific grounds for its affirmation are weaker than those for its denial.

Now it is always desirable, for the sake of clearness, to keep the question of principle distinct from the question of fact. Before entering therefore on the history of Galileo's condemnation, we beg our readers' attention to those truths, theological and scientific, which will enable them (as we consider) more justly to appreciate it. We begin with the theological.

(1) It is held by all thoroughly approved theologians, that Holy Scripture differs from all other books in the fact that it is throughout the Word of God; that every proposition which it contains is infallibly true, in that sense in which God intended it. We are very far from denying that this doctrine,

* See note at p. 389.

particularly in the present day, is surrounded with great difficulties, which require a controversialist's attentive consideration. But one matter must be treated at a time: and our present subject is not the inspiration of Scripture, but the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation. The above-named doctrine then on Scripture will be assumed as true in every part of the following discussion.

(2) The Holy Father is appointed by God guardian of the Apostolic Deposit; and it is his province, therefore, to warn Catholics against opinions and modes of thought, which he may judge adverse to doctrinal purity. But all the statements of Scripture, rightly understood, and the true doctrine, moreover, of Scriptural inspiration, are parts of the Apostolic Deposit. Hence, it is his province to warn Catholics against opinions or modes of thought, which may tend to irreverence towards the Written Word.

(3) Those controversialists, whether Catholic or Protestant, who censure the condemnation of Galileo, are in the habit of assuming, almost as a matter of course, that the Scripture texts, which were the ground of his condemnation, are manifestly irrelevant; that they merely purport to describe phenomena as such; and that in their simple and obvious sense, they would not be otherwise understood. So, among others, speaks Dr. Pusey, in his admirable volume on Daniel. We are amazed at this opinion. It may, indeed, be perhaps truly maintained in regard to Jos. x. 12-14, or Isaiah xxxviii. 8, which tell us of Josue's miracle and Achaz's sundial. Nay, it may perhaps be truly maintained as to most, or even all, of those texts which speak of the sun's motion. But consider the following: (Ps. ciii. 5), "Thou who didst found the earth on its stable support (*super stabilitatem suam*): it shall not be moved for ever." (Ps. xcii. 1), "He hath fixed the earth which shall not be moved." (Job xxxviii. 4-6), where God Himself speaks: "Where wast thou," asks the Creator, "when I laid the foundation of the earth? Upon what were its supports established?" (*super quo bases illius stabilitæ sunt?*) Texts altogether similar are Ps. xvii. 16; lxxxi. 5; xcv. 10; cxxxv. 6; Prov. iii. 19; viii. 29. We entreat our readers to study successively these various texts.* It

* We have cited them from a collection put together by the unhappy Passaglia, during the days of his orthodoxy, in an admirable note on Faure's edition of St. Augustine's "Enchiridion," p. 46. A still more copious assemblage of texts will be found in the article on "motion of the earth," named at the head of our article. (Eccl. i. 4), "But the earth standeth for ever," viewed in its context, appears to us far less strong than those which we have chosen; though greater stress was perhaps laid on it by cotemporary anti-vol. v.—no. x. [*New Series.*]

is most unfair to speak, as Dr. Pusey speaks, of "the mistakes of theologians," in the interpretation of these texts. Surely, had it not been for the Copernican theory, no one who believes in the inspiration of Scripture, would have thought of doubting that in them God expressly declares the earth's immobility. If any one hesitates at this statement on first reading them, he must be convinced, if he will put into words his own version of their meaning. Take e.g. the first: Ps. ciii. 5: "Thou who didst found the earth on its stable support; it shall not be moved for ever." This means, as we are now aware, "Thou who didst place the earth in its orbit; it shall not cease from steadily revolving therein:" but who will say that this is a sense in the slightest degree obvious? * And the same test may be applied with equal efficacy to every text we have named.

(4) No inconvenience, however, arises, nor is there any irreverence towards God's Written Word, though this or that text be understood in a very unobvious sense, if that sense be affixed in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established. It is, indeed, somewhat remarkable, that perhaps the strongest instance producible of this, is altogether independent of science and its discoveries. The Agnoëtæ were condemned as heretics, for holding that our Blessed Lord, in His human nature, knew not "the day and hour" of divine judgment.† The Church, therefore, imperatively requires her children to understand Mark xiii. 32 in some very unobvious sense. But is there anything in this either unreasonable or irreverent? God surely has the right to interpret His own Word; for you would not deny this right to an ordinary mortal. Indeed, Catholics always maintain very truly against Protestants, that in several cases most serious error would be introduced, if Scripture were understood in some obvious sense, contrariwise to the Church's exposition. Now the certainty of a scientific demonstration, though of a lower

Copernicans than on any other. It should be observed, as will presently appear, that no ecclesiastical authorities cited any particular text; they speak generally of contrariety to Scripture.

* We cannot give the Copernican interpretation a better advantage, than by quoting from Berthier's note on the verse. "This globe is placed on its own foundations; and *immovable in this sense*, that all its parts are maintained [in their mutual relations] notwithstanding the particular movements which take place on its surface and in its bosom. . . . Although our globe has two movements, the diurnal and annual, it subsists with all its parts without deflecting from the path which the Creator has assigned to it." Not an obvious paraphrase surely!

† See Petavius de Incarnatione, l. xi. c. i. nn. 4, 15.

order than the certainty of faith, still is absolute; and the demonstration, therefore, of Copernicanism, should be reasonably taken as God's authoritative explanation of His own language.

(5) But on the other hand, if a private individual may ascribe to any text of Scripture any unobvious sense he pleases—not in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, proved to be reasonable—but according to his individual bias and caprice, the same result would practically follow as from an actual denial of inspiration. We shall see immediately that in Galileo's time Copernicanism was "scientifically unlikely." If on the strength of a theory scientifically unlikely, men are at liberty to contradict Scriptural texts as understood in that sense, which is both the only obvious one and also the only one hitherto heard of in the Church,—what single text is safe? What is the difference of result between openly denying the authority of Scripture in general, and explaining away every text one dislikes in particular? Such conduct is a very grave offence against faith; and it is the Holy Father's duty to put it down with a strong hand.

(6) "The prevailing opinion in the Catholic Church as to what Scripture says on matters" appertaining to faith and morals, "cannot be false, for it embodies the teaching of the authorized exponent of Scripture. But it has never been denied, that the common opinion of what is asserted in Scripture on other points,—such as belong, *e.g.*, to the physical history of the universe—may be mistaken, and may be corrected and improved from time to time, by the progress of science, and the discoveries of history." *

(7) The providence of God will, of course, secure that no Papal decision, claiming infallibility, contains false doctrine. Now, Paul V. undoubtedly united with the Congregation of the Index, in solemnly declaring that Copernicanism is contrary to Scripture. But we shall presently see it to be beyond the possibility of question, that this was issued as a doctrinal decree of the Congregation, and not as the Holy Father's infallible teaching.

(8) Even before this decree, every Catholic was under the obligation of interiorly dissenting from Copernicanism. This is evident from what has been said. He was under the obligation of not disbelieving various texts of Scripture, in their one obvious sense, in the one sense hitherto universally received, when he had no warrant for such disbelief, except a theory which even scientifically was unlikely. The Congre-

* "Dublin Review" for October, 1863, p. 527.

gational decree added to the obligation in two ways. It emphatically and urgently impressed on his mind the obligation which otherwise existed; and, secondly, from that time forward, the recognition of such obligation no longer depended on his own personal judgment, but on the authority of the Holy See and of its most trusted advisers. Although he well knew that this judgment, in the shape in which it was given, was not strictly infallible, yet he also knew that on a matter of Scriptural exposition these authorities were immeasurably more likely to be right than a private individual.

(9) But scientific truth cannot really be opposed to theological; and the Church could not rightly issue any command, which should prevent a full and searching scientific investigation of the Copernican hypothesis.

In addition to these theological principles, there are three scientific statements to which we beg the reader's attention.*

(1) It is the business of a scientific man to pursue truth by scientific methods. One very chief scientific method is the invention of "hypotheses." No one, indeed, has a right to regard these hypotheses, while remaining merely such, as true or probable; yet they are most serviceable to science. It is found that some imagined property of nature, if it were but true, would account for a variety of phenomena, between which no bond of connection has hitherto been discovered; or that some imagined physical law would be a far simpler explanation of certain multitudinous facts, than any hitherto known. It would be monstrous to infer at once, merely from this, that the imagined property or law probably exists; yet the discovery is a most important service to science, as a clue to the ascertainment of fresh truths. When Copernicus found that his hypothesis afforded a far simpler explanation than any hitherto devised, for the motions of the heavenly bodies, he had every reason to rejoice in his invention, as being not improbably the herald of some eventful and critical era in astronomical investigation. But if, without any positive proof, he regarded his hypothesis as a probable truth, he was no less gravely censurable on scientific grounds than on theological.

(2) We insist on the proposition, that simplicity is no proof of truth. A certain hypothesis explains various phenomena far more simply than they had hitherto been explained. This argument, under the most favourable circum-

* It is more straightforward and satisfactory to state at once, that the present writer has no knowledge of physical science, which can warrant him in expressing any opinion of his own on such matters. He has taken, however, the best means in his power to insure scientific accuracy.

stances, can never by possibility amount to a proof that the hypothesis is true. There is no imaginable link between premiss and conclusion, except by subsuming the further premiss, that God always acts by the most simple means; but this premiss not only has never been proved, but is pretty obviously false.*

But in Copernicus', or even Galileo's time, this argument hardly furnished a presumption, much less did it establish a likelihood. The argument from simplicity may be thus stated at its greatest advantage. Let it be granted that some hypothesis, very far simpler than any hitherto devised on the same object matter, accounts for all the phenomena now known; let us further suppose that, by assuming it freely and energetically during a series of years, men find that it would account for a constantly increasing number of phenomena, between which no connection has hitherto been observed; while, on the other hand, through all this time it has landed the inquirer in no conclusion antagonistic to known facts. We will not deny that from such circumstances there ensues a considerable scientific likelihood of its truth. But in Galileo's time there was no such reason whatever for counting the simplicity of Copernicanism as a reason for its truth. From the time, indeed, of Copernicus to that of Galileo himself, it did not account even for known phenomena: on the contrary, the fact that a stone when thrown up falls down on the spot from which it is thrown, *could be explained on the old system*, but *could not be explained on the new.*† Galileo invented a mechanical doctrine which solved this particular difficulty; and let us grant, for argument's sake (which is not entirely true, as we shall see), that from his time the theory (so to speak) started fair; that it comprehended all the known facts. It was pos-

* "We know well that nature in many of its operations works by means of a complexity so extreme as to be almost an insuperable obstacle to our investigations.

"The Sabeian theory [*i.e.*, the theory of a non-omnipotent creator] is the only one by which the assertion that nature works by the simplest means can be made consistent with known fact. Even so, it remains wholly unproved."—Mill on Hamilton, c. 24.

† "The strength of the anti-Copernicans lay in this, *their unanswerable* argument of the throwing up a stone. Both parties believed that the stone of itself would not follow the motion of the earth; at least, such was the opinion until the Galilean philosophy was fully received."—"Motion of the Earth," p. 458.

"In the sixteenth century the wit of man could not imagine how, if the earth moved, a stone thrown directly upwards would tumble down upon the spot it was thrown from. . . . The advocates of the earth's motion, before the time of Galileo, never even conceived" the law which explains this; "and of course, never proved it."—De Morgan, "Ante-Galileans," p. 22.

sible, no doubt, that subsequent years would carry it through the brilliant and triumphant career, on which we can now look back: but there was then really no ground for even surmising this; there was no ground for even surmising, that it might not lead legitimately to one or to a thousand conclusions, which should be contradictory of undeniable phenomena. For centuries the rival theory had been found consistent with every new ascertained phenomenon. In Galileo's time Copernicanism was in this respect just entering on its trial.

It seems to us, indeed, that in Galileo's time the Copernican argument, founded on the simplicity of that theory, was much on a par with the anti-Copernican argument founded on the evidence of men's senses. Both arguments professedly appeal to the reason, while really they appeal merely to the imagination. "Can we fancy," asked the Copernicans, "that God has not acted on a scheme so impressive and so beautiful as ours?" "Can we fancy," reply their opponents, "that this earth is constantly in motion, which we feel to be the stablest of all things? that our senses are given to deceive us? that during great part of our lives we cling to the earth with our head downwards?" The reply to both arguments is the same. On such questions we have no means whatever of auguring what God is likely to do: it is a matter for evidence, as to what He has in fact done.

(3) So valueless in Galileo's time was the mere argument from simplicity. *Before* his time, indeed, it is not too much to say that the Copernican theory was a mere guess, a mere conjecture. Listen to the chief arguments cited on both sides, before Galileo's discovery of Jupiter's satellites. We quote from De Morgan's "*Motion of the Earth*," using the letter C. for the Copernican argument, and the letter P. for the Ptolemaist opposed to them.

C. contended generally for the greater simplicity of their system and the incredibility of the enormous velocity which the sphere of the fixed stars must have if the Ptolemaic hypothesis were true: to which it was answered: P. That God doeth wonders without number. C. *That the earth would corrupt and putrefy without motion*, whereas the heavens are incorruptible. P. That wind would give sufficient motion. C. *That the most movable part of man is underneath*, since he walks with his feet; whence the most unworthy part of the universe, the earth, should be movable. P. [in addition to a good answer.] That if the earth moves, the head of a man moves farther than his feet. C. That rest is nobler than motion, and, therefore, ought to belong to the sun, the nobler body. P. That for the same reason the moon and all the planets ought to rest. C. *That the lamp of the world ought to be in the centre.* P. That a lamp is frequently hung up from a roof to enlighten the floor.—P. 47.

And such were the arguments, of which it has been gravely contended that they would justify Catholics in disbelieving the obvious and traditional sense of God's Written Word! No doubt Galileo considerably improved the scientific aspect of his cause; but what was it even in his time? It is thus summed up in an extremely able and fair paper in the *Rambler*, which we have named at the head of this article. The writer quotes Delambre as his authority:—

The Ptolemaic theory had sufficed for centuries to explain and to account for all the observed motions of the planets as logically and as precisely as the Copernican theory does now; and it was during all this time found capable of taking in and preserving all the exact knowledge of the world. Such being the state of the case . . . a new system suddenly makes its appearance, and claims to supersede the old; and on what grounds? Because it accounted for phenomena in a more simple way than the old theory. But then the old theory *did* account for phenomena, however complex it might have been; and *simplicity is not always an infallible test of truth*. Again, it was in analogy with the newly-discovered system of Jupiter's satellites, and accounted for the moonlike phases of Venus which the telescope revealed. *And these three points constituted about the whole proof which Galileo could bring forward*. His other arguments, from the tides and magnetism of the earth, are all moonshine. The Newtonian theory of gravitation was then unknown; and the periods of the revolutions of the planets appeared quite as disconnected and random as did the cycles and epicycles of the old theory. Newton first explained the one law on which the revolutions depended; before his time *there was nothing to make the Copernican system more plausible and reasonable than the Ptolemaic theory*. The modern demonstrations of the *annual motion of the earth*,—namely, the micrometrical observations on the discs of the bodies of the solar system, and especially the great discovery of the aberration of light, by which that motion is made evident to the senses,—*were then unknown*: and as to the diurnal motion, it was unproved till Richer's voyage to Cayenne, where he was obliged to shorten his pendulum. And it is only within the last few months that an experiment has been devised by which this motion may be exhibited to the senses, namely, by the apparent revolution of the plane of the vibration of a pendulum fixed over a horizontal table. *Before these demonstrations, there was no solid reason to induce men to disbelieve the evidence of their senses. The most decided Copernicans were reduced to mere probabilities*, and were obliged to confine themselves to preaching up the simplicity of the Copernican system, as compared with the absurd complexity of that of Ptolemy.* It is now generally taken for granted that the Copernican theory is self-evident. So far from that being the case, we may safely affirm, that *up to Galileo's time the balance of proof was in favour of the old system*; that is, the old system was at that time the probable one, and Copernicus' theory the improbable one (pp. 15, 16).

* Delambre, *Astron. Mod. Discours pré.*

But fairly and temperately as this writer expresses himself, it would seem nevertheless that he states Galileo's scientific status at somewhat greater advantage than truth will warrant. M. Artaud, in the volume named at the head of this article (pp. 306—321), draws attention to a paper contributed by M. Léon Desdouits, a Catholic savant, to the *Univers Catholique* of March, 1841. The *gravity of the air*, M. Desdouits reminds his reader, was first discovered by Torricelli after Galileo's death. The Florentine philosopher, therefore, from ignorance of this fundamental truth, was in an inextricable difficulty. To say that the earth is whirled through the terrestrial air, was plainly inconsistent with phenomena; while yet he could give no sufficient reason for supposing that the earth carries the air with it in its revolution. He was unable, therefore, to complete a theory of his own, which he could even reconcile with known facts; and since his opponents had no difficulty whatever in so reconciling theirs, it is not too much to say that his hypothesis, in its then incomplete state, was "scientifically unlikely"—i.e., that there were stronger grounds for rejecting than for accepting it.*

Lastly, we should not fail to point out, that the particular argument on which he laid by far his greatest stress, is admitted by every one nowadays to have been absolutely valueless and irrelevant. We allude to that which he attempted to draw, from the flux and reflux of tides. His own confidence therefore in the scientific strength of his position, is no kind of argument for its real strength.

Let us now turn to the history of the case. Dr. Madden's volume, named at the head of our article, will be found a very valuable and interesting repertory of facts, though we regret to find ourselves not unfrequently differing from his judgment of them.† For ourselves, we shall consider them only so far as they bear on the theology of the matter.

* How great a difficulty in Galileo's way was the one here stated, is a question which we leave to the judgment of our scientific readers. A Protestant gentleman of great scientific eminence, whom we have consulted, considers that M. Desdouits has greatly overstated its magnitude. Apart from *gravitation* of the air, he says, there is its adhesion to solids, and a kind of friction against itself. All this would tend to produce Galileo's phenomenon, though of course inadequate, without adding gravitation, for the required result.

† If among any Protestants there still lingers the belief that Galileo was tortured or otherwise cruelly treated, we may refer him to Dr. Madden's work for the most complete refutation of such calumnies. He has done excellent service, both in this respect, and generally by his copious narration of facts.

Firstly, since so much has been said about the Church's unequal treatment of Copernicus and Galileo, let us speak of the former. We have seen that if Copernicus merely published his theory as a most serviceable hypothesis, he deserved extremely great scientific praise and no kind of theological censure; but that if he advocated it as a probable truth, he was both scientifically and theologically condemnable. Now which of these was the case? Let us begin with Prof. De Morgan:—

When the work of Copernicus appeared in 1543 . . . it was neglected as a purely speculative trial of a strange and impossible hypothesis. In 1566 Ramus simply reproaches Copernicus with the gigantic character of his hypothesis, and says it would have been better to have taken one *nearer to the truth*: in a manner which implies that he thought *both were agreed as to what the truth really was*.—"Motion of the Earth," p. 454.

Indeed it is perfectly certain, and admitted by all, that in his preface he declared himself to advocate it as a pure hypothesis, "which fulfilled the objects of submitting the orbits of the heavenly bodies more conveniently to calculation, but which need not necessarily be true *nor even probable*." (*Rambler*, p. 4.) It is said that this preface was not written by himself; but as no one doubts that he sanctioned its insertion, such a fact is immaterial. It is alleged again, and indeed cannot be denied, that there are some few passages in his work, which in their more natural sense speak of his theory as probably true; but much stronger evidence must be adduced than we have seen, before we will admit that a grave ecclesiastic prefaced the great work of his life by a deliberate falsehood on the very fundamental thesis which he proposed to maintain.* A fact mentioned by Prof. De Morgan both confirms our scepticism, and generally illustrates our argument. He says that, with one single exception (*Digges*) all the admirers of Copernicus during the sixteenth century—*i. e.*, up to the time of Galileo—represent him as really holding what his preface declares. ("Ante-Galileans," p. 7, note.) *Digges* alone of them denied that Copernicus meant his assertions "only as mathematical principles feigned, not as philosophical truly averred." But we will not pursue this enquiry further. Since Copernicus in his preface explained himself as he did,—and since there was evidently nothing stated prominently in his work to force a different interpretation on the reader's mind,—no further defence is needed for the inactivity of ecclesiastical authorities.

* It is wonderful how ready sometimes are the votaries of physical science to invest their heroes with moral faultiness, for the sake of extolling their scientific perspicacity. A much stronger instance will presently appear in the instance of Galileo.

Even as to Galileo, it is plain enough that he never openly expressed a decided belief in Copernicanism;* though there were very great suspicions of his intending to convey this opinion without expressing it. One strong corroboration of this suspicion was, that he applied himself to the task of harmonizing it with the Scriptures; which, of course, was an unmeaning procedure, if he treated it as a mere scientific hypothesis. And generally a movement seemed setting in, headed by Galileo, towards the advocacy of Copernicanism as really true.† The Church, as in duty bound, applied herself to check the growing mischief. Both the Congregations of which our present article speaks—that of the Inquisition and that of the Index—were called into action, but in somewhat different ways. The Inquisition took merely disciplinary measures; and the Index, indeed, took disciplinary measures, but it also issued a doctrinal decree. It would seem that the Holy Father commissioned the Inquisition to pursue the matter according to the ordinary course of that tribunal, while he chose the other Congregation as the mouthpiece of his own doctrinal deliverance. It is only this latter declaration which strictly concerns us; but it will be more satisfactory if we take all the various facts in order.

Early, then, in 1616 the Inquisition, by the Pope's command, referred the matter to its theological qualifiers; *i.e.*, to certain theologians, whose business it was to give a theological opinion on such questions as the Congregation might refer to them. Their response is well known:—

That the sun is in the centre of the world and immovable by local motion, is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to the Holy Scripture.

That the earth is not the centre of the world, nor immovable, but that it moves, and also with a diurnal motion, is also absurd, philosophically false, and, theologically considered, at least erroneous in faith.

This response received no special approval from the Holy Father, and we are at liberty therefore to form our own opinion on its merits. We would express, indeed, with great diffidence the criticism which we would suggest; and the theologians had probably many arguments before them with which we are unacquainted. But we are unable to see why a severer censure

* A singular mistake has been made by the *Rambler* writer on this head, to which we shall presently refer.

† This fact, it will be presently seen, is stated by the Index in its disciplinary decree.

should be expressed on the former than on the latter proposition. It seems to us, as we have already said, that the Copernican explanation of those texts which seem to affirm the earth's immobility, is far more unobvious than of those which seem to affirm the sun's motion. The question, however, is comparatively unimportant. That the theologians, under then circumstances, were perfectly right in condemning Copernicanism as theologically unsound, does not to our mind admit of question.

On February 25, 1616, a Congregation of the Holy Office, held in Paul V.'s presence, and acting therefore by his express sanction, founded on this response its practical resolve. In obedience to such resolve, on the following day Cardinal Bellarmine, having summoned Galileo to appear, addressed to him a mild admonition; and the acting commissary of the Holy Office, in the presence of notary and witnesses, commanded him altogether to avoid "the said false opinion;"* and announced to him that thenceforth he would not be allowed to defend or teach it in any manner, *i.e.*, even as an hypothesis, either by word or writing, nor to treat of it at all. To this Galileo promised obedience, and was at once dismissed.

Next comes the disciplinary decree of the Index, also issued with the Pope's sanction, and dated March 5, 1616. We copy this from the *Rambler* article:—

Since it has come to the knowledge of this holy Congregation, that the false Pythagorean doctrine, altogether opposed to the divine Scripture, of the mobility of the earth and immobility of the sun, as taught by Copernicus in his book *De Revolutionibus*, and by Diego à Stunica in his commentary on Job, is being promulgated and accepted by many, as may be seen by a printed letter of F. Foscarini, in which he attempts to prove that the said doctrine is *consonant to truth, and not opposed to holy Scripture*:—therefore, lest this opinion insinuate itself farther, to the damage of Catholic truth, this Congregation has decreed that the said books of Copernicus and à Stunica be suspended till they are corrected, and that the book of Foscarini, and all others teaching the same thing, be prohibited.

The gravamen of the charge, it will be seen, is that Copernicanism is advocated, not merely as a serviceable hypothesis, but as "consonant to truth, and not opposed to holy Scripture." Nor does the decree, we think, decide the personal question, whether Copernicus really intended to suggest the truth of his theory. It need only mean that his work contains certain

* "Ut omnino desisteres à dictâ falsâ opinione," says the decree of 1633, in recounting the past history of the case. The word "desisteres" and others similar to it need not necessarily imply that Galileo had actually *professed* "the said false opinion;" and the facts presently mentioned in the text will show, that they were not intended to imply this allegation as being certainly true.

passages which, taken in their objective sense, imply that assertion. "Cardinal Gaetani was" at once "employed" to make the necessary corrections in Copernicus's work, "and he carefully changed every dogmatic assertion" of the theory, "or any conclusion from it, into a merely hypothetical statement; after which the work was allowed."* Professor De Morgan adds ("Ante-Galileans," p. 6), that "the alterations were very few in number: and though confessedly disposed to cancel the whole of chapter eight, as treating of the truth of the motion of the earth, they (the Congregation) were nevertheless able to allow it to stand, because the author seemed to be speaking problematically; whence they only imposed a few verbal alterations."†

Lastly, comes the doctrinal decree of the Index, which would seem to have been issued simultaneously with its disciplinary decree. Of this, so far as we know, the fullest extant account is to be found in Bellarmine's letter to Galileo. We copy this from Dr. Madden's translation (p. 121), with only one obvious alteration at the end.

We, Robert Bellarmine, having learned that the Signor Galileo-Galilei has been subjected to false imputations, and that he has been reproached with having made before us abjuration of his errors, and that by our order certain penances were imposed on him, declare conformably with truth that the said Galileo, neither before us nor before any other person whosoever in Rome, nor in any other place that we are aware of, made any sort of retraction in relation to any of his opinions, or of his ideas—that no punishment or penance was inflicted on him; but that a communication was made to him of a declaration of his Holiness, our sovereign, *which declaration was promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of the Index*, from the tenor of which it results that "the doctrine attributed to Copernicus as to the pretended movement of the earth round the sun, and as to the place which the sun occupies in the centre of the world without moving from its rising to its setting, is opposed to the Holy Scriptures, and consequently may not be defended nor held." In faith of which we have written and signed the present *propiâ manu*, the 26th of May, 1616, as here below.

ROBERT CARDINAL BELLARMINE.‡

* *Rambler*, p. 6.

† This decree makes evident, what is otherwise admitted by all; viz., that the prohibition imposed on Galileo against teaching the theory even as an hypothesis, was a personal penalty inflicted on him, and extended to none else.

‡ From this letter the *Rambler* writer deduces (p. 5) his singular opinion—an opinion on which he bases much of his argument—that Galileo at this time was not required to withhold interior assent from Copernicanism, but only not to teach it. But firstly, such an interpretation of the letter is intrinsically self-contradictory: it represents Bellarmine as telling Galileo that the

Here, then, is a doctrinal decree of the Index, sanctioned by the Pope, that the new theory "is contrary to the Holy Scriptures, and may therefore neither be defended nor held." It will be seen, indeed, that this decree is a good deal more reserved, than the response of the Inquisition qualifiers; yet that its purport is very clear and unmistakeable. We have already argued, that it was the one true doctrinal decision under then circumstances, and that interior assent was due to it from all Catholics. The only remaining question is (a most vital one, however) whether it were intended as an infallible pronouncement *ex cathedrâ*. The theological investigations with which we commenced this article, leave no possible doubt on the true answer. The whole question, as we have seen, turns on one single issue: whether the publication of this decree were or were not expressly and formally commanded by the Holy Father himself. Care is taken that its very form shall exclude the possibility of two opinions on the matter. The "declaration of his Holiness" was "promulgated"—not by his Holiness, but—"by the Sacred Congregation of the Index." And it is truly remarkable that Zaccaria, who is so express in laying down that no declaration of this kind involves the Pope's infallibility, cannot be suspected of devising his doctrine for a solution of the Galileo difficulty; because (as we shall presently see) he was himself an anti-Copernican.

There is in fact but one objection on this head which can possibly be made. It may be asked whether contemporary Catholics, at all events, did not consider the judgment to be *ex cathedrâ* and infallible. And it happens fortunately (which might easily have been otherwise) that materials are extant enabling us most unanswerably to prove the reverse. If one theologian were more prominent than another in his opposition

Pope has declared Copernicanism to be a tenet "which may not be held or defended," and at the same time *permitting* Galileo to "hold" it, though not to "defend" it. Then, secondly, on the preceding 28th of February—i. e., a very few days before—Bellarmine, in obedience to the Holy Office, had enjoined Galileo to "depart" (*recederes*) from that false doctrine, to "desert" it (*desereres*), to "desist" (*desisteres*) from it. He certainly, therefore, could not on the present occasion have permitted him to hold it. Thirdly, and most importantly of all, Galileo adduced this letter of Bellarmine's for his defence before the Inquisition in 1633; whereas nothing can be more certain (as will be seen in the text) than that his defence at that period was a denial of his having ever accepted Copernicanism as a truth. It is quite evident that Galileo sought and obtained Bellarmine's certificate, for a reason just the opposite of that supposed in the *Rambler*; for the purpose of showing that he had never anticipated the Church's judgment, by advocating the truth of his scientific hypothesis. This also is M. Chasles's understanding of Bellarmine's certificate, quoted by Dr. Madden (p. 121).

to Galileo, it was Bellarmine: yet his words are recorded by F. Grassi, also an opponent of Galileo's, to the following effect:—"When a demonstration shall be found to establish the earth's motion, it will be proper to interpret the Holy Scriptures otherwise than they have hitherto been, in those passages where mention is made of the movement of the heavens and the stability of the earth."* Again, a passage is extremely noteworthy which is cited by the *Rambler* writer (p. 9) from "Fromond of Louvain, a contemporary of Galileo himself, and a great opponent of the new theory":—

In a chapter of his *Anti-Aristarchus*, entitled, "Whether the opinion of Copernicus is now to be esteemed heretical," after citing authorities on the affirmative side, he says: "But it seems that several learned Catholics in Italy, France, Germany, and Belgium care very little for these authorities, grounding themselves on the persuasion that the authority of the Cardinals in defining matters of faith is not the highest, nor co-extensive with that of the Pope. Moreover, they have a very plausible way of explaining the passages of Scripture which make against them. But these arguments do not make them sufficiently secure, because the Congregation acts with full Papal authority; and, as may be seen by the bull of erection in 1588, the Congregation of the Index always submits its decisions to the Pope, by whom they are examined and ratified, and from whom they receive their authority. According to this rule, the decree in question must have been examined and confirmed by the Pope, by whom, therefore, the theory is denounced as false, repugnant to Scripture, and heretical. Thus a severe man would judge. But," proceeds Fromond, "when I consider how circumspect and slow Popes usually are in defining matters of faith *ex cathedra*, and that they always issue these decrees in their own, not in other persons' names, I think that the censure must be somewhat softened, and the authority of the Congregation of the Index must be supposed not equal, but next to that of the Pope. So I would not yet dare to condemn the Copernicans of open heresy, unless I were to see another more express decree emanate from the Head of the Church himself. Nevertheless, the Copernican opinion is at least rash, and has one foot within the limits of heresy, unless the Holy See determine otherwise."

Fromond, then, we see, draws the very distinction which we are now advocating on Zaccaria's authority: he decided that this declaration could not be *ex cathedra*, because Popes "always issue such decrees in their own, and not in other persons' names." Then Professor De Morgan quotes Riccioli (born in 1598), "one of the strongest theological opponents of the earth's motion," as follows ("Ante-Galileans," p. 24):—

* *Rambler*, p. 13.

Since no definition of this matter has as yet issued from the Supreme Pontiff, nor from any Council directed and approved by him, it is not yet of faith that the sun moves and the earth stands still by force of the decree of the Congregation; but at most and alone by the force of the Sacred Scriptures, to those to whom it is morally evident that God has revealed it. Nevertheless Catholics are bound in prudence and obedience, at least so far as not to teach the contrary.

The Professor adds, that not only was Riccioli permitted by the censorship so to publish, but that "many others who went before him" had received the same permission. We regard, therefore, our point as proved, and pass on to the further history of these transactions.

It is often taken for granted by Galileo's admirers, that throughout he interiorly accepted Copernicanism as undoubtedly true. They represent him, therefore, in fact, as one of the most mendacious and cowardly poltroons who ever appeared in public life; and we would fain, if possible, "deliver him from his friends." That he was greatly attached to the theory; earnestly desired the Church's permission to believe it; and would at once have heartily and delightedly believed it, could he have obtained this permission;—is clear enough: but to our mind it is by no means clear, that he was prepared deliberately to accept it in defiance of her authority. The certificate which he sought and obtained from Bellarmin is one strong argument for our conclusion; and M. Chasles (Madden, p. 121) quotes the following from his private letter to a friend:—"None in the world," he writes, "can call in question my exemplary piety, and my implicit obedience to the commands of the Church." Lastly, nothing can be more express than his statement to the Holy Office in 1633.

Galileo being placed in the presence of the officers of the Inquisition, he was asked if he held or holds, and since when he held, the opinion of Copernicus. To that he replied: "Formerly, that is to say, before the decision come to by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, and before any injunction was communicated to me in relation to the subject, I remained indifferent, and I held the two opinions of Ptolemy and Copernicus as disputable, because both one and the other could be true in point of fact—in *natura*. But since the decision above-mentioned has been established by the prudence of superior authorities, all ambiguity has ceased in my mind; and I have held, as I now hold, for very certain and indubitably, the opinion of Ptolemy—that is to say, the immobility of the earth and the mobility of the sun. (Madden, p. 102.)*"

* Galileo's language before the decrees of 1616 seems to have been quite in accordance with this statement; for towards the end of 1615 he spontaneously applied to the Holy Office to learn "what he should believe on the

At all events, it is not less than monstrous to say, that on this latter occasion the Holy Office required him to retract an opinion which he had hitherto avowed; they did but require him to confirm by oath that statement of his interior disbelief in Copernicanism, since its condemnation in 1616, on which he had stood throughout as on his one sole ground of defence.

As to this process of 1633, by far our simplest course will be to publish the decree with which it terminated, and also Galileo's abjuration. This decree is the most trustworthy authority for the facts of 1616; and our readers, by perusing it, will be the better able to judge whether we have fairly grappled with the facts of the whole case. We will draw special attention to a few passages by italics. The translation is founded on Dr. Madden's (pp. 107—113), but we have made various changes to bring it (as we think) into nearer accordance with the Latin, which he has also published (pp. 189—194).

SENTENCE OF THE INQUISITION.

Since you, Galileo, the son of the late Vincent Galileo, a Florentine, and seventy years of age, were denounced to this Holy Office, because you held as true the false doctrine maintained by many—namely, that the sun is in the centre of the world and immovable, and that the earth moves also with a diurnal motion; because you had certain disciples to whom you taught the same doctrine; because you kept up a correspondence on the same with several German mathematicians; because you published certain letters on the solar spots, in which you explained the same doctrine as true; also, because you replied to certain objections against you, taken from sacred Scripture, by glossing the same Scripture according to your own interpretation of it.

Moreover, since a certain writing in the form of an epistle was shown which appeared to have been written by you to a disciple of yours, and in it you had followed the hypothesis of Copernicus, containing certain propositions against the true sense and authority of the Sacred Scriptures.—This holy tribunal, being desirous, therefore, of obviating the inconveniences and prejudices which were arising and prevailing, to the injury of the Sacred Faith,—by the orders of our lord the Pope and of the most eminent cardinals of this supreme and universal Inquisition, by the qualifiers of theology two propositions were qualified, concerning the stability of the sun and the motion of the earth, as follows :—

Copernican system." This is stated, on the authority of a letter from him to Renieri, in an early number of this REVIEW (July 1838, p. 94). The article to which we refer, expresses or implies more than one proposition, with which the present writer cannot concur; but it contains a large number of interesting and pertinent facts, and its perusal will throw (we think) much additional light on the general argument of our present article. Dr. Madden (p. 6) attributes its authorship to the late Rev. Mr. Cooper.

1. That the sun is in the centre of the world, and immovable by local motion, is absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to the Holy Scripture.

2. That the earth is not the centre of the world nor immovable, but that it moves, and also with a diurnal motion, is also absurd, philosophically false, and, theologically considered, at least erroneous in faith.

But when it pleased us in the meantime to proceed mildly against you, it was decreed in the Holy Congregation held in the presence of the Holy Father, on the 25th of February, 1616, that Cardinal Bellarmine should enjoin you to keep aloof (*recederes*) altogether from the aforesaid false doctrine, and that, in the event of your refusing, the commissary of the Holy Office should order you to abandon the said doctrine, and that you should neither teach it to others nor defend it, *nor treat of it*; and that if you did not acquiesce in this command you should be thrown into prison; and in execution of this decree, on the following day, in the above-mentioned place, in the presence of the Cardinal Bellarmine, you were mildly admonished by him, and commanded by the commissary of the Holy Office, before a notary and witnesses, that you should wholly avoid the said false opinion, and that in future you would not be permitted either to defend it nor in any way teach it, either orally or in your writings: and when you promised obedience, you were discharged.

And in order that so pernicious a doctrine should be taken wholly away, and no longer allowed to spread, to the great detriment of the Catholic truth, a decree emanated from the Sacred College of the Index in which the books were prohibited which treat of doctrine of this kind, and that doctrine was declared false by it, and altogether contrary to the sacred and divine Scriptures. And as finally this book appeared, published in Florence last year, the title of which showed that you were author of it, which title was "*Dialogo di Galileo-Galilei delle Due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo Tolemaico e Copernicano*:" and when, at the same time, the Sacred Congregation knew that through the publication of that book, every day more and more the false opinion of the motion of the earth and the stability of the sun was disseminated, the said book was diligently examined; and in it was clearly found a transgression of the said precept, which had been intimated to you: and that you in the same book defended the said prohibited opinion already condemned, and declared to you as having incurred condemnation. For as much as in the said book you tried to make it appear, by various circumlocutory phrases, that you leave that opinion as undecided by you and *expressly as probable*; which likewise is a most grave error,—*since that opinion can in no manner be probable which has already been declared and defined as contrary to Scripture*. Therefore, by our order, you were cited to this Holy Office, and on your examination on oath, you have acknowledged the said book as written and printed by you. It has been also confessed by you that, about ten or twelve years ago, after the order before referred to was issued, you had begun to write the said book; also, that you asked for license to publish it—not, however, communicating to those from whom you gained that permission, the prohibitory injunction that you should not hold, defend, or teach in any manner that doctrine.

It has been likewise confessed by you, that in several parts of the said book the composition of the work was such that a reader might think the arguments put forward on the false side to be so worded as by their strength they might rather convince the intellect than be easily refuted—excusing yourself that you had fallen into an error, as you said, *quite foreign to your intentions*, from writing in the form of a dialogue, and on account of the natural tendency of every one to take pleasure in the subtleties of his own mind, and in showing his acuteness over that of others—in discovering ingenious arguments even for propositions that are false. And when it was intimated to you that the fitting time had come for your defence, you produced a certificate in the handwriting of Cardinal Bellarmin, addressed to you, as you state; procured, as you say, by you, *that it might defend you from the calumnies of your enemies, who had reported that you had been called on to make an abjuration and had been punished by the Holy Office*—in which certificate it is said that you had not abjured, had not been punished; but only that a declaration made by the Holy Father, and promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, had been communicated to you, in which it was decreed that the doctrine of the motion of the earth and the stability of the sun was contrary to the Sacred Scriptures, and therefore might not be defended nor held.

Wherefore, as here there is no mention made of two particular articles of the said precept—that is to say, that “you should not teach” and “in any manner”—it is to be believed that in the course of fourteen or sixteen years those things passed out of your memory, and that, on account of the same forgetfulness, you were silent about that precept when you solicited a license for publishing the said work of yours. And this was not urged by you to excuse your error, but, that it might be ascribed, *rather to a vain-glorious ambition than to malice*. But this very certificate produced by you in your defence rather aggravates the charge against you: since in it it is declared that the said opinion is contrary to Scripture; and nevertheless you dared to treat of it, to defend it, and even to argue in favour of its probability. Neither does that permission [to publish] help you, so artfully and craftily won by you, since you did not make known the prohibition that had been imposed on you. But as it appeared to us that you did not speak the entire truth with respect to your intention, we indicated that it was necessary to proceed to a rigorous examination of you, in which (without purging yourself from the other things which were confessed by you, which were pressed against you with respect to your intention) you answered catholically. Which things, therefore, having duly considered, and having examined into the merits of your cause, together with the above-mentioned confessions and excuses of yours, and whatever other matters should be rightly seen and considered, we come to the following definitive sentence against you:—

Invoking, therefore, the name of the most holy Lord Jesus Christ, and that of His most glorious Mother, always Virgin, Mary, by this, our definitive sentence, which sitting in council, and by the advice of the Reverend Masters of Theology, and of our doctors of laws, we publish in these written documents concerning this cause, and the causes in controversy between His Magnificence Carolus Sincerus, doctor of both laws, Fiscal Procurator of the Holy Office, on one part, and you, the accused Galileo-Galilei, of the other.

... we say, judge, and declare, that you the above-named Galileo, on account of those things, proved in the documents of this process, and which have been confessed by you as above-stated, *have rendered yourself to this Holy Office vehemently suspected of heresy*—that is, that you believed and held that doctrine which is false and *contrary to the sacred Scriptures—videlicet*, that the sun is the centre of the orbit of the world, and that it moves not from east to west, and that the earth moves and is not the centre of the world; and that *an opinion can be held and defended as probable, after it has been declared and defined as contrary to the sacred Scriptures*. And consequently that you have incurred all the censures and penalties, by the sacred canons and other general constitutions and particular statutes promulgated against delinquents of this kind, from which it is our pleasure that you should be absolved—provided first, that with a sincere heart and faith not feigned, before us you abjure, curse, and detest the above-mentioned errors and heresies, and every other heresy and error, contrary to the Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church, by that formula which is presented to you. But lest this grave fault of yours, and pernicious error and transgression, should remain unpunished altogether, and for the time to come that by more caution you should keep clear of them, and should be an example to others that they should abstain from this sort of offences, we decree that by public edict the “Book of the Dialogues of Galileo-Galilei” be prohibited—but you we condemn to the formal prison of the Holy Office during our pleasure. And as a salutary penance we prescribe that, for three years to come, you should recite once a week the Seven Penitential Psalms, reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, commuting, or taking away altogether or in part the above-mentioned penalties and penances.

ABJURATION OF GALILEO.

I, Galileo-Galilei, son of the late Florentine, Vincent Galileo, seventy years of age, appearing personally on trial before this tribunal, and on my knees before you, most eminent and reverend Lord Cardinals, Inquisitors-General of the Universal Christian Republic into matters against heretical pravity, having before my eyes the Holy Gospels which I have in my hands, I swear that I always have believed, and now believe, and with the help of God I will always believe henceforward, all that which the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church holds, preaches, and teaches. But because by this Holy Office, subsequently to its being enjoined on me juridically that I should abandon that false opinion which holds that the sun is the centre and immovable—that I must not hold, defend, or teach in any manner, or by any writing whatsoever the said forbidden doctrine, which is repugnant to the sacred Scriptures—I wrote, and caused to be printed, a book in which I treat of the same condemned doctrine, and adduce arguments with great efficacy in favour of it, not producing any solution of them—therefore I am judged vehemently suspected of heresy—that is to say, that I had held and believed that the sun was the centre of the world and immovable, and that the earth was not the centre and is moved. Therefore I, desiring to remove from the minds of your Eminences and of all Christian Catholics this vehement suspicion against me, legitimately conceived, with a sincere

heart and faith not feigned, I abjure, curse, and abhor the above-named errors and heresies, and generally every other error and sect contrary to the above-mentioned Holy Church : and I swear never more in future to say or assert orally or in writing aught which can bring a similar suspicion on me ; but if I shall know any heretic or person suspected of heresy, I will denounce him to this Holy Office, or the inquisitors or ordinary of the place in which I may be. I swear, moreover, and promise to fulfil and observe entirely all penances adjoined me, or which may be imposed on me. But if it should happen that I act in opposition to my promises, protestations, and oaths (which God forbid), I subject myself to all penalties and punishments which, by the sacred canons and other general constitutions and particular provisions enacted and promulgated against delinquencies of this kind. So help me God and the Holy Gospels on which my hands are laid.

I Galileo-Galilei above-mentioned, have abjured, sworn, promised, and engaged as above, and in faith of these obligations I have signed the present autograph of my abjuration, and repeated the same word by word.*

As to this decree of 1633, the following circumstances are observable. (1) The Holy Office acted, of course, in virtue of a jurisdiction derived from the Pope ; but there is no reference to his special approval, as there was in 1616. (2) Copernicanism is treated as a heresy, on the simple ground that every express statement of Scripture contains an immediate revelation from God ; and that its contradictory is, therefore, heretical. (3) So far as the cardinals rest on any ecclesiastical pronouncement, it is not on the response of their own qualifiers in 1616, but on the declaration of the Index sanctioned by Paul V. (4) There is nothing, however, to imply (but quite the contrary) that they regarded this decree as the Pope's judgment, *ex cathedrâ*. They ascribe that decree, in fact, to the Congregation of the Index, and not to the Pope. Yet (5) a certain considerable authority is claimed for it. "In no way," say the cardinals, "can an opinion be probable, after it has been declared and defined as contrary to the Scriptures."

We have been hitherto speaking on the effect of these decrees in regard to cotemporary Catholics. We are now to speak of their legitimate bearing during that interval which elapsed, between Galileo's death and their suspension by Benedict XIV. This seems to us, in fact, the only even apparent difficulty of the question ; so transparently reasonable and legitimate was the course taken by ecclesiastical authority in the earlier period. On this new part of our

* No one, we suppose, now credits the absurd romance about Galileo rising from his knees and saying, "E pur si muove."—(See Madden, p. 113.)

subject we speak with much diffidence, as we are not aware of any Catholic who has hitherto treated it; but the general principles of theology seem to us fully sufficient for giving us a clue through the labyrinth.

We must commence by a certain definition of terms. The word "probable," in particular, must be excluded from our discussion; because, otherwise, incurable confusion would arise, between its theological sense on the one hand, and its sense so deeply rooted in popular English on the other hand. When an Englishman calls a proposition "probable," he always means, we think, that it is more probable than its contradictory. But this in theology would be "*magis probabilis*;" a proposition is "*probabilis*" which rests on solid grounds, even though its contradictory may rest on grounds still more solid. We may distinguish, then, four different stages of a scientific proposition. (1) It may be a "mere hypothesis," as Copernicanism was in the time of Copernicus. (2) It may be a "grounded hypothesis," *i.e.*, it may have solid arguments in its favour, though as yet the opposite arguments are still more solid. Such was Copernicanism in the time of Galileo. (3) It may be a "likely hypothesis," *i.e.*, the arguments in its favour may outweigh those on the opposite side without being actually conclusive. (4) It may be an established and demonstrated truth.

It is important to illustrate this, by the particular case before us. During the period which we are to discuss, the Copernican theory became scientifically more and more likely, till at length actual proof was obtained. Such proof was first given to the world in 1687, when Newton showed in the "*Principia*" that Hadley's observation of 1676, in regard to shortening the pendulum, proved the earth's diurnal motion. No proof of its orbital motion was published before 1727, when Bradley gave to the world his discovery on the aberration of light. A considerable period commonly elapses before such proofs become generally known, and still more before they become generally accepted: yet it is certainly a matter of surprise, that, even so late as 1755, we find F. Faure calling on those who are "Copernicans and Newtonians from mere hearsay," "to bring forward at least, if they can, any demonstration drawn from astronomical observations, *which observations are not explained by either hypothesis*. For this fact," he adds,—*i.e.*, that the observations are explainable on either hypothesis,—"*is confessed by the mathematicians themselves, as many of them as are ingenuous, and of good faith.*"*

* "*Enchiridion*," p. 47.

Further, a proposition may be *scientifically* likely, without being *actually* so. To take a most extreme case, it is imaginable in the abstract, that a proposition may be *scientifically* "likely" in an extremely high degree, and yet *actually* not even "grounded." How can this be? There may be some declaration of Scripture or the Church so peremptory and unmistakable, as to out-balance any amount of scientific likelihood; and to engender absolute certainty, that of such proposition, there will never be discovered a scientific proof. We are far from meaning that such a case has ever existed, but it is imaginable in the abstract. When Galileo was required to deny that his theory was "probabilis," he was not required to deny that it was *scientifically* "grounded," but only that it was *actually* so. This is most plain: because the ecclesiastical objection was its contrariety to Scripture.

Now a Catholic of this intervening period had no concern with the Inquisitional decrees, either of 1616 or of 1633: these were purely personal to Galileo. Neither (still less) had he any concern with the theological response of the qualifiers in 1616; for this was not a congregational decree at all. The two which concerned him, were firstly the disciplinary, and secondly, the doctrinal decree, issued by the Index in 1616. So far as the former affected him, it was only in his liberty of action; but so far as the latter, it affected also his liberty of thought. Now, there was a very important difference of circumstance between these respective decrees. The former continuing as it did in force to the time of Benedict XIV., must be considered for all practical purposes to have been re-enacted by every successive intermediate Pontiff; but the latter was never repeated at all. And since it is the freedom of science for which our opponents are especially jealous, and which they especially represent as outraged by these decrees, we will begin by considering their legitimate effect on the action and thought of a scientific man, who should be duly obedient to the Church.

Firstly, then, as to the disciplinary decree. He was not permitted to express himself, as though Copernicanism were an *actually* "grounded" hypothesis. But he was permitted and encouraged to use the hypothesis most actively, as his clue to fresh scientific results; and to treat with most ample justice the scientific arguments for and against. He was fully permitted to maintain that Copernicanism was *scientifically* "likely" in the highest possible degree; but he was not (we imagine) at liberty to teach expressly, that it had received absolute and irrefragable scientific proof. We must maintain that in all this his liberty as a man of science was not re-

strained in any appreciable degree. To say that Copernicanism was *actually* "grounded," was to say that the declarations of Scripture and the authority of the Congregation's doctrinal decree was not sufficient to override his scientific arguments. But to enter on this question at all—to approach it ever so distantly—was to abandon his character of scientific man, and assume that of theologian. His only scientific restriction was, that he might not represent the theory as having received absolute scientific proof; and considering the above-mentioned circumstances, the hardship of this was not very great. He might earnestly maintain that such and such a phenomenon was not explicable on the anti-Copernican hypothesis; but he was not allowed *in words* to draw the conclusion, that the Copernican hypothesis was scientifically demonstrated as true. He was not commanded or desired to keep back one single scientific argument which told in its favour; he was not prohibited nor discouraged from exhibiting the force of that argument in the strongest possible light. If it be said that at all events no *advantage* was gained by the restrictions imposed on him, we shall reply to that objection in its proper place.

Next for the doctrinal decree. To simplify our statement, we will make the grotesque supposition that one single man of science—an excellent Catholic—lived and pursued scientific studies through the whole period. He has the deepest deference both for the obvious and traditional sense of Scripture, and also for the doctrinal decree in question; and he enters therefore on his investigation with the fullest expectation, nay, he considers it almost a matter of course, that Copernicanism will be sooner or later disproved. Still it is his duty to fix his eye carefully on every vestige of scientific argument, on one side no less than on the other; and he thus finds to his amazement, as years go on, that the scientific presumptions in its favour are rapidly accumulating, while no fresh difficulty is discovered. This circumstance compels him to ask himself, what is the theological weight in the opposite scale. He has well known from the first that the decree was no infallible pronouncement; and, again, he is either himself aware, or learns from theologians, that there is more than one text in Scripture (we gave a very strong instance in p. 394) which the Church has always understood in some more or less unobvious sense. He also learns from them the Catholic principle which we have already stated (p. 395); viz., that the received and traditional sense of Scripture on scientific or historical matters, is far less authoritative than on matters of faith and morals.

Gradually, therefore, he comes more and more to think that Copernicanism may very possibly turn out to be true. Yet, however great its scientific likelihood—while remaining mere likelihood—we think he will shrink from forming a decided and confident opinion of its truth, until the Church gives him some sanction for such opinion. It is her office, not his, to determine the sense of Scripture. We fully admit, however, that, supposing him cognizant of an absolute scientific demonstration, there is no further room for doubt; since that cannot be theologically false which, by a rigorous scientific demonstration, is established as true. Here, however, we would draw a distinction. Those who are actually capable of appreciating this scientific demonstration, should of course interiorly accept the truth of Copernicanism. But the mass of men are quite differently circumstanced; they must still choose between one authority and another; and we think they will act more perfectly, if they abstain from any absolute acceptance of the new theory, till they have obtained some guidance from the Church.

This will be our best place for inserting the well-known protestation of Newton's Catholic editors, in 1741. It is prefixed to the third book of the "*Principia*":—

Newton in this book assumes the hypothesis of the motion of the earth and the author's proposition could not be explained except upon the same hypothesis. Hence we have been compelled to act a part (*alienam coacti sumus gerere personam*); but we declare that we obey the decrees that have been made by the Supreme Pontiffs against the motion of the earth.

The obvious meaning of the protestation we take to be this: "Had we been writing a scientific treatise of our own, we should have adduced indeed all the scientific arguments we know in favour of Copernicanism, but we should have deferred to the disciplinary decree now in force, by abstaining from all language which might imply its actual truth. Newton, however, of course, expresses himself quite differently; and since we are but his commentators, it was impossible for us to avoid expressing ourselves as he does: but we hereby protest that we have had no intention of publicly uttering any opinion whatever, on the actual truth of Newton's theory."

Just as scientific men will be always disposed to give scientific reasons a very undue preference over theological, so will theologians be ever disposed to give theological reasons a somewhat undue preference over scientific. Both classes are naturally far more struck by that particular kind of argument, with which their habits render them familiar. We cannot be

surprised, then, at Passaglia's statement, that when Faure wrote his work (in 1755) the theological schools were commonly averse to the Copernican hypothesis. It will be more satisfactory, however, if we consider in the case of theologians, what we have already considered in the case of astronomers, viz.: the legitimate effect on them of the two decrees.

As to the doctrinal decree, its legitimate effect on both classes of men seems to us much the same. But the disciplinary decree limited the free speech of theologians immeasurably more than of astronomers. The latter, as we have seen, were free to express the scientific likelihood of Copernicanism, as strongly as ever they pleased; but however much disposed a theologian might have been to think, at some given time, that the scientific arguments for its truth reasonably outweighed the theological arguments for its falsehood, he was prevented from publicly stating that opinion. Of course he might freely express it in private conversation with other theologians, or might communicate it to the Holy Father; and, indeed, it must have been some such pressure of theological opinion which led Benedict XIV. to suspend the decree.

It will be asked, what was its advantage at last? Of course we are here to assume the Church's teaching: viz., that books, theologically unsound, should be carefully kept from those Catholics who are not specially qualified to read them without injury; and that liberty of the press "can never sufficiently be execrated and detested."* Now, in Galileo's time, all books which advocated the truth of Copernicanism were theologically unsound. And a most important service was done by preserving the Catholic flock free from the plague; free from a most false, proud, irreverent, and dangerous principle of Scriptural interpretation.

But should the decree have continued so long in force? On such matters of mere prudence, no one maintains that the Church is infallible; and looking back from our present vantage-ground, we should be inclined to submit, that the supreme authorities would have acted wisely in suspending it some forty or fifty years sooner than they did. But this is a matter of detail, not of principle. Our general notion is this. The following, as we have already mentioned, may be called the two opposite poles of relevant doctrine. On the one hand there is neither inconvenience nor irreverence in ascribing to the purely physical statement of Scripture a new and unobvious sense, if that sense be affixed in deference to an absolute and irrefragable scientific de-

* Encyclical, "*Mirari vos.*" See our comment on this passage in our January number, p. 67.

monstration; yet, on the other hand, to do this on the strength of a theory which scientifically is not even likely, is unsound, censurable, and most dangerous. If it be asked, as a question of doctrine, at what precise point the line is to be drawn—what is the *degree* of scientific likelihood which would legitimize a change of Scripture interpretation—we frankly answer that we know not the definite answer; but if it be asked, as a matter of discipline, what practical course was desirable under circumstances, it was plainly (we think) the wise course to continue the disciplinary decree as long as possible. Who were injured by its continuance? Not scientific men; for they had full liberty to bring forward every scientific argument they could wish: not theologians; for the great majority of them disbelieved Copernicanism altogether: not the mass of uncultivated Catholics; for it would be absurd to say they had any power of judging rightly on the question. Further, without censuring any who acted differently, we would strongly maintain that those took the more perfect course, who withheld all interior assent from a theory apparently so unscriptural, until they were cognisant of some rigorous scientific proof. On the other hand, the danger of removing the prohibition was most serious. For what would the Church declare by such removal? That an important series of Scripture texts might be lawfully understood in a sense most opposite to their obvious and their traditional acceptations; in a sense which had hitherto been regarded as unsound. Now the multitude of men, whether Catholic or Protestant, are very unfitted for drawing nice and accurate distinctions; they could not be expected to discriminate between one class of texts and another, or readily to understand how change of circumstances could justify the Church in revolutionizing her practical guidance on a somewhat important question. So violent a shock to received ideas and to traditional religion, was not unlikely to issue in consequences so serious, that authorities were bound to delay their act until the latest possible moment. When a complete scientific proof of the new theory was propounded, and was accepted by scientific men,—then, and not till then, came the appropriate time for action. As a matter of fact, the suspension was delayed somewhat longer: “Pope Benedict XIV. suspended the decrees; and in 1818 Pope Pius VII. repealed them in full consistory.”* . . .

“But can it be denied that the Church’s acts of 1616 seriously retarded the triumph of Copernicanism?” Let us, for

* *Rambler*, p. 23. In 1744 Galileo’s famous dialogue was published entire at Padua, “with the usual approbations.”—(Artaud, p. 307.)

argument's sake, admit it, and what follows? The acts in question were put forth for the purpose of repressing a method of interpreting Scripture, which was most unsound and unspeakably dangerous: viz., the departing from its obvious and its traditional sense, on the strength of a scientifically unlikely theory. We must be excused for thinking, that true principles of Scriptural interpretation are immeasurably a more precious possession, even than scientific truth.

But it may well be doubted whether the Church did retard the progress of scientific truth. What retarded it was the circumstance, that God has thought fit to express many texts of Scripture in words which have every appearance of denying the earth's motion. But it is God who did this, not the Church; and, moreover, since He thought fit so to act as to retard the progress of scientific truth, it would be little to her discredit, even if it were true that she had followed His example.

At least, however, "it will not be denied that the history before us is a significant warning against ultramontaniam. It was precisely those who most earnestly laboured to be in harmony with the Church's mind and the spirit of Rome, who were slowest in accepting the newly discovered truth." We should be very sorry, if the latter fact could with truth be denied. God has put forth certain utterances, which have every appearance of declaring the earth's immobility. The course of all others most consistent both with reverence and with reason, was to abstain from interpreting these passages in an unobvious sense, until some irrefragable scientific proof of Copernicanism were given. This was evidently the animating principle of what the Church did; and this, therefore, was the lesson learned by those who most assiduously studied her spirit.

Lastly, it has been objected against this whole series of ecclesiastical events—we are quoting the very words of an eminent anti-Catholic philosopher—that "it necessarily tells much against the claims of those who should be at least among the wisest of men, if they used their authority against what the result proved to be the real direction of truth and progress." Certainly, it would tell against those claims, if the Church had ever professed to enjoy any special privilege of discerning "truth" in the purely physical and material order. But the reverse is notorious; she claims authority, as all the world knows, over those things alone which appertain, directly or indirectly, to the region of faith and morals. We are far from meaning by this, that her sphere is narrow or confined; on the contrary, those things which bear indirectly on faith and morals are enormously numerous. We are still further from

sympathizing with those unsound Catholics, who will question this or that ecclesiastical decision, on the ground of its dealing with matters external to the spiritual order: for it is a first principle of Catholicism that the Church, by the very fact of pronouncing a decision, pronounces also that the decision is within her province. Still, what the Church has testified of herself in every age, would lead us as little to expect from her any superhuman sagacity on the earth's motion, as on the electric telegraph, or on the properties of gas.

But, at the risk of being charged with paradox, we must soberly maintain, that in no part of her history has she more conspicuously displayed her divine gifts, or exhibited in her conduct more unmistakable marks of an overruling Providence, than in her whole treatment of the theological questions which concerned Galileo. The great principle on which she then proceeded, she maintains no less firmly in the nineteenth century than she did in the sixteenth; viz., that it is unsound and censurable to contradict the obvious and traditional sense of Scripture, on the strength of a theory scientifically unlikely. That which has changed in the interval is no theological principle, but only a scientific fact; the fact, namely, that Copernicanism is now not scientifically unlikely, but, on the contrary, a scientifically established truth. Then, amidst what pitfalls she was walking throughout the whole of Galileo's career! a single false step and all was lost.* We will mention two circumstances in particular. Consider how anti-Catholic a position the Copernican party was assuming; consider, on the other hand, how confident were the Pope and ecclesiastical authorities that its tenet was condemned by Scripture. How truly remarkable, that no adverse decision was put forth, for which any one could even claim infallibility! that the Pope formally promulgated his decree by means of the Congregation, instead of himself ordering its promulgation! Then, again, earnestly desirous as they were to crush the "anti-Scriptural" error, and firmly as they were persuaded that it was philosophically baseless no less than theologically unsound, surely the one natural thing for them to do, was to prohibit Catholics from publishing any scientific argument in its behalf. Yet, in the very height of their anti-Copernican zeal, they were withholden from this indefensible measure; and they allowed consistently throughout the fullest and freest scientific discussion of the theory. Who can fail to see in all this the Finger of God?

* Humanly speaking, of course. We are arguing that God infallibly preserved her from any such false step.

Some lynx-eyed critic may, indeed, think to catch them tripping; and may point out that they exceeded their province, by condemning Copernicanism philosophically as well as theologically. But this very criticism draws attention to another argument in our favour. For who made this mistake? Firstly, the theological qualifiers of the Inquisition; learned and accomplished men no doubt, but of whom no one has ever alleged that they were instructors of the Church. Secondly, to some extent, perhaps, the two Congregations in the *preamble* to their *disciplinary* decrees; and here again it is notorious that the preamble even of a doctrinal decree is never understood as authoritatively teaching doctrine. What, then, was the doctrinal guide of cotemporary Catholics, alone recognized as such? Undoubtedly and notoriously that doctrinal decree, which the Congregation of the Index promulgated under Paul V.'s sanction. But this decree totally avoids the dangerous and untheological confusion; and condemns the new theory on no other ground than that of its contrariety to Scripture.

We are now then in a position to draw out somewhat more accurately the doctrine which we sketched in a former article,* on those doctrinal dicta of Popes which are not definitions of faith. We would premise, as we stated in that article (p. 44), that we use the word "doctrine" and its derivatives to include not merely that which is "directly" doctrinal—*i.e.*, which is actually part of the Apostolic Deposit—but that also which is "indirectly" doctrinal; *i.e.*, which is intimately bound up and connected with the former. A very large number of philosophical truths, of politico-religious truths, of dogmatical facts, are all included under the head of "doctrine." We next entreat our reader to peruse the remarks which he will find in pp. 51 and 52 of that article. And we will thus complete what we have there stated; recapitulating for that purpose much which has been urged in the article now drawing to an end.

Three different species may be considered of those Papal doctrinal dicta, which are not definitions of faith. The first includes all those which are pronounced *ex cathedrâ*, and are therefore infallible. This species is subdivided into two different classes. The former class consists of those which are expressed directly by the Pope, in his capacity of Universal Teacher. Most of these are in the form of allocutions, encyclicals, and the like; and bear their own evidence of being intended for the whole Church. Some, however, are in form addressed to individual pastors, or portions of the Church;

* January, 1865, art. 3.

and it may not be always absolutely certain which of these are *ex cathedrâ*. Most commonly, however, their contents will make this sufficiently clear: moreover, it is not improbable that the Pope supplies some test of this distinction; and that all are *ex cathedrâ*, of which he himself commands the publication. These, then, make up the former class, included in the first species; while the latter class comprises those doctrinal decrees of Papal congregations, which are promulgated by the Pope's express command. This whole species then—containing the two above-named classes—is infallible by divine promise; and every Catholic, therefore, is bound to accept the whole of them with most unreserved and absolute interior assent.

The second species consists of "*obiter dicta*;" of Scriptural, theological, philosophical arguments; preambles to a decree; and the like. "Many statements, even doctrinal statements, may be introduced, not as authoritative determinations, but in the way of argument and illustration."* In these, the Holy Father is not professing to give any doctrinal guidance at all; and there is no difficulty whatever, therefore, in admitting that they may be more or less mistaken.

The third species holds an intermediate place between the two first. The dicta which it includes are not expressed *ex cathedrâ*, and therefore are not infallible; yet, on the other hand, they are intended as direct inculcations of Catholic and obligatory doctrine. This species, like the first, is subdivided into two classes. The former class includes doctrinal statements put forth by the Pope himself, but not as Universal Teacher; put forth in pastoral addresses to this or that individual or church, with the view of preserving purity of faith or expelling doctrinal error. In the latter class, we place those doctrinal decrees of Pontifical Congregations, which are not promulgated by the Pope's express command. It will be clear to every one, we think, that both these classes stand in the same category; but as more is said by theologians of the latter class than of the former, we will consider it first.

Of these congregational decrees, then, Zaccaria says, as we have already seen (see note to p. 389) that "it appertains to Providence not to permit that Rome, even apart from cases where the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ*, should condemn as erroneous a doctrine which is not so." Bouix understands him to mean by this, that they are in some sense infallible: but, as we have said, the word "infallible" surely implies, not the mere fact of inerrancy, but the divine promise of inerrability;

* See this question admirably handled in Dr. Murray's "*De Ecclesiâ*," c. 17, n. 262—270.

and this Zaccaria's words do not claim for these decrees. At the same time, even in his own sense, no Catholic of the present day can precisely accept his remarks, because of this very case of Galileo. Zaccaria himself was no doubt a hearty anti-Copernican, and had, therefore, no difficulty in the matter; but all Catholics at this day are Copernicans as a matter of course. Yet, with a very little change, we think that his remark may stand, and that it conveys a very important truth. We would say this, then, in regard to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation: there is no promise of their inerrability; yet we may humbly hope and expect that God will at no period permit them to err in the doctrinal guidance which they give, regard being had to the circumstances of the time. Most certainly we must maintain that the decree against Galileo is no exception to this statement: on the contrary, it afforded true doctrinal guidance to contemporary Catholics; and was, in fact, the one legitimate application of Catholic principle, to the circumstances with which it dealt.

Zaccaria's reason for his statement, as we have seen, is his persuasion of God's special watchfulness over the doctrinal purity of Rome. We have already (p. 391-2) drawn out two arguments, which were possibly both of them in his mind when he expressed his judgment. And it is plain that the same arguments hold, not merely of these Congregational decrees, but (with still greater force) of those doctrinal instructions, which the Pope authoritatively addresses to a single church or to an individual Catholic. Our general doctrine, therefore, is this. By fully submitting ourselves to the Pope's doctrinal guidance, even in cases where that guidance is not strictly *ex cathedrâ*, there is every reason to expect that we shall assuredly be led aright; that we shall be led to that doctrine which, under the circumstances contemplated by him, is alone true.

Let us apply this doctrine to another instance, which has come before us in this article; viz., Pope Zachary's condemnation of Virgil. You may sometimes hear Protestants speak of the latter as deserving high scientific praise, for his belief in Antipodean men. This shows the blinding force of prejudice. Suppose he did believe the existence of such men, it could only have been by the merest guess; he had access to no scientific proof of it whatever. Surely it is the excellence of a scientific man, as such, that he proportions the strength of his conviction to the strength of his reasons, and not that he jumps to a conclusion by guesswork. Yet the same writers will moralize over the "darkness," the "narrow-mindedness," of S. Boni-

face or Pope Zachary. Certainly these holy persons did not know of Antipodean men; but neither did Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle: were the latter therefore narrow-minded and in the dark? Protestants, however, are commonly far more indulgent to a godless pagan than to a Catholic Saint.

Now to the question. Virgil held "that under the earth is another world, and other men, and *another sun and moon*." Why did the Pope and S. Boniface consider that this implied some grievous error? Perrone* gives the obvious reason; that, since no one at that time dreamed of any possible communication between two opposite surfaces of the earth, Virgil quite certainly held that there were men on this earth not descended from Adam. Under those circumstances, therefore,—in the then state of physical knowledge,—any doctrine whatever of Antipodean men implied theological unsoundness. And since, in the earlier part of our article, we showed that there is no pretence for representing Pope Zachary's letter as an instruction *ex cathedra*, in strict necessity no more need be said on the matter.

We fully admit, of course, or rather maintain, that Divine Providence will never permit the Pope to issue any declaration as Universal Teacher, condemning a scientific tenet which may afterwards turn out to be true. But really, so far as its condemnation of Virgil goes, there is no reason why Zachary's letter might not have been *ex cathedra*. "That under the earth is another sun and moon"! A modern man of science would be as much aghast at such a notion (though on very different grounds) as was S. Boniface himself.†

Our practical conclusion is this. For doctrinal guidance—using that word in its largest legitimate sense—let us ever fix our eyes steadfastly on the Holy See, let us ever listen eagerly and with docility to the voice of Rome. Peter lives and teaches in his successors. He teaches, not only when they lift up their voice to address the Universal Church, but when they impart Apostolic Truth to individuals who seek it at their hands. Nay he teaches by their very acts of government; by the doctrinal principles on which they rule the Church. "As Rome acts by her strong words, so also she speaks by her strong acts."‡

* De Deo Creatore, n. 289.

† The *Rambler* says (p. 20), we know not on what grounds, that the Pope misunderstood Virgil's meaning. At all events the fact would be irrelevant; for that tenet which he condemned—whether Virgil's or no—is beyond question extravagantly false. A recent Catholic writer (the "Catholic Layman" on University Education) has given a note (p. 46) to the case of Virgil; but in the text we have implicitly answered his remarks.

‡ Abbé Morel.

The particular instance of Galileo has been (especially of late) confidently, and with an air of triumph, held up before public attention, as a palmary and conclusive refutation of these "exaggerated pretensions." We have not chosen then our own battle-ground; we have advanced to the attack of that fortress, which the enemy values as his chief stronghold. It must be for others to decide, whether our attack has on the whole been unsuccessful.

ART. V.—THE FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM.

The Formation of Christendom. Part First. By T. W. ALLIES. London: Longmans.

IT is somewhat paradoxical, but strictly true, to say that the greatest and most important revolution which ever took place upon earth is that to which least attention has hitherto been paid, and concerning which least is known,—the substitution of "Christendom" for the heathen world. Before our own day no historian, no philosopher of modern times has felt any interest in this vast theme, and whatever information with regard to it is attainable must be sought in the fragmentary remains of ancient writers, or in works very recently published on the Continent. In the volume before us Mr. Allies has taken ground not yet occupied by any English author. He has availed himself of two works—Döllinger's "Christenthum und Kirche" and Champagny's *Histoires*,—and he acknowledges in the most liberal and loyal manner his obligation to them; but, in the main, he has been left to find his way for himself, and no man could well be more highly qualified for the task, whether by the gifts of nature or by the acquirements of many years. We infer from the work itself, that his attention was immediately turned to the subject by his appointment as Professor of the "Philosophy of History" in the Catholic University of Dublin, under the rectorship of Dr. Newman. The duties of his post obliged him to weigh the question, "what is the philosophy of history?" and the inaugural lecture with which the volume before us commences, although it gives no formal definition of the phrase (which is to be regretted), supplies abundant considerations by the aid of which we may arrive at it. History, in its origin, was

far more akin to poetry than to philosophy, and even when it passes into prose it is in the half-legendary form, which makes the narrative of Herodotus and of the annalists of the middle ages so charming to all readers. They are ballads without metre. Next came that style of which Thucydides is the model, and which Mr. Allies calls "political history." "Its limit is the nation, and it deals with all that interests the nation." "Great, indeed, is the charm where the writer can describe with the pencil of a poet and analyze with the mental grasp of a philosopher. Such is the double merit of Thucydides. And so it has happened that the deepest students of human nature have searched for two thousand years the records of a war, wherein the territory of the chief belligerents was not larger than a modern English or Irish county. What should we say if a quarrel between Kent and Essex, between Cork and Kerry, had kept the world at gaze ever since. Yet Attica and Laconia were no larger."

And yet it needed something more than territorial greatness in the states of which he wrote to enable even Thucydides himself to realize the idea of a philosophical history. For the five hundred years which followed the Peloponnesian war brought to maturity the greatest empire which has ever existed among men, and although, at the close of that period, one of the ablest and most thoughtful of writers devoted himself especially to its history, yet, says our author, "I do not know that in reading the pages of Polybius, of Livy, or even of Tacitus, we are conscious of a wider grasp of thought, a more enlarged experience of political interests, a higher idea of man, and of all that concerns his personal and public life, than in those of Thucydides." Great, indeed, was the genius of those ancient historians, magnificent were the two languages which they made their instruments,—languages "very different in their capacity, but both of them superior in originality, beauty, and expressiveness to any which have fallen to the lot of modern nations. It may be that the marbles of Pentelicus and Carrara insure good sculptors." "In the narrative—that is the poetic and pictorial part of history—they have equal merit. Their history is a drama in which the actors and the events speak for themselves. What was wanting was the bearing of events on each other, the apprehension of great first principles—the generalization of facts." And this no mere lapse of time could give. It is wanting in the works of the greatest ancient masters. It is found in moderns, in all other respects immeasurably their inferiors. "What, then, had happened in the interval?" Christianity had happened—Chris-

tendom had been formed. "There was a voice in the world greater, more potent, thrilling, and universal, than the last cry of the old society, *Civis sum Romanus*, and this voice was *Sum Christianus*. From the time of the great sacrifice it was impossible to sever the history of man's temporal destiny from that of his eternal; and when the virtue of that sacrifice had thoroughly leavened the nations, history is found to assume a larger basis, to have lost its partial and national cast, to have grown with the growth of man, and to demand for its completeness a perfect alliance with philosophy."

Thus, then, the "philosophy of history" is the comparison and arrangement of its great events, by one whose mind is stored with the facts which it records, and who at the same time possesses the great first principles which qualify him to judge of it. We may, therefore, lay it down as an absolute rule, that without Christianity no really philosophical history could have been written.

Not unnaturally, then, the first example of the philosophy of history was given by a man whose mind, if not the greatest ever informed by Christianity, was at least among a very few in the first class, was moreover so thoroughly penetrated by Christian principles, that to review the events of the world in any other aspect, or through any other medium, would have been to him as impossible as to examine in detail without the light of the sun the expanse of plains and hills, rivers and forests, which lay under him as he stood on some predominant mountain-peak. God the Almighty Creator—God incarnate, who had once lived and suffered on earth, and now reigned on high until He should put all enemies under His feet, and who was coming again to judge the world which He had redeemed—the Church founded by Him to enlighten and govern all generations throughout all nations, and in which dwelt the infallible guidance of God the Holy Ghost—the evil spirits, powerless against the Divine presence in the Church, but irresistible by mere human power—the saints, no longer seen by man, but whose intercession influenced and moulded all the events of his life,—all these were ever before the mind of S. Augustine, not merely as articles of faith which he confessed, but as practical realities. To trace the events of the world without continually referring to all these, would have been to him not merely irreligious, but as unreal, unmeaning, and fallacious as it would be to a natural philosopher of our own day to investigate the phenomena of the material world without taking into consideration the attraction of the earth and the resistance of the air. This should be noticed, because we have all met men who, while

professing to believe most, if not all, of these things, would consider it bad taste to introduce such considerations into any practical affair. They are, in short, part of that very remarkable phenomenon, the "Sunday religion" of a respectable English gentleman, which he holds as an inseparable part of his respectability, but which is well understood to have no bearing at all upon the business of the week. Living as S. Augustine did at the crisis at which the civilization of the ancient world was finally breaking up, his eye was cast back in review over the whole gorgeous line of ancient history, which swept by him like a Roman triumph. Egypt, Assyria, Greece, Rome, each had its day: the last and greatest of them all he saw tottering to its fall. But far more important than this comprehensive survey, which the circumstances of his times made natural to so great an intellect, was his possession of fixed and certain principles, the truth of which he knew beyond the possibility of doubt, and which were wide enough to solve every question which the history of the world brought before him. Great men there had been before him, but the deeper their thoughts the more had they found that the world itself and their own position in it were but a hopeless enigma without an answer, a cypher without a key. A flood of light had been poured upon the piercing mental eye of S. Augustine when the waters of baptism fell from the hand of the holy Ambrose upon his outward frame. Every part of the Old Testament history glowed before him, as when from behind a cloud which covers all the earth, the light of the sun falls concentrated upon some mountain-peak; and the man who reverences and ponders as divine that inspired history has learned to read the inner meaning of the whole history of the world as no one else can. In every age, no doubt, Almighty God rules and directs in justice and mercy the world which He has created; but in general He hides Himself behind an impenetrable veil. "Clouds and darkness are round about Him, justice and judgment the establishment of His throne." To many an ordinary spectator, the world seems only the theatre of man's labour and suffering. He passes through it as he might through one of the arsenals of ancient Greece or Rome, where indeed great works were wrought, but where the hand of the workman was always as visible as the result produced. A more thoughtful man might see proofs of some unknown power, just as in an arsenal of our day, works, compared to which the fabled labours of giants and cyclops were as child's play, are hourly performed by the stroke of huge hammers welding vast masses of glowing metal, while nothing is seen to cause or explain their motion.

All this is understood by one who has once been allowed to see at work the engine itself which sets all in motion. So does the Old Testament history unveil to the eye of faith the hidden causes, not only of the Jewish history, but of the great events of secular history. All that seemed before only results without cause, is seen to be fully accounted for; not that we can always understand the ends which the Almighty worker designs to accomplish, or the means by which He is accomplishing them, but everywhere faith sees the operation of Almighty power directed by infinite wisdom and love, and, while able to understand much, it is willing to await in reverent adoration the development of that which as yet is beyond its comprehension. It sees that the history of other nations is distinguished from that of the children of Israel, not so much by the character of the events which it records (for the extraordinary manifestations of Divine power were chiefly confined to a few special periods), as to the principle and spirit in which it has been written, and that secular history viewed by eyes supernaturally enlightened assumes the same appearance.

In fact it is not difficult to write a history of the reigns of David and Solomon and their successors down to the fall of the Hebrew monarchy, which sounds very much like that of any other Oriental kingdom. The thing has been done of late years, both in Germany and in England. It was by this that Dean Milman, many years ago, so greatly shocked the more religious portion of English readers. Nor were they shocked without cause; for his was a history of the Jews, from which, as far as possible, Almighty God was left out, while the characteristic of the inspired narrative is, that it is a record not so much of the doings of men as of the great acts of God by man and among men. Only Dean Milman was more consistent than those who condemned him. He was right in perceiving that the greater part of the history of the Jews is not materially different from that of other nations. But he went on to infer that, therefore, we may leave God out of sight in judging of Jewish history, as we do in that of other nations, instead of learning from the example of the Jews that in every age God is as certainly working among every nation. That by which he offended religious Protestants was the application of their own ordinary principles to the one history in which they had been taught from childhood to see and acknowledge with exceptional reverence the working of Almighty God in the affairs of the world.

This it is which gives its peculiar character to many of the chronicles of the middle ages. It is impossible not to feel

that the writers see no broad distinction between the history of the nations and times of which they are writing and that of the ancient people of God. And hence in their annals we have far more of the philosophy of history, in the true sense of the word, than was possible to any ancient author. For with all their ignorance of physical causes, which led them into many mistakes, their main principles were both true and vitally important, and were wholly unknown to Thucydides and Tacitus. But the circumstances of their times made it impossible that they should survey the extensive range of facts which lies before a modern historian. In many instances also they were led by the imperfect state of physical science to attribute to a supernatural interference of God in the world things which we are now able to refer to natural causes. That God has before now interfered with the course of nature which He has established in the world, and may whenever He pleases so interfere again, these were to them first principles. And so far they reasoned truly and justly, although their imperfect acquaintance with other branches of human knowledge sometimes led them to apply amiss their true principle. Their minds were so much accustomed to dwell upon the thought of God, and upon His acts in the world, that they were always prepared to see and hear Him everywhere, and in every event. When they heard of any event supposed to be supernatural, they might be awestruck and impressed, but could not be said to be surprised; and hence, no doubt, they sometimes accepted as supernatural, events which, if examined by a shrewd man who starts with the first principle that nothing supernatural can really have taken place, could have been otherwise explained. Besides, their comparative unacquaintance with physical science led them into errors in accounting for and even in observing those which they themselves did not imagine to be supernatural. But their first principles were true. And the modern who assumes, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the course of the world is modified and governed only by the passions and deeds of man is in his first principles fundamentally wrong. They fell into accidental error; he cannot be more than accidentally right.

Our author says:—

In the middle ages, and notably in the thirteenth century, there were minds which have left us imperishable memorials of themselves, and which would have taken the largest and most philosophical view of history had the materials existed ready to their hand. Conceive, for instance, a history from the luminous mind of S. Thomas with the stores of modern knowledge at his command. But the invention of printing, one of the turning-points of the human race, was first to take place, and then on that soil of the middle ages,

so long prepared and fertilized by so patient a toil, a mighty harvest was to spring up. Among the first fruits of labours so often depreciated by those who have profited by them, and in the land of children who despise their sires, we find the proper alliance of philosophy with history. Then at length the province of the historian is seen to consist, not merely in the just, accurate, and lively narrative of facts, but in the exhibition of cause and effect. "What do we now expect in history?" says M. de Barante, and he replies, "Solid instruction and complete knowledge of things; moral lessons, political counsels; comparison with the present, and the general knowledge of facts." Even in the age of Tacitus, the most philosophic of ancient historians, no individual ability could secure all such powers (p. 12).

Thus philosophical history is one of the results of Christianity. Professor Max Müller makes a similar remark with regard to his own favourite study of ethnology. Before the day of Pentecost, he says, no man, not even the greatest minds, ever thought of tracing the genealogy of nations by their languages, because they did not know the unity of the human race. The unity of mankind is naturally connected in the order of ideas with the unity of God. Those who worshipped many gods, and believed that each race and nation had its own tutelary divinity, not unnaturally regarded each nation as a separate race. So far was this feeling carried by the most civilized races of the old world, that they thought it a profanation that the worship of the gods of one race should be offered by a priest not sprung from that race. The most moderate and popular of the Roman patricians rejected the demand of the *plebs* to be admitted to the highest offices of the state, not as politically dangerous, but as profane. The Roman consul, in virtue of his office, was the priest of the Capitoline Jove, to whom, on certain solemn occasions, he had to offer sacrifice. It would be a pollution that a plebeian, not sprung from any of the tribes of Romulus, should presume to offer that sacrifice. In fact, the consulship would hardly have been thrown open to the *plebs* until the long-continued habit of inter-marriage had welded the two portions of the Roman people so completely into one that the plebeian began, at last, to be regarded as of the same blood with the Furii, the Corneli, and the Julii. The first measure by which the tribunes commenced their attack upon the exclusive privilege of the great houses was wisely chosen; it was the Canuleian law, by which marriages between the two orders were made legal and valid. Before that, patricians and plebeians were two nations living in one city, and, according to the universal opinion of the ancient world, this implied that they had different gods, different priests, a different ritual, and different temples. But the day of Pentecost blended all nations into a new unity—the unity of the body of

Christ; and its first effect was, that the preachers of the new law proclaimed everywhere, that "God had made of one blood all nations of men, to dwell upon the face of the whole earth." The professor points out what curiously completes the analogy between the two cases, that while Christianity, by collecting into one church all the nations of the world, and by teaching their original unity, naturally suggested the idea that all their different languages had some common origin, any satisfactory investigation of the subject was long delayed by the unfounded notion that the Hebrew must needs be the root from which they all sprung. Thus, in both cases, the germ of studies, whose development was delayed for ages by the imperfection of human knowledge, appears to have been contained in the revelation of the gospel of Christ.

It is important to bring these considerations into prominence, because the knowledge which would never have existed without Christianity, is, in many cases, retained by men who forget or deny the faith to which they are indebted for it. Our author draws comparison between Tacitus and Gibbon (page 14).

The world of thought in which we live, is, after all, formed by Christianity. Modern Europe is a relic of Christendom, the virtue of which is not gone out of it. Gregory VII. and Innocent III. have ruled over generations which have ignored them; have given breadth to minds which condemned their benefactors as guilty of narrow priestcraft, and derided the work of those benefactors as an exploded theory. Let us take an example in what is, morally, perhaps the worst and most shocking period of the last three centuries,—the thirty years preceding the great French revolution. We shall see that at this time even minds which had rejected, with all the firmness of a reprobate will, the regenerating influence of Christianity, could not emancipate themselves from the virtue of the atmosphere which they had breathed. They are immeasurably greater than they would have been in pagan times, by the force of that faith which they misrepresented and repudiated. To prove the truth of my words, compare for a moment the great artist who drew Tiberius and Domitian and the Roman Empire in the first century, with him who wrote of its decline and fall in the second and succeeding centuries. How far wider a grasp of thought, how far more manifold an experience, combined with philosophic purposes, in Gibbon than in Tacitus. He has a standard within him by which he can measure the nations as they come in long procession before him. In that vast and wondrous drama of the Antonines and Constantine, Athanasius and Leo, Justinian and Charlemagne, Mahomet, Zenghis Khan, and Timour, Jerusalem and Mecca, Rome and Constantinople, what stores of thought are laid up—what a train of philosophic induction exhibited! How much larger is this world become than that which trembled at Cæsar! The very apostate profits by the light which has shone on Thabor, and the blood which has flowed on Calvary. He is a greater historian than his heathen predecessor, because he lives in a society to which the God whom he has aban-

doned has disclosed the depth of its being, the laws of its course, the importance of its present, the price of its futurity.

A very little thought will show that, constituted as man's nature is, this could not have been otherwise. Man differs from the inferior animals in that he is richly endowed with faculties which, until they have been developed by education, he can never use, and appreciates and embraces truths, when they have been set before him, which he could never have discovered unassisted. This is the most obvious distinction between reason and instinct. The caterpillar, hatched from an egg dropped by a parent whom it never saw, knows at once what food and what habits are necessary for its new life. Weeks pass away, and its first skin begins to die; but (as if it had been fully instructed in what has to be done) it draws its body out of it as from a glove, and comes forth in a new one. A few weeks later it forsakes the food which has hitherto been necessary for its life, and buries itself in the earth, which up to that very day would have been certain death. There a mysterious change passes upon it, and it lies as if dead till the time for another change approaches. It then gradually works its way to the surface, and comes out a butterfly or a moth. It is now indifferent to the plants, which in its former state were necessary to its existence; but yet it chooses those plants on which to deposit its eggs. We are so apt to delude ourselves with the notion that we understand everything to which we give a name, that ninety-nine people out of a hundred seem to think they account for this marvellous power of the inferior animals to act exactly right under circumstances so strangely changed, by calling it "instinct." But, in truth, why or how the creature does what it does, we no more know when we have called it "instinct," than we did before. All we can suppose is that as the Creator has left none of His creatures destitute of the kind and degree of knowledge necessary to enable it to discharge its appointed office in creation, the appetites and desires of the insect are modified from time to time in the different stages of its existence, so that they impel it exactly to the course necessary for it to take, with much greater certainty than if it understood what the result was to be. How different is the case of man. Not only is he a free agent, and therefore to be guided by reason, not by mere propensity, but neither reason nor speech, nor indeed life itself, could be preserved or made of any use except by means of training and education received from others. A man left to shift for himself like the animal whose changes we have been tracing, would die at each state of his existence for want of some one to teach him what must be done for his preservation.

This same training is equally necessary for his physical, intellectual, and moral and spiritual life. But he is so constituted that the different things needful for him to know for each of these purposes approve themselves to him as soon as they are presented to his mind from without; and the things which thus approve themselves, although he could never have discovered them, we truly call natural to man, because no external teaching would have made him capable of learning them unless the faculty had been as much a part of his original constitution as the unreasoning desires which we call instinct are part of the constitution of brutes. And therefore, when once developed by education, they remain a part of the man, even when he casts away from him those teachers by whom they were developed. Nero would never have learnt the use of speech if he had not caught it from his mother; yet when he used it to order her murder he did not lose what she had taught him, because it was a part of his nature. And so of higher powers, the result of a superior training. Principles which men would never have known without Christian training, are retained when Christianity itself is rejected, because they are part of the spiritual endowment given to man by his Creator, although without training he would never have been able to develop them. His rejection of Christianity results from an evil will. The parts of Christian teaching against which that will does not rebel, he calls and believes to be the lessons of his natural reason, although the experience of the greatest and wisest heathen shows that his unassisted natural faculties never would have discovered them.

Nor is this true only of individuals. Nations trained for many generations in Christian faith have before now fallen away from Christianity. But it does not seem that they are able to reduce themselves to the level of heathen nations in their moral standard, their perception and appreciation of good and evil, justice and wrong, or of the nature and destinies of the human race. In some respects they are morally much worse than heathen. But it does not appear that in these points they can sink so low, because their nature, fallen though it be, approves and accepts some of the truths taught it by Christianity. Hence, in order to judge what man can or cannot do without the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, we must examine him in nations to which the faith has never been given, rather than in those which have rejected it. Unhappily, there are at this moment parts of Europe in which the belief in the supernatural seems wanting. An intelligent correspondent of the *Times* a year ago described such a state of things as existing in parts of Northern Germany and Scandinavia.

The population believes nothing, and practises no religion. Public worship is deserted, not because the people have devised any new heresy of their own as to the manner in which man should approach God, but because they have ceased to trouble themselves about the matter at all. Lutheranism is dead and gone; but nothing has been substituted for it. The intelligent Protestant writer was surprised to find a population thus wholly without religion orderly and well-behaved, hard-working, and by no means forgetful of social duties. The phenomenon is, no doubt, remarkable; but it is by no means without example. Many parishes (we fear considerable districts) in France are substantially in the same state. The peasantry are sober, industrious, and orderly, to a degree unknown in England. They reap the temporal fruits of these good qualities in a general prosperity equally unknown here. They are saving to a degree almost incredible, so that it is a matter of ordinary experience that a peasant who began life with nothing except his bodily strength, leaves behind him several hundreds, not unfrequently some thousands of pounds sterling. But in this same district whole villages are so absolutely without religion, that, although there is not one person for many miles who calls himself a Protestant, the churches are almost absolutely deserted, and the *curés* (generally good and zealous men) are reduced almost to inactivity by absolute despair. Some give themselves up to prayer, seeing nothing else that they can do; some will say that they are not wholly without encouragement, because, after fifteen or twenty years of labour, they have succeeded in bringing four or five persons to seek the benefit of the sacraments out of a population of as many hundreds, among whom when they came there was not one such person to be found.*

* It should be observed that the morality said to exist in those parts of France which have so nearly lost the faith is not Catholic morality; in fact the population in those districts is decreasing, and that (it is universally admitted) from immorality. It should also be remembered that there is a most marked contrast between these districts and those Lutheran districts of which the *Times* spoke; in the latter, Lutheranism has died out of itself. In the worst districts of France, the Catholic religion has not died out, but has been displaced by a systematic infidel education inflicted on the people by a godless government. Lastly, even where things are the worst, there are a few in each generation who, in the midst of a godless population, turn out saints, really worthy of that name. It is seldom that a mission is preached in any village without some such being rescued from the corrupt mass around them. Nothing, in fact, can more strongly mark the contrast between the Catholic religion and Lutheranism. The subject is far too large to be discussed here, but we have suggested these considerations to avoid misconceptions of our meaning.

Appalling as is this state of things, the natural virtues (such as they are) of populations which have thus lost faith are themselves the remains of Christianity. History gives us no trace of any people in such a state except those who have once been Christians. For instance, in all others, however civilized, slavery has been established both by law and practice; no one of them has been without divorce; infanticide has been allowed and practised. Nowhere has the unity of man's nature been acknowledged, and, what follows from that, the duties owing to him as man, not merely as fellow countryman. And hence, nowhere has there existed what we call the law of nations, a rule which limits the conduct of men, not only towards those of other nations, but, what is much more, towards those with whom they are in a state of war, or whom they have conquered. In the most civilized times of ancient Greece and Rome, no rights were recognized in such foreigners. All these things are the legitimate progeny of Christianity, and of Christianity alone, although they are now accepted as natural principles by nations by whom, but for the Gospel of Christ, they would never have been heard of.

We have enlarged upon this point because, not only in what he says of Gibbon, but in many parts of his subsequent chapters, Mr. Allies attributes to the influence of Christianity things which a superficial observer may attribute rather to some general progress in the world towards a higher civilization. We shall see instances of this as we proceed. We are satisfied that the objection is utterly unfounded. We see no reason to believe that without Christianity any higher or better civilization than that of Rome under Augustus and Athens under Pericles would ever have been attained. That those who lived under that state, so far from expecting any "progress," believed that the world was getting worse and worse, and that there remained no hope of improvement, nor any principles from which it could possibly arise, is most certain. Nor do we believe that those who thus judged of the natural tendency of the world were mistaken, although by a stupendous interference of the Creator with the course of nature, an improvement actually took place.

The philosophy of history then sifts and arranges the facts which it records, and judges of them by fixed and eternal principle of right and wrong, drawing from the past lessons of wisdom and virtue for the future. It will approach nearer and nearer to perfection, as the range of facts investigated becomes wider, and as the principles by which they are judged are more absolutely true, and applied more correctly, more practically, and more universally. Hence, it would

never have existed without Christianity, and although in Christian nations it is found in men partially or wholly unworthy of the Christian name, but who retain many ideas and principles derived from Christianity alone, yet even in them it is exercised imperfectly in proportion as they are less and less Christian.

Mr. Allies thus compares Tacitus and S. Augustine—

The atmosphere of Tacitus and the lurid glare of his Rome compared with S. Augustine's world, are like the shades in which Achilles deplored the loss of life contrasted with a landscape bathed in the morning light of a southern sun. Yet how much more of material misery was there in the time of S. Augustine than in the time of Tacitus! In spite of the excesses in which the emperors might indulge within the walls of their palace or of Rome, the fair fabric of civilization filled the whole Roman world, the great Empire was in peace, and its multitude of nations were brethren. Countries which now form great kingdoms of themselves, were then tranquil members of one body politic. Men could travel the coasts of Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, Syria, Asia Minor, and Greece, round to Italy again, and find a rich smiling land covered by prosperous cities, enjoying the same laws and institutions, and possessed in peace by its children. In S. Augustine's time all had been changed; on many of these coasts a ruthless, uncivilized, unbelieving, or misbelieving enemy had descended. Through the whole Empire there was a feeling of insecurity, a cry of helplessness, and a trembling at what was to come. Yet in the pages of the two writers, the contrast is in the inverse ratio. In the Pagan, everything seems borne on by an iron fate, which tramples upon the free will of man, and overwhelms the virtuous before the wicked. In the Christian, order shines in the midst of destruction, and mercy dispenses the severest humiliations. It was the symbol of the coming age. And so that great picture of the Doctor, Saint, and Philosopher, laid hold of the minds of men during those centuries of violence which followed, and in which peace and justice, so far from embracing each other, seemed to have deserted the earth. And in modern times a great genius has seized upon it, and developed it in the discourse on *Universal History*. Bossuet is worthy to receive the torch from S. Augustine. Scarcely could a more majestic voice, or a more philosophic spirit set forth the double succession of empire and of religion, or exhibit the tissue wrought by Divine Providence, human free will, and the permitted power of evil.

After this estimate of S. Augustine, he speaks of—

A living author,—at once statesman, orator, philosopher, and historian of the highest rank, who has given us, on a less extensive scale, a philosophy of history in its most finished and amiable form. The very attempt on the part of M. Guizot to draw out a picture of civilization during fourteen hundred years, and to depict, amongst that immense and ever-changing period, the course of society in so many countries, indicates no ordinary power; and the partial fulfilment of the design may be said to have elevated the philosophy of history into a science. In this work may be found the most important rules of the science accurately stated; but the work itself is the best example

of philosophic method and artistic execution, united to illustrate a complex subject. A careful study of original authorities, a patient induction of facts, a cautious generalization, the philosophic eye to detect analogies, the painter's power to group results, and, above all, a unity of conception which no multiplicity of details can embarrass; these are some of the main qualifications for a philosophy of history which I should deduce from these works. Yet, while the action of Providence and that of human free will are carefully and beautifully brought out, while both may be said to be points of predilection with the author, he has not alluded, so far as I am aware, to the great evil spirit and his personal operation. Strong as he is, he has been apparently too weak to bear the scoff of modern infidelity—"he believes in the Devil"—unless, indeed, the cause of this lies deeper, and belongs to his philosophy; for if there be one subject out of which eclecticism can pick nothing to its taste, it would be the permitted operation of the great fallen spirit. Nor will the warmest admiration of his genius be mistaken for a concurrence in all his judgments. I presume not to say how far such an author is sometimes, in spite of himself, unjust, from the point of view at which he draws his picture. Whether, and how far, he be an eclectic philosopher, let others decide. It would be grievous to feel it true of such a mind; for it is the original sin of that philosophy to make the universe rotate round itself. Great is its complacency in its own conclusions, but there runs through them one mistake—to fancy itself in the place of God (p. 31).

Those who have ever made the attempt to analyze in a few lines the genius of a great writer will best be able to estimate the combination of keen intellect, patient thought, and scrupulous candour in this criticism. We must not deny ourselves one more quotation:—

S. Augustine, Bossuet, Guizot, Balmez, Schlegel: I have taken these names not to exhaust but to illustrate the subject. Here we have the ancient and the modern society, Africa and France, Spain and Germany, and the Christian mind in each, thrown upon the facts of history. They point out, I think, sufficiently a common result. But amid the founders of a new science who shall represent our own country? Can I hesitate, or can I venture, in this place and company [*i. e.* before the Catholic University of Dublin, in the chair of which this lecture was delivered] to mention the hand which has directed the scattered rays of light from so many sources on the wild children of Central Asia, and produced the Turk before us in his untameable ferocity—the outcast of the human race, before whom earth herself ceases to be a mother—by whom man's blood has ever been shed like water, woman's honour counted as the vilest of things, nature's most sacred laws publicly and avowedly outraged,—has produced him before us for the abhorrence of mankind, the infamy of nations? To sketch the intrinsic character of barbarism and civilization, and out of common historical details, travel, and observation to show the ineffaceable stamp of race and tribe, reproducing itself through the long series of ages, surely expresses the idea which we mean by the philosophy of history (p. 33).

We have given a disproportionate space to this inaugural lecture, both for its intrinsic importance and because it gives a shadow of the whole plan of Mr. Allies's work, both that part which lies before us and that which remains to be published; for the volume before us is "only a portion, perhaps about a fourth, of the author's design." In the six lectures which it contains, he gives us an estimate, first, of the physical and political condition of the Roman empire in its palmy days; then, of the force by which it pleased God to constitute the new creation in the midst of it. In the last four lectures he compares the vital principles of these two vast social organizations—the heathen and the Christian,—first in a representative man of each class, then in the effects produced upon society at large by the influence of each; then in the primary relation of man to woman in marriage; and, lastly, in the virginal state; although under this last head there can hardly be said to be a comparison, as heathen society has simply nothing to set against that wonderful creation of Christianity,—holy virginity.

We know not where we have met any painting of the Roman empire so striking as that contained in the first lecture. Of the multitude of Englishmen who read more or less of the classical Latin authors, a very small proportion have ever paid any attention to the Roman empire, as it is displayed by Tacitus and Juvenal. This is the natural result of the grace and eloquence of Livy and Cicero, much rather than of any strong preference for republican institutions. Indeed it is impossible not to be struck with the vast influence which Roman republicanism exercises in France compared with England. Nor is it difficult to account for this. France, except to a limited degree under the monarchy of July, has never enjoyed constitutional liberty. The Frenchman, therefore, who dreams of liberty at all, places his dreamland in a Roman republic. Boys who in England would rant about John Hampden are found in France ranting about Junius Brutus. For what the Englishman means when he talks about liberty is "English liberty," the Frenchman means the Roman republic. So much has this been the case, that even in America the war of independence began, not in any aspiration after a republic, but for the rights of English subjects. The sword had been drawn for a year before the colonies claimed independence, and very shortly before, Washington had declared that "there was no thought of separation, only of English liberty." What proves that these were not mere words was, that even after independence had been achieved, the leaders, who met in congress, agreed almost to a man in

expressing their preference for "an English constitution," if circumstances had placed it within their reach. All the world knows that France became a republic chiefly because Rome in her palmy days had been so called; nay, to this hour all the terms adopted by the revolutionary party have been borrowed from classical times. Such was the term "Citizen," so appropriate to a people whose boast was that they were free of a city which had conquered the world, so absurd as denoting the members of a great nation in which not even centuries of extreme centralization have prevented political rights from being exercised by each man in his own province. Such, again, was that inundation of pagan names which the revolutionary times substituted for those of the saints, and which are still characteristic of France,—Camille, Emile, Antonine, and even Brute and Timoleon. This we take to be one great reason why many sensible persons in France are so greatly afraid of classical studies in schools and colleges. They say that they turn the heads of boys, especially French boys. It is highly characteristic of the man, that the officers of the House of Commons, who made forcible entry into the house of Sir Francis Burdett when he was committed by order of the House, found him reading with his little son, not Plutarch's life of Brutus or Cato, as would assuredly have been the case with a Frenchman, but "*Magna Charta*." He was not less theatrical, but he was a thoroughly English actor.

And yet we strongly suspect that out of a hundred boys who leave a classical school more than ninety believe that Roman history ends with Augustus. The university no doubt gives a somewhat more extended view. But even there Tacitus is usually about the limit. We wonder how far this feeling was carried before Gibbon published the "*Decline and Fall*."

Hence we especially value the wonderful picture of the Empire painted by our author.

It was in fact a federation of civilized states under an absolute monarch: the municipal liberties were left so entire, that Niebuhr mentions Italian cities in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome itself, which retained all through the times of the Empire and the middle ages, down to the wars of the French revolution, the same municipal institutions under which Rome had found them. They were swept away by that faithful lover of despotism, Napoleon I., to make way for the uniform system of a *préfet* and *sous-préfet* in each district. It is more important to bear this in mind because, as the revolutionists aped the manners and names of the Roman Republic without understanding them, the imperialists of France are apt to assume that they faithfully represent the Roman Empire. Now

the one striking characteristic of the French Empire is that it raises yearly 100,000 military conscripts, besides the naval conscription, the police and the very firemen, all of whom are carefully drilled as soldiers. How was it under Augustus ?

It is hard to conceive adequately what a spectator called "the immense majesty of the Roman peace" (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxvii. 1). Where now in Europe, impatient and uneasy, a group of half-friendly nations jealously watches each other's progress and power, and the acquisition of a province threatens a general war, Rome maintained, from generation to generation, in tranquil sway, an empire of which Gaul, Spain, Britain, and North Africa, Switzerland, and the greater part of Austria, Turkey in Europe, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, formed but single limbs, members of her mighty body. Her roads, which spread like a network over this immense territory, from their common centre, the golden milestone of the Forum, under the palace of her emperors, did but express the unity of that spirit with which she ruled the earth her subject, levelling the mountains and filling up the valleys for the march of her armies, the caravans of her merchandise, and the even sweep of her legislation. A moderate fleet of 6,000 sailors at Misenum, and another at Ravenna, a flotilla at Forum Julii, and another in the Black Sea, of half that force, preserved the whole Mediterranean from piracy; and every nation bordering on its shores could freely interchange the productions of their industry. Two smaller armaments of twenty-four vessels each on the Rhine and the Danube secured the Empire from northern incursion. In the time of Tiberius, a force of twenty-five legions and fourteen cohorts, making 171,500 men, with about an equal number of auxiliary troops, that is, in all, an army of 340,000, sufficed not so much to preserve internal order, which rested upon other and surer ground, but to guard the frontiers of a vast population, amounting, as is calculated, to 120,000,000, and inhabiting the very fairest regions of the earth, of which the great Mediterranean Sea was a sort of central and domestic lake. But this army itself, thus moderate in number, was not, as a rule, stationed in cities, but in fixed quarters on the frontiers, as a guard against external foes. Thus, for instance, the whole interior of Gaul possessed a garrison of but 1,200 men,—that Gaul which, in the year 1860, in a time of peace, thought necessary for internal tranquillity and external rank and security to have 626,000 men in arms.* Again, Asia Minor had no military force; that most beautiful region of the earth teemed with princely cities, enjoying the civilization of a thousand years, and all the treasures of art and industry, in undisturbed repose. And within its unquestioned boundaries, the spirit, moreover, of Roman rule was far other than that of a military despotism, or of a bureaucracy and a police pressing with ever watchful suspicion on every spring of civil life. The principle of its government was not that no population could be faithful which was not kept in leading-strings,

* Surely the author should have added the Belgian army (fixed by the laws of 1853 at 100,000), and that part of the Prussian, &c., which is raised west of the Rhine, in comparing the military force of ancient Gaul with that of the same district in our day.

but rather to leave cities and corporations to manage their own affairs themselves. Thus its march was firm and strong, but for this very reason devoid alike of fickleness and haste.

It might have been added, that, as a general rule, the army which guarded each portion was composed of the natives of the country in which they were stationed. Roman citizens they were no doubt, but citizens of provincial extraction, and posted to guard on behalf of Rome the very country which their fathers, sometimes but a very few generations back, had defended against her.* This is a policy the generosity of which France dares not, at this day imitate, even in her oldest provinces. To say nothing of the British army in Ireland, the Breton conscripts are still sent to serve at Lyons and Paris.

The extracts we have given, will doubtless lead every reader to study for himself Mr. Allies's descriptions of Rome, and the life of the *Thermæ*, and of the Colonies, everywhere reproducing the life of Rome. Every page breathes with the matured thought of a mind of remarkable natural acuteness, and stored with refined scholarship. There is nothing of beauty or majesty in that magnificent old world which he does not seem to have witnessed and mused over.

It is hardly possible to realize all this greatness without being tempted to repine in the remembrance whither it was all hastening—that the peace of the Roman world was but “the torrent’s smoothness ere it dash below;” its magnificence only the feast of Baltassar in that last night of the splendour of Babylon, when the Medes and Persians were already under her walls, and the river had been turned away from its course through her quays, and a way left open for the rush of the destroyer into her streets and palaces. Already the mysterious impulse had been given which, during so many centuries, drove down horde after horde of barbarians from the wild North-East, to overflow the favoured lands that surrounded the Mediterranean. In the early days of Roman history the Gauls had rushed on, sweeping away those earlier races whose remains we are now exploring in the shallows of the Swiss lakes, and whose descendants are probably to be found in the Basques, and in some of those degraded castes which, in spite of the welding power of the Church, left proscribed remnants in France and elsewhere, until the great revolution. That mighty wave burst upon the rock of the Capitol, threatened for a moment utterly to overwhelm it, and then fell broken at its feet. But it is not by repelling one wave,

* Champagne, Rome and Judea.

however formidable, that a rising tide is turned back. In the day of Rome's utmost power her very foundations were shaken by the torrent of the Cimbri and Teutones. They, too, were broken against the steel-clad legions of Marius, and fell off like spray on the earth. But the tide was still advancing. What need to trace its successive inroads? Every reader of Gibbon remembers how the time came at last, when the very site where Rome had stood had been so often swept by it, that of all its greatness, there remained nothing more than the sea leaves of some castle of shingles and sand, after a few waves have passed over it.

Quench'd is the golden statue's ray ;
The breath of Heaven hath swept away
What toiling earth hath piled ;
Scattering wise heart and crafty hand,
As breezes strew on ocean's strand
The fabrics of a child !

There even came a time when for many weeks the very ruins of ancient Rome were absolutely deserted, and trodden neither by man nor beast. No wonder that the world stood by afar off, weeping and mourning over the utter destruction of all that the earth had ever known of greatness and glory. So the sentence had been passed, in the day of her greatest glory, by the prophetic voice of the angel, who cried with a strong voice,—

"Fallen—fallen, is Babylon the great, and is become the habitation of devils and the hold of every unclean spirit, and of every unclean and hateful bird. And the kings of the earth shall weep and bewail themselves over her, when they shall see the smoke of the burning ; standing afar off for fear of her torments, saying, Alas ! alas ! that great city Babylon, that mighty city ; for in one hour is thy judgment come. And the merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn over her, and shall stand afar off from her for fear of her torments, weeping and mourning, and saying, Alas ! alas ! that great city which was clothed in fine linen, and purple, and scarlet, and was gilt with gold and precious stones, and pearls. For in one hour are so great riches come to nought."—(*Apocalypse*, chap. xviii.).

It was not the ruin of one city, however glorious, but the sweeping away of all the accumulated glories of the civilization of the whole civilized world, during more than a thousand years. All had been embodied in Imperial Rome. In the words of our author,—

The empire of Augustus inherited the whole civilization of the ancient

world. Whatever political or social knowledge, whatever moral or intellectual truth, whatever useful or elegant arts, "the enterprising race of Japhet" had acquired, preserved, and accumulated in the long course of centuries since the beginning of history, had descended without a break to Rome, with the dominion of all the countries washed by the Mediterranean. For her the wisdom of Egypt and of all the East had been stored up. For her Pythagoras and Thales, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and all the schools besides of Grecian philosophy suggested by these names, had thought. For her Zoroaster, as well as Solon and Lycurgus, legislated. For her Alexander conquered, the races which he subdued forming but a portion of her empire. Every city, in the ears of whose youth the poems of Homer were familiar as household words, owned her sway. The magistrates, from the Northern Sea to the confines of Arabia, issued their decrees in the language of empire—the Latin tongue; while, as men of letters, they spoke and wrote in Greek. For her Carthage had risen, founded colonies, discovered distant coasts, set up a world-wide trade, and then fallen, leaving her the empire of Africa and the West, with the lessons of a long experience. Not only so, but likewise Spain, Gaul, and all the frontier provinces, from the Alps to the mouth of the Danube, spent in her service their strength and skill; supplied her armies with their bravest youths; gave to her senate and her knights their choicest minds. The vigour of new and the culture of long-polished races were alike employed in the vast fabric of her power. Every science and art, all human experience and discovery, had poured their treasure in one stream into the bosom of that society, which, after forty-four years of undisputed rule, Augustus had consolidated into a new system of government, and bequeathed to the charge of Tiberius (p. 41).

No wonder the ancient world had assured itself that, as nothing greater, nothing wiser, nothing more glorious than Rome could ever arise upon earth, so its greatness, wisdom, and glory could never be superseded. It was "the eternal city." It was "for ever to give laws to the world." The contemporary poets could imagine no stronger expression of an eternity, than that of a duration while Rome itself should last. Yet was it at that very time that the eyes of a fisherman of the Lake of Tiberias were opened to see the angel "coming down from heaven with power and great glory," from whose mighty cry over the fall of Babylon we have already quoted some words. No wonder, when the time came that his prophecy was fulfilled, the world stood by weeping and mourning, not over the fall of a single city (such as Scipio Africanus had forecast as he watched the smoke of old Carthage rising up to heaven), but over the ruin of the civilization of the whole world. No wonder that, even in our own age, those whose hearts have so far sunk back to the level of heathenism as to value only material prosperity and worldly greatness, still re-echo the cry,—

Alas ! the eternal city, and alas !
The trebly hundred triumphs, and the day
When Brutus made the dagger's edge surpass
The conqueror's sword in bearing fame away.
Alas ! for earth, for never shall we see
That brightness in her eye she wore when Rome was free.

But the voice of divine wisdom was far different :—" Rejoice over her, thou heaven, and ye holy apostles and prophets, for God hath judged your judgment upon her. And a mighty angel took up a stone, as it were a great millstone, and cast it into the sea, saying, ' With such violence as this shall Babylon, that great city, be thrown down, and shall be found no more at all : and the voice of harpers, and of musicians, and of them that play on the pipe and on the trumpet shall no more be heard at all in thee ; and no craftsman, of any art whatsoever, shall be found any more at all in thee ; and the sound of the mill shall be heard no more at all in thee : and the light of the lamp shall shine no more in thee ; and the voice of the bridegroom and the bride shall be heard no more at all in thee ; for thy merchants were the great men of the earth, for all nations have been deceived by thine enchantments.' And in her was found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth."

Thus total, according to the prophecy, was to be the destruction of the wealth, civilization, greatness, and glory of the ancient heathen world, gathered together in Rome, that in the utter sweeping away of that one city all might perish together. How fully the words were accomplished we know by the lamentation of the whole world over Babylon, the echoes of which still ring in our ears. But to us Christians it rather belongs to weigh the words which follow without any break in the sacred text (although the division of the chapters leads many readers to overlook the close connection). " After these things I heard, as it were, the voice of much people in heaven, saying, ' Alleluia. Salvation, and glory, and power is to our God. For just and true are His judgments, who hath judged the great harlot which corrupted the earth with her fornications, and He hath avenged the blood of His servants at her hands.' And again they said, ' Alleluia. And her smoke ascendeth for ever and ever." Here is the answer to that cry of the angel, " Rejoice over her, thou heaven, and ye holy apostles and prophets."

Were any comment needed upon such prophecies—any explanation of the sentence passed upon a civilization so great, so ancient, so widely extended, and so refined,—anything to reconcile us to the utter destruction of so much that was fair

and mighty, we may find it in the latter half of the lecture before us. Not that our author is insensible to the marvellous beauty of that glow with which classical literature causes the figures of those days to shine before us. That would be impossible for a man of his studies. He says—

Is not the very language of Cicero and Virgil an expression of this lordly, yet peaceful rule; this even, undisturbed majesty, which holds the world together like the regularity of the seasons, like the alternations of light and darkness, like the all-pervading warmth of the sun? If every language reflects the character of the race which speaks it, surely we discern in the very strain of Virgil the closing of the gates of war, the settling of the nations down to the arts of peace, the reign of law and order, the amity and concord of races, the weak protected, the strong ruled; in a word,

“Romanos rerum dominos, gentemque togatam.”

Neither, need it hardly be said, has he set the hideous pollutions of that civilization fully before us: that is rendered impossible by its very hideousness. Let those who recoil from the horrors of what he has said—but a faint outline of the miserable truth, though traced with singular artistic form and beauty—bear in mind the while the words of the inspired prophecy, “All nations have drunk of the wine of her fornication, and the kings of the earth have committed fornication with her”—“Her sins have reached unto heaven, and the Lord shall reward her iniquities”—“In her was found the blood of prophets, and saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth.” The crimes, as well as the civilization of a thousand years, were accumulated at Rome, and both were swept away together by that overwhelming flood of fierce barbarians. Little were it worthy of Christians to mourn over a civilization into whose very heartstrings such unutterable pollution was intertwined; especially as it was removed, not like Babylon of old, to leave behind it nothing but desolation, but to make room for that kingdom of God which was to be enthroned upon its ruins; for such was the purpose of God, that the very centre of Christendom, the very seat of the throne of Christ upon earth, on which He would visibly sit in the person of his Vicar, was there to be established, whence the throne of the Cæsars and the golden house of Nero had been swept away in headlong ruin. “I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth was gone. And I heard a great voice from the throne saying, ‘Behold the tabernacle of God with men, and He will dwell with them. And they shall be His people, and God Himself shall be their God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.’” “And He that sat on

the throne said, 'Behold, I make all things new.'" The full accomplishment of these words we expect, in faith and hope, when "death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more; for the former things are passed away;" yet, surely, whatever more glorious accomplishment is yet to come, it were blindness not to see how far they are already fulfilled in the substitution of Christendom for the civilized pagan world—the setting up the throne of the Vicar of Christ upon the ruins of the palace of the Cæsars.

First among the causes of that hideous accumulated mixture of blood and filth in which heathen civilization was drowned, Mr. Allies most justly places the institution of slavery as it was at Rome, because by this the springs of human life were tainted. It is certain that during all the long years of the duration of the Roman empire, there was among its heathen population no one human being who lived beyond the earliest childhood, who was not polluted, and whose very soul was not scarred and branded by the marks of that hideous moral pestilence. We say "its heathen population," because great as must have been the evil it wrought upon ordinary Christians, we doubt not that there were those who gathered honey out of corruption, and whose justice, charity, and purity came out from that furnace of temptation with a brightness which nothing but the most fiery trial could have given to them. From slavery the whole of Roman society received its form. Our author most truly says, "The spirit of slavery is never limited to the slave; it saturates the atmosphere which the freeman breathes together with the slave, passes into his nature, and corrupts it." This miserable truth can never be too often impressed upon men, because unhappily, there are still advocates of slavery who think that they apologise for it if they can prove, as they think, that the slave is happy. As well might they argue that the introduction of the plague into London would be no calamity, if the man who brought it in upon him entered the city dancing and shouting. In ancient Italy slaves replaced the hardy rustics, that "*prisca gens mortalium*," who, though doubtless far less virtuous than they appeared in the fevered dreams of men sick of the vices of Rome in the last days of the republic, were still among the best specimens of heathen life. Wherever slavery extends, labour becomes dishonourable as the badge of servitude, a few masters languish in bloated luxury, but the nation itself grows constantly poorer, as an ever-increasing proportion of its population has to be maintained in indolence. At Rome slaves were the only domestic servants, and after a time the only manufacturers. And, yet, even this is nothing compared to the evils of a state

of society in which the great majority of women as well as of men are the absolute property of their masters. Horrible as was this state of things, it offered so many gratifications to the corrupt natures of those whose hands held the power of the world, and without whose consent it could not be abolished, that it would have seemed to any one who had ever witnessed the life of a wealthy Roman noble, no less than madness to imagine that any man would ever willingly surrender them.

As a matter of fact, so far was this state of society from holding out any hope of its own amendment, whether sudden or gradual, that, as our author remarks—

Of all the minds which have left a record of themselves, from Cicero to Tacitus, there is not one who does not look upon the world's course as a rapid descent. They feel an immense moral corruption breaking in on all sides, which wealth, convenience of life, and prosperity only enhance. They have no hope for humanity, for they have no faith in it, nor in any power encompassing and directing it.

Faithless and hopeless they were ; but whatever this world could give they had in abundance :—

In the time of heathenism the world of sense which surrounded man flattered and caressed all his natural powers, and solicited an answer from them ; and in return he flung himself greedily upon that world, and tried to exhaust its treasures. Glory, wealth, and pleasure intoxicated his heart with their dreams ; he crowned himself with the earth's flowers, and drank in the air's perfume ; and in one object or another, in one after another, he sought enjoyment and satisfaction. The world had nothing more to give him ; nor will the latest growth of civilization surpass the profusion with which the earth poured forth its gifts to those who consented to seek on the earth alone their home and their reward ; though, indeed, they were the few, to whom the many were sacrificed. The Roman noble, with the pleasures of a vanquished world at his feet, with men and women from the fairest climes of the earth to do his bidding—men who, though slaves, had learnt all the arts and letters of Greece, and were ready to use them for the benefit of their lords ; and women, the most beautiful and accomplished of their sex, who were yet the property of these same lords—the Roman noble, as to material and even intellectual enjoyment, stood on a vantage-ground which never again man can hope to occupy, however—

“ Through the ages an increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widen'd with the process of the suns.”

Cæsar and Pompey, Lucullus and Hortensius, and the fellows of their order, were orators, statesmen, jurists and legislators, generals, men of literature, and luxurious nobles at the same time ; and they were this because they could use the minds as well as the bodies of others at their pleasure. Not in this direction was an advance possible (p. 159).

Our author draws with great skill and vigour a picture of the moral society of the heathen world, and of the beliefs upon which the practice of the heathen rested. Into these we have no room to follow him. At the end of this lecture he shows what sights they were which met the eyes of a stranger coming from the East in the days of Nero,—an execution in which four hundred men, women, and children were marched through the streets of Rome to the cross, because their master had been killed by one of his slaves. In all such cases the Roman law required that every slave in the house, however innocent, however young or however old—man, woman, or child—should be put to death. Thence the stranger passed to a scene of debauchery such as the world had never imagined, in the gardens close to the Pantheon. This stranger,—

Why has he come to Rome, and what is he doing there? Poor, unknown, a foreigner in dress, language, and demeanour, he is come from a distant province, small in extent, but the most despised and the most disliked of Rome's hundred provinces, to found in Rome itself a society, and one, too, far more extensive than this great Roman Empire, since it is to embrace all nations; far more lasting, since it is to endure for ever. He is come to found a society, by means of which, all that he sees around him, from the Emperor to the slave, shall be changed (p. 101).

What madness can have inspired such a hope, or what miracle, real or simulated, could fulfil it? And that, not in the golden age of pastoral simplicity, in which men looked for wonders with an uncritical eye, but "amid the dregs of Romulus," when all the world seemed to have fallen together into the "sere and yellow leaf."

He has two things within him, for want of which society was perishing and man unhappy: a certain knowledge of God as the Creator, Ruler, Judge, and Rewarder of men; and of man's soul made after the image and likeness of this God. This God he has seen, touched, and handled upon earth; has been an eyewitness of His majesty, has received His message, and bears His commission. But whence had this despised foreigner received the double knowledge of God and of the soul, so miserably lost (as we have seen) to this brilliant Roman civilization?

In the latter years of Augustus, when the foundations of the imperial rule had been laid, and the structure mainly raised by his practical wisdom, there had dwelt a poor family in a small town of evil repute, not far from the lake of the remote province where this fisherman plied his trade. It consisted of an elderly man, a youthful wife, and one young child. The man gained his livelihood as a carpenter, and the child worked with him. Complete obscurity rested upon this household till the child grew to the age of thirty years (p. 104).

Then follows in few words, the history of His life, death,

and resurrection. These things the fisherman had seen, and in this was the power which was to substitute a new life for the corrupt civilization of a world.

The details of the comparison which follows we may leave to be considered when the work is continued. They are drawn out with great spirit, thoughtfulness, and artistic beauty. For the comparison of the two systems in an individual Mr. Allies selects on the one side Cicero, on the other S. Augustine. An able reviewer has maintained that "Marcus Aurelius was the person to compare with S. Augustine." Mr. Allies has given his reasons for not selecting either Marcus Aurelius or Epictetus in the defective religious system of both. There were, however, other grounds which seem to us even stronger. To test what heathenism can do, it was necessary that the example selected should, as a chemist would say, present not "a trace" of any other influence. Now this was impossible in the days of Epictetus or Aurelius. Christianity had then been taught and professed publicly and without restraint for many years, with only occasional bursts of persecution since Nero first declared war upon it. Its theology, indeed, was fully known only to the faithful, but its moral code was publicly professed. The Christian teachers came before the people as philosophers. It is absolutely certain that all the great Stoics, and especially the emperor, must often and often have heard of the great moral and religious principles laid down by the Christian teachers, however imperfect was his knowledge of their religious practices. But we have already had occasion to remark that men are driven, whether they will or no, to approve and admit these great principles when they are only publicly stated and maintained, although certain not to have discovered them by their unassisted reason. We cannot, therefore, but regard the religious and moral maxims of the later Stoics as an imperfect reflection of the full light of Christianity, like the moonlight illuminating without warming, but still taking such hold of the minds which have once embraced them, that they could never be forgotten. The life and practice of the imperial philosopher, we have every reason to believe, was, for a man without the faith and the sacraments, wonderfully high. Far be it from us to depreciate it, for whatever there was in it that was really good we know resulted from that grace which is given even beyond the bounds of the Church. But our knowledge of details is most meagre, while Cicero we know probably more familiarly than any great man in whose intimacy we have not lived. The thoughts and speculations which approved themselves to the deliberate judgment of Marcus Aurelius, these we know, and in many respects they are wonderful. Of his life we

know little more than he chose publicly to exhibit to his subjects. The failings of Cicero were petty and degrading; but if he had been firmly seated on the throne of the Cæsars, and if we had possessed no more exact details of his life than we do of the life of Marcus Aurelius, we much doubt whether we should have been aware of them. Merivale says,—“The high standard by which we claim to judge him is in itself the fullest acknowledgment of his transcendent merits; for, undoubtedly, had he not placed himself on a higher level than the statesmen and sages of his day, we should pass over many of his weaknesses in silence, and allow his pretensions to our regard to pass almost unchallenged. But we demand a nearer approach to the perfection of human wisdom and virtue in one who sought to approve himself as the greatest of their teachers.” He was condemned indeed by his heathen countrymen, but their censure was rather of his greatness than his goodness, and they would probably have been even more severe had he attained what he did not even aim at,—Christian humility.

Considering these things, and especially that Cicero belonged almost to the last generation, which was wholly uninfluenced by the reflected light of Christianity, and in which, therefore, we can to a considerable degree measure the real effects of heathen philosophy, we venture to think that Mr. Allies has judged well in comparing him as the model heathen with S. Augustine as the model Christian. The comparison is drawn with a masterly hand.

On the whole, however, we incline to think that the two last lectures are of the greatest practical value especially at the present crisis. The salt by which Christianity acts upon the world seems to be martyrdom and holy virginity. Both of them have been always in operation since the days of John the Baptist. But there are periods of comparative stillness in which martyrdom is hardly seen, or at least only at the outposts of the Christian host. At such times, it is by holy virginity that the Church acts most directly and most powerfully upon the world. This was the case in the Roman empire as soon as persecution relaxed.

Our author says—

A great Christian writer [S. Chrysostome] who stood between the old pagan world and the new society, which was taking its place, and who was equally familiar with both, made, near the end of the fourth century, the following observation: “The Greeks had some few men, though it was but few, among them, who, by the force of philosophy, came to despise riches; and some, too, who could control the irascible part of man; but the flower of virginity was nowhere to be found among them. Here they always gave precedence to us, confessing that to succeed in such a thing was to be

superior to nature and more than man. Hence their profound admiration for the whole Christian people. The Christian host derived its chief lustre from this portion of its ranks." And, again, he notes the existence, in his time, of three different sentiments respecting this institution. "The Jews," he says, "turn with abhorrence from the beauty of virginity; which, indeed, is no wonder, since they treated with dishonour the very Son of the Virgin Himself. The Greeks, however, admire it, and look up to it with astonishment, but the Church of God alone cultivates it." After fifteen hundred years we find the said sentiments in three great classes of the world. The pagan nations, among whom Catholic missionaries go forth, reproduce the admiration of Greek and Latin pagans; they reverence that which they have not strength to follow, and are often drawn by its exhibition into the fold. But there are nations who likewise reproduce the Jewish abhorrence of the virginal life. And as the Jews worshipped the unity of the godhead, like the Christians, and so seemed to be far nearer to them than pagan idolaters, and yet turned with loathing from this product of Christian life, so those nations might seem from the large portions of Christian doctrine which they still hold, to be nearer to Christianity than the Hindoo and the Chinese; and yet their contempt and dislike for the virginal life and its wonderful institutions seems to tell another tale. But now, as fifteen hundred years ago, whether those outside admire or abhor, the Church alone cultivates the virginal life. Now, as then, it is her glory and her strength, the mark of her Lord, and the standard of His power, the most *special* sign of His presence and operation. "If," says the same writer, "you take away its seamliness and its continuity of devotion, you cut the very sinews of the virginal estate; so when it is possessed together with the best conduct of life, you have in it the root and support of all good things: just as a most fruitful soil nurtures a root, so a good conduct bears the fruits of virginity. Or, to speak with greater truth, the crucified life is at once both its root and its fruit (p. 382).

We must conclude by expressing our deliberate conviction that no study can be more important at the present day than that of the change from heathen civilization to Christendom, the means by which it was brought about, and the effects which it produced. For in our day, most eminently, the Protestant falling away is producing its fruits in restoring throughout all Europe more and more of the special characteristics of heathen society. We have not room at present to offer any proofs of this, but we would beg every reader to observe for himself, and we are confident that his experience will confirm what we say. Nor is it only Catholics that are aware of this tendency. A thoughtful writer in the *Saturday Review*, six months back, devoted a whole article to trace the points of resemblance between an educated English Protestant of our day and a heathen of cultivated mind. Those who feel disposed at once to regard the idea as an insult are probably judging of heathen civilization by Nero and

Domitian. Mr. Allies's book will at least dispel this delusion. In fact, it is only too obvious that there is, even in our own day, no want of plausibility in what is, at the bottom, only revived heathenism; and in consequence of this remarkable resemblance, nothing could be more strictly practical at the present moment than any studies which show us the old heathen civilization as it really was, in its attractive as well as its repulsive qualities.

ART. VI.—THE IRISH LAND QUESTION.

REPORT.—*Tenure and Improvement of Land (Ireland) Act.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 23 June, 1865.

THERE is an ignoble hypocrisy in the way that English statesmen and publicists now condescend to certain arguments, when the laws which concern the relations of the Irish peasantry with their landlords, and the obligations of the State in their regard, are considered. The temper in which Irish religious questions are discussed is, generally speaking, bad enough; but on this particular subject the governing classes appear to lose all specific gravity of common sense and moral dignity. Certainly, there is no very high public opinion anywhere upon the subject at present; the Irish people seem almost to have resigned hope of any remedy except emigration. But we can fancy an historian, who may, in future, have to deal with events affecting the conduct of the empire in the present age and during the next century, especially in its relations with its colonies and with America, reading with curiously incredulous eyes, for example, the transactions of the Committee of the House of Commons of last session on the condition of the Irish tenantry: and we can imagine the way he will criticise the peculiar animus which was manifested in the course of its proceedings by such men as Mr. Cardwell, Mr. Lowe, and (*longo intervallo*, of course,) Sir Robert Peel. And why? Because these gentlemen, at all events, know perfectly well that the committee was merely a mechanism for shuffling aside the consideration of a great question of state and of law, and a question of a very high order of administration—not at all capable of being settled on the shallow premises put forward in the organs which, from sympathy or connection of one kind or other, advocate the cause of the landlords—a question, moreover, of which the true policy and political economy are now actually ignored by

Parliament. Mr. Cardwell's character, as a statesman, is of a kind at once crude and effete. No personage of his time has got so much reputation for so little capacity; but there is something absolutely pitiable in the contemplation of his conduct in connection with this particular committee. He is the minister who has conducted and carried through Parliament an Act to redress one of the most difficult and overwhelming grievances of modern times—a question to be compared, in its admitted weight upon the general conscience of mankind, with the emancipation of the West Indian negroes, or the settlement of the Russian serfs. His measure has proved so utterly inadequate and inoperative that, after several years, it is found, by Parliamentary return, that it has not been called into action by the class for whose benefit it was supposed to be intended, in even one single instance. Thereupon Mr. Cardwell is eager to worry the principal witnesses who appear before the Committee to inquire into the operation of this Act, into some sort of admission, that it was only because he proposed to give the tenant for his improvements, made with the landlord's consent, an annuity at the rate of seven pounds ten shillings *per centum*, instead of a fixed money payment at the termination of his tenure, that the Act failed to establish for its author an enduring fame, and to pacify a troubled people. Nevertheless, he votes against this very proposition in Committee. One can fancy what Sir Robert Peel would feel, if he had lived to witness such a spectacle!

The night before that lamented statesman met with the accident that caused his death, he walked homewards from the House of Commons with one of his favourite disciples. He had spoken his last speech in the Pacifico debate. His mind was very anxious. He said, "It is impossible this ministry can hold office for many months. I must, despite myself, be Premier again very soon. I wonder how people will take my policy. I mean to bring in sweeping measures in regard to Ireland." "What! to abolish the Established Church?" asked his companion. "Certainly not!" replied Sir Robert; "no one cares very much about the settlements of the Church in Ireland at present. It is the Encumbered Estates Court that must be enlarged. Some way must be found, at whatever cost, of fastening the people to the glebe; the system of wholesale evictions must be put an end to."

A certain colour for the strong opinions with which this anecdote credits Sir Robert Peel, may assuredly be found in his Parliamentary speeches on Irish affairs during the previous three years—and especially when cases of wholesale eviction were brought under the consideration of the House of

Commons. On one of these occasions * he said, "That these ejectments were illegal is expressly stated in the report of Major McKie to the Commissioners. I know, however, that the law is powerless in procuring redress in such cases; but I know also that the mere statement of the facts in the House of Commons, accompanied with the expression of such feelings as can alone be excited, when such facts are narrated to us, will not be without its influence." Again, in speaking of the Kilrush Evictions,† he said, "I must say that I do not think the records of any country, civil or barbarous, present materials for such a picture as is set forth in the statement of Captain Kennedy . . . I do not know whether the law can provide a remedy, but the mention of such facts may have some effect in checking these evictions, more especially if it is known that the recitals are heard with an expression of the deepest abhorrence by the House of Commons." The House of Commons, and the followers of Sir Robert Peel in particular, seem to have since become singularly callous to such recitals. But there remains evidence in several of the great statesman's speeches that to the last his mind was labouring to find that legal remedy against the abused powers of the landlord, the absence of which he so earnestly deplored. In his very able speech on the Rate in Aid Bill, his scheme of Irish policy is vaguely outlined. Apparently it was his wish to appoint a commission with very extraordinary powers to deal with all the problems affecting the social condition of Ireland. They should be authorized to assist and direct emigration, to give loans for draining and the general improvement of property, to establish agricultural and manufacturing schools, to make roads and railroads, to erect piers for the fisheries, but, above all, to take the estates of certain encumbered proprietors absolutely into their hands, and to divide them into small peasant properties. "If you consent," he said, "to take the course which I earnestly recommend, if you invite new capitalists to undertake the cultivation of the land, do not permit the transfer of estates from one insolvent proprietor to another; if you do, you will do no good; but enable small proprietors to cultivate their own vegetables, to live upon the produce of their farms, and to write to their friends that there is no country in the world which has such prospects as Connaught . . . I make these suggestions, especially as regards the transfer of property, with the utmost hesitation, being an unprofessional man. I am deeply sensible of the necessity of a remedy, and the difficulty of providing it; but if you are as

* Hansard's Debates, 3 S., vol. 97, p. 1010. † *Ibid*, 3 S., vol. 105, p. 1287.

convinced of the evil as I am, then I trust that you who have the command of the best advice, will not be deterred from applying a remedy by any legal technical difficulties." In conclusion, he spoke of the deep discontent of the Irish people with the Government. "Between you and them," he said, sadly, "there exist no great national sympathies." The present panic of Fenianism shows how little they have grown up since. "Peace may not always be preserved," he continued. "You may have formidable combinations directed against you. We cannot conceal from ourselves—experience shows it—that the west coast of Ireland is the weak part of our empire." And, lo! we live to see the Channel Fleet sent to the coast of Connaught by Sir Robert the Second to guard against an expedition, like that which General Garibaldi led to Sicily five years ago. Not a single one of the measures which Peel advised with such solemnity has been ever introduced; and, at the close of the last Parliament, a leading Peelite, Mr. Cardwell, informed the Irish people, through the House of Commons, that on the great question of the tenure of land her Majesty's Government were determined to make no concession whatsoever to them.

It is quite evident, we submit, from these passages, that Sir Robert Peel did not regard the system of landed property settled in Ireland as having any very sacred character that should dispense it from being dealt with for the benefit of the people of the country, even in a rather extra-legal manner, if necessary. There is nothing here about "tenant right being landlord wrong." On the contrary, if we may extract its obvious sense from the language, Sir Robert Peel rather contemplated that it was the duty of the State to place the tenant in the position of the landlord—compensating the latter for his interest, of course: and not merely this, but by a grand series of national improvements, and a large expenditure of public money, making the position as easy to the new peasant proprietor as possible. The particular method which he seems to have leant to was the formation of companies, aided by the State, to purchase and divide the lands. Such a company was attempted two years after by Mr. Gavan Duffy, but perished under the malignant influence of the connection, which was then led by Mr. John Sadleir. Some such project is still the natural road to areal and effectual settlement of the land question. Notwithstanding the rapid extravasation of the population by emigration—notwithstanding the large substitution of grazing for cottier farms, something approaching to the character of a revolution is necessary to adjust satisfactorily the conditions of land tenure in Ireland. The statesman who attempts it

may live to be regarded, however maligned at the time, as a benefactor to the empire not less great than Stein and Hardenberg proved to Prussia.

Sir Robert Peel is not the only minister of that time who contemplated a policy that would now be called communistic in regard to Irish landed property. There is good reason to believe that Lord Clarendon was anxious to signalize his administration by an act for which the landlord press would have had to go back for a precedent to the commission of titles of Strafford. Certain it is that, during the most anxious period of his viceroyalty, he engaged in correspondence with a Prussian statesman of eminence, with a view to ascertaining how far the principles of the great property revolution wrought by Stein and Hardenberg could be applied to Ireland; and that his serious conviction then was that Irish society could only be settled on a wholesome basis by an absolute, or at least a very considerable re-distribution of landed property. It is to be regretted that after his recall from Ireland he should have completely abandoned all thought of a country in the conduct of whose affairs he had had such a trying and considerable experience. It is one of the disadvantages of constitutional government that its rapid alternations of power, and the changes of function which they bring to statesmen of a certain position, afford to them an excuse for shuffling out of their best grounded convictions. Sir Robert Peel would certainly have carried through a striking and comprehensive Irish policy had he lived. It will not be to the credit of Lord Clarendon's position in history that, having certain very clear and strong convictions on the subject, his lips have been absolutely sealed on Irish affairs ever since he left the Castle.

The Committee of last session—its whole constitution, animus, method of procedure, and result—remind us of the leg of mutton characterised by Dr. Johnson as ill-bred, ill-fed, ill-cooked, and ill-carved. It was ill-constituted. Being so, it proceeded to deliberate with a foregone conclusion. The majority of its members were evidently disposed to resist the reception, or to minimize the effect of whatever evidence ran contrary to their ideas. It declined to report even the general conclusions upon which all the witnesses who appeared before it were agreed; nor did it give any reason of its own for ignoring the weight of so much respectable testimony. Seldom has a committee of Parliament, appointed to investigate a great grievance, so scandalously shirked its duty. The pretext of those who led the proceedings of the Committee in this direction would be, we suppose, that the Irish land question is, in reality, not a great grievance, but only a great nuisance.

Instead of that horror and indignation with which Sir Robert Peel regarded the eviction of the tenantry—instead of that desire to do justice between the stronger and the weaker class, which led him to urge that the technical limit of the law should not trammel the conscience of a statesman dealing with this case of high imperial policy—what do we find in the minds of men who might be supposed to share his convictions and sentiments? We must say that the apparent animus of such members of the Committee as Lord Naas, Lord Claud Hamilton, and Mr. George, representatives of the Irish landlord interest as they openly are, contrasts favourably with that of Mr. Lowe, Mr. Cardwell, and the present Sir Robert Peel, gentlemen who might be expected to view the subject as an affair of State and policy, and a question of political economy of the first class. The advantages of a good law regulating the relations of man with man on any great social question where there are conflicting interests, are so great that the danger, generally speaking, is of its sense being strained by the pressure of those who seek to benefit by it. But when a law pretends to deal with such interests, and can find not one single individual who can see the possibility of any benefit to himself in its provisions, it is obvious that the law is condemned in the most complete way that a law can be condemned, and that the legislator is bound to take shame to himself for the same. Mr. Cardwell, however, throughout the whole proceedings of the Committee, seemed to be only beset by the idea that he ought to endeavour to elicit from the witnesses some admission that, though the law had not succeeded, yet it ought to have succeeded; nay, that, perhaps, with some slight amendment of detail, it even yet might be made to succeed. As for its leading principles, he took care, in a very solemn manner, to inform Parliament and the Irish people that these were, in a sense, sacred. Happily, the Irish people do not seem to have attached any undue importance to the announcement. If, indeed, it were to be generally treated by them as the final censure of the hopes which they have been led to entertain on this subject for many years by greater statesmen than Mr. Cardwell, there is not a farmer in three provinces of Ireland who would not be ready to join the Fenians.

Mr. Lowe's services on such a Committee might have been of inestimable value if he had devoted the considerable faculties of his mind, and especially its acute penetrative power of examination, to elicit the facts of the case, and to apply to them proper principles of legislation and political economy. But Mr. Lowe, beyond all the other members, showed a certain unaccountable propensity to that ugly process of

"evisceration" of the witnesses, which Mr. Roebuck suggested as the duty of the Committee. His mind in the matter was as shallow as an article in the *Times*—the one English journal which has never shown even common intelligence or a regard for decency of feeling in dealing with this question—and his manner was hardly less insolent and overbearing than that of Sir Robert Peel.

It is not worth while, perhaps, to characterize the temper and the capacity of the Chief Secretary of the Lord Lieutenant in dealing with any important Irish interest. How much longer whatever public spirit remains in the country will tolerate such an administration at the Castle, we are loath to predict. Every one is lost in amazement at this moment at the semi-delirious display of energy with which he has brought over the Channel Fleet and a bevy of gun-boats, a score of regiments and a park of artillery, set the whole police force of the country in motion, despatched special trains, stopped the electric telegraph, and suspended the Habeas Corpus all of his own will and pleasure, in order to arrest a few dozen of Fenians—shop boys, lawyers' clerks, linen-drappers, tailors, hodmen, printers' devils. Last year our amazement was that Orangemen and Ribbonmen should be shooting each other for the space of a week or ten days in the town of Belfast, all the places of business that were not closed gutted by the mobs, and the hospitals crammed with wounded men and women, while there was no more sign of the existence of a government in the country than there might be if a civil war broke out in a backwoods' city of shanties. Sir Robert Peel at the Castle is as much a measure of the wretched condition of public opinion in Ireland as a bailiff in charge of a house is a sign of the state of family affairs. As to his conduct on this Committee, however, one illustration will do the reader good. Sir Robert Peel is examining Mr. Dillon, a barrister of twenty-five years' standing, an alderman of the city of Dublin, and at present member of Parliament for the county of Tipperary, and this is the style in which he begins:—

You are, I think, an alderman of the City of Dublin?

Yes.

I admire the spirit in which you advocate your views. You differ from Judge Longfield, you differ from Lord Dufferin, and you have said to gentlemen who have already asked you questions that you disregard any practical knowledge of farming, that you do not go to agricultural meetings, nor invite the opinion of landlords or tenants, but judge from your own scope?

Not exactly that; I said, on the contrary, that I thought these meetings would afford a very good opportunity of acquiring useful information on the

subject ; but that there were other sources as well, and that on the whole I found it more convenient to derive my information from those other sources.

One is amazed at the mildness of Mr. Dillon's answer. Of course there is not a particle of foundation in his direct examination for the version of his views so insolently put forward by the Chief Secretary. On the contrary, on every occasion when he was asked how far his views agreed with those of Judge Longfield and Lord Dufferin, Mr. Dillon eagerly spoke of their authority as of the highest. On one point only did he differ from Judge Longfield, and that is with regard to certain powers proposed to be given to County Courts, and this is the way in which he expressed his difference :—

I do differ from Judge Longfield with the greatest respect for his judgment, but still, without any doubt on my own mind.

In the same way, when he was asked by Lord Claud Hamilton "whether those who managed property, and spent large sums on the improvement of property, are not the best judges in this matter," which is only another way of saying that landlords ought to be let alone to legislate for themselves and their tenantry, Mr. Dillon answered :—

The management of land is one subject, and legislation about land-tenure is another. There are persons who have applied their attention to matters of legislation relating to land, who have never cultivated land or managed it in any way ; and, on the other hand, there are men of great intelligence, who have been all their lives engaged in tilling land, and in the management of land, but who have never thought about legislating on the subject.

The whole temper of such an answer is, we need hardly say, absolutely remote from the construction put upon it by the Chief Secretary. But after all, there is little use in complaining of the insolence, or sounding the shallowness of Sir Robert Peel.

It is time that we should proceed to examine the evidence laid before the Committee. Notwithstanding the efforts to "eviscerate" it, in which the majority of the Committee participated, it is very weighty, and considering the different positions and circumstances of the witnesses, wonderfully well connected. There were only six witnesses in all examined, but it would be difficult to find in Ireland six of higher authority in point of personal character, or of more ample and varied opportunity of experience in the different phases of this most difficult question. Judge Longfield, who was the first witness taken, was Judge of the Encumbered Estates Court from the date of its formation, until its powers were transferred to the present Landed Estates Court, over which he still presides—that is to

say, he has had fifteen years' experience in the position of gravest responsibility and largest opportunities of information from every side of the question in that tribunal, whose express duty it has been to direct what amounted to a partial revolution in Irish property. He told the Committee in evidence, that from twenty-five to thirty millions worth of Irish estates had passed through the two Courts during the period of his connexion with them ; and no one has ever hitherto dreamed of alleging that the Court used its very considerable and exceptional powers otherwise than most wisely and effectually. It is extraordinary to find a man of Mr. Lowe's character and talents, when he comes to examine a witness of such character, actually treating him as if he were an advocate of Communism. Here is a fragment from the evidence :—

So far as you strip a man of his proprietary rights and remit them to some other person, so far you are acting upon the principle of appropriation or confiscation ?—I am not particular about names.

Of course it is a question of degree between that and taking his whole estate ?—Of course it is a question of degree between a man walking by me in the street, and simply brushing against me, or knocking me down ; but difference in degree is often everything.

So that you would make a law to authorize people to brush against you in the street ?—No, but if the want of that permission stopped up the street, I would let it be done.

It is humiliating to contemplate a man of Mr. Lowe's powers treating a question of this kind in a way so finicking and narrow. When it comes to Sir Robert Peel's turn, we are not at all surprised that he should call in question the Judge's knowledge of the condition of Irish property on the score of his not being a landlord. After making quite sure of this, he comes down with all the air of one who is making a conclusive point in the following question :—

In fact, your knowledge of land in Ireland is derived solely from the fact of your being Judge of the Landed Estates Court ?—Chiefly, but not solely.

The question is about as sensible as if, in a committee on the Rinderpest, some honourable gentleman were to try to shake the authority of a foreign medical witness by saying,—“In fact, then, your knowledge of the Russian cattle plague is derived solely from the fact of your having been at the head of the Government Veterinary Department charged with the supervision of the steppes which originate this disease, for the last fifteen years ?”

Lord Dufferin, the second witness examined, was a hardly less important authority than Judge Longfield on a most

interesting department of this inquiry. He is an extensive proprietor in that district of the north of Ireland, where the custom of the Ulster tenant right most absolutely prevails. He has had a very extensive practical experience of its operation, and he has also made it a subject of study in an economic point of view. His evidence is the more valuable and interesting that in theory he decidedly disapproves of the Custom, and wishes the Ulster tenantry would rather see their interest in a system of leases for a considerable term of years, with a right to be compensated for unexhausted improvements, the value of which should be settled by an official arbitrator at the end of the term. No evidence can for this very reason be more powerful than his lordship's in regard to the sense of security and independence which the use of this famous agricultural custom generates.

We have already spoken of Mr. Dillon, the third witness examined, who has since been elected to a seat in Parliament for the county of Tipperary. Mr. Dillon's political career, which now enters upon a very important and critical phase, dates back to the period when the Young Ireland party was formed during the Repeal agitation. He was one of the first contributors to the *Nation*. He was an active member of the committee of the Repeal Association, from which he seceded with Mr. Smith O'Brien in 1846. Not remarkable for that rapid, militant, and brilliant eloquence which belonged to so many of his associates, the early gravity of his character and the solidity of his judgment gave him great weight in their councils. A large reward was offered for his apprehension in 1848, but he succeeded in escaping to America, whence he returned about the same time that an amnesty was extended to his associates, who had been transported to Tasmania. He has since taken a gradually increasing part in Irish public affairs, and in particular may be said to have assumed the chief responsibility of conducting the new National Association formed at the commencement of this year with the sanction of so many of the Irish Prelates. Mr. Dillon may, therefore, in a sense be regarded as representing the political aspect of the question, and the views with which it is agitated by the more moderate and influential portion of the popular party in Ireland.

Mr. Dillon was followed by Mr. McCarthy Downing, a solicitor of very extensive practice in the south of Ireland, who has for many years resided in a district in which the visitation of the famine almost disintegrated society—the district of Skibbereen—and who had the most ample and close opportunities of observing the great changes which throughout that part of the

country followed through sweeping evictions on the one hand, and the action of the Encumbered Estates Court on the other. He, too, has been an active politician for the last fifteen years, and took a prominent part in the foundation and agitation of the Tenant League.

The Bishop of Cloyne was the next witness examined. No better exponent could have been selected of the general opinions, experience, and sentiments of the Irish prelacy and clergy upon this question. A public character of blameless consistency, integrity, and independence, talents of a very high order, cultivated as well by study as by travel, a natural elevation and eloquence of language, have, apart from his exemplary character as a bishop, given to Dr. Keane a wide-spread and well-established influence in Ireland. If the Committee were anxious to hear what was the general sentiment of so influential a portion of the body politic of the country, they could not have heard it through a more valuable organ; and, indeed, it must be said that there was no evidence laid before them which on the whole they heard with so much attention and respect. After having stated, early in his examination, that he had lived for nearly fifteen years in France, had travelled through Italy once, and through Belgium twice, and had frequently visited England, when his lordship went on to say, "To those who are living constantly in Ireland and who never leave the country the sense may not be so painful, but going from any country on the Continent that I have visited and crossing over from England, as soon as I arrive in Ireland I am struck by witnessing more indications of misery in one small town there of 4,000 or 5,000 souls than I could see throughout the length and breadth of England, France, and Belgium together"—the evident sincerity and actuality of the words forcibly impressed every person who was present.

Mr. Edward Curling was the last witness produced by the promoters of the inquiry. Mr. Curling is one of the most extensive land-agents in the south of Ireland. He manages in that capacity the estate of the Earl of Devon, the estate of the Earl of Dunraven, and the Locke estate. On the Devon estate alone, of which he has had the charge for the last seventeen years, there are eleven hundred tenants, and during that period it has not been necessary to evict one of them. Nor is Mr. Curling's experience of the management of landed estates confined to Ireland. For sixteen years before he went to Ireland he was agent of an extensive estate in Suffolk, and previously he had been director of a colony for the improvement of agriculture in Cephalonia; and, in early life, he had farmed a property of 600

acres in Van Diemen's Land. A more varied and authentic experience of its kind it is hardly possible to conceive, for it provided the most ample opportunity of comparing the English system of tenure and improvement with that which prevails in Ireland, and the system of managing land in countries where the relation of landlord and tenant does not obtain with both. As the result of actual practical experience in the daily administration of those relations, none of the evidence tendered to it was entitled to more attention from the Committee.

But the majority of the Committee, when they came to draw up their report, simply paid no attention whatsoever to the evidence. It is apparent, as we have already remarked, that throughout they viewed its tendency with unfriendly eyes. Several of the members addressed themselves to their task with the evident object of reducing the amount of information which the various witnesses were prepared to give to a minimum; and, in the very form in which it was elicited, the members representing the Government generally sought to disparage it as much as possible. The report is in these terms:—

The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the operation of the Act 23 & 24 Vict., c. 153, on the Tenure and Improvement of Land in Ireland, have considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following report:—

That the Committee having examined several witnesses on the recommendation of the promoters of the inquiry, are of opinion, that the principle of the Act of 1860, embodied in the 38th and 40th sections, namely, that compensation to tenants should only be secured upon the improvements made with the consent of the landlord, should be maintained.

Your Committee are of opinion that several modifications of the provisions of the Act may be advantageously made without infringement of this principle; and, amongst others, that in the clauses providing compensation for improvements made by tenants, the payment of a lump sum of money should be substituted for the annuity provided by the Act, and that the duration of the compensating period in certain cases should be altered; and they have agreed to report to the House the evidence taken.

Never surely did a Parliamentary Committee utter a more extraordinary Report. They were appointed to inquire into the operation of the Act 23 & 24 Vict., c. 153. Why not report the fact that the Act, having been for five years in existence, had not ever once come into operation at all? Why not report that every witness who came before them—judge, landlord, barrister, solicitor, bishop, land agent—absolutely agreed that it was inoperative because it was inadequate? The Committee

recommend that "the principle that compensation should only be secured upon improvements made with the consent of the landlord" should be maintained. The recommendation of the Committee is in direct contradiction to the great mass of the evidence which they received. Why not state to the House such general conclusions as all the witnesses examined are agreed upon, instead of flinging the evidence in a heap on the table, with a report which is neither a report on the operation of the Act, nor a report on any of the actual results of the inquiry?

There were a number of propositions upon which all the witnesses were agreed, and which were established, we submit, beyond a reasonable doubt, upon which it was not less than the duty of the Committee to have informed Parliament. It was agreed, for example, that the agriculture of Ireland is at present in a very backward condition, owing to the fact that no adequate capital is expended in permanent improvements on the land, either by landlord or tenant; moreover, that, as a rule, whatever improvements are made in Ireland are made by the tenant, and that their value is also, as a rule, confiscated by the landlord, whenever he is pleased to terminate the tenancy, which also, as a rule, is tenancy at will. Let us take the points of this proposition, and the evidence bearing upon them. Judge Longfield says:—

The agriculture of Ireland is in a very backward state in most places. . . . There is no county in Ireland, no very large district, not requiring improvement. . . . There is no adequate capital expended on permanent improvement, whether by landlord or tenant. . . . As a rule, it is the tenants in Ireland who improve the land. . . . It is on the tenants we have to rely for improvements. . . . To my own knowledge, they make those improvements very frequently with a great feeling of discontent, even while they are making them. . . . The cause of this discontent is the feeling that after a certain period, the whole value of those improvements will go to a man who has contributed nothing to them, to the landlord. . . . Compensation, generally speaking, is scarcely thought of; the landlord could not do it mostly. . . . Except in the north of Ireland, it is never asked for; I never knew it asked for. . . . The majority of tenants in Ireland now hold as tenants from year to year; the number of leases are diminishing, I may say, daily.

On the same points Lord Dufferin gives evidence:—

There can be no doubt that agriculture in Ireland is in a backward condition. . . . I think there is scarcely any part of Ireland that I have ever seen that does not want improvement. . . . As a rule, we rely in the north of Ireland upon the tenants for improvements. . . . As a general rule, in all parts of Ireland, I believe that to be the case.

As Lord Dufferin's examination chiefly related to the state of the tenantry of Ulster, admittedly the most prosperous in Ireland, and to the nature and operation of the custom of tenant-right, we find no evidence upon his part as to the practice of compensating the improvements made by the tenants in other provinces. He says, however, that he is afraid the practice of giving notice to quit to all the tenants prevails on some estates, and that it is a practice which cannot be too much condemned.

Mr. Dillon's evidence is to the same effect :—

I think progress in Irish agriculture is very slow, and its condition very backward. . . . This is very much due to insecurity of tenure. . . . That is to say, to the absence of leases, and to the absence of any rule of law or custom securing to the tenants compensation for any improvements they make. . . . The landlords, as a class, do not improve. . . . Improvements have not been generally made in the country to an adequate extent. . . . I think improvements in Ireland have gone on imperceptibly by the labours of the tenants, acting generally under that sense of security with which ordinary landlords inspire their tenants. That is the usual way in which improvements have been made in Ireland, not under any specific contract at all. . . . I think that the legal status of the Irish tenant is at present in itself exceptional ; I think there is not a country in Europe where the occupier of land has not a larger amount of protection than the Irish occupier. . . . I would say, in fact, that there is no occupier in any country, with whose laws I have any acquaintance, who has less motives for improving the land than the Irish tenant.

On the same points Mr. MacCarthy Downing's evidence was as follows :—

Agriculture is in a very backward state in those portions of the country with which I am acquainted. . . . I attribute that principally, if not entirely, to the relations existing between landlord and tenant. . . . The principal cause of emigration is the want of security to the tenant for any improvements that he may make ; he does not and will not invest his money upon the soil where he is but tenant from year to year. . . . A man who is but a yearly tenant will not expend upon the land his capital and labour to the same extent as he would if he had a certainty that the improvements he might make upon that land would be, at all events to some extent, his own. . . . As a rule (in Cork county), they are tenants from year to year. . . . Leases are very much the exception. . . . They have undoubtedly decreased very much. . . . Since the last day of last April, I saw myself twelve or fourteen houses unroofed, and the whole of the population turned out on the roadside ; their ancestors, as I understood, had been on that land for upwards of a hundred years ; the property was sold in the Encumbered Estates Court, the lease fell in on the 1st of May, and on the 1st of May the whole of the population was turned out, and the houses unroofed.

The Bishop of Cloyne's evidence on the same points was as follows :—

I am very sorry to say that the state of agriculture in Ireland is very backward indeed ; and I do not see the slightest chance of an improvement in it on what may be called a large national scale, unless more encouragement be given to the improving tenant than he is now able to command. . . . During the last sixty or seventy years, I believe there is no one acquainted with the history of Ireland who would not say that all the improvements that were made were made by the tenant. We have it on record ; you have it in the speeches of Lord Palmerston and others, that all the improvements, as a rule, are made by the tenant, and not by the landlord. . . . I never heard anyone, whether landlord, agent, clergyman, or tenant, discuss the question, who did not say that the agricultural produce of Ireland might be increased either to as high a figure as it now yields, or to two-thirds, three-fifths, a fourth, or (that was the very lowest calculation that I ever heard any one give in) one-fifth. . . . I do not expect that the improvement which is required for Ireland can ever be brought about by any other class except by tenants who have capital enough of that kind to effect the whole work. . . . The tenant-at-will who makes improvements has no security whatever. . . . It is a downright impossibility that the landlords can make improvements to the extent to which they are just now necessary. . . . Comparatively, very few tenants in Ireland have leases. . . . The landlords up to the present date have had the benefit of making no compensation, and whatever improvements are made, they have had exclusively the advantage of them. . . . I firmly believe, without any exaggeration at all, that at this moment there is ground for as much useful and remunerative employment as would employ all the idle hands that there are in Ireland and many more, and that that useful employment could raise from the soil several millions annually of which the country is now deprived ; and that if that sum were raised annually, it would reproduce itself ; it would ensure rent for the landlord, comfort to the tenant, employment for the shopkeepers, and, I may say, impart a stimulating and healthy influence to the prosperity of all classes.

In fine, we take Mr. Curling's evidence :—

In England, all permanent improvements are effected by the landlord. . . . In Ireland it is not so. . . . They are made generally by the tenant. . . . The state of things is entirely opposite in the two countries. . . . I consider this would justify an exceptional legislation for Ireland. . . . I think a tenant is a fool to expend his money without security (by a lease or extended period of compensation). . . . I think, generally speaking, the improvements in that way are effected by the tenant. . . . Generally speaking, if such improvements were not effected by the tenant, they would not be effected at all. . . . On the Devon estate, the mountain land was reclaimed exclusively by the tenant. . . . It would be no use my advising the landlord (to undertake such improvements), because I know he has not the means of doing it. . . . These improvements were chiefly done by tenants-at-will. Leases have only been in operation (on the estate) since 1858. . . . There

is nothing in the state of the law to prevent Lord Devon, if he thought fit, from raising the rents upon the tenants who have improved, and evicting them if they did not pay.

On the utter uselessness of the Act of Mr. Cardwell all the witnesses were agreed. Mr. Curling said that, so far as his knowledge went, it had been a dead-letter. He had already predicted its failure in letters which he published in 1860, and he had not known of a single case in which it had been availed of. The Bishop of Cloyne declared that it had not offered any inducement to tenants to improve, and "there could not be a better proof of that than the fact that nothing has been done under the Act." Mr. McCarthy Downing, in answer to the question as to whether it had practically operated in the districts with which he was acquainted, said:—"It has not worked at all, and I told the Attorney-General for Ireland (now Baron Deasy), when the Bill was brought in, that, in my opinion, he would not have one single case under it in the great county of Cork." Mr. Dillon said:—"The Bill has practically been inefficient . . . It has done no practical good to Ireland." Lord Dufferin said:—"The Act has been inoperative, as far as it concerns the case of any tenant upon my estate; of course beyond that I could not say, but I believe that it has remained quite inoperative . . . I do not believe that the giving compensation under the form established in the Act would be any inducement to a tenant to invest his capital." Judge Longfield, when asked whether to his knowledge any one had acted upon it, answered,—*"I believe not any one."* Certain powers with regard to leasing had been reserved to his Court. In the course of five years they had only been raised in two cases.

Again, on the point that landlords ought not to have the right of distraining for rent, but should stand in the same position as other creditors, all the witnesses who were examined to that effect, and especially Judge Longfield, expressed the most emphatic opinion.

We separate these conclusions upon which witnesses of such various rank and character and of such indisputable authority and integrity were agreed, from the mass of evidence in detail which they gave of their own personal experience, or of their own peculiar views; and we have no hesitation in saying that the Committee, which having been appointed to inquire into the operation of the Act of 1860, refused to report such conclusions to Parliament, unrebuted as they were by an atom of contrary evidence, shamefully

ignored its duty. In examining the minutes of the Committee to see how the report was arrived at, we find, as we might have expected, that it was by a combination of the Irish landlords upon the Committee and the members representing the Government. But what we should not expect to find, and what we do nevertheless find, both in the proceedings of the Committee and in its minutes, is, that the gentlemen connected with the Government were far more offensively and determinedly hostile to the people of Ireland than even those who represented their landlords. There is no comparison between the conduct of Lord Naas, Lord Claud Hamilton, and Mr. George throughout, and that of Mr. Cardwell, Mr. Lowe, and Sir Robert Peel. The draft of the report actually adopted is that proposed by Lord Naas. It is bad enough, but on the whole it is rather better than that suggested by Mr. Lowe:—

Your Committee, while fully recognizing the moral duty which binds a landlord to make reasonable compensation for unexhausted improvements to an outgoing tenant, is of opinion that any attempt to enforce this duty by law would exceed the legitimate limits of legislation, would impair the security of property, would sow discord between landlord and tenant, and prove ultimately most injurious to the weaker party—the tenant himself.

It is useless to argue that such a report would have been completely contrary to the evidence. That is a secondary question. The wonder is how a man of Mr. Lowe's admitted abilities, range of information, and pretensions as a politician, could advance a series of propositions so preposterous—contrary to the admitted principles and practice of legislation in every civilized country on the face of the globe, contrary to more than one Act of Parliament, and to the opinions of eminent statesmen, contrary to the accepted doctrines of political economy, contrary to all the lamentable experience which the history of Ireland affords, and in its last clause contrary to common sense itself. But our view of the conduct of Mr. Lowe, Mr. Cardwell, and Sir Robert Peel would be incomplete, if we did not notice the last amendment which was added to the report. It was Mr. George who suggested that, at all events, the Committee should recommend the substitution of payment by a bulk sum for Mr. Cardwell's absurd and abortive system of annuities. Lord Naas at once agreed to the amendment, which was carried by a majority of three; but of the six gentlemen who voted against it, three were Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Lowe, and Mr. Cardwell; and the other three were Sir Edward Grogan, Lord Dunkellin, and Mr. Hunt. There was a bitter significance in Judge Longfield's reply to a ques-

tion as to whether much good might be done by the Committee. "That depends," said the learned judge, "on the report of the Committee; and on whether the report will be acted upon." We are now aware that the report of the Committee is bad enough; but bad as it is, we see from the last vote of the members of the government connected with it, what chance there is of its being acted upon.

The truth is, there are only two honest alternatives before those who have on their consciences the responsibility of advising the public conduct of the Irish people. Either they must take higher ground in the argument of this case, and compel the attention of ministers and Parliament to it by every constitutional process capable of employment—or else advise the people to abandon their country and go where it is possible for them to live according to the ordinary conditions of manhood. Being, as they are, an exclusively agricultural people, if it be impossible for them at home to acquire any property in the results of their peculiar industry; if in relation to their landlords, they can only remain in a condition which, now that negro slavery and Russian serfdom have been abolished, is the lowest actually existing in any civilised society; if Parliament absolutely will not remedy this state of things at all, then, in the name of the law, let the country be emptied of men and filled with cattle. In America or Australia an Irish farmer can become a landed proprietor for half the expenditure of sweat and money that it costs him merely to offer a temptation to his landlord's rapacity at home. But it is because we doubt whether the true policy and political economy of this case has ever been fairly brought before Parliament that, in going over the evidence laid before this Committee, we have taken pains to extract what may appear to many of our readers to be only the leading truisms of this unhappy case. All the witnesses were agreed to the fact, and it is notorious, that all the agricultural improvements have been made by the tenants, and that hardly any are made by the landlords, and that any such improvements that are being made, or may be made for the future, will be made by the tenants—that millions of property have thus been added to the value of the country, but that it is utterly unsecured by law, nay, systematically appropriated with the protection of the law. Now this question, as a question of political economy, has hitherto been argued on a very shallow ground, on the ground, to wit, that the claim of the tenant amounted to an interference with the right of contract. There is a higher ground, however, that is to say, the question of what power the State has of eminent domain, or of guardianship as to the

use of the right of property by the landlord. We do not commit ourselves to a positive opinion upon a question the discussion of which has been evaded by many of the first authorities on the science of political economy. But let us simply place, before closing this article, alongside of the evidence which we have just summarised, the deliberate opinion of certainly the highest authority upon political economy that has arisen in England since Adam Smith—we mean the honourable member for Westminster, Mr. Stuart Mill, whose powerful support the advocates of the tenant's cause in Parliament will doubtless endeavour to enlist when their case is introduced next session. In his chapter on "Property in Land," then, Mr. Mill says :—

Whenever, in any country, the proprietor, generally speaking, ceases to be the improver, political economy has nothing to say in defence of landed property as there established. In no sound theory of private property was it ever contemplated that the proprietor of land should be merely a sinecurist quartered on it. In Great Britain the landed proprietor is not infrequently an improver. But it cannot be said that he is generally so. . . .

Landed property in England is thus very far from completely fulfilling the conditions which render its existence economically justifiable. But if insufficiently realized even in England, in Ireland those conditions are not complied with at all. With individual exceptions (some of them very honourable ones), the owners of Irish estates do nothing for the land but drain it of its produce. What has been epigrammatically said in the discussions on "peculiar burthens" is literally true when applied to them ; that the greatest "burthen on land" is the landlords. Returning nothing to the soil, they consume its whole produce, minus the potatoes strictly necessary to keep the inhabitants from dying of famine ; and when they have any purpose of improvement, the preparatory step usually consists in not leaving even this pittance, but turning out the people to beggary if not to starvation. *When landed property has placed itself upon this footing it ceases to be defensible, and the time has come for making some new arrangement of the matter.*

When the "sacredness of property" is talked of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency. When private property in land is not expedient, it is unjust. It is no hardship to any one, to be excluded from what others have produced : they were not bound to produce it for his use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at all. But it is some hardship to be born into the world and to find all nature's gifts previously engrossed, and no place left for the new-comer. To reconcile people to this, after they have once admitted into their minds the idea that any moral rights belong to them as human beings, it will always be necessary to convince them that the exclusive appropriation is good for mankind on the whole, themselves included. But this is what no sane human being could be persuaded of, if the relation

between the landowner and the cultivator were the same everywhere as it has been in Ireland.

Landed property is felt even by those most tenacious of its rights, to be a different thing from other property ; and where the bulk of the community have been disinherited of their share of it, and it has become the exclusive attribute of a small minority, men have generally tried to reconcile it, at least in theory, to their sense of justice, by endeavouring to attach duties to it, and erecting it into a sort of magistracy, either moral or legal. But if the state is at liberty to treat the possessors of land as public functionaries, it is only going one step further to say, that it is at liberty to discard them. *The claim of the landowners to the land is altogether subordinate to the general policy of the state. The principle of property gives them no right to the land, but only a right to compensation for whatever portion of their interest in the land it may be the policy of the state to deprive them of.* To that, their claim is indefeasible. It is due to landowners, and to owners of any property whatever, recognized as such by the state, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to what they derived from it. This is due on the general principles on which property rests. If the land was bought with the produce of the labour and abstinence of themselves or their ancestors, compensation is due to them on that ground ; even if otherwise, it is still due on the ground of prescription. Nor can it ever be necessary for accomplishing an object by which the community altogether will gain, that a particular portion of the community should be immolated. When the property is of a kind to which peculiar affections attach themselves, the compensation ought to exceed a bare pecuniary equivalent. But subject to this proviso, the state is at liberty to deal with landed property as the general interests of the community may require, even to the extent, if it so happen, of doing with the whole, what is done with a part whenever a bill is passed for a railroad or a new street. The community has too much at stake in the proper cultivation of the land and in the conditions annexed to the occupancy of it, to leave these things to the discretion of a class of persons called landlords, when they have shown themselves unfit for the trust. The legislature, which if it pleased might convert the whole body of landlords into fundholders or pensioners, might, *à fortiori*, commute the average receipts of Irish landowners into a fixed rent-charge, and raise the tenants into proprietors ; supposing always that the full market value of the land was tendered to the landlords, in case they preferred that to accepting the conditions proposed.

There will be another place for discussing the various modes of landed property and tenure, and the advantages and inconveniences of each ; in this chapter our concern is with the right itself, the grounds which justify it, and (as a corollary from these) the conditions by which it should be limited. *To me it seems almost an axiom that property in land should be interpreted strictly, and that the balance in all cases of doubt should incline against the proprietor.* The reverse is the case with property in moveables, and in all things the product of labour : over these the owner's power both of use and of exclusion should be absolute, except where positive evil to others would result from it ; but in the case of land, no exclusive right

should be permitted in any individual, which cannot be shown to be productive of positive good.

This is strong doctrine, doubtless, notwithstanding the ample and careful reservation of the right of compensation, which relieves it from the imputation of confiscation; but whenever it shall be advanced in a Parliament of landlords, we may be sure of an outcry about Communism. For our part, we simply wish to see the other side of the case stated in as clear and simple terms. Hitherto, we are not aware of any political economist of note-worthy name, who has ventured to traverse Mr. Mill's propositions and deductions. When such an argument is advanced, we shall be ready to give it whatever weight it may seem entitled to. But at present it is our persuasion that the Tenant Right party are bound, if they really believe in and wish to advance their cause, to take the controversy from this new and higher point of view. One thing is certain, whatever political economists may ultimately agree to be sound doctrine on the subject, statesmen have never been able to see anything very sacred in such rights of property as stood in the way of the public good. Who has ever seriously censured the revolution effected by Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia, or the various settlements of land tenure made by the British Government in India, or the arbitrary arrangements of property made by Austria and Russia in connection with the abolition of serfdom and villenage? When the mere asking of compensation for improvements is treated as a project of spoliation, it is well to remember what we have stated in an early part of this article. It is a very remarkable fact that statesmen so orthodox as Sir Robert Peel and Lord Clarendon were both anxious, at a period so recent, to imitate the policy of Stein in a general state-settlement of the conditions of landed property in Ireland.

It is well to remember finally, that the Tenant League, under the conduct of Mr. Duffy and Mr. Lucas, advanced this question, upon which so insignificant and deprecatory a tone is now adopted, so far that the Government of Lord Derby proposed to give retrospective compensation, and that the Lower House actually passed such a measure with the assent of the leaders of both parties. Such a settlement may even still be obtained; but a degree of political courage, energy, and independence is required on the part of its promoters, of which we are sorry to say we do not see much evidence at present.

Essays and Miscellaneous Papers.

[On two former occasions (No. IV. pp. 529-532, No. VI. p. 487) we have expressed an earnest desire for the establishment of some concordat between the rival schools of philosophy (Ontologism and Psychologism), which now unhappily divide Catholics. The two main preparations for such a concordat would seem to be these :—(1) That thinkers of either school shall have the fullest and most unreserved belief in the Church's infallibility on such questions ; and (2) that they shall study each other's opinions, rather with the purpose of finding matter for agreement than for difference.

The writer of the following paper, while holding decidedly with the Ontologic school, yields to no one living in profound deference to the Holy See's infallible authority ; neither is he (we think) unduly contentious against his opponents. Moreover, the books which he criticises are at this moment matters of familiar discussion among educated Englishmen ; and it is very desirable that Catholics shall have some general view of their respective value. For these reasons we have much pleasure in inserting the paper. We need hardly say that by doing so we in no way commit this REVIEW to the advocacy of Ontologism. On the contrary, we hope we may be able on future occasions to insert philosophical communications from more than one writer of the opposite school.]

CALDERWOOD AND MILL UPON HAMILTON.

Philosophy of the Infinite : Second Edition, greatly enlarged. By the Rev. HENRY CALDERWOOD. Macmillan & Co., Cambridge and London, 1861.

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By JOHN STUART MILL. London : Longman & Co., 1865.

IF the English public be not a metaphysical public, the class of metaphysicians in England must be very extensive. The large sale of the four costly volumes which, under Messrs. Mansel and Veitch's editorship, contain the logical and philosophical doctrines of Sir William Hamilton, is a strong proof of this. And ample confirmation of the proof is adducible from the fact of such an abstruse and recondite work as Dr. McCosh's "Primitive Intuitions," having run to a second edition within five years of its first appearance, and of John Stuart Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy" being actually out of print within six months of its issue from the press. Some remarks, therefore, upon the leading

metaphysical points under discussion at the present day require neither apology to deprecate the general reader's ire, nor rhetorical display to captivate his notice.

And it will perhaps contribute to a clear understanding of what is here set down, if the writer of it straightway leads his reader to the stand-point from which he has reviewed the labours of the two very able metaphysicians whose most recent works are at the head of this article. This may be done by directing his attention to the condemnation which is often pronounced upon metaphysicians for their practice of laying down a theory and of accepting or rejecting the theories of others just in so far as these recede from or approximate to their own. For it is said, and with some show of truth, that to act in this wise is to act in a manner most partial, narrowminded and unfair; that to act thus is to try men not by what they are really worth, but by an arbitrary standard set up by, and varying with the caprice of, an individual. The reply to such a course of reasoning seems to be something of this kind. The greater half of a metaphysician's labour must consist of a critical examination of the tenets of his contemporaries and predecessors, and as a matter of fact does so. But what does judgment imply save comparison—comparison between some candidate for approval, and that which has been in some form or another, rightly or wrongly no matter, already approved; between the subject under examination and an acknowledged standard? In philosophy, however, where is this standard to be met with? Truth is one, without doubt; but it so happens that considerably more than one set of writers believe that they have exclusive possession of the truth. Two rival schools—the school of experience and the school of innate ideas—divide the philosophic world at large; two rival schools, the psychological and the ontological divide the philosophic Catholic world; and in both cases numberless divisions exist in each school, and numberless subdivisions in each division. Upon a variety of very important points scarcely any two contemporary philosophers are perhaps in cordial agreement. What, then, must the metaphysician do? What, then, to bring the matter at once more home, must the critic do? Must he, in his notice of any work, confine himself to a bare enumeration and analysis of its principal chapters or paragraphs, or cram his pages with an annotated edition of the table of contents, and so fulfil his duty to an expectant public, which looks to him for a calm and studied *judgment*? Certainly not. Let him but honestly show his colours at the outset, state to which school he himself belongs, to what division of that school, and even

to what subdivision of the division, he leans, and so proceed. The standard by which *he* is about to judge will then be manifest and understood, and the fair demand for an acknowledged criterion will have been fairly encountered. For a standard may be admitted *as a standard*, though its intrinsic truth be disputed. It may even serve the purpose of a standard as adequately as if its intrinsic truth were indisputable. If my colour-blind neighbour mistakes green for red and red for green, his judgment, that my painting is artistic so far as the redness of the grass and foliage depicted are concerned, is intelligible enough. At the worst, the argument comes to the old adage "*Noscitur ab inimicis.*" And so far as the facts of ordinary experience go, how many hours of anxious plodding has not the knowledge that such a writer has praised or condemned such a work spared us? It is the same in political literature. The *Standard* and *Press* have but to condemn either an individual or a course of action, and the Liberal at once perceives the bearing each must have upon his own views; and in the same way the most inveterate and uncompromising Tory can extract his modicum of truthful information from the most reckless articles of the *Times* in Lord Palmerston's day of official power. The writer of this paper purposes criticising the works placed at the head of it from an ontological point of view. And yet in his ontologism he differs fundamentally from the rationalistic ontologists of Germany. He differs on some vitally important points from the unhappy Gioberti. He finds himself in greatest accord with Father Rothenflue; with M. Branchereau, author of the Sulpician-text-book; with Mgr. Maret, and with M. Hugonin. At the same time he acknowledges to the great want of an able digest of the various works that have of late years issued so teeming from ontological sources, and of a manual in which the youthful student may find their teachings reduced to an intelligible but strictly scientific form—both, of course, written in a submissive Catholic spirit, and both humbly submitted to the infallible judgment of the holy Roman Church. It is scarcely hazardous to state that nothing would serve so effectually to bring the two great schools into proximity, not to say union, with each other, as two works of this description. Can no one be found to attempt at least one of them? The labour would be great and anxious, but the utility incalculable and unquestionable, as all who are aware of the influence a fundamental theory has—not directly perhaps, but by means of several intermediate modified forms of itself, and ultimately—upon important points of practice, will not fail to recognise.

Apart from the large amount of philosophical literature to which Sir William Hamilton's writings have given rise, and to the due appreciation of which they are necessarily the clue, they—the lecture upon metaphysics especially—cannot fail to repay the reader any time or trouble he may expend upon them. For although his theory is fundamentally unsound, and if consistently pursued entirely subversive of all divine faith together with human knowledge, still the lectures contain a great number of passages which unveil to us in Sir William a keen and sagacious handler of philosophical minutiae, a great number of classifications and summaries of philosophical systems, and a great number of collections of the opinions of various writers upon specified questions. Indeed, wherever the knowledge of the speculations of other men's minds can be brought to bear, there is Sir William strong. He is a less able philosopher than historian of philosophy;* and in cases where opposition to any favourite author of his is based upon misconception, the ability he displays in clearing the ground for its refutation is of a very high order. An instance of this, and perhaps one of the most illustrative, occurs in Lecture XXIII., p. 72, vol. ii., where he takes up cudgels for his fellow-countryman Thomas Reid. Apart from his theory of the Unconditioned, which after all bears traces, as Mr. Calderwood has well observed, of the influence of Kant, there seem to be but about a couple of very valuable original passages throughout.† One of these is his proof that the principle of contradiction can never give more than a formal philosophy. It is to be met with in the Appendix II. to vol. ii., p. 524, and is undoubtedly one of the most welcome accessions to the body of metaphysical truths, as all members of the orthodox ontological school of philosophy will not fail to observe, though some may very possibly claim for others than Sir W. Hamilton the merit of being the first to assert and uphold such a doctrine. Its real importance he was himself very far from seeing. The other is the conclusion he comes to, and to which by the masterly manner of his statements he insensibly draws the reader, that what the mind has once received it never completely loses; and that we each of us lead a life

* "It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as the direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy itself."—*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, &c., p. 52.

† "Readers who have never given systematic and consecutive study to his (Sir W. Hamilton's) writings will be astonished at the contradictory and insignificant nature of his contributions to philosophy."—*Fortnightly Review*, July 1st, 1865, p. 507.

hidden in the depths of the soul's centre, of which the reflex powers usually take little or no cognisance. His remarks upon the phenomena exhibited during mesmerism and sleep prove him to have been not only a sound reasoner upon given facts, but a laborious and careful investigator of the facts themselves. In a word, he brings *à posteriori* evidence of a truth for which the strongest *à priori* grounds have been advanced by able writers, and really adds the weight of his name to that system of philosophy which starts off with the great, the fundamental dogma, of the existence in man of two orders of thought—the intuitive and the reflective.

His theory of the Absolute or Unconditioned is a very different affair. He rose into eminence upon it, eminence greater far than usually falls to the lot of living man, much less to living metaphysician; and yet but for Mr. Mansel, who pretty successfully made it serve his turn; for Mr. Calderwood, who has very effectually combated its main position; and for Mr. Mill, who has made it and its concomitants so many pegs on which to hang his own tenets, the theory might have been as soon out of mind as its originator. Its essence and the grounds for its merciless condemnation require but two words. It drove the Absolute, God, from the domain of reason, of intelligence, and relegated Him to the regions of a mysterious and, as can be easily shown, spurious kind of faith. It went about doing with a vastly more philosophical appearance at least than Auguste Comte's speculations possess, what it was a main point with the founder of the Positive school to effect. M. Comte would consign God and all other truths of religion to what he termed the *theological* period of a man's life—the years of infancy and childhood, and would blasphemously put on a level with the hobgoblins and bogies of youthful imagination the ever-existing and everywhere-present Creator of man and of all things. What the irreligion of an infidel led M. Comte pointedly and consciously to do, Sir William Hamilton's philosophical speculations led him, though still a believer in the principal truths of revelation, unconsciously to do. According to him, the Absolute, the Infinite, is immeasurably, hopelessly out of the reach of the limited, the finite reason of man. The two cannot be brought to any kind of intercommunion. Everything of the sort is an utter impossibility. All relation between the Infinite and the finite is a palpable contradiction in terms. Knowledge is a relation, and therefore finite reason can possess no real knowledge of the Infinite.

The astonishing part of the whole business was that, in spite of his theory, so acute and able a logician as Sir William

should go on from year to year writing and lecturing upon that very Infinite, the idea of which he maintained to be beyond the bounds of that finite intellect which in man gives life and form to the word, and about which, as Mr. Calderwood justly observes, "he cannot proceed to reason without annihilating his own defence."* To understand, he said, we must comprehend, and how can the finite comprehend the Infinite? And he thought the case against human reason triumphantly made out. He might not have been so satisfied had he but just argued with himself against his own theory with one quarter of the ability he was in the habit of bringing to bear upon its opponents. It might then have struck him that to understand fully, even as God understands Himself, comprehension is necessary, is in fact identical with, and but another word for, understanding or knowledge. But to understand partially, as in our understanding of God, apprehension is alone requisite. The deepest of mysteries has its intelligible side, and it is by this that the finite intellect takes hold of it. From the very circumstances of the case, all intercommunion between the finite and the Infinite is necessarily surrounded with mystery; but that all is mystery is a contradiction in terms. That creation has mystery about it and that this mystery comes into prominence, still as mystery, the more we would penetrate into the *how* of the fact, the *δύσκει*—as Aristotle puts it—of the *ᾧτι*, is certain; but though an object of divine faith, human reason accepts what it understands of it, inasmuch as the fact of creation is the only rational means of relation between original All-Being and those things which were drawn out of original chaos. "Let a man ask," says Mr. Calderwood, "the explanation of finite existence, and the intuitive belief in the One Infinite Being comes as the answer."†

Sir William Hamilton, it is true, allows of what he calls a "negative notion" of the Infinite, obtained by abstraction from the finite. But his logic is again at fault here; for abstraction can give nothing which does not exist in the concrete. Hence his "negative notion" is simply nothing at all, or much more than it would suit his philosophy to make of it. It is nothing at all, or a real and positive notion of the Infinite. In his letter to Mr. Calderwood he eats his own words, one might almost say his own works, with an explicitness which the fact of its being literally forced out of him by his adversary's skill renders painful to the honest and candid student of philosophy. "I do not think," he says, "that you have

* Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 17.

† Ibid, p. 46.

taken sufficiently into account that the Infinite which I contemplate is considered only as *in thought*; the Infinite beyond thought being, it may be, an object of belief, but not of knowledge. This consideration obviates many of your objections.* It obviates them all. It leaves Mr. Calderwood with not another word to say, but it at the same time takes away all necessity for his uttering a syllable more. "If this be all," he replies, "the discussion is at an end, and there can be no need for writing six sentences on the subject, because no one ever asserted that human thought could in any case extend to such a measure as to become *infinite thought*."† And no impartial critic could possibly do what Mr. Calderwood very justly refuses to do, and what no man of ordinary sense could in fairness do, that is, take a brief letter entered in the Appendix of Sir William Hamilton's works as really subversive of the speculations of his life. One cannot look upon Sir William, when hard pressed by an adversary abler than himself, as the Sir William, the idol of a well-thronged lecture-room, the chief of a popular and widely-spread school of philosophy, the Sir William of the four goodly volumes at present under notice. His letter to Mr. Calderwood contains in reality a complete avowal of the fundamental mistake in his philosophical system. But neither the public at large nor his warmest supporters and disciples have for a moment regarded it as such, nor does it seem that he himself ever so regarded it. He does not appear to have scanned the length and depth of his own statement. And yet it is with much hesitation that one can venture to lay blunders at the door of Sir William Hamilton, which owe their existence to a lack, not of rare logical acumen, but of that ordinary reasoning power which draws a conclusion from given premises. His conduct in this instance is not without a miserable parallel in the annals of philosophy. Descartes wincing, retracting, re-asserting and re-retracting under the logic of Arnauld‡ can scarcely fail to be recalled to mind by the brief correspondence between Sir William Hamilton and his quondam pupil. Certainly, if this be all, one cannot help agreeing with Mr. Calderwood that there is an end of the discussion. For if this be all, the far-famed originator of a wondrously intricate system merely asserts what generations of philosophers have asserted before him,

* Lecture II., p. 530.

† Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 15.

‡ "Aux objections qui lui furent faites par ses contemporains," says his panegyrist, Mgr. Maret, "en particulier par Arnauld, il répondit d'une manière un peu embarrassée et confuse."—*Philosophie et Religion*, p. 142.

and what the ablest of contemporary philosophers assert with him and assume as the ground-work of their philosophical speculations. But then, what becomes of the magnificent Hamiltonian structure—of the Conditioned and the Unconditioned, of the Absolute, the Cognisable and the Inconceivable? Just nothing at all; and of course Sir William cannot stand that.

As to the spurious kind of *faith* to which Sir William Hamilton consigns his Infinite, will it stand the test of a rigid analysis? Is it a product of the intellect or not? * And if not, what is it, whence is its origin? If it is, then between our minds and the Absolute there exists correlation; we do take the leap from the finite to the Infinite; we bridge the gulf, and Sir William's theory vanishes.

That there are other methods of attacking the theory of the Unconditioned besides the *reductio ad absurdum*, and that when anything beyond the simple annihilation of it is desirable, these methods should be adopted, are facts undeniable. Mr. Calderwood's five hundred pages of closely wrought argument are evidence enough in this respect, and it is high time to introduce the reader to them.

The very able author of "The Philosophy of the Infinite" has but one aim throughout his exceedingly well-written book, and that is to establish the doctrine of a positive notion of the Infinite being a necessary portion of the first principles inherent to every rational soul. His pages, it is true, literally

* "I am not now considering what it is that, in our author's opinion (he is referring to Sir William Hamilton), we are bound to believe concerning the unknowable. What here concerns us is the nullity to which this doctrine (of *beliefs*) reduces the position to which our author seemed to cling so firmly—viz., that our knowledge is relative to ourselves, and that we can have no knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute. In telling us that it is impossible to the human faculties to know anything about things in themselves, we naturally suppose he intends to warn us off the ground—to bid us understand that this subject of inquiry is closed to us, and exhort us to turn our attention elsewhere. It appears that nothing of the kind was intended: we are to understand, on the contrary, that we may have the best-grounded and most complete assurance of the things which were declared unknowable—an assurance not only equal or greater in degree, but the same in nature, as we have for the truth of our knowledge; and that the matter of dispute was only whether this assurance or conviction shall be called knowledge, or by another name. If this be all, I must say I think it not of the smallest consequence. If no more than this be intended by the 'great axiom' and the elaborate argument against Cousin, a great deal of trouble has been taken to very little purpose; and the subject would have been better left where Reid left it, who did not trouble himself with nice distinctions between belief and knowledge, but was content to consider us as knowing that which, by the constitution of our nature, we are forced, with entire conviction, to believe."—*An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c.*, pp. 59-60.

bristle with the name of Hamilton; but this arises from Sir William Hamilton's doctrine running directly counter to that which Mr. Calderwood so convincingly against Hamilton establishes. It would be a mistake however to suppose that his work is but a running comment or attack upon Hamilton's; for though joining issue with him upon the main question, and working it out his own way in direct opposition to his old master's teachings, he mounts higher up than did Sir William, goes farther back in his investigations than it suited either his adversary's taste or theory to do, and so makes his book both independent and complete. He does not merely accept that *belief* to which Sir William consigns the Infinite, but by a masterly analysis of the facts presented by consciousness he demonstrates the necessity, on the part of man, of recognizing the existence of such belief. He might, with very great advantage to his cause, have mounted a step higher, gone back a pace or two farther.

A sound system of philosophy must be based upon, must in fact itself be a mental structure in strict correspondence with the world of reality, and indeed but a true picture of that reality. Now there are two methods of approaching such a system, one from the side of the individual finite being making the approach, and the other from the side of the First Cause, the Infinite. In other words, we can set to work by beginning with that which is but secondary in the grand system, but is nearest to us, or with that which is primary in the system, without which, in fact, we who are at work with the investigation could not exist to attempt it, but yet is not known—at least reflexly and scientifically known—until a process of self-introspection and analysis has been gone through. The more strictly scientific process of the two is perhaps the one which sets off with that which is primary *in se*: the more satisfactory process, however, especially in the present state of philosophical science, is that which takes up whatever thinking man must acknowledge we have, and by an exhaustive analysis lays open the treasures that lie hidden therein. Now every thinking man must acknowledge that he actually thinks, must admit the existence of what philosophers very properly term "the fact of thought." By denying it he denies the possibility of all argument and of all philosophy, and puts himself and his convictions entirely *hors de combat*. Moreover, "the man who doubts consciousness at the same time trusts consciousness in declaring his doubt, and thereby prevents the need for any one contending with him."*

* Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 30.

The fact of thought as analysed by Père Hugonin, in the first pages of his admirable but somewhat lengthy "Ontologie," is found upon analysis to contain two component parts—the finite thinking being, and alongside of it, in creative or conservative * contact with it, the Omnipresent Infinite. Mr. Calderwood, however, does not take precisely this basis for his philosophy of the existence of the Infinite. He does not stop short with the fact of consciousness itself and resolve it into its constitutive elements, but seizes upon a solitary fact presented by consciousness and goes to work with it. His remarks, in consequence, though perhaps coming more directly home to non-scientific readers, lose much of the force with which otherwise they would have addressed themselves to professed metaphysicians, and render necessary a long proof that the *belief*, which he proposes to analyse, is actually a fact of consciousness. He does this in a most satisfactory style, but having to do it at all makes him lose much by that lack of curtness and concentration which a more scientific method of procedure would not have failed to insure. There is another serious objection to the course he has pursued; but it will be well before touching upon it to draw the reader's attention to the doctrine to which Mr. Calderwood gives such deservedly great prominence, and to which attention has been drawn above, namely, that of the existence in man of two distinct orders of thought. One extract will abundantly exemplify his teaching in this respect. His language is not so precise or technical as it might be, but there is no mistaking his real meaning, and there can be no shutting the eyes to the deep philosophical importance of the truths which he teaches. "The belief," he says, "in the existence of the One Infinite God *rises into consciousness* when experience and reflection are such as to require its application. Although the first principles of reason are essential to the human mind, it is very erroneous to suppose that they constitute a stock of cognitions and beliefs of which the mind is conscious from the first dawn of intelligence. They are rather hid as treasures within the soul, than known to be there; they are riches which the mind carries, *without being aware of their existence*, until the demands of observation or reflection *call them up into consciousness*, when they are seen to possess all the value of necessary and self-evident truths. Hamilton has well said that those notions or cognitions which are primitive facts are given us; they are not indeed obtrusive—they are not even cognizable

* "Non enim aliter Deus res in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando."
—St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*, i., Q. ix., 2.

of themselves. They lie hid in the profundities of the mind, until drawn from their obscurity by the mental activity itself employed upon the materials of experience.* To attempt, therefore, to test the doctrine of innate convictions by inquiring whether children appear in the world with certain first principles before their mind, would be to mistake the doctrine, and specially the manner in which such principles are declared to be recognized within. Equally mistaken would it be to expect that, because such convictions are essential to the nature of men, they must be always present before each individual mind, or recognized with the same frequency by all. What is affirmed is, that they are natural possessions of the mind, that they rise into consciousness with all the distinctness and authority of self-evident truths, but that the materials of observation or reflection are needful to call them before us for recognition. They have been given to us for guidance, and they rise before the mind only when its occupation is such as to require their direction."†

The objections met by this doctrine of the two orders of thought, the reflective and the intuitive, are precisely the same, as well in the plan Mr. Calderwood has followed, as in the one which he has not followed. The knowledge that underlies his *belief* is in exactly the same predicament as is the knowledge which underlies the fact of consciousness itself. Neither can become reflex without an intervening process, either of ratiocination or of revelation. The intuition of God and, of course, of His existence, or rather of that necessary Being which is God, lies at the bottom of the belief, and is really but another name for that knowledge which Mr. Calderwood, against Sir William Hamilton, nobly demonstrates the presence of in every rational soul.

It is a pity that Mr. Calderwood has not, as has been stated above, proceeded straightway, with Père Hugonin, Dr. Brownson and others, to dissect and anatomise the fact of consciousness itself, instead of the particular fact of consciousness which he styles *belief*. That he proves beyond cavil the existence of such belief can scarcely be denied; but he might have saved himself the labour altogether, and rendered his work all the better for it. He seems a little carried away by his own logical prowess, and so forgets that vantage-ground can seldom be yielded with impunity. He gains nothing and runs the risk of losing much, by descending from the high level of pure metaphysical truth to the plane of facts, which,

* Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 351.

† Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 43-45.

to the mind of many, are by no means indisputable. For there are men of note in the philosophical world who would deem it hard to have to acknowledge with Mr. Calderwood, that the divine existence, and especially all that the divine existence according to him implies,* is a *necessary belief*. It certainly is not so in the ordinary sense of the term, or otherwise there could be no controversy at all upon the subject. The knowledge which underlies such belief, which is all that Mr. Calderwood need be in quest of, can be arrived at by an analysis of the fact of thought, and this fact no thinking man can possibly deny. Of course, it can be also extracted from the fact of this *belief*, if the belief be but granted or assumed. But then comes the inevitable inquiry as to how far this belief has inherent hold upon every man's mind. To say that it has it intuitively, is either unmeaning or but an identification of the belief with the intuition; and to say that it has it reflexly, is to say that which the bulk indeed of philosophers admit, but which is after all a debatable matter. For it is but the simple assertion that no thinking man can deny the existence of God. Now, had Mr. Calderwood let his beliefs alone, and confined himself, as strict justice to the cause in his hands demanded, to pure intuitions, he would have arrived at the point for which he was making by a much less circuitous and troublesome route. He would have avoided those difficulties which always attach to the use of more technical terms than is absolutely essential. And although his volume would have fallen sadly short of its present goodly appearance, the improvement in its contents would have more than made up for the deficit.

It is not without hesitation that one can venture to charge so able and clear-sighted a writer with anything in the shape of mistiness, vagueness, or uncertainty; but mistiness, vagueness, and a considerable amount of uncertainty do seem to settle upon the reader in his progress through his work. Beliefs, primary beliefs, convictions, consciousness, and even *conscience* (p. 55), necessary conditions of human intelligence, first principles of the mind, ultimate data of consciousness—all seem so strangely confounded with and made to stand for one another, that the pith of several of the most interesting and important passages is liable to be lost by the absence of precision in the language in which they are presented. As to the necessary beliefs themselves, Mr. Calderwood is quite alive to the class of objections that may be raised against them, and his reply to

* "When, therefore, we find a necessary belief in an Infinite God rising in our mind, the province which it occupies is exclusively that of affirming the existence of one self-existent, infinite, intelligent, and holy Being."—*Ib.*, p. 101.

them *en masse* is too eloquent and characteristic to be passed over; though, at the same time, it is so far of a piece with the general treatment of the question as to be neither completely convincing nor exhaustive. "I am very far," he says, "from asserting that, since the Divine existence is a necessary belief, it is impossible for men either to neglect or deny it. And any one who argues that such impossibility is an inevitable consequence, mistakes the nature of the necessity involved. Let a man refuse or neglect to turn his attention to the facts of the question, and he may maintain anything to his own satisfaction, no matter how monstrous it may seem to others. Let him refuse to apply his mind in the relation in which a necessary conviction is said to arise, and he may negligently overlook what his nature contains, and dogmatically contradict what is nevertheless a primary belief. Nay more, he may reason with great acuteness and power to a conclusion directly subversive of our fundamental belief. Let him start with false premisses, let him do as Spinoza has done, let him give certain false definitions, and the conclusion may be attained, but only at the expense of reason. Any one may reach a pantheistic conclusion, making all things God, if he only, like Spinoza, define *substance* and *attribute* in a sense in which other persons never employed them. He may arrive at his conclusion in such a case with logical accuracy, and yet that conclusion be metaphysically untrue. Define a substance, 'that which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself,' and an attribute, 'that which is the essence of a substance,' and a man may make nonsense of the universe; but in all this he is only working among his own fancies, and is never looking at the facts before him. Let him maintain atheism or pantheism as he may; he cannot live in harmony with his theory. Conscience will work, despite his theory, whether atheistic or pantheistic, which it could not do, if either theory were true. The inquiry will often arise in his mind: whence came I, and whence have come all these objects around me? And with such questions before his mind he will find the truth pressed upon him. He may stifle the inquiry, and escape from it by turning his thoughts to other objects; but let him prosecute it, and as he is an intelligent being, with the soul of humanity within him, and possessed of all its principles, he must believe.*

It cannot be denied that the mode of attack adopted by Mr. Calderwood against sceptics in general, and against Sir William Hamilton in particular, is perfectly legitimate and sound. The only fault that can be found with it is, that it is not the best.

* Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 54-56.

A sound philosophy may undoubtedly be built upon either that which Sir William assumes without any proof, or upon that which Mr. Calderwood clearly proves ought to be assumed and accepted as a strictly philosophic fact. In other words, given that fact of consciousness which is called *faith*, the germs of a sound philosophy, a philosophy such as will really prove itself the basis of a sound theology, are *ipso facto* conceded.

It is scarcely to the purpose of the present paper to enter upon the very important and extremely abstruse relation which faith bears to knowledge, or to follow Mr. Calderwood through the very searching exposition of his thesis upon the subject. Few philosophers out of the Hamiltonian school are disposed to deny that faith of any and every description necessarily implies some amount of knowledge of its objects, and the Hamiltonians can be successfully combated from the pages of their own master. Dr. Newman has stated the Catholic, not to say the universal, doctrine upon the point in one of his University lectures. "Faith," he says, "is an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge."* Another and a more authoritative exposition is to be met with in the justly celebrated "*Analecta Juris Pontificii*." It is this: "La foi est une vertu, divinement infuse en nous, en vertu de laquelle nous acquiesçons pleinement aux choses que Dieu nous révèle; en d'autres termes, c'est un don de Dieu qui, en éclairant notre intelligence, la dispose et l'incline à acquiescer à toutes les choses qui nous sont révélées de Dieu. . . . La foi, en tant que vertu, a son siège dans l'intelligence, dont l'acte est de croire ou d'acquiescer, alors que la volonté le lui ordonne."† Mr. Calderwood's conclusions are quite in accord with both the *Analecta* and Dr. Newman. "What I affirm here is, that faith and knowledge are invariably united in consciousness. They combine to form a single act of the mind, and are separated only by analysis, which is the result of subsequent reflection. 'Neither is faith without knowledge, nor knowledge without faith.'‡ Belief in an object is possible only inasmuch as a certain knowledge or understanding of the nature of the object is possible."§ "I hold it to be true, concerning our belief in the Absolute God, what Sir W. Hamilton has shown in a general way concerning all our primary beliefs, that it is in itself a cognition, or, in other words, involves an immediate knowledge of the Deity; for as a principle of knowledge it

* Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 47. † Vol. iv. p. 2064.

‡ Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* v. 1. (Ὅτις ἡ γνώσις ἀνεύ πιστεως, οὐτε ἡ πίστις ἀνεύ γνώσεως.)

§ Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 133.

must itself be a knowledge."* "This knowledge is, and can be, nothing but a knowledge of the object which faith reveals, yet it is to be observed that it is a limited and, therefore, imperfect knowledge.† It is such as an intelligent being must have of the object of belief, since it is impossible to believe in the existence of an object of which we can have no conception. . . . But it is a knowledge of the Infinite God, to whose existence faith bears testimony."‡ "Our knowledge is indeed limited, but it is as real, as trustworthy, as authoritative as our faith is; and the two must stand or fall together."§ "It will tax the ability of any philosopher to show how we can believe in an object of which we can know nothing."||

But if Mr. Calderwood is strong in his exposition of the principles of sound philosophy, he is a giant in the contest upon which he subsequently enters with Sir William Hamilton in defence of it. It is in philosophy as in other matters. Let a man but go completely astray upon any one important doctrine, and the difficulty of refuting him, either directly or by no end of *reducciones ad absurdum*, lies less in the lack of points of exposure than in the judicious selection of such as may be with the greatest show of inconsistency made to tell their tale to his own adherents. Mr. Calderwood is in every sense equal to his task, and seldom has the old man at chess completely beaten by the boy, met with a more apt and striking simile. Sir William Hamilton distinctly teaches that "the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge,"¶ and that, therefore, though he denies that the Infinite can be *known*, still "it must and ought to be believed." Mr. Calderwood on the other side maintains, as has been already stated, that where faith is there must knowledge of some sort also be; and that "the two doctrines, that we believe in the Infinite and that we cannot know the Infinite, are mutually destructive."** And he follows up his thesis with a searching scrutiny of the fundamental positions of Sir William's philosophy. He shows that an adequate refutation of Sir W. Hamilton's teaching can be extracted from his own writings, inasmuch as in his distribution of the mental phenomena faith has either no place whatever, or is included in the acts of cognition. Nay, further, that he distinctly classes his *belief* among those "first principles, self-

* Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 145.

† See Professor Fraser's Essays in Philosophy, p. 195.

‡ Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 146-7.

§ *Ibid.* || *Ibid.*, p. 148.

¶ Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. p. 530.

** Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 135.

evident or intuitive truths, primitive notions, innate cognitions, natural knowledges," and also with those "cognitions and judgments" which, being principles of knowledge, he owns to be knowledges themselves.* And as for the Hamiltonian dogma, which is thought by its upholders to provide an escape from the difficulty of scepticism pure on the one hand, and from inconsistency unmistakable on the other, namely, that of "negative thought;" this, too, melts into nothing at the mere touch of Mr. Calderwood's logical wand. He just brings to bear against it the old ontological doctrines, that nothing cannot possibly be an object of thought, any more than nothing can possibly be an object of bodily sight; and that between the Creator of all things and things on the one side, and nothing at all on the other, there cannot exist any *tertium quid* whatsoever, and "like the baseless fabric of a vision," not a rack is left behind.

The last point to be noticed in Mr. Calderwood's work, and one of the most interesting and important, is his treatment of the Hamiltonian theory of the Relativity of Knowledge; and in the arguments he brings to bear upon Sir William is to be found the germ of the true and only satisfactory answer to Mr. Mill's speculations upon the same subject.

A very pleasing book, entitled "Recent British Philosophy," has just issued from the press. It is by Mr. David Masson, whom everybody recognises as at least an original kind of writer. His last production is certainly worthy of him in that character, and is calculated to repay even the general reader for the trouble he may put himself to in working through its four hundred pages. One very remarkable omission, among many others less so, will not fail to strike those at least who may have read these lines. It is the total absence of any account of Mr. Calderwood's labours in the field of philosophy, with the exception of the bare mention of his book in the list of modern works upon metaphysics, and of his name in a footnote, as being the person to whom Sir William Hamilton's explanatory letter was addressed. The man he makes most of is no other than the one whose comments upon Sir William Hamilton's works are now in everybody's hands, and are here under especial consideration. Mr. Masson shall introduce him to the reader after his own fashion. "Finally, Mill, the youngest of three †—he was but twenty-nine years of age when he wrote the passage which I have quoted ‡—had for several

* Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 136—138.

† Hamilton and Carlyle were the two others.

‡ From the Review of Professor Sedgwick's Discourse on the Studies of Cambridge, 1835; reprinted in Mill's "Dissertations."

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years been writing, in the *Westminster* and other Reviews, articles from which it was to be inferred that, when his courageous and truth-loving father, and that father's friend, Bentham, should be gone from the earth, they would leave behind them, in this heir of their hopes, one fit to be an expounder of their ideas through another generation, but who was likely rather to look right and left in that generation for himself, and to honour his descent, not by mere adhesion to what he had inherited, but by an open-mindedness that should push on passionately, at every break of light, in the quest of richer truth. If the history of London during the last reign and the present should ever come to be written, the historian might be reminded of one building in it, now no longer extant, of which rather particular mention might be desirable. It was the dingy old India House in Leadenhall Street, of whose many interesting legends it is now certainly not the least interesting, that, thirty years ago, young John Mill, not so well known to the general public as he has been since, had there his official room, to which, along intricate passages, friends and admirers of his, seeking his conversation, would find their way on late afternoons.* This same John Stuart Mill, the reader may be interested to know, is son of the late James Mill, whose History of India and connection with the East-India House, were as celebrated in his day as anything that his son has done is in ours. In process of time, Mr. John Stuart Mill succeeded his father as examiner of Indian correspondence. On the transfer of the administration of Indian affairs from the Company to Her Majesty's Government, he declined an offer on the part of Lord Stanley to become a member of Her Majesty's Indian Council, and retired from the service. As a political economist he is well known to the public, and his "System of Logic," published in 1863, is one of the ablest and best-considered books upon the abstruse topics of which it treats. He has written several articles in the *Edinburgh Review*, and a great number in the *Westminster*, of which he was for some time joint, and subsequently sole, editor. To his fame as a political economist is due his recent election as one of the Members of Parliament for Westminster. Perhaps no writer's influence and popularity have ever been so steadily and uninterruptedly on the increase as Mr. Mill's. Triumphant then, if not justly, does Mr. Masson observe, a page or two in advance of the passage quoted above: "Mill, too, has more than fulfilled his promise. . . . At the present moment it may be said that it is Mill as a philosopher that is

* Recent British Philosophy, p. 9.

in the ascendant in Britain. It is Mill that our young thinkers at the Universities, our young legislators in Parliament, our young critics in journals, and our young shepherds on the mountains, consult, and quote, and swear by." Mr. Masson may recollect a very true and pithy sentence in his hero's little work upon Liberty, to the effect that "in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation."* Mr. Mill's success and popularity have induced him to speak out his mind, in terms unmistakably plain; and upon no point does he, perhaps, speak more plainly than upon the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. With Mr. Calderwood's assistance it will not be a very difficult task to single out the one great underlying fault which vitiates his entire system.

To the general importance of this question in the study of philosophy, and to the particular importance of it in the study of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, both Mr. Masson and Mr. Mill bear testimony. Mr. Masson says: "There are no portions of Sir William Hamilton's writings better known than those in which he proclaimed his conviction of the utter impossibility of an Ontology. . . . There is no doctrine more strongly identified at the present day with Sir William Hamilton's name than the doctrine which he expressed most generally by calling it "the Relativity of Human Knowledge."† Mr. Mill says—"The doctrine which is thought to belong in the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was the ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the later French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and others have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is the subject of the most generally known, and most impressive, of all his writings, the one which first revealed to the English metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in philosophy:‡ and, together with its development, it composes the 'Philosophy of the Conditioned,' which he opposed to the German and French philosophies of the Absolute, and which is regarded by most of his admirers as the greatest of his titles to a permanent place in the history of metaphysical thought."§ Mr. Mill himself is the strenuous advocate of a doctrine which rejoices in the self-same title as Sir William Hamilton's, but

* Recent British Philosophy, page 2.

† Pp. 130-1.

‡ His first contribution to the *Edinburgh Review*, entitled "On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned."

§ Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c., p. 5.

is manifestly, at least to the mind of Mr. Mill, very unlike it. To his mind Sir William has clutched but at the shadow of what he himself holds the substance firmly within his grasp. "Sir William Hamilton's famous doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge has guided many to it (*i.e.* to Mr. Mill's view of it), though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having understood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had."* Again, after stating that "it is hardly possible to affirm more strongly or more explicitly than Sir W. Hamilton has done, that things in themselves are to us altogether unknowable,"† and quoting a passage from the celebrated "Discussions," which he recognises as being, so far as the language goes, "decisive," he reiterates his charge:—"In the sense which the author's phrases seem to convey—in the only substantial meaning capable of being attached to them—the doctrine they assert was certainly not held by Sir W. Hamilton."‡ Finally, "The conclusion I cannot help drawing from this collection of passages is, that Sir W. Hamilton either never held, or when he wrote the Dissertations had ceased to hold, the doctrine for which he has been so often praised, and nearly as often attacked—the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He certainly did sincerely believe that he held it; but he repudiated it in every sense which makes it other than a barren truism. In the only meaning in which he really maintained it, there is nothing to maintain. It is an identical proposition, and nothing more."§ These are very hard and significant words. Mr. Calderwood has not said harder throughout the whole of his controversy; and yet he had the provocation of seeing his charges of inconsistency met by Sir William with but greater and more numerous inconsistencies than ever. Before following Mr. Mill, however, in his sifting criticism of the doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge as held by Sir William Hamilton, it will be necessary to give the reader a clear insight into the various meanings which attach to the phrase. And an epitome of Mr. Mill's second chapter will, perhaps, do this in the most satisfactory manner. It will be perceived, however, by a comparison of what is here said with what Mr. Mill says, that beyond the simple enunciation of the various meanings of the term in question (and that seldom in precisely his words) nothing is due to his work. The comments that are subjoined to these enunciations are

* The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (signed I. S. M.), *Westminster Review*, April, 1865.

† Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c., p. 17.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

such as arose in the mind during the process of epitomising his more intricate and lengthy explanations.

Notwithstanding Mr. Bain and his "nerve-currents inwards" and his "nerve-currents outwards," which proclaim the identity and utter inseparability, if pursued back far enough, of Self and Not-self, of subject and object, there are, as it were, two stand-points in philosophy—the Ego and the world external to the Ego, with which the Ego has to do that which men call to *know* or *take cognizance of*. The great commonwealth of philosophers is almost to a man against him, as is also in a very marked manner the language itself of mankind. Now some of the most fundamental questions philosophy has to solve arise from the relation or connection of knowledge between the Ego and the Non-ego which surrounds it.

Some philosophers have maintained that we know nothing of itself, but only by contrast with and as distinguished from something else, and this view Mr. Mill declares to be "defensible in itself" and "a real and important law of our mental nature."* But surely does it not occur to ask, how are these differences themselves known? If they are something, according to the thesis, they are incognisable; if nothing, they can be no object at all of thought or knowledge. However, as Sir William Hamilton did not use the term Relativity of Human Knowledge in this sense, there is no need of discussing its merits—or rather its demerits—more at length. Mr. Bain may be left in undisputed enjoyment of it. Its atmosphere will be just the thing for his inward and outward everything-absorbing nerve-currents.

Other philosophers have maintained that of the physical objects around us we know nothing, except what our senses tell us. What our senses tell us are called sensations; and, for aught we know or can know, an object is but a group of sensation-causing powers. In other words, we have evidence of nothing lying beyond or beneath our sensations. This is the extreme form of the doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge; and those who with Bishop Berkeley have held it, are called Idealists. Among those philosophers who, in reliance upon this doctrine, go beyond simple Idealism, and not merely contend that all we can possibly know of anything is the manner in which it affects us, but that there is absolutely nothing else to be known, are to be ranked Hume and his followers, together with Professor Ferrier. They are called Sceptics, and were they all but consistent, scepticism would be the avowed creed of each. It, however, not unfrequently

* Examination of S. William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c., p. 6.

happens that when men find those principles which they have taken up, or to which they have by some process or other worked their way back, and which lead logically to scepticism, are carrying them past some boundary-mark which custom, religion, or their own natural common sense has set up against all philosophical vagaries, they suddenly stop short and take refuge in some saving though illogical doctrine, which seems to be a kind of terminus to the onward march of their original principles, but in reality is not their ultimate end or destination.

But by far the greater number of philosophers who hold to the Relativity of Human Knowledge, believe that there is a real universe of "Things in Themselves," and that there is a "Thing in Itself"—a *Noumenon* behind every phenomenon, which is the cause and reason of its existence. If Sir William Hamilton held the doctrine at all, it was this form of it that he adopted. He, in common with many others, maintained that all external existing things have an inmost nature, but that their inmost nature is not accessible to our faculties. In other words, that though the essences do really exist—and herein lies the difference between Natural Realists and Idealists we cannot know from anything given us in the phenomena (as the very term implies), that they do exist. And according to Mr. Mill, both Herbert Spencer and Comte hold the Relativity doctrine as thus understood.

This view of it is, with a slight modification, held also by those who bring Space and Time into the question. These maintain that Space and Time are laws of our perceptive faculty, and that we have no reason to suppose that the "Thing in Itself" actually exists in Space and Time, but that we cannot, owing to the nature of the several powers of the mind, help regarding them as though they did. Kant was the originator of this, to the minds of ordinary men, adroit method of looking at things precisely in the way in which they are not; and the influence of Kant upon German, French and English speculation can scarcely be over-estimated.

Others, among whom are Hartley, James (the father of John Stuart) Mill and Professor Bain have held that Time and Place, together with Extension, Substance, Cause and the rest, are not as it were innate forms of the mind, in which, as Kant imagined, objects are moulded into their appearances, but are the product of simple sensation working after the known laws of association.

Another sense which may be given to Relativity of Human Knowledge, perhaps no one will be found who could bring himself to deny, though in candour it must be owned, that the history of philosophy seems scarcely to warrant disbelief in

the acceptance of any absurdity or the rejection of any truth on the part of some men styling themselves, and styled by others, philosophers. For, however disposed one may be to reject the Relativity doctrine in the various meanings of the term hitherto set down, that man's need of hellebore (to use one of *Liberatore's* favourite antidotes for philosophical opponents) would be extraordinary indeed, who did not see that all our knowledge is relative to us, inasmuch as it is we that know it.

Finally, there is one other mode of understanding the doctrine of Relativity, and as Mr. Mill's lucid account of it would suffer by any transposition of sentences or change even of wording, it shall be given precisely as he gives it:—"The position taken (by those who adhere to the mode under consideration) may be, that perception of things as they are in themselves is not entirely denied to us, but is so mixed and confused with impressions derived from their action on us, as to give a relative character to the whole aggregate. Our absolute knowledge may be vitiated and disguised by the presence of a relative element. Our faculty (it may be said) of perceiving things as they are in themselves, though real, has its own laws, its own conditions, and necessary mode of operation; our cognitions consequently depend, not solely on the nature of the things to be known, but also on that of the knowing faculty, as our sight depends not solely upon the object seen, but upon that together with the structure of the eye. If the eye were not achromatic, we should see all visible objects with colours derived from the organ, as well as with those truly emanating from the object. Supposing, therefore, that things in themselves are the natural and proper object of our knowing faculty, and that this faculty carries to the mind a report of what is in the thing itself, apart from its effects on us, there would still be a portion of uncertainty in these reports, inasmuch as we could not be sure that the eye of our mind is achromatic, and that the message it brings from the *Noumenon* does not arrive tinged and falsified, in an unknown degree, through an influence arising from the necessary conditions of the mind's action. We may, in short, be looking at things in themselves, but through imperfect glasses: what we see may be the very thing, but the colours and forms which the glass conveys to us may be partly an optical illusion. This is a possible opinion; and one who, holding this opinion, should speak of the relativity of our knowledge, would not use the term wholly without meaning; but he could not, consistently, assert that *all* our knowledge is relative, since his opinion would be that we have a capacity of absolute knowledge, but that we are liable to mistake relative knowledge

for it."* Mr. Mill, while acknowledging that this view is one that may be tenable to a man not unworthy of the name of a philosopher, seems evidently to consider it as unworthy of the name of sound philosophy. Mr. Masson says very truly of him: "At one point or another every form of philosophy not reducible to Mr. Mill's own ultimate interpretation of Locke's Empiricism, is thrust at in the volume through the ribs of Hamilton."† There are few Catholic writers, however, who have ever held, or consistently with their ideas received from revelation of the powers of the soul injured by the fall of man could hold, a different doctrine. And as a matter of fact it is palpable that Catholic writers, taken as a body, do form no inconsiderable portion of the great body of past and present metaphysicians.

Such being the various significations attached to the term Relativity of Human Knowledge, Mr. Mill enters at once upon the investigation of Sir William Hamilton's writings, to make out therefrom the precise sense in which he held and taught the doctrine. Mr. Masson considers that he has arrived at a conclusion pretty akin to the unwarrantable, when he sums up and states, "That Sir William Hamilton did not hold any opinion in virtue of which it could rationally be asserted that all human knowledge is relative; but did hold, as one of the main elements of his philosophical creed, the opposite doctrine of the cognoscibility of external things, in certain of their aspects, as they are in themselves, absolutely."‡ Thus much is certain, if Sir W. Hamilton did hold the doctrine in any of its forms, it was in that which recognises a real substratum under every appearance—a Noumenon at the back of and supporting every phenomenon, but at the same time unknown to us "in itself." We, having no organ except our senses for communicating with it, can only know what our senses tell us; and as they tell us nothing but the impression which the thing makes upon us, we do not know what it is *in itself* at all. Now, this view is undoubtedly quite exclusive of any knowledge at all of the Infinite, for what phenomenon in the world bespeaks to our senses, or requires as its Noumenon, an Infinite? And if Sir William Hamilton ever meant anything at all, he certainly meant that the Infinite is necessarily unknowable to us. But we have seen him also maintaining that this unknowable Infinite does come into intellectual relation-

* Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c., pp. 15-16.

† Recent British Philosophy, p. 313.

‡ Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c., p. 31.

ship with us by a process of *belief*—not that kind of belief which we exercise when told by a reliable authority, that Pekin is the capital of China, but of a belief which in sundry places he ranks among the knowing processes of the soul. Of two things, then, one: either his belief was a makeshift, or, as Mr. Mill would call it, “a mere fetch,” and a very incoherent and illogical fetch too, as Mr. Calderwood abundantly proves; or there is *primâ facie* evidence against him of knowing nothing deeper than the name of the very doctrine which mankind, almost at large, has given him the credit of originating. No writer, certainly, ever sat more prominently on the horns of a very awkward-looking dilemma. Either Mill or Calderwood must be in the right, and the chances of both being so are by no means inconsiderable. In favour of Mr. Calderwood it must be said, that no one has more strenuously attacked Sir William’s *beliefs* than Mr. Mill; and on the other hand, a feeling that Mr. Mill has to some extent overdone his work arises in the student’s mind, when he considers that there would have been no necessity whatever of Sir William’s introducing the subsidiary dogma of beliefs, to which the Noumena of all phenomena and the Infinite should be consigned, if he had not a more distinct conception of what he meant by the Relativity of Human Knowledge than Mr. Mill gives him credit for. Hence, Mr. Mill’s chapter upon belief without knowledge, when coupled with that upon the Relativity of Human Knowledge, proves somewhat too much. Besides, the sum total of the matter comes but to a dilemma: either Sir William Hamilton did not understand, and so consciously hold, the doctrine, or his system abounds with inconsistencies. Now, no impartial student of his works would for a moment think of denying that they do abound with inconsistencies. Mr. Masson, with a *naïveté* which the context alone precludes from reading like sarcasm, remarks thus upon Sir William’s far-famed beliefs:—“Nothing is more characteristic of Sir William Hamilton, than the occurrence of such hot theistic phrases in his purely speculative discussions Their occurrence is, I think, nobly, and at the same time puzzlingly, significant. For are not these phrases most intensely and definitely ontological, and has not Sir William forsworn Ontology? What is the explanation? How can one be consistent, who first maintains that nothing can be predicated speculatively of the Absolute, and then proceeds straightway not only to predicate existence of the Absolute, but to speak as if the human virtue of veracity must also be predicated of the same? A full exposition of Sir William Hamilton’s views of faith in its connection with philosophy would have supplied the missing keystone to

the total arch.* How would he have discriminated belief from knowledge? How would he have distinguished between that Faith in the Infinite, the necessity and obligation of which he so strongly upheld, and either of those metaphysical doctrines which he disowned. One can divine, or infer from expositions of his disciples, what might have been the nature of his replies; but the absence of a full exposition from himself is felt as a serious blank."† And in his notice of Mr. Mill's latest work he literally summons all Hamiltonians to the defence of their master, by saying that of course they will not be slack in coming forward, and singles out Messrs. Mansel and Veitch, Professors Baynes and Fraser, and Dr. Cairns, as the men to whom the philosophic world may look with hope for a speedy reply to Mr. Mill. But to return.

Mr. Calderwood has debited Sir William with at least so much of the genuine doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge as excludes all knowledge of the Infinite, inasmuch as all human knowledge is relative and the Infinite transcends all relativity. And his reply is, "the Infinite does exist in relation, and it can be no contradiction of His nature that He should be recognized in relation."‡ Against Sir William the answer is conclusive, though not so against Mr. Mill. It contains, however, the germs of sound philosophy, and the only logical argument against Mr. Mill's views must be based upon the truth which it conveys. For whether Sir William Hamilton did or did not hold the doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge, there can be no mistake about one thing, and that is, that his critic and opponent Mr. Mill does, and professes to do so in its strictest acceptation. And a man of Mr. Mill's attainments and eminence can hold no doctrine, however fundamentally unsound, without making it—by the sheer force of that personality he throws into it, and of those multitudinous ways in which he works it up into great and striking, and often original truths—extremely captivating, especially to young and ardent thinkers. The doctrine of Relativity is upheld by Mr. Mill in its purest and simplest of forms. He has nothing in the world to do with the Noumena or Essences of Things. They may exist or they may not; but one thing (according to him) is beyond dispute, and that is, the utter impossibility of our knowing anything at all about them. We know nothing *in se*; all our knowledge is relative, and of the relative. Mr. Calderwood had completely cut the ground from under Dr. Mansel's feet,

* Not necessarily: there is at least one other alternative.

† Recent British Philosophy, pp. 147-8.

‡ Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 159.

when, in reply to his defence of Sir William Hamilton's *beliefs*, he drew attention to the fact that a relative knowledge and a knowledge of the relative are by no means convertible terms, and that a relative knowledge (inasmuch as all *our* knowledge is in one sense relative, *i.e.* known by *us*) may be had of that which in itself is in a certain sense beyond all relation. But Mr. Mill's relativity is to his mind of the strictest type. We can, he maintains, know all that which we know only in a relative way; and, further, we know that alone which is relative *in se*. The region of our knowing faculty is the phenomenal world; beyond this it cannot act or even go, any more than we can get beyond space or out of time—using these terms, of course, in the ordinary, and not in the philosophical (according to some) acceptation.

Now, in spite of the originality which a thinker of Mr. Mill's mental calibre cannot help commingling with any theory he may favour, this doctrine of Relativity, even as he professes to hold it, is but a modification or extension of the old making-much-of-Subject-at-the-expense-of-Object (as the Germans would find some compound for expressing it) doctrine, which is upheld in one or other of its various forms by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Locke, Hume, Condillac, and a host of others down to Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mill. Kant was by no means, as some imagine him to be, the originator of the theory. It is but a development of the Cartesian method of doubt and Ego-cogito system;* and Cartesianism is but the Psychologism of Aristotle and the Schoolmen in its most objectionable form, translated into language more in accordance with the forms of modern thought. Consequently, upon Aristotle's principles, though backed by all the erudition and subtlety of his ablest exponents, the school of Phenomenalism cannot possibly be refuted. Once take the soul of man, or if it please better, man as he is, not only as the starting-point, but as the primary principle and basis of all sound philosophy, and the science of sciences may be brought down to the dust of dogmas, which, to the common sense of mankind at large, if intelligible at all, smack rather of the ravings of insanity than of the dictates of reason. Yet that philosophy which refuses to look upon "things as *they are* in themselves," and to weigh them for what they are worth *in rerum naturâ* (for lack of a stronger

* "Clearly, then, the metaphysician's first step must be to shut out from his investigation everything but what is subjective; not taking for granted the existence of anything objective corresponding to his ideas, until he has ascertained what property of his ideas it is which he predicates by calling them true."—Mr. Herbert Spencer, in the *Fortnightly Review* for July 15th, 1865, p. 542.

expression), and will consider them only in reference to one of themselves, *i.e.* the subject thinking; that philosophy which makes the "thinking" the root of the "thinghood," and not the "thinghood" the sole basis of the "thinking"; that philosophy which thus speculatively—common sense stands in the way of it practically—ignores or even denies the possibility of an ontology or science of things as they are in themselves; in other words, that philosophy whose moving principle is the doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge, does not only bring upon its supporters that ruin which is inevitable to a divided house, but, unfortunately, brings contempt upon even sound and genuine metaphysical speculation. No, unless, as Mr. Calderwood hints, things and the Creator of things be taken into our philosophy, and made in it what they are *in se*, the most elaborate structure ever reared by professor before the eyes of admiring disciples, will but crumble into ruins, which will, perhaps, crush and cover one generation, and blind with their dust two or three that succeed it. The connection between Faith and Knowledge, between Revelation and Reason, between Theology and Philosophy, abounds, no doubt, with difficulties and intricacies. Thus much, however, is undeniable: here we are, here Things—creatures like ourselves—are, all finite objects. In addition to this, we have an idea of, we know something of, an Infinite, and part of that something is that the only relation out of or beside the relation by which we know His existence, that can be in the order of nature, is that by which we depend upon Him for existence, and, of course, for a thinking existence—the relation of *creation*. All this we know just as clearly, to say the least of it, and just as certainly, as we know any fact at all; as, for example, that Mr. Mill himself exists, or that it is his book, and not somebody else's, or, perhaps, nothing at all but an appearance, that I am reading. Let a man deny this, and he may with perfect consistency, and with as much chance of general credit, deny that anybody else or anything else but himself exists at all, and that all argument is but an illusion—or, rather, phenomenon—of his own brain, or, at best, a kind of gymnastic exercise, in which his *τὸ ἔγω* from time to time takes delight to indulge.

Of course, many may object—set philosophers of a certain stamp will necessarily object—to this mode of dealing with a very great and important question. But let the reader observe that the real philosophical point is in no way lost sight of. The main thing aimed at is to direct attention to the rule of judging doctrines and theories *ex consequentiis*; to get men to test the conclusions to which in their studies they may happen to arrive, less by the rules of logic, for the fault may be in their principles,

and so anterior to the application of any logical process, than by that ordinary sense, which is called and which in one signification is common;—to say nothing at present of that revelation to which the dictates of reason, of course, bear no comparison, when there is a question of the truth or non-truth of a vast number of the most important facts. And it is this common sense which gives a *prima facie* rejection, indeed, to any philosophy which sets off with a total neglect of the consideration of things in themselves, but revolts outright at the conclusions which such a class of premises necessarily yield. The result must, even in philosophical science, be looked to, and philosophers cannot escape this crucial test. In the great philosophising period of the world's history, the days of the Schoolmen, divine faith kept speculation upon the main points right as to the principles and conclusions which were taught, though, as wherever human will can intrude there error follows, the various processes which followed upon the acceptance of these principles, the different methods in which they were worked up together, and many of the extravagant hypotheses which were introduced to give a strictly logical air to foregone conclusions, cannot fail to amuse, puzzle, and, at times, annoy the student. With the rejection of revelation, common sense has not thriven in a greater degree than heretofore, though there is necessarily more need of its exercise, and ought to be more frequent recurrence to its aid.

To read Mr. Mill's last work, one would imagine—his bold and vigorous style lead one insensibly but almost irresistibly to imagine—that so far as the genuine doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge is concerned, his writings completely exhaust the subject. It is less with the consequences of the doctrine than its principles that he deals; but the whole tenor of his remarks is to convince the reader that Sir William Hamilton, while believing that he held the doctrine, was woefully deceived, and that he himself is its truest and most faithful exponent. “Non nostrum inter vos” &c., is as significant a reply, perhaps, as could be given to these two heads of a great and powerful philosophical school. And its significance receives considerable addition, when their words are coupled with one or two extracts from another writer of the Phenomenal school—the Rev. John Grote. What Mr. Mill is to Sir William Hamilton, the Rev. John Grote is to Mr. Mill. His criticisms need neither preface nor comment. “What I differ from Mr. Mill in this sentence,” he says, “is this, that while condemning apparently Ontology, or the notion that bodies have a super-perceptual constitution, which we may hope to find out, he seems to

countenance the belief, that they have one, which, from its very nature it is useless for us even to try to find out. This is the 'notional' Ontology, if I may so call it, which seems to me worse than an attempted Real Ontology. It is what I have alluded to above as the Kantist manner of thought. I give no opinion as to proper Kantism. I say nothing at all as to whether there is any meaning in speaking of 'an essential constitution of things:' I say only this, that if the notion is to be entertained even so far as to say that such a thing is *possible*, this constitution must have some relation to the facts about things which we know by our sensations, along which relation there is a road for our intellect towards the knowledge of this constitution—how good a road is a question I do not enter upon: the question is as to a chasm or dis-continuity, in virtue of the nature of things.

"I do not allude to this in Mr. Mill for the purpose of criticizing his sentences—it requires much fuller consideration than I am giving here, to know how far a particular sentence expresses a philosopher's full view; but because it is all a part of that which is my difference with him—his not indeed ignoring the philosophical view, which would be the course of many phenomenologists, but his attempt to bring it in along with the phenomalist, in a way which confuses both." And a little farther: "I cannot resist dwelling still, however, for a moment on this page of Mr. Mill, in which every sentence both of his and Sir W. Hamilton's fills me with a sort of wonder—how so much knowledge, and so much ignorance or nescience, of 'these things in themselves,' can go together I cannot understand." And again: "There can be little doubt but that in all this there is the confusion I have spoken of, and that the philosophers who have thought in this manner did not know whether they themselves meant that we could not know *the thing itself*, because we could only know qualities, or because with *our* intelligence we could only know *some* qualities."*

* *Exploratio Philosophica*, part i. pp. 185-7. The sentence Mr. Grote refers to does not occur in Mill's "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," but in his *Logic*, and is as follows:—"It may be safely laid down that of the outward world . . . we know and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations which we experience from it." Mr. Grote had not seen, and purposely withheld from himself the opportunity of seeing, the "Examination, &c.," before publishing his own observations upon Mr. Mill. "Since the following pages have been written," he says in his Preface, p. xxx, "I have become aware of a book which Mr. Mill is publishing, or has published, on the subject of his philosophical differences with Sir William Hamilton. I speak in this doubtful manner only because I have purposely avoided learning

But these remarks upon the point of the Relativity of Human Knowledge must be drawing to a close. They have been protracted to some length because it forms the vital question between Hamilton and Mill on the one hand, and between Mill and his critics on the other; because also, it lies very nigh unto the root of the difference between the two rival Catholic schools—the Psychological and the Ontological. In philosophy as in religion, many of the new doctrines are but discarded principles and theories disguised under forms partially new; and Phenomenalism must be met and combated by the same weapons under which fell the old *species intelligibiles* and other *entia rationis* which the *phantasmata* of Aristotle first put into the heads of the Schoolmen, and which the restraining power of the dogmas of revelation applied to metaphysics by the master hand of the Angel of the Schools, alone prevented from developing into sheer Hegelianism long before Kant and Hegel were dreamt of. Are the phenomena thing or no thing? If thing, then some thing beyond phenomena is cognisable, and actually cognised; if no thing, then they are *nothing*, and nothing cannot possibly be an object of thought. Between thing and no-thing there is no *tertium quid*, and it is almost beyond endurance to hear men whose common sense shouts this into their ears, and who firmly believe what revelation teaches them—that God made all *things* out of *nothing*, uphold doctrines which have for their basis the supposed existence of an imaginary, phenomenal world—a *mundus logicus*, which is but a creature of their own brains, or rather an abstraction from the *mundus realis* in which we live, move, and have our being, and of which we form no insignificant a portion.

There are without doubt several other topics discussed by Mr. Mill which might be taken up and treated of by a Catholic writer; but Mr. Mill himself acknowledges that, so far as Sir William Hamilton is concerned, this of the Relativity of Human Knowledge is beyond comparison the most essential. In fact, at the end of his examination of Sir William's treatment of it, and of one or two points closely allied to it, which altogether occupy but about one hundred pages, he bids adieu to him almost as an original thinker, and sets about "criticising doctrines common to him with many other thinkers" (p. 106). "On most of the subjects," he goes on to say, "which remains to be discussed, at least in the psychological department (as distinguished from the logical), Sir W. Hamilton is merely an

farther. To have waited, and referred to what Mr. Mill may thus say, would have involved a wide controversy."

eminent representative of one of the two great schools of metaphysical thought . . . For the future, therefore, we shall be concerned less with Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, as such, than with the general mode of thought to which it belongs."*

Two points in particular seemed too important and attractive to be passed over in the present paper, but, owing to want of further space, must be deferred for the present. One of these was the question as to how far inconceivability is an evidence of untruth, which necessarily opens up the whole theory of consciousness. It is upon this subject that Mr. Herbert Spencer, treading in Mr. Grote's footsteps, differs as widely from Mill as Mill himself can possibly do from Hamilton. And the other was Mr. Mill's strictures upon the only original doctrine of Sir William's other than that of the Relativity of Human Knowledge with its collaterals, namely, his theory of Causation.

The various comments upon Mr. Mill's work which are at the present moment issuing from the press, either in the shape of distinct volumes or of articles in the various periodicals, will be well worthy of the attention of those Catholics who are unwilling to be behind their fellow-countrymen in the discussion of those important topics which are now almost table-talk among them. It will be the purpose of a subsequent paper to bring at least some of these before the reader's notice.

R. E. G.

* Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, &c., p. 106.

Foreign Events of Catholic Interest.

IN our last number we spoke of the spread of the revolutionary movement in Spain, and alluded to the project set on foot by the Masonic lodges to overthrow the Catholic throne of Queen Isabella, and to establish an "Iberian Empire." Since that time, the movement has made rapid strides. The ministry of Narvaez has succumbed to the revolutionary pressure, and, yielding to evil influences, the Queen of Spain has recognized the *Cavourian* kingdom of Italy. To inaugurate the new policy, dictated by the Liberals of Spain and accepted by the timid counsellors who surround and betray the throne, O'Donnell, once the friend and colleague of Espartero, then his successful rival, is called to power. His first act after the ignominious recognition of Italy, was to close the Cortes, in order to escape the shame he would have been put to by the indignant questionings of every true Catholic and of every loyal Spaniard. But this cowardly evasion of his duty of answering face to face before the public for his conduct and advice availed him but little. He has been called to account in a manner which no Spanish minister can affect to disregard. With a noble unanimity, and in language as indignant as it is just, the Spanish episcopate have protested against the recognition of the kingdom of Italy as a betrayal of the traditional policy and of the Catholic character of Spain. Although not to the number, or with the energy we could wish, many of the municipal councils have protested against an act which has made, for a variety of reasons, a painful impression on the mind of every one who has the interests of religion and the real honour of Spain at heart. The Archbishop of Toledo has resigned the trust and tutorship of the Prince of Asturias, and has withdrawn from Madrid; whilst the ambassadors at Rome and at Paris have refused any longer to represent a policy which is as repugnant to them as it is dishonourable in itself. Cardinal Antonelli himself, in replying to the notification to the Holy See that the Spanish government had resolved on recognizing the new kingdom of Italy, gave a dignified and severe rebuke to the ministry by saying that, whatever governments may choose to do, the Pope could never for a moment doubt of the faith and loyalty of the Spanish people. The Spanish recognition of Italy was unconditional; unlike that even of Napoleonic France, it was made under no reserve. The Spanish government had not even the decency to stipulate for the preservation of the temporal rights of the Papacy. It was a complete and unqualified surrender of those public principles which had hitherto dictated the policy of Spain in the Roman question. The recognition of the revolutionary kingdom of Italy is, moreover, an act, on the part of the Queen, of suicidal weakness; it is an unworthy concession to the false spirit of Liberalism, in the same manner as the surrender of the

royal patrimony was to the communistic tendencies which are so rife in many of the commercial cities of Spain. Both of these acts have only augmented the evil which they hoped to avert. The timid sacrifice of the royal patrimony of the Kings of Spain, far from removing the unpopularity of the Crown, has only whetted that appetite which craves for the possession of its neighbour's goods as the proper food for its palate. The disgraceful state of commercial credit, which was made the pretext for this demand, has not in the least benefited by the cowardly surrender of the royal patrimony. The effect has rather been the reverse; for such a policy was looked upon as a confession of weakness. The dynastic vessel was surely in danger, when so valuable a freight was thrown overboard. After all, it was but a sop to the whale.

In like manner, the recognition of Italy—an act which has a two-fold effect, one on the foreign relations, and the other on the home policy of Spain—will give such an impetus to the revolutionary movement as, far from saving, is not unlikely to end in the overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty. This act of the government of O'Donnell is a pledge given to the revolution, is the formal adoption of the policy of the Spanish Liberals. It is the lowering of the Catholic standard before an enemy who is only strong because of the divisions, treachery, and cowardice in the Catholic camp. It points, again, to military revolt, to brute force, personified in the successful soldier, so well known and so dreaded in unhappy Spain. It means, in the end, the recall of Espartero, and the triumph of the revolution over the Crown and over the Church.

It means all this, and more; for the recognition of Italy has of late years been the touchstone of parties. To recognize Victor Emmanuel was to break with the Pope; to enter into friendly alliance with Italy was to forswear the loyal traditions of Spain. But this policy is not merely negative in its effect; it implies the active espousal of Liberal opinions in every department of political and religious life, at home as well as abroad. Such a policy is very wide in its application, and goes very deep into the heart of things; its adoption involves many considerations as to the social and religious condition of Spain. The question irresistibly forces itself upon our notice, what can the state of that Catholic country be, in which such things as we witness or apprehend can take place? Inspired by the hopes of a better future for so Catholic a country, or deluded by the reminiscences of its past glories, writers have too often thrown a gloss over the rottenness which, to a certain extent, lies beneath the surface of things, and which goes far to account for the present disturbed state of the Spanish peninsula. Owing to the glorious privilege which it enjoys, of being exempt from heresy, and to the existence of laws prohibiting religious error, both the friends and the enemies of Catholicism are too apt to impute to Spain a higher Catholicity than it in reality deserves. It must be remembered that the successive governments which have proscribed Protestantism have prohibited the monastic orders. The heretic has been forbidden to propagate in Spain his pernicious error; but the Jesuit, the foremost soldier of truth, is still proscribed by the laws. No Protestant churches are permitted to pollute the Catholic soil of Spain; yet government after government has plundered

ecclesiastical and monastic property, has left the churches roofless and tenantless, and the monasteries in ruins, all over the country. Though the maxims of Government and the political traditions are Catholic, the politicians of Spain are, for the most part, corrupt to the core. They are the children of the revolution : they have no faith but in armies ; no hope but in bribery and corruption. The successful politician is the favourite general : yesterday it was Espartero—to-morrow it may be General Prim. Installed in power by a military revolt, each soldier of fortune is ready to sacrifice one principle after another of the monarchy or of the Church at the bidding of self-interest, or on the demand of the liberalism of the day. A long series of governments, founded on narrow personal interests, representing no principle, has produced a political rottenness which is one of the chief dangers of the Spanish monarchy. Another serious evil which we must take into account, if we wish rightly to gauge the present state of things in Spain, or that which seems impending, is the spread of communistic principles in the commercial cities and districts. In these great resorts of mercantile activity, the anti-social and irreligious literature of France has done its work of corruption. It is here the *Siècle* finds its chief readers ; and here the translation of impious French works meets with reward and encouragement. In such classes revolutionary principles have taken root, and nowhere in Spain than over such classes has religion less hold. A curious trial in one of the great Spanish cities lately brought to light, in an unexpected manner, the extent and activity of communistic ideas. We were not altogether unprepared for such a revelation ; but what is more surprising, is the manner in which the Royal dynasty is publicly threatened in the Liberal press and in the Cortes. Spain, says one of these journals, only puts up for a moment with the present dynasty for want of something better. And in the Cortes, a member of the Left put, at the close of a violent harangue on the sanguinary suppression of the riot in the streets of Madrid, on the 10th April, such ill-boding questions as these—"At the eve of 1830 did Charles X. dream of the advent of Louis Philip ? Of the outbreak of the revolution of 1848, what notion had the citizen-king ? Who, then, shall dare to say that the Bourbon dynasty in Spain shall last 48 hours ?"

In the religious condition of Spain, to turn our attention for a moment in that direction, in the midst of much that is hopeful and most praiseworthy, there are many causes for dissatisfaction. The country, indeed, is Catholic to its core. It has been permeated for ages by a Catholic spirit, and it is still alive with Catholic instincts. It has inherited traditions of faith and practices of piety which trials, such as Spain has had to undergo, have failed to uproot. The Spanish character has, it seems to us, taken its impress to no small degree from the Catholic Church. Its dignity, its kindliness, its chivalry, and its charity, reflect the supernatural workings of grace. There is a natural delicacy and consideration for the wants and weaknesses of others about the Spanish people which bespeak a long training, and the habitual presence of higher influences than are often found in countries which lay claim to a greater civilization than that of Catholic Spain. In the villages and small country towns the people respond readily to the requirements of religion. They form a fine stuff to work upon. They are the

sound fruit from the seed which was sown by the glorious monasteries now in ruins, and round which Catholicism still thickly clusters, like ivy around ruined walls. But the loss, which the destruction of the monastic orders and their continued suppression by every successive government which rules in Madrid have caused, is visibly telling in a weakened zeal among the people and a lessened vigilance on the part of the clergy. In the capital and in the larger cities religion is losing somewhat of its hold on the hearts of the people, and though custom does much to preserve the outward appearance of piety, yet custom is but a sorry substitute for the hearty energy of faith and the active work of charity. Catholicism is interwoven with the national feelings and the national pride of the Spaniard—in itself an inestimable boon, but for that very reason standing in greater need that its spiritual character should be perpetually vivified by the supernatural agencies of the Church. In the extinction of the monasteries one of the most potent means which the Church possesses for preserving and quickening the Catholic spirit of a people is lost to Spain.

The absence of the regular clergy naturally reacts injuriously on the secular clergy, and this injurious effect is in nowise likely to be corrected by the lax discipline exercised over such of the ecclesiastical students at least as attend the universities. These students of theology do not live in common under ecclesiastical direction, but lodge in the town, and mix freely with the other students. Their pursuits are of their own choice, and their reading depends on individual taste. Most of the light literature which falls into their hands is of a most frivolous if not of a worse description. To remedy this long-standing evil as much as possible, the noble episcopate of Spain, the real hope and strength of the country, have for many years been successfully engaged in increasing the number and efficiency of the seminaries. But theirs has been an uphill work in a country so long the victim of revolutionary violence, a violence which, like that in Sardinia, was not content with plundering the Church and exiling the bishops, but sought to alienate Spain altogether from the Holy Sec. The revolutionary party is patient in evil-doing. It knows how to bide its time. For some years the Spanish liberals have abstained from acts of overt hostility; now it appears the time of action has arrived. Their first object is to seize upon the reins of government, and then either to depose the Bourbon dynasty altogether, or to force the Crown to adopt a revolutionary policy. At a meeting of the more advanced party, held some short time ago, the plan of attack was accurately laid down. The revolution was to have broken out simultaneously all over the country; the dispersed troops, the gendarmes, the civil guard, were to have been disarmed, and all communication between the metropolis and the provinces was to have been cut off, and not till the government should have been compelled to send the troops concentrated at Madrid into the provinces, was the revolution to have broken out in the capital, and thus completed the victory. Of the success of this plan no doubt appears to have been entertained. The Masonic lodges of Lisbon had suggested the King of Portugal, a pliable instrument in the hands of the revolution, and therefore not unacceptable to Italy and France, as the nominal ruler of the "Iberian Empire." Espartero, the veteran leader of the revolution, and the inveterate enemy of

the Church, was, of course, to have been consulted as to the distribution of power, and the supreme direction of the revolution was nominally left to him. Between himself and Olozaga, the friend and pupil of Cavour, and present head of the Progressists, not only a long-standing rivalry but the bitterest animosity exists, which is the reason why, on this occasion, the party of action have put forward a more unknown man in the place of Olozaga. But their chief hope of success is General Prim, on account of his great popularity with the army, and who is only too eager to supplant both his rivals in the leadership of the Progressists. The Spanish soldiers justly enjoy a high character for honour and loyalty; but the revolutionary party reckon on being able to gain over the army by corrupting, as they did in Naples, the higher officers. For this infamous work General Prim is the chosen agent. No man is more fitted for such a task than this soldier of fortune. A Swiss by birth, he has made Spain his home, and revolutionary intrigues have been to him a labour of love. He fought in the Carlist wars, he has thriven on revolutions. He has suffered exile on many occasions, and made friends for himself among the supporters of the revolutionary party in all the cities of Europe. By the discovery of the military conspiracy at Valencia the immediate success of this comprehensive scheme has been retarded. But it has already produced disastrous results at Madrid, and has dragged unhappy Spain once more back to the paths of revolution.

The following are some of the first fatal results of the inchoate revolution. The "Liberal Union" governs again at Madrid, Narvaez has succumbed to its pressure, O'Donnell has accepted power on its terms. Consequently, his first act on his accession to office was the recognition of Italy. "Spain," he told the Cortes, "without attacking the rights of the Pope, must adopt a policy in conformity with the requirements of a European nation under a constitutional Government." The Court of Madrid has had to change its private as well as its public policy. The saintly prelate, the confessor of the Queen, who succeeded some years ago in suppressing the scandals of the Court, has been banished from Madrid; Sister Patrocinio, the abbess of San Pascual, who has succeeded in establishing so many houses of her order in Spain, and whose influence and good counsels have been attended with such beneficial results, has been relegated to her convent at Aranjuez. The Archbishop of Toledo has resigned his tutorship of the Prince of the Asturias. But, on the other hand, General Prim, the favourite of the revolution, has been recalled to Madrid, and Emilio Castelar, the revolutionary professor, and editor of the *Democracia*, whose removal caused the audacious riots of the 10th April, has been reinstalled at the University; and finally, Queen Christina, who for some months past has been consorting with the leaders and prime instigators of the Italian revolution, is now again in high favour at Court. She is indeed a bird of ill-omen. Her re-appearance at Madrid at this juncture tends much to confirm the worst forebodings. To crown the work of concession to the revolutionary demands, and to give a public pledge before the world of her accession to the ranks of the European revolution, Queen Isabella has at last consented to fraternize with the Emperor Napoleon. As long as the Bourbon Queen was true to Catholic and Conservative principles, Napoleon, it is known, refused to set foot

on Spanish soil; but now the Queen and Spain are rewarded by his presence. It remains to be seen whether these weak and unworthy concessions to revolutionary policy will suffice to satisfy the French Emperor and the Spanish Liberals, and save the last Bourbon dynasty in Europe from the open and covert dangers it is threatened with. But whether it does succeed or no, such a course of policy is a dishonour to Spain and a re-opening of the revolutionary era which the too sanguine friends of that unhappy country had hoped was at last closed. The Ministry of O'Donnell, there is but too much reason to fear, is but a preparation for the advent of the Progressists to power, and then comes open revolution against Church and Crown and people. Against such combinations the Catholic party in the Chambers is all but powerless. The Moderados are split up into hostile sections, jealous of one another. There is no principle of cohesion. The political condition of Spain is pitiable in the extreme. Such a nation whose successive Governments for years have plundered the Church and suppressed the monastic orders with greater severity than Sardinia, and whose present Government recognizes Italy, and consorts with the enemies of the Pope, but ill deserves to bear its proud appellation of Most Catholic.

Of Portugal nothing new or favourable can be said. It is an ever ready agent to further the schemes and plots which are now agitating from end to end the sister-country. It has drunk the revolutionary cup to the dregs. Unlike Spain, Portugal cannot boast of a valiant and unsullied episcopate, zealous only in the discharge of its sacred duties. Its clergy, too, are degenerate; many of them are morally corrupt, more are entangled in the meshes of Freemasonry, and not a few are active agents in that ministry of evil. There is no hope, either, of a better supply from the seminaries. The hand of the government is everywhere, in the interests of unbelief, working for evil. The ecclesiastical nominations on the part of the government, its patronage and its control, which is almost unlimited over religion and education, are all directed to the extirpation of Catholic principles from the mind and heart of the people. There is no hope, unless some gifted and saintly prelate or Catholic politician should be raised up by Providence to change the whole current of thought that pervades the nation, and to free it at last from that fatal "Pombalism" which crushes out under its weight every higher and holier instinct in the heart of the nation.

Although, of late, the chief activity of the revolutionary party has been directed against Spain, nevertheless, the Mazzinians have not been dormant in Italy. The dissolution of the Chambers, which, five years ago, inaugurated a policy as disastrous to religion as to the political well-being of the country, and the elections about to take place in October, are the events which have naturally occupied the attention of these relentless enemies of the Church and of society. It is, in truth, an important crisis, for now the Catholics of Italy are called upon to rectify or to annul the revolutionary policy of the government. The future welfare of Italy is, in a manner, put into their hands. The liberty of the Church and the rights of the Holy See are left to the vindication of the electors. Of the issue of the elections there would be no doubt, had the large mass of the Italian people the requisite knowledge of

their duties in such an emergency. But, like the people in Spain, the Italians are unaccustomed to the stir and turmoil of elections ; they are prone to obey, not to dictate a policy ; they are the governed, not the governors ; they have no sense of the responsibility imposed upon them. The right exercise of political power or a right conception of its meaning is not gained by a people without a larger experience in the habits of self-government than is dreamt of by modern constitution-mongers. The vice of modern constitutions is that power falls into the hands of the designing or ambitious few under the leadership of the demagogue or the successful soldier ; and that, while the country is governed in the name of the people, the rights and true interests of the people are shamefully trampled under foot. In this way pseudo-parliamentary government becomes the worst of despotisms, and inasmuch as it is the hollowest and most pretentious of shams, it is more hateful than the absolutism of kings. In Italy the Catholic Church has been persecuted in the name of the people ; but are the people sufficiently conscious of their duty and of their power in the coming elections to put a stop to the outrages which have been done to religion, and to force the government to restore, at least to the Papacy, the plundered provinces ? The clergy and the leaders of the people are doing their best to enlighten them as to their duty at this crisis, but the apathy which they have to encounter in the good and the pious is not the least of their discouragements. At the same time the whole organization of the Liberals and of the Mazzinians is exerted to its utmost to return members pledged to continue the work of spoliation and impiety, and to carry the bloody revolution up to the gates of Rome and into the Vatican itself. The Italian government has also issued its programme ; it in so far coincides with the Mazzinian views, that it urges the complete separation of political and religious interests. With Byzantine craft it also seeks to gain the adhesion of the country clergy, by offering them a legal share in the monastic spoils. In the meanwhile the Pope calmly awaits the course of events and watches with the singular confidence which his trust in Providence inspires, the rapid approach of that period which is to leave the Papal territories once more a prey to the revolution, let loose by the victories of Solferino and Magenta upon Rome and upon Europe. As this eventful period approaches, the one dominant question, the one all-absorbing interest among good Catholics everywhere and on all occasions,—except perhaps during the recent elections in Ireland,—is how best to protect the temporal power of the Pope ; how so to act in every kingdom of Europe, as to induce governments to throw at least their moral weight into the scale in favour of the Pope against his enemies, in favour of moral against brute force, in favour of religion against revolution.

In Naples the civil war still continues ; * brigandage, so often declared to

* The latest tragedy has occurred in the valley of Avellino, where the two last bands in that district have just been dispersed. Manfra, the brigand chief, was sitting at table with his gun between his knees, in order to guard against treachery in the men who harboured him, when a woman silently came behind the brigand, and cut his throat. Two thousand lire (£160) were set upon his head. This young girl, Theresa Cunzo is her name, claims the blood-money. A fine marriage portion for so young a maiden, and very

be at an end, still renders the country unsafe. In spite of the 80,000 armed men, which the revolutionary government of Sardinia had originally thrown into the country, and which no government has yet dared to withdraw, the disaffected are still harboured and encouraged by the peasantry and the townspeople of the Neapolitan states. The capture, long confinement, and heavy ransom of an English traveller, in the states seized by Victor Emmanuel, have brought home to many of our political writers the conviction that the Italian revolution means insecurity of property and of life, means the loosening of the bonds of society and of religion. The state of things in the Neapolitan kingdom must have taught a lesson, even to such an *Italianissimo* as Mr. Gladstone, that treason against a legitimate sovereign, and fanatical hatred of the Catholic Church, are not elements out of which a good government is made; that fusillading by tens of thousands in cold blood is not social progress; that burning towns and villages by tens of hundreds is no sign of popular consent; that prisons, crowded as they never were crowded before under even the most exceptional of circumstances, is no evidence that the fall of the Bourbons has brought an increase of liberty; that, in fine, the plunder of church property, the suppression of religious orders, and public blasphemy of all which the people hold sacred, are not symptoms of the growth of true religion.

Liberal politicians, and writers with a revolutionary bias in their minds, are fond of comparing the state of things in Austria, especially as regards financial difficulties, with that in Italy, and of contrasting the state of Venice under Austrian rule with that of Naples under the government of Victor Emmanuel. Both these points deserve closer consideration than is often bestowed upon them. As to taxation in Austria, to quote only well-known and authenticated facts, it amounts to 75 florins per head; in Italy to 82½. According to the financial report laid before the Chambers at the close of the year 1864, the Italian deficit was as high as 307 millions lire, and the estimated deficit for the year ending in 1866 amounted to 625 millions. In Austria, on the contrary, by a timely reduction in the Budget, it is estimated that the deficit will be entirely covered. To meet current expenses, the Italian Parliament, on the 15th of April of the present year, sanctioned a loan of 425 millions lire; in Austria a loan will be required, but only to meet the charges falling due at the National Bank, but not to increase the existing debt. Again, the public funds of Austria enjoy higher consideration than those of Italy, as is shown by the character they bear on the money markets of Europe. Both countries, alike, have had to alienate their railways and Crown lands, and are open, in this respect, to an equal reproach. The famine in Hungary has caused a temporary increase in Austrian taxation, both on account of the taxes being unpaid in the distressed districts, as because of the necessity of sending thither relief to the amount of twenty

tempting, perhaps, were it not for the blood upon her hand. The chief of the other band was attacked by soldiers, and escaped their pursuit, though many shots were fired at him. The next day he was found in the streets, dead of his wounds.

millions of florins. But although the taxes at present are high in the Austrian empire, they are borne with good-will. Italy, on the contrary, has just been burdened with new taxes, such as those on tobacco and salt, which have so added to the already oppressive weight of taxation as to have led in many places, such as Melignano, Como and Lecco, and even in Brescia, to a determined resistance, which was only put down by force of arms, and with bloodshed. These towns are all in Lombardy, the richest province of Italy, and of which the boast has so often been made that it had exhibited the greatest attachment to the new order of things in Italy. Under the Austrian government of Lombardy, nothing like this had ever occurred; on the contrary, it enjoyed, as is well known, great prosperity. This, at least, is a proof that it is not in Austria, but in Italy, that taxation acts so oppressively.

In constitutional matters Austria has, at the present moment, it is true, a grave and most difficult duty to perform; it has to reconcile the claims of the Hungarians to self-government with the preservation of the principle of unity in the empire; and it has to shape a constitution so as to give satisfaction to both moieties of the empire. The successful issue of such a task is by no means certain. But these difficulties are light when set in the balance with the combat which the government of Florence is exposed to from so many opposing factions. The discontent, although springing from various grounds, is equally great in all the provinces of the new Italian state. The violence of the party of action is not less to be feared than the open resistance of the royalists. In addition to this, a reconciliation even between the Pope and Victor Emmanuel, would be the source of a great embarrassment to the government. If we look to Venice, it is true that the nobles and the town population are opposed to Austria, and conspire to throw off its hated yoke; but the great mass of the peasantry takes no part in these proceedings. No resistance is offered to the conscription. But in Sicily and Naples, although Victor Emmanuel has been five years in possession, were the troops, which almost cover the country, withdrawn, his rule would not be worth five days' purchase. We need not insist again, in this comparison of Austrian rule in Venice with that of Sardinia in the Neapolitan States, on the unexampled severity and bloodthirsty cruelty by which these states were acquired and are now held. It is enough to point out that Venice only comprises a small portion of the Austrian empire, whereas the new provinces comprise in extent and population nearly a half of the Italian states. And, moreover, even in the other provinces of the kingdom, life and property are by no means secure, whilst the criminal statistics show a state of things which is not elsewhere easily to be matched; whereas in Venice, travelling is as free from danger as in other parts of Europe, and the number of criminals is small; and were not the public peace sometimes interrupted by attacks made from the neighbouring provinces, nothing would be heard of disturbances in the Venetian states. For the revolutionary press, then, to affect to suppose that Austria would ever be willing to sell a province of 456 geographical square miles, containing a population of two and a half millions, to bankrupt Italy, is the height of absurdity. Venice is the southern gate of the Austrian empire, and the defence of the Adriatic, and, therefore,

not to be parted with for love or money. And as to violence, the famous Quadrilateral has surely nothing to fear from the ill-jointed kingdom, which is scarcely able to keep its own, and whose armies have more than they can accomplish in hunting down brigands in their caves.

In presence of the evil which lawlessness, disregard of treaties, and violation of sovereign rights has wrought in Italy, it is a matter of the deepest shame and regret to see the example of Napoleon and of the King of Sardinia followed by the two great Conservative powers of the North, in their treatment of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The Gastein Convention is as great a disgrace as the treaty of Villafranca. Bismark is as unscrupulous as Cavour. The King of Prussia also has shown himself as ready to increase his territory or to "rectify his frontier" at the expense of a weak neighbour as the Emperor Napoleon or Victor Emmanuel. If not in the material gain, Austria bears an equal share with Prussia in the moral guilt of the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy and the seizure of the Duchies. Let us, however, remind statesmen like M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Earl Russell, who read such severe homilies to the two great Conservative powers on the Gastein Convention, of their participation in, and approval of, the revolutionary violence of France and Sardinia in Italy, when treaties were torn to shreds, and provinces of weaker neighbours seized under the flimsiest of pretexts. With what face, too, can they who worshipped Cavour, and did public homage to the motley hero of the Italian revolution, denounce Bismark and his Royal master for unscrupulous ambition and lawless violence? If the foreign policy of the German Powers reflects discredit on Conservative principles, the home policy of some of the lesser states of Germany, in their treatment of the Catholic Church on the matter of education, both in popular schools and in episcopal seminaries, is open to the severest animadversion. We have not space to advert at the present moment to the progress of the conflict between the Church and the Government, touching the new scheme of godless education introduced into the popular schools of Baden. In a future number we shall refer more at large to this scheme, which is simply an attempt on the part of the Civil Power to monopolize education, to deprive parents of their natural rights, and to oust the Church from her office as supreme teacher of the people.

An infringement still more flagrant of the divine rights of the Church, as well as of the constitution of the country, has been perpetrated in Bavaria, by the forcible closure of the episcopal seminary at Spire. In a former number we described the steps which the Bishop of Spire had taken to secure the purity and independence of theological teaching, as well as the outrageous manner in which the Bavarian Government had acted towards that zealous prelate in the exercise of his episcopal rights, and the insolent disregard it had paid to the protests and petitions of the united episcopate of Bavaria. The State, in a word, claims the right of controlling the theological teaching in the episcopal seminaries. While closing the seminary, it offered the Bishop of Spire to set up a theological faculty in the Government Lyceum of his episcopal city. The bishop, however, would by no means consent to the principle that theology should be taught only in Government institutions; the minister von Koch would not discuss the principle, and

the bishop has found no redress at the hands of the Government. The matter, however, was referred at once by the bishops to Rome. The Pope, in a Brief addressed to the archbishop of Munich and the Bavarian Episcopate, applauds their unanimity in defence of the Church, and urges upon the Bavarian Government the duty of respecting the clear and undoubted rights of the Church and of the episcopacy, and the necessity of abstaining from a forced and arbitrary interpretation of the existing concordat. The Holy Father then declares that the right of the bishops to teach the clergy belongs to them by Divine right, and is inherent in their sacred office, and is in no possible manner derived from any concession on the part of the civil power, or from any convention entered into between the State and the Church.

In this Brief, in reference to the necessity of having theological schools in the seminaries, the bishops are warned as to the dangers likely to be incurred in institutions more or less exempt from episcopal vigilance and control; but, before all things, the necessity is pointed out, especially in these times, that the sacred science should be drawn from uncontaminated sources of Catholic teaching. The Papal Brief concludes by saying, that the Holy See will take the matter into its own hands and endeavour to persuade the Bavarian government to confer with Rome as to the disputed article of the concordat, and to come to an amicable arrangement, so that the bishops should no longer be hindered in the exercise of their episcopal rights.

In the meantime, after many obstacles thrown in their way on the part of the government, the bishops of Bavaria have held a meeting at Passau to concert measures as to the defence of their episcopal rights, and to carry out the advice of the Holy See in the matter of clerical education. Two grave matters, which lie at the bottom of many existing disagreements, are brought to the surface by the dispute between the episcopate and the Bavarian government. The one is the monstrous principle in a Catholic government, that not to the Pope, not to the bishops, but to the civil power, belongs the supreme control over the education of the clergy. The other is the nature of the relation between secular science and theology. Both of these questions touch the quick of Catholic teaching. State-omnipotence is the vice of modern governments, and is simply incompatible with the essential rights of the Catholic Church; but in the views put forward so much of late in Germany, and even among ourselves, as to the relations of science and theology, the attack against Catholic truth is more covert and subtle. In the matter of the seminary of Spire, the reason alleged for its suppression is, that "quite independent theological institutions do not give the necessary guarantees for theological science," and that it can in no way be tolerated that "the freedom of theological science should be limited by the theological intelligence of a diocesan bishop." Only under the supervision of the Minister of Public Worship, and in the charge of men whose minds are enlarged by a free and independent pursuit in all the sciences, can theological science hope to flourish. The Church must, therefore, trust her theology "to the infallibility of learned men," but not to the "theological intelligence of a diocesan bishop." In the discussion which has arisen between the friends of an "independent" theology and the defenders of episcopal rights, the

authority of Dr. Döllinger has unfortunately been made use of in support of the government view as to theological teaching in episcopal seminaries.

After much assertion and counter-assertion, it appears from the public papers that not before the closing of the seminary, not, indeed, during the remonstrances which followed that act, but afterwards, on his opinion being asked by the King, Dr. Döllinger expressed an opinion to the effect that there was no guarantee in episcopal seminaries for the teaching of scientific theology. Now, considering that all episcopal seminaries are most unreservedly subject to Papal authority, Dr. Döllinger's opinion comes to this—that the State's view of theology is purer and more enlarged than the Pope's. It is really difficult to know what would surprise us as coming from Dr. Döllinger; but after such a notion as this, it is a very small thing to point out (what is nevertheless true) that Dr. Döllinger's opinion completely passes over the question of episcopal rights attacked by the civil power, and tends, under actual circumstances, to strengthen the Government in the view it has taken of its duty of exercising, in the interests of religion itself, a control over the education of the clergy. That the right of a bishop to teach theology in his seminary is in nowise dependent on guarantees to be given to secure a scientific theology is abundantly clear to all from the united statements of the bishops and of the Papal Brief itself.

Unfortunately, there is a large class of Catholics in Germany who tamely acquiesce in the abridgement of the liberties of the Church and of the authority of the Pope, but who cannot for an instant brook any interference with the unlimited freedom of science. All teaching, even theological, according to them, suffers under the immediate control of the Church. The Church is the enemy, the State the friend, of intellectual freedom. Such a disloyal spirit and such a limited intellectual grasp of Catholicism will be corrected, at least in a measure, we confidently hope, by the speedy establishment of the projected German Catholic university. The progress this scheme has already made, and the practical steps which have been already taken to secure its success, we hope to speak of on a future occasion, especially as the work is not only interesting in itself, but may show us the way to meet the want, so severely felt among ourselves, of a Catholic university in England.

Foreign Periodical Literature.

LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.

Civiltà Cattolica, February 18, 1865.

1.—*Liberty of Conscience the Corollary of Political Naturalism.*

THE Papal Encyclical of last December, after proscribing political naturalism, passes on to the condemnation of two other pestilential errors : the impunity of religious offences, and the so-called liberty of conscience. "Against the doctrine of Scripture, of the Church, and of the Holy Fathers, they [the modern reformers] do not hesitate to assert that 'that is the best condition of society in which no duty is recognized, as attached to the civil power, of restraining, by enacted penalties, offenders against the Catholic religion, except so far as public peace may require.' From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by our predecessor, Gregory XVI., an *insanity*, viz., that 'liberty of conscience and worships is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly-constituted society ; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil, whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any other way.' But, while they rashly affirm this, they do not think and consider that they are preaching the *liberty of perdition*."

Both these errors are but the consequence of the apostasy of the State from God, by the renunciation of all regard for or reference to the supernatural order. The State, indeed, when once it has shut itself up within the limits of pure nature, no longer making any distinction between true and false belief, has no reason whatsoever for extending legal protection to the Catholic religion. An offence against Christ and His Church is no longer a social crime, because society, as such, does not consider itself as bound by any religious obligation ; the believer and the heretic, the worshipper of God and the blasphemer of His Name, are all alike in its regard. Legal atheism, or the absence of all reference to religion in the civil laws, is the legitimate consequence of this political condition. The State having abdicated its office of protector of the Church, has, in so doing, given up its title to proscribe heterodoxy and impiety ; because the State in itself is not a competent judge in religious matters. So long as it lent its arm to the

Church, it had a right, so far, of interference ; while itself defining nothing, but simply accepting the dicta of the sole authoritative teacher of truth, it maintained them against the assaults of error. *Karolus Dei gratia rex, Ecclesie defensor, et in omnibus Apostolicæ Sedis fidelissimus adjutor.* In this formulary, which the Christian empire placed at the head of its capitularies, the ground of the support which civil legislation is entitled to give to canonical legislation is expressed. But this noble charge being once relinquished, political power has no longer any claim to influence the intellect or control the tongue of its subjects in reference to religious truths and observances. It must leave them at liberty to embrace this or that belief, or reject all alike, and free to express their corresponding opinions and feelings. In other words, it is constrained to give full liberty of conscience and of worships. This is the great conquest at which the enemies of society and of the Church aim in order to ruin both. They urge two sophisms in support of their claim. The State, they say, is distinct from the Church : *ergo*, it ought to be separated from it ; the State cannot teach truth : *ergo*, it can neither receive nor protect it. But these men are not satisfied with liberty of conscience, as a consequence of the separation of the political from the religious order ; they demand, moreover, that it should be erected into a principle, proclaiming it to be an inalienable right of man. And since it is the duty of the State to recognize and protect the rights of its citizens, they infer that the recognition and the assurance of liberty of conscience and of worship belong to the ideal of society, so that no government withholding the boon is to be considered as either just or well constituted. Thus having taken away from the State the office of guardian of the truth, they impose upon it the duty of protecting error.

The Papal Encyclical, following up error in all its windings, not only proscribes liberty of conscience as a consequence of political naturalism, but brands it, considered in itself, as an insanity ; and since there are not a few who regard it, not as a dogmatic principle, but merely as a measure of the utmost benefit to human society, the Pontiff further declares it to be the *liberty of perdition*. Let us briefly consider the justice of both these pronouncements.

2.—*Liberty of Conscience justly styled an Insanity by the Supreme Pontiff.*

Liberty, for our present purpose, may be understood either as freedom from all constraint contrary to the nature of the subject, or exemption from any law regulating the operation and use of that freedom. Thus we say that a river has free course when, unimpeded by obstacles, it flows towards the sea, following its natural law of gravity ; and we call the flight of a bird free, which wings its way hither and thither in the air, with nothing to regulate its motions. The advocates of liberty of conscience clearly do not understand the word in the first sense, which would lead to quite an opposite conclusion to that which they have in view. For, if liberty were taken to signify the faculty of following without hindrance one's proper nature, conscience, so far from withdrawing itself from the Church's guidance,

in order to obtain such freedom, would then only be free when not hindered from remaining under its direction. For what is the nature of the human conscience? To conform itself to the rule of the true and the good. Now this rule is no other than the eternal law of God, propounded and applied by the Church's infallible teaching. Human conscience accordingly can then only be said to be truly free when it is allowed to follow this teaching without impediment; that is, free from unnatural restraints. But this is not what the modern spirit is seeking; on the contrary, it is striving with all its power to thwart this tendency of conscience: we have a recent example in the obstacles which in France and Italy have been thrown in the way of the free utterance of the Pontiff's voice—obstacles which the sacerdotal firmness of the episcopate has nobly broken through.

It is in the second sense that the modern spirit understands the word liberty; that is, as exemption from all laws regulating its use. Now, if liberty of conscience is to be taken in this sense, undoubtedly it must be regarded as insanity, as the aberration of a disordered intellect. For on what ground could such a liberty be claimed? Three suppositions alone are conceivable: either there is no law for the direction of man's conscience; or this law is identified with the conscience itself; or, finally, if it be distinct from the conscience, man nevertheless has the right not to conform himself thereto. The first supposition is that of the promoters of indefinite progress, who, not admitting the existence of any absolute, but only of relative truths, as a consequence do not recognize any immutable rule of the good and of the just. For them there is no distinction between moral good and moral evil; all is good and all is evil under different aspects. The second supposition is that of the pantheists, who, confounding nature with God, consequently confound the human conscience with the Divine. For them man's conscience itself is the fountain of truth and justice. The third, although they would not state it in this form, is that of the liberals, who maintain the exercise of liberty, as such, to be the sovereign right of man, prior to all idea of duty. With them uncontrolled action is right action. But liberty of conscience is sheer folly, whichever of these suppositions is adopted; for the first denies all moral order, the second results in the deification of man, and the third resolves itself into the right to do evil and embrace error.

But it will be replied, that by exemption from law is only meant exemption from external control, as distinguished from individual inward persuasion. The reasonable conscience, it will be said, can follow no other rule but that of truth; and truth is not fabricated by authority, but apprehended by the intellect.

The thesis, thus stated, resolves itself into pure rationalism, without, therefore, ceasing to be an insanity, as the root also from which it springs is insanity. Such a liberty of conscience supposes the negation of the supernatural order, the negation of Christ and of the Church, and the complete abandonment of man to himself. But such has not been the economy of Divine Providence. God has not left man within the limits of simple nature, but has raised him to the supernatural order by faith and grace. He has redeemed him from the bondage of sin by the Incarnation of the Word, and has constituted him member of a spiritual society by the instrumentality

of the Church. And as concerns the assured knowledge of good and evil, God has not left men to the direction of their own fallible reason, but has consigned them to the teaching and guidance of this same Church, to which He has given the charge of leading them to the pastures of salvation. Whosoever does not acknowledge this is an unbeliever; and there is no disputing with unbelievers about liberty of conscience; the argument with them turns on the truths of the Christian faith. Such a man is altogether losing his time in reading this article; but he will do well to study the writings of Christian apologists. It is believers who are here addressed, and they are asked whether, Christ and His Church being acknowledged, liberty of conscience be conformable or contradictory to reason. If God has deigned to speak to us by His only-begotten Son, and if He has instituted the Church to perpetuate and apply that Son's teaching amongst men, it needs but common sense to see that for any one to admit man's right to follow what doctrine he pleases is equivalent to admitting in him a right to contradict God, and exempt himself from the established Divine order. And this is insanity, as the Supreme Pontiff has declared.

This specious sophism can delude only simpletons. No doubt man's conscience can have no other rule but truth; but for this very reason it must have the authority of God and of His Church for its rule, for it is only then assured of not departing from truth. God is incapable of error or of falsehood. His authority, therefore, is identified with truth, as is likewise that of the Church by participation, through the infallibility which she possesses by Divine assistance. There is no room here, therefore, for the opposition set up between truth and authority, between the conceptions of the reason and the homage of faith; for in both these acts reason apprehends truth, although in adhering thereto it leans, in the one case, on its own evidence, in the second on the Divine. Again, the Church, in proposing truth to our acceptance, does not fabricate it, but only assures to us the possession of it. Depositary of God's revelation to man, she either makes known its articles, or deducts the consequences flowing from them, both to remove error and to direct our moral life. But it is the desire to follow the irregular appetites of sense, and not the wish to conform to the dictates of reason, which really animates the rationalistic propounders of liberty of conscience. And this also is insanity, aiming as it does at practical materialism, and at degrading man to the condition of the inferior creature. Liberty of conscience in this sense is the liberty of a brute beast. The error is as old as the time of Job, who says, "Vir vanus in superbiam erigitur, et tanquam pullum onagri se liberum natum putat.—A vain man lifteth himself up into pride, and thinketh himself born free, like a wild ass's colt."—*Job* xi. 12.

3.—Liberty of Conscience justly called by the Pontiff Liberty of Perdition.

This proposition scarcely needs proof after what has been already said; since the right to liberty of conscience is an insanity, its practical application cannot be in itself a source of welfare to human society. It may accidentally be the cause of good; it may be accepted as a lesser evil in a society distracted by religious divisions, and in which public conscience has be-

come obscured by doubt. The necessity of enabling the citizens to live together in some sort of union, and of providing for the maintenance of such degree of order as remains, may render it advisable, or even imperative, for a government more or less to abstain from all interference in religious matters, and leave every one in the free exercise of such forms of worship as have already been long and peaceably tolerated. For it is no longer a question of preserving society from an evil which it is possible to avoid or ward off; but of attempting to re-acquire by violent means possession of a lost good, and by so doing only irritate an angry wound by fruitless efforts.

Leaving the question, however, of opportunity and political prudence, which is not the point under consideration, and looking at the thing simply in itself, and in the effects flowing from its intrinsic nature, it is undeniable that liberty of conscience is, as the Holy Father has pronounced, liberty of perdition.

This is proved, 1st, by the discord of which it is the source. S. Augustine defines society as *concoro hominum multitudo*. This concord, although manifested externally, has its seat in the will, and its root in the intellect; for man as a moral being acts from his will and intellect. But what concord of will and intellect can there be where there is religious discord? Nothing has a closer connection with the mind and heart of man than religion. His religious ideas group round the supreme term of all his hopes and the highest object of his veneration. Religion directs us to God as our first beginning and last end. The love of our last end influences all our secondary affections, and rules and modifies them after its likeness. Reverence for our Lord assuredly cannot tolerate that He should be made a mark for the contempt of others. What sympathy, what cordiality can exist between a Renan who blasphemes Christ, and a believer who would give every drop of his blood to advance His glory! True it is that charity bids us hate error and love the erring; but no one can deny that this is no easy task, requiring much perfection of mind and heart. And if so, it is unwise to expect that such exalted charity should prevail amongst the mass of mankind. It is scarcely necessary to recall to mind all the bloody civil wars which have so often desolated Germany, France, and the Swiss cantons, and of which religious discussion was the origin. We have but to cast our eyes on present times to be convinced of its disturbing effect on the peace of society. Neither need this surprise us. Every anarchical principle is in its nature dissolvent; and division in the order of ideas must eventually find expression in the order of facts.

Respect for all opinions indifferently is prescribed as a remedy for this serious evil. But the remedy, besides the frequent impossibility of its application, is as bad as the disease. Respect may be obtained, though not always very easily, for purely speculative opinions, or for free and open questions, or for such as affect individuals only. But if they are practical, and especially if they practically affect you or your concerns, respect will be preached somewhat in vain. A thief's opinions lead him to break some day into your house. Will his opinion meet with respect, or will such a visitor not rather receive a bullet for his welcome? Now religious opinions are not

only practical, but they are frequently injurious in their effects upon the interests of others. For instance, the iniquitous sect of Freemasons professes hatred to the Catholic Church, and has sworn its extermination. Hence their perfidious efforts to throw discredit on its ministers, to despoil them of their possessions, and remove them from all influence in the relations of society; to bring its doctrines and morality into contempt. Can Catholics be expected with any show of reason, or with any chance of success, to treat the opinions of these men with respect?

But let us suppose that mutual respect were possible and easy. What would be its obvious effect? Religious indifferentism; for if respect for men's opinions is to be anything more than a sham, it must spring from an inward esteem, not of the men only, but of their doctrines. Such a state of mind implies universal scepticism, where nothing is really believed, or, which is the same thing, where contradictory opinions are believed to be one as probable as the other.

Some persons wonder why, for the last three centuries, in those regions which are infested with Protestantism, saints have been so rare amongst the professors of the true faith, where formerly they abounded, and whilst they have still continued to flourish in other countries free from heresy. Let Germany, for instance, be compared in this respect to Italy and Spain. It is not necessary to have recourse as an explanation to the Divine wrath, which has rendered the hand of the Lord less liberal of His choicest gifts in these lands; a natural cause suggests itself in the weakening of a lively and energetic faith, the gradual result of contact with the heterodox, and of the constant necessity of paying them due regard. A Christian's faith manifests itself in all the acts of his life, social as well as private, civil as well as domestic. Now, how is this continual and universal manifestation possible, when at every turn you stumble on a heretic or an unbeliever, and must take care not to displease him?

But, apart from this consideration, there can be no doubt that this liberty of conscience imperils the souls of numbers. The public profession of error, not less than the open practice of immorality, is a stumbling-block for those who have not by long habit acquired stability, and who have not had adequate religious instruction. In the Our Father we pray God to preserve us from temptation, and in the act of contrition we resolve to avoid all proximate occasion of sin. Why, but because the feebleness of our corrupt nature exposes us both to illusion and seduction: *Fascinatio nugacitatis obscurat bona, et inconstantia concupiscentie transvertit sensum?* And if this be true of all the children of Adam, how much more, then, is it of the ignorant multitude, whose passions are so easily moved, and of inexperienced youth, at once so impressive and so impulsive?

A common sophism in the mouths of the defenders of liberty of conscience is based on the omnipotence of truth. Truth, say they, is stronger than error; you may, therefore, rely upon its ultimate triumph. The modern notions of free trade are to be applied to the moral order. Competition always ends in the sale of the best commodity, while the worst goods find no market. Now, who will deny the superiority of truth over error? Very well: but it may be replied, Why do you not apply this sapient plan in your

family? Have you confidence in the power of virtue? Allow it, then, to have a free contest with vice within the walls of your house. Why are you so cautious in the choice of your servants and friends? why so guarded in the education of your children? Why do you look so carefully to the books they read, and the companions with whom they associate? Leave them full liberty: let them see and hear all that is dissolute and offensive to morals; let them frequent the most corrupt society. The splendour of virtue must fain outshine the attractions of vice: it must triumph in the conflict. Remember the principles of free trade: the best merchandise is sure to have the preference.

But why do you not also apply your system in the civil order? What mean all your restrictions, all your laws, your police, your prisons? Let justice and injustice also have free scope: let them have free competition in human society. S. Augustine made use of this very argument on this same subject: "Kings," says this great doctor, "according to the Divine injunction, serve God in their capacity of kings, if in their dominions they command what is good and prohibit what is evil, not only in what concerns social relations, but in what regards religion. It is in vain to say, leave me to my own free will; for why should you not with equal reason say this with respect to homicides, adulteries, and all other social misdeeds and abominations, the restraint of which wickedness by just laws is most useful and salutary."—*Contra Cresconium*, l. iii. 57.

It is not that we have no faith in the force of truth, although we must confess to having small confidence in the strength of some of the intellects to which it is propounded, or of the wills which are bound to follow it. Our opponents step aside from the question, passing from the subjective to the objective, and substituting the possible for the actual man. Our nature, such as it really exists *in ordine rerum*, not in the brains of the progressists, is not a pure intellect contemplating truth unveiled, and embracing it without opposition; it is a compound of mind and of fancy, of reasonable appetite and of sensitive desire. Truth is viewed through the mists of the imagination, and is often in direct opposition to the strongest tendencies of the animal portion of this nature. To perceive truth often needs discernment; it needs instruction; it needs calm examination and freedom from prejudice. Even when recognized, an arduous conflict with the passions is often necessary before the will can be brought to embrace it. It is all very fine to say that the best merchandise will always find buyers, and be purchased in preference to the bad. For this to happen, it must be known to be good; and, moreover, its price must not be too high. If the article costs much, few will buy it, in spite of its excellence. The example drawn from the advantages of free trade is, besides, quite out of place here. We shall enter into no disquisition concerning those advantages, albeit there are those who do not consider the benefit derived from the removal of all protection as altogether unqualified, and are of opinion that the strong profit thereby to the detriment of the weak. Be this as it may, the reasons urged in favour of free trade are inapplicable in the moral order. All concur in the case of material things to give a preference to the best merchandise—the judgment of the mind, and the inclination of the senses. But, as we have seen, in the moral

order, even supposing that the judgment is not perverted, the passions create a powerful obstacle, which has to be surmounted.

One of the strongest motives of credibility of our holy religion is the fact that, notwithstanding the elevation of its doctrine and the difficulty of its precepts, it has been able to triumph over the errors of Paganism, and get possession of the minds and affections of men. This is a prodigy wherein we see the finger of God. For either it implies other prodigies of which this was the result; or, if effected without a miracle, itself is the greatest prodigy of all.

"Se il mondo si rivolse al Cristianesimo,
Diss' io, senza miracoli : quest' uno
È tal, che gli altri non sono il centesimo."

That all the world, said I, should have been turn'd
To Christian, and no miracle been wrought,
Would in itself be such a miracle,
The rest were not one hundredth part so great.*

Now, can we expect what has itself been the work of a Divine intervention, or which must have necessitated such intervention as its cause, to become the spontaneous effect of the ordinary course of things? or are miracles to be renewed to please the friends of liberty of conscience? The Church, assisted by God's Spirit, knows our frail nature better. She knows that in the moral order, as in the physical, a pestilential atmosphere is sure to poison those who breathe it. She is always, therefore, labouring to purify the social atmosphere; hence she desires to see scandals removed and error repressed; she desires to banish the causes of seduction; she desires to strengthen man's weakness by the presence of virtuous examples, and by the reiteration of exhortations to good. And yet, in spite of all the solicitude and the multiplied aids to virtue with which the Church surrounds us, many and many are still lost through corruption of mind and heart. Judge what would be the consequence of an opposite system! Those who are experienced in the conduct of souls know well how arduous a task it is to restrain ardent youth on the inclined plane of vice, notwithstanding all the aids of a holy education, of fortifying sacraments, the removal of occasions of sin, and the chastisement of the vicious. And you expect it to be pure and virtuous when given up as a prey by your liberty of conscience to all the incentives of sense, and to all the sophisms of unbelief!

The journals of Naples and Palermo recorded the public burning of the Pontifical Encyclical by parties of school-boys. Do you suppose that these beardless striplings would have dreamed of committing this sacrilege if they had been kept at their studies by strict discipline, instead of being allowed unbridled liberty? Not one of these little heads would have had the strange conceit of exalting itself above the universal Teacher of the Church. And if one such fool had been found among them, he would soon have been brought to his senses by the wise application of old school regulations; or at least his punishment would have acted as a warning to the rest. But

* Dante, *Paradiso*, xxiv. Cary's Translation:

this would have been a return to the barbarism of bygone ages ; in our enlightened days of progress, liberty of conscience has taught even our little boys to imitate Luther ! Blessed results of this boasted liberty !

SPIRITISM IN THE MODERN WORLD.

Civiltà Cattolica, July 2, 1864.

THERE is no fact more universally and constantly asserted in the world than the intervention of the supernatural in the accustomed natural order. If we regard man's relations with God, we find that no worship ever existed or does exist without claiming to have its revelations, its visions, its ecstasies, or, at any rate, some form or other of communication with extramundane and invisible beings. If we look to the relations of man with his fellow-man, the history of every people records prophecies of future things, the penetration of secrets naturally impenetrable, the knowledge of events yet distant. And, finally, when we view man in his immediate connection with nature, so frequent are those prodigies by which the physical laws which govern the world are suspended, so general is the persuasion of their reality amongst all nations, that we find that the first explanation commonly suggesting itself of extraordinary facts which by their unusual character excite surprise, is that they are miraculous. Such is the spontaneous judgment of mankind. The existence of the supernatural has accordingly in its favour the universal consent of the human race in all ages.* It is impossible to point to any period when this belief was obliterated, or to any nation which disallowed it.

Since it is impossible that the human intellect, formed for the knowledge of truth, can constantly and universally persevere in maintaining a falsehood, it is futile to assert that this general consent is founded solely on error and deceit. Allowing that there has been imposture in numerous cases claiming to pass for genuine, such counterfeits do but prove that there is something genuine which may be counterfeited ; just as bad coin proves that there is sterling money in circulation. As for the reasonings of those sophists who strive to demonstrate that all supernatural or superintelligible facts are impossible, the common sense of mankind rejects their arguments, while facts themselves every day contradict them by those experimental proofs against which no logic can avail. The philosopher, then, who refuses to admit the supernatural into the economy of Providence sets himself in opposition to both reason and facts.

The Christian by the very act of his profession admits the coexistence in the world of two distinct and separable orders, the natural order, which governs the physical and moral laws of the world, and the supernatural, which, according to Revelation, governs the moral laws of man. The object of his faith is mystery, certain in itself, but above human intelligence ; he yields the homage of his will, not only to a God, the Creator and Preserver of

* The incredulity of a certain portion of the scientific world cannot be alleged in contravention of this broad general fact, which they themselves admit when they qualify the opposite disposition as vulgar and popular.

the world, but to a God the Repairer of the human race and the Sanctifier of souls. Hence, he recognizes an assisting power in his actions, not only from the concurrence of the First Cause of all being and of all action, but also from grace, an aid not due to nature but flowing from the pure liberality of God ; and by this grace his moral life is raised above the mere natural order, and enters into peculiar relations with God. In fine, he aspires to a beatitude as superior to the simply natural end as the very knowledge of it was impossible without the supernatural fact of Revelation. Now this supernatural order, in which the Catholic professes to live, was only known and established in the world by other supernatural facts, those prodigies which may be called the visible testimony of nature to that invisible order above nature to which redeemed man has been raised by God. The Christian acknowledges himself to be ennobled by this benefit above his simply human condition, and made, in a sense, participator of the divine. He accordingly does not merely admit the existence in the world of solitary supernatural facts, but professes a faith, a law, a life, altogether supernatural.

The supernatural, then, exists in the world to lead man to God. Of necessity, therefore, everything which turns man away from God rises in opposition to it. Now, the three great enemies of man are the world, the flesh, and the devil ; and all three are leagued together to mar the idea of the supernatural in man, each after its proper manner. The flesh tends to degrade man to the rank of the beasts, with whom he has common tendencies and passions : to the fleshly mind not only is the supernatural a word void of efficacy or meaning, but even the spiritual is disavowed by it ; man's soul is not a spirit which survives the matter it informed, but only a force which has its origin in matter itself, and which shares its destruction. The world, which may be defined as the rebellion of the reason against God, scorns to accept mysteries and miracles ; it measures the whole order of existences by the span of its own intellect ; and as it admits of no truth which is superior to the human intellect, of no law restrictive of human liberty, so neither will it acknowledge in the domain of facts anything which oversteps the limits of those rules which it recognizes in the government of nature. Finally, the devil, through hatred of God and man, strives in every way to substitute himself for God in this world ; by counterfeiting genuine prodigies and true revelations he draws men into the meshes of superstition, through a delusive and lying supernatural. Materialism is the offspring of the flesh, rationalism of the world, pseudo-theurgy of the devil ; and all these three systems, differing in their origin, have a common terminus—paganism. Paganism is, indeed, the great enemy of the supernatural, which assumes a concrete and actual form in this world only in Catholicism. It matters little what road the human intellect takes in its denial of divine Revelation, for all these roads end alike in the worship of the creature in the place of the Creator.

Of these three enemies of the supernatural the most formidable is not that which denies, but that which counterfeits it. Materialism will never be either popular or enduring : denying, not the supernatural alone, but the spiritual, it is plainly opposed to facts of the most palpable and universal character, and no sooner does it attempt to form a scientific system but it is triumphantly refuted. A certain class of gross minds will practically

welcome it, some shallow or bewildered intellects will speculatively adopt it, but it never can become that scientific heresy which, by invading the field of principles, shall menace Christian society with utter ruin and destruction. This danger is more to be apprehended from rationalism, because the order of facts which it denies is that which is least obvious to comprehension ; it is able, accordingly, to assume a certain scientific form calculated to dazzle and flatter man's strongest passion, his pride. Nevertheless, the contradictions it involves prevent it from long withstanding the investigation of reason ; for if you admit a spiritual soul in man, and a God above him, infinite and omnipotent, you cannot deny the possibility of mysteries and prodigies ; and when once the abstract possibility is conceded, historical criticism steps in to establish their existence as a matter of fact, and thus upsets the whole rationalistic system. In pseudo-theurgy we recognize the greatest danger ; for, on the one hand, it accepts existing facts, and on the other corresponding systems. It can associate itself, as, indeed, it has associated itself, with all the various forms which human philosophy has taken, while it satisfies man's natural leaning towards the superhuman and the infinite ; thus, instead of deluding his hopes, it soothes and nourishes them, albeit with unwholesome food. Hence, the universal dominion in ancient times of paganism, which still retains in its thralldom vast regions of Asia and Africa, keeping its hold on nations by no means barbarous or altogether devoid of mental culture. Human science, which with its own weapons can successfully combat materialism and rationalism, as we have seen it battling and triumphing over them in the bosom of ancient heathenism, is powerless against pseudo-theurgy, and is compelled to lay down its arms and abandon the unequal contest.

Nor must we suppose that in our enlightened times, and amidst the civilization of the Christian world this danger is past. History tells us that not a century has elapsed since the commencement of the Christian era without its demoniacal apparitions. Leaving at present the historical notice of such facts, which have been more or less frequent at different times, let us observe what is passing around us in our own day, of which numbers have been witnesses, and in which not a few have borne a part. First of all we had turning tables, then speaking tables, mysterious rappings, mediums, spirits, evocation of departed souls : all these wonders minister to the curiosity of very many, to the profit of not a few, and have become the subject of inquiry, more or less serious, with a certain number. We attribute these phenomena to the direct co-operation of the spirit of darkness, and this we propose to demonstrate.* For the present we pre-suppose the truth of our assertion in order to point out on the one hand the serious danger to souls from any participation in these manifestations, and on the other, some *a priori* reasons to account for the striking proportions which these facts have assumed in our day.

* Some years back the *Civiltà Cattolica* (serie iii., vol. iv., v., viii.) maintained and proved this assertion by irrefragable arguments and proofs. The recent spread of spiritism in Italy has given occasion to a more ample treatment of the same subject in a series of papers, an analysis of which we are giving in this Review.

The great danger of these communications proceeds from their taking every possible variety of form, according to the class of people dealt with, thus, in the first instance, disarming all suspicion. Spiritism is pious, pure, and even ascetic, when in contact with persons who would shrink from the utterance of any word offensive to morals or Christianity. Its pious attitude, again, has two phases, according to the disposition of those it addresses. Some deluded Catholics find themselves in presence of blessed souls, angelic beings discoursing of the spiritual life, revealing the future, and expatiating on the joys of heaven. But, as all good respectable persons have not so lively a faith, and do not readily give credit to celestial visions or apparitions of saints and angels, spiritism modifies the character of the actors whom it introduces to these individuals, and, while still keeping up its innocent and moral behaviour, brings on the stage, not angels and saints, but acquaintances, friends, and departed celebrities : the scene is changed, but the drama is the same. But now observe spiritism in company of another sort ; see its demeanour with the worldly and unprincipled. It becomes jocose, slangy, satirical, its conversation is more or less tinged with scepticism ; we meet with the wicked suggestion, the false proposition, and even the absolute negation of all religion. Spiritism talks about politics with politicians ; about industry and traffic with men of business ; with the learned it is all speculation and erudition ; with the vulgar it is coarse and vulgar. Nay, it accommodates itself to the national temperament. America has had its positive, dogmatising and bold spiritism ; England its sceptical, discursive, and cautious spiritism ; Germany its mystical, transcendental spiritism ; France its careless, gay, generous spiritism ; and so on. Spiritism, in fine, makes itself the echo of the habits and prepossessions of its interrogator, hereby rendering itself welcome and agreeable, and disposing men's minds to confidence ; thus insensibly leading them on to the horrible delusion which it is preparing for all alike—the negation of God and the utter corruption of the heart.

In this accommodating character of the spirits we recognize the chief source of the peril of spiritism, and a reason for its having spread so rapidly and gained numerous adherents everywhere, even in the most polished cities. But we must seek another cause of its success in the predisposition of men's minds to receive this delusion. It entered on its new and present period in the Protestant regions of America, whence it was transplanted to Europe, its poison spreading first and chiefly amongst Protestants. Catholic countries became also infected, but rather through the contact of Protestant ideas than from the local neighbourhood of Protestants. This fact, which is historically true, as we shall have occasion to prove, and which may be described as a kind of radiation of Protestantism towards Catholicism, excites a reasonable suspicion that modern spiritism is the natural offspring of Protestantism. The suspicion becomes conviction when we reflect on the natural process which takes place in the human mind under the influence of the dissolving principle of the Protestant heresy. The primary assertion of Protestantism is the *independence of man's reason* : the negation of supernatural truth is its ultimate conclusion. *I believe because I see* : this is its logical term. Protestantism does not deny the supernatural as such ; it denies it inasmuch as the supernatural withdraws itself from the controlling judgment of man's

reason. Two extreme, and both of them fatal, consequences flow from this principle. They will be adopted respectively according to circumstances. Either man will lack subjective evidence of the supernatural, and he will flatly deny its existence; he will be a materialist, a rationalist, a pantheist, according to the mode and degree in which error has developed itself in his mind; or he will possess subjective evidence through the influence of the spirit of darkness, and then the man will become superstitious; he will be a visionary, a spiritist. By his very condition the Catholic is shielded from this peril, for he does not believe because he sees, but because the Church attests to him that God has revealed to the world the truth which he believes. It is in Protestantism, then, that we find the germ of spiritism, as in Catholicism we meet with the strongest obstacle which it has to encounter.

But as this definite formula, *I believe because I see*, is only the ultimate phase of Protestantism as such, so also all who call themselves Protestants are not alike disposed to allow themselves to be deluded by spiritist visions and revelations. Those amongst them who, in despite of their fundamental principle, still maintain a portion of the Christian creed which they carried with them when they forsook the bosom of the Catholic Church, and who may thus be called Protestants only by halves; those who still retain some superintelligible dogma, in virtue of which they profess belief in a revelation of which they themselves are neither the subject nor the evidence; such Protestants are naturally much more averse to diabolical superstition, and less prone to fall into the illusions of spiritism. In like manner, a man who is truly and entirely Catholic, that is, in outward profession of faith, in the intimate conviction of his mind, in the ordinary practice of his life, will never be caught by the flattering bait of spiritism: he will abhor it as a snare to his soul, and as an offence against God. But there are persons who call themselves Catholics, and perhaps believe themselves to be so, but who in truth are not, for they have their minds thoroughly imbued with Protestantism, especially as hating the control of any spiritual authority, and attached to its own opinion as the highest law. Catholics of this stamp (if Catholics they can be called) run the same risk as Protestants, and the curiosity of their minds prepares a ready welcome for the new guest who is trying to make an entrance. For all such persons spiritism is a necessity, a temptation, or, at least, a recreation.

Whoever reflects on what we have here suggested will be disposed to consider it no unreasonable conclusion that modern spiritism may be regarded as possibly the first apparition of that last fatal heresy which shall prevail in the world, and cause such ruin of souls that many even of the elect will barely escape shipwreck. Error follows a certain method, and has certain connecting laws, if not so fixed and regular, at least very similar to those which belong to truth. After the special negation of this and that dogma by a spurious authority substituting itself for the true one, the rebellion of the intellect against God as revealing Himself to man finally arrived at the implicit negation of all supernatural truth, by disowning the very principle of authority itself. This is the work of Protestantism. When this phase has been reached, special error, as a religious symbol uniting individuals or churches, is no longer possible; the field is thrown open to this new universal

heresy, which embraces all error, combats all truths, and approaches by gradual development to its ultimate goal. This goal, as we have seen, is the introduction of the superhuman diabolical in the room of the divine supernatural. Protestantism has already become rationalism : rationalism will go on transforming itself into gross pantheism, a disguised idolatry, whose superstition will be fed by diabolical visions and revelations, precisely as described by the Apostles when prophesying of the last times. The Spirit of God, indeed, plainly affirms that many shall then abandon the faith, dedicating themselves to the spirit of error and to doctrines of devils, and this by the agency of hypocritical deceivers, who shall make their impious superstition the means of beguiling the simple, and seducing them into the commission of all evil. (1 Tim. ix. 1 ; Jude 18 ; 2 Peter iii. 3.) From these prophecies it would seem no presumptuous or chimerical deduction, that pagan theurgy shall be the last form error shall assume upon earth.

In saying this it is by no means intended to assert that these last times are already come ; but merely to point to the direction in which error is setting in the world, a direction leading to the predicted term. Just as all things are manifestly contributing towards the formation of that unity of empire which is spoken of in Holy Scripture as another of the signs of the last times—steamships, railways, electric telegraphs, all those wonderful means of rapid communication every day multiplying by which men are labouring to satisfy their insane desire to shorten time and abridge distance—so also is the general mind becoming gradually prepared for that great apostasy of the last days when pagan theurgy will be restored to honour, and the world shall see incense burned to the devil once more. The age which has successively applauded, as eminent rationalistic critics, the Strausses, the De Lettrés, the Renans, betrays symptoms of getting wearied of rationalism itself, and craves for error in a new-fashioned dress, or in an old-fashioned costume revived. The Procluses, the Jamblicuses, the Plotinuses, those old eclectics of pagan philosophy, who thought to strangle Christianity in its infancy, called their doctrine magic ; the new eclectics of modern philosophy, who hope to bury Christianity in its green old age, call it spiritism : the name varies, but the thing is the same.

It has become the duty of Catholic writers to set the faithful on their guard against this peril. Many have already given the alarm, and especially the shepherds of the flock in charge have raised their voice in frequent promulgations, and the Pastor of pastors himself has spoken in the numerous and solemn replies which he has given to the applications of the Bishops. From these documents it is proposed to draw the substance of the work we have undertaken. All that the writers, who desire to be simply an echo of the Church's voice, design to add of their own, is the form and connection of the argument which will thus unite in a brief compendium what has been stated and affirmed on this subject by the highest and best authorities. The plan adopted will be first to establish the historic truth of the superhuman facts attributed to spiritism. It was natural that a materialistic philosophy which denied all spiritual existences should be strangely embarrassed at finding itself face to face with a host of spirits ; it was equally to be expected that rationalistic philosophy, which denies all supernatural action in the world,

should be perplexed at so many facts superior to all human force, and inexplicable by all the power of sophistry. Hence it is that Mesmer's tub, Puységur's tree, Du Potet's mirror, Fox's rapping-tables, the talking tripods of Milan, Home's mediums, and all the other multifarious portents of spiritism, have excited in them wonder mixed with fear, and not choosing to give credit to what their very eyes beheld, they preferred to close them that they might lull themselves to repose in a state of artificial incredulity. These things, they said, were mere conjuring tricks, clever deceits of legerdemain, lies and illusions, more or less innocent impostures concerted beforehand and ingeniously carried out, optical and acoustic deceptions, games, amusements—what you will, anything but truth and reality. Fools! they did not foresee that this reality would hold its ground inexorably against them with proofs more potent than all their contradictions, and that they who would acknowledge neither spirit nor prodigy anywhere would be compelled to encounter them at every turn.

The reality of the facts once established, their nature must next be ascertained; and here two hypotheses may be advanced in explanation of them: they may be attributed to purely natural forces, or they may be referred to forces superior to nature. The first hypothesis being excluded, the second must necessarily be admitted. There are two ways of effecting this exclusion, both of which will be employed. The explanations of these phenomena on natural grounds advanced by different writers will be examined, and it will be shown that they none of them solve the proposed problem, and must all be rejected as completely unsatisfactory. But this is not sufficient. We must inquire whether it be possible to find some other explanation, and this inquiry will involve an investigation of the universal character belonging to all these facts; from which investigation it will appear that they are irreconcilable with any merely physical cause, and are altogether removed from the control of the laws of nature, which is equivalent to saying that they are above nature.

Having proved what these facts are not, the next point will be to prove what they are; whether they are to be referred to spirits of light or to spirits of darkness; to God or to the devil; to a good or to an evil source. There is, unhappily, a school of spiritists who believe that they enjoy ineffable ecstasies, the visits of angels, saints, and departed souls; nay, even receive direct revelations from God. This is not only a gross delusion, as it proceeds from an ignoring of the true character of those supernatural communications with which God on rare occasions consoles the mortal pilgrimage of His most favoured children, but it is also most pernicious, as it would deprive these communications of their distinction of being the gratuitous gifts of God, and exposes its followers to the peril of mistaking infernal actions for heavenly manifestations.

When it has thus been demonstrated that there is no assignable cause for the prodigies of modern spiritism but diabolical intervention, to complete the proof a short inquiry into the nature of magic with the guiding light of theologians will be a profitable conclusion. It will involve a glance at the magic of past ages, for the purpose of comparison, and it will be found that under all the varying forms necessitated by the varying errors, manners, and dis-

positions of times and of people, the same monster is discoverable, the same bad purpose evident, the same evil effects constantly recurring.

To destroy the power of the devil, the Man-God appeared on earth in the fulness of times, and when He ascended into heaven, amongst the most precious gifts which He bequeathed as an inheritance to His Apostles, and, in His Apostles, to His Church, was power over hell. Nothing will follow more naturally upon an inquiry into the devil's action in this world than the observation of the manner in which the Church has exercised this her power. It will call us to admire the great contest sustained by the Spouse of Jesus Christ against the great enemy of God and rebel against His authority, Satan. The triumphs of the Church in past times are the pledge of other triumphs yet to come before the last great victory which shall terminate her battle on earth, because the world itself shall then come to an end. We shall find that her old weapons have not grown rusty, and shall witness the same malediction pronounced by Pius IX. on modern necromancers which Peter uttered against Simon Magus, and the same prohibitions which were given to the faithful in apostolic times against taking part in such communications renewed in our days by the Bishops of the Church and the Sovereign Pontiff. The multiplicity of the subject matter and the length of the road traced out will render brevity indispensable. Details must as much as possible be avoided, and the different stages of the argument must be indicated rather than dwelt upon. While taking accurate notice of the topography of our road, like the traveller we must think chiefly of the end at which we would arrive, and cannot pause either for admiration or for comment.

Notices of Books.

The Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost ; or, Reason and Revelation. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. London : Longman.

OUR Archbishop has ever had a singular devotion to God the Holy Ghost ; and for this reason two doctrines are very dear to him, which were clearly taught by the Fathers, but on which later theologians have dwelt with less emphasis. The first of these is, that since Pentecost all the justified possess a substantial union with the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, such as was never given before the Incarnation. The second is, that the whole corporate action of the Church is in truth the action of the Holy Ghost who gives her life. The Archbishop, *e.g.*, is not content with saying (what is most true) that the Church possesses unintermittent infallibility in her practical teaching ; rather he will urge that "there is a perpetual Divine Teacher in the midst of her" (p. 72), and that she is but His organized instrument. No one can doubt, that such a view invests that whole doctrine, which concerns the Church's office and attributes, with an interest and impressiveness far greater than it would otherwise possess ; and no other writer has so thoroughly and consistently systematized this doctrinal view as Archbishop Manning.

These two truths, and others also, are included in that "temporal mission of the Holy Ghost" which is the author's present theme. The Holy Ghost proceeds eternally from Father and Son ; this is His eternal Procession : but ever since that great Day of Pentecost, He has proceeded also in time from Father and Son, to confer on us those multifarious blessings purchased by the Incarnation ; and this is His temporal Mission.

The work before us (after a touching dedication to the Oblates of Charles), begins with an introduction of somewhat miscellaneous character. Firstly, it treats on the word "rationalism ;" and the historical origin of that sense in which it is a term of reproach, and in which the author will invariably use it. "The normal state of the reason is that of a disciple illuminated, elevated, guided, and unfolded to strength and perfection, by the action of a Divine Teacher. The abnormal is that of a critic testing, measuring, limiting the matter of Divine Revelation by his supposed discernment or intuition. The former is the true and Divine rationalism ; the latter the false and human rationalism" (p. 3).

From this the author proceeds to investigate the motives of faith (pp. 10-15), and he explicitly retracts those erroneous tenets which he advocated when a Protestant (pp. 26-28). It was, in fact, his devotion to the Holy Ghost—his ever growing perception of those very truths concerning

that Divine Person, which he inculcates in this volume — that gradually emancipated him from the heresy in which he was born.

The first chapter is on the Holy Ghost's relation to the Church. "The Church of all ages and of all times is immutable in its knowledge, discernment, and enunciation of the truth; and that in virtue of its indissoluble union with the Holy Ghost and of His perpetual teaching by its living voice, *not only from Council to Council* and from age to age, with an *intermittent and broken utterance*, but always and at all times, by its *continuous enunciation of the Faith*, as well as by its authoritative dogmatic decrees" (pp. 35-6). We are specially glad of an energetic protest against that truly anti-Catholic tenet, which would represent the Church's infallibility as occasional and intermittent. The author proceeds to prove his position from Scripture and the Fathers; and to express the various distinctions which exist between the Holy Ghost's present office and that which was His before the Incarnation. Before that time, He came to all men in *operation*; but now "He comes through the Incarnate Son by a special and permanent *presence*." Before Pentecost, Christ's mystical body was not complete; at Pentecost the Holy Ghost descended to organize and perfect it. Before Pentecost there was no *indissoluble* union between the Holy Ghost and believers; none otherwise than "conditional on the correspondence and fidelity of the individual:" and Catholics indeed, as *individuals*, are still under the same law of probation; but His union with the Church as an *organized body* is indissoluble and imperishable. Before Pentecost, He only wrought invisibly; but now visibly through the Church, His creation. From this His indissoluble union with the Church accrue to her those three properties, those three endowments, and those four notes, which the author proceeds to enumerate: whereas all misbelievers concur in this one particular—in regarding the Holy Ghost's union with the Church as dissoluble and accidental. No controversialist, we think, before our present author has brought out this great truth at all so clearly and forcibly; and he adds, in connection with it, some momentous remarks on infallibility. To appeal, as some Anglicans are fond of doing, from a "disunited Church" to a "united" one, which is infallible, is to deny the office of God the Holy Ghost.

The chapter concludes with an enumeration of the various organs of infallible utterance; of which we will here cite one, because some Catholics have ventured to question it. "The definition and decrees of Pontiffs," says the Archbishop (p. 81), "speaking *ex cathedra*, as the head of the Church and to the whole Church, whether by Bull, or Apostolic Letters, or Encyclical, or Brief, to many or to one person, undoubtedly emanate from a divine assistance, and are *infallible*."

The second chapter is on the Holy Ghost's relation to human reason. Reason receives revelation by intellectual apprehension; propagates its doctrines; defines them with ever increasing accuracy and fulness; defends them by argument; vindicates the truth of revelation; and transmits it from one generation to another by scientific treatment and tradition. Among other interesting features in this chapter, we may refer to the following:—(1.) Photian barrenness of thought: "Since S. John of Damascus, I hardly know what the Greek Church has produced, except a few meagre Catenas of the

Fathers upon certain books of Holy Scripture, the works of Theophylact, a body of miserable Erastian canon law, a few still more meagre catechetical works, and many virulent and schismatical attacks upon the Primacy of the Holy See" (p. 103). (2.) The following allusion to Sir John Acton's revolutionary tenets: "To erect historical and biblical criticism, or theology founded on it, into a science *which is to form the public opinion of the Church*, to control the hierarchy, and to conform to itself even the judgment of the Holy See, is to invert the whole order of the divine procedure" (p. 115). (3.) Creation of the theology by the Church: "the Church, acting judicially and magisterially, is the creator of theological science, and controls it by its decisions, which are infallible" (*ib.*).

But there is another passage on which we should dwell at somewhat greater length: "The scholastic method . . . holds to this day its ascendancy. And that, because it represents the intellectual process of the Church, elaborating, through many centuries, an exact conception and expression of revealed truth. *The scholastic method can never cease to be true, just as logic can never cease to be true*, because it is the intellectual order of revealed truths in their mutual relations, harmony and unity. To depreciate it is to show that we do not understand it" (p. 106). Perhaps, at last, no more important service has been conferred by the Encyclical and Syllabus, than its peremptory condemnation of certain views which various Catholics had unsuspectingly imbibed, on the supposed obsolescence of scholasticism and its imagined unsuitableness to our time. (See Syllabus, prop. xiii.) Very far more mischief was contained in these shallow criticisms than appeared on the surface; no less, in fact, than a tendency to overthrow altogether dogmatical study properly so called, and substitute in its place critical, historical, or controversial.

The third chapter is on the inspiration of Scripture. We need hardly say that the Archbishop is of one mind with all thoroughly approved theologians, in holding that the Written Word cannot contain the smallest error on any subject, however widely removed from religion; though, at the same time, he admits that there is no divinely given security against errors of transcription. He expresses this doctrine with great clearness, and develops it most ably in various particulars. Incidentally he shows with great force (pp. 149, 150) that Holden did not really hold these laxer opinions on the matter which some have ascribed to him; but speaks with severity (p. 156) of the Abbé Le Noir, whose tenets are much laxer than any which have been even ascribed to Holden.

The fourth chapter is on the Holy Ghost's relation to scriptural interpretation. In this, attention is drawn to the circumstance, that the exaggerated notion, originating at the Reformation, on the true office of Scripture, has led by a natural reaction to that disbelief of inspiration itself, which is now so frightfully prevalent among educated Protestants. This was just what might have been expected, from so wildly extravagant a tenet as the old Protestant Rule of Faith. The full body of Catholic dogma was taught, not only before the New Testament existed as a volume, but before one single book of it was written. This body of dogma is the only true key to Scriptural interpretation; any other theory on this subject being manifestly inconsistent with the plainest facts.

The fifth and last chapter is on the Holy Ghost's relation to the Divine Tradition of the Faith. "The real ultimate question between the Catholic Church and all Christian bodies separated from it, is not one of detail, but of principle. It is not a controversy about indulgences, or purgatory, or invocations and the like, but of the divine tradition of dogma, its certainty and its purity. The Catholic Church teaches that, as the preservation of the world is creation produced, and a continuous action of the same omnipotence by which the world was made, *so the perpetuity of revelation is sustained by the continuous action of the same Divine Person from whom it came.* All bodies in separation from the Church justify their separation on the alleged necessity of reforming the corruptions of doctrine which had infected the Church and fastened upon the dogma of faith" (pp. 214-215). "The appeal to antiquity," for instance, "is both a treason and a heresy. It is a treason, because it rejects the Divine Voice of the Church at this hour, and a heresy, because it denies that voice to be Divine" (p. 226).

This chapter (and so the volume) ends with what is in many respects the most interesting portion of the whole work—the distinction between dogmatic theology on one hand, and moral, ascetic, mystical, on the other. Protestants know wonderfully little about the former, but they do not, it would seem, suspect the very existence of the latter. Thus they blame dogmatic theology for not doing that, which the Church never intended it to do, but which, on the contrary, she has habitually entrusted to a distinct science. "Let any one with the least claim to be a scholar examine the four families of mystical writers, saints, and theologians, which, like the four rivers of Paradise, water the Church of God; namely, the Benedictine, the Dominican, the Franciscan, and the Jesuit; especially the last, in its innumerable works on the spiritual exercises of S. Ignatius; and if he be a competent scholar and a candid man, I am confident that he will acknowledge first, that no communion or body separated from the Catholic and Roman Church has ever produced *any exhibition of the mind and character of Jesus*, or of the moral and spiritual idea of Christianity, I will not say equal in proportion or in fulness, but *so much as like in kind, to the mystical theology* which, traceably from the fifth century to the nineteenth, has watered the Church of God. The words of the psalmist may be truly said of this stream of the waters of life, ever full and overflowing its banks—'*fluminis impetus lætificat civitatem Dei.*' And next, he will be constrained to confess that all this exuberance of the interior spiritual life has diffused itself throughout the Church *under the direction of the most rigorous and inflexible dogmatic theology*, which has hung suspended with all its constellations of truths over the surface of this inundation of spiritual life, like the firmament over the sea. Certainly dogmatic theology does not treat of the interior life either of the Head or the members of the Church; but it generates the piety and the prayer which sanctifies the soul through the truth, and the mystical theology which directs and sustains it" (pp. 245-246).

From what has been said, our readers will in some degree have inferred the great value of this volume. It is a treasure-house of sound doctrine; and in proportion as any Catholic studies and masters the great lessons which it conveys, he will obtain a kind of instinctive discernment, whereby every heretical or unsound system will stand confessed to him in its true colours.

The *Union Review* for September, 1865. London : Hayes.

THIS number contains one paper exclusively devoted to a bitter personal attack on ourselves : this we have criticized at the end of our second article, and have no more to say on the subject. But in two other places mention is made of the DUBLIN REVIEW ; and both passages call for notice.

The first of these is an argument drawn out (pp. 568-572) to show that the "definition of the Council" of Florence, "which was pronounced by the Pope at the end" of its sessions, tells in favour of Unionism and against the plenitude of Papal authority. This argument chiefly rests on a most singular version of one among the Florentine decrees ; whereby that decree is represented as conveying a doctrine, which most assuredly, so far from being Florentine, is one of those very errors which the Council implicitly condemned. Our opponent's version of the decree runs thus ; and we follow his example in italicising the words on which our argument is to turn :—

"Moreover we define that the Holy Apostolic Chair, and the Roman Pontiff, is possessed of the primacy over all inhabited lands ; and that the Roman Pontiff is successor of blessed Peter, the Coryphæus of the Apostles ; and that he is true vicar of Christ, and head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians ; and that to him, in blessed Peter, was given by our Lord Jesus Christ full power of teaching, directing, and governing the Catholic Church, *in the way determined both in the Acts of the Œcumenical Synods and in the holy canons.*"

Our opponent evidently uses this word "determined" in the sense of "appointed" or "prescribed."

Now at the outset, every one knows that the Florentine definition is extant both in Latin and in Greek, and that the two are equally authentic. But our opponent quietly ignores the Latin, which by no imaginable contrivance can be distorted into the sense which he desires :—"Quemadmodum in gestis ecumenicorum conciliorum et in sacris canonibus continetur." *i. e.*, "as is contained in the acts of ecumenical councils and in the sacred canons."

The Greek runs thus :—"Καθ' ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τῶν οἰκουμενικῶν συνοδῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς κανόσι διαλαμβάνεται." And we must maintain that, even if there were no Latin to guide us, these words could not by possibility be understood as our opponent wishes. For three different reasons :—

(1) Who ever heard of the word "διαλαμβάνεται," as signifying "determined," "appointed," "prescribed" ? It signifies of course "received" or "accepted." Christ has given to the Pope plenary power, "as is the accepted doctrine in the acts of Councils and in the holy Canons."

(2) The Pope's prerogative, whatever its extent, was originally conferred on S. Peter ; and when it was so conferred, there had been neither Ecumenical Councils nor Sacred Canons. If, therefore, the Council's mind had been what our opponent supposes, it would have declared that such power was given "to be exercised as *may* be determined" by Councils and Canons ; or, in other words, the verb could not possibly have been, as it is, in the indicative mood.

(3) On our opponent's interpretation the decree contradicts itself. The very lowest sense which can be given to the words "*full power*" must be "a power limited by no human authority." The Council thus having declared that "*full*" power was given by Christ to the Roman Pontiff, could not possibly in the same breath have added, that Councils and Canons have a privilege from God of controlling the exercise of such power. Then how very strong a phrase is that of "*Christ's true vicar*"! We do not see how less can possibly be understood by it than that, within the sphere of such vicariate—i. e., within the whole spiritual sphere—all the power which Christ has delegated to any human authority, He has delegated to the Pope. He cannot therefore, according to the Council, have delegated to Councils a power of controlling the Pope.

It must not, however, be forgotten at last, that even if the Greek could by possibility be understood as our opponent wishes, the Latin is its one legitimate and authentic explanation; and no violence can distort the plain sense of the Latin.

Indeed, the most cursory inspection of the proceedings at Florence will sufficiently show, that the Latin theologians in no respect concealed or kept back the full exclusive Roman doctrine on Papal supremacy. Or reference may be made to a very accessible and interesting work, which our opponent himself mentions:—"The History of the Council of Florence," written by Popoff, a most zealous anti-Papalist, and translated into English by Dr. Neale (Masters, London, 1861). Here are a few extracts from this work:—

"The Cardinals, with *strange assurance* [says Popoff] told them" before the Council began, "that the Church of Rome is the mother, the Eastern the daughter" (p. 17). And when the bishops arrived, "the Pope expected" the Patriarch "to bend his knees before him and kiss his shoe" (p. 38), though this demand the Pope afterwards withdrew (p. 39), avowing as his reason his "desire for peace." In the various discussions on Papal authority the Pope declared that he "wished to retain all the privileges of his throne, such as that of . . . exacting the Patriarch's full submission to his will; in a word, the right of governing the whole Church" (pp. 151, 2).

And how does the schismatic Popoff himself regard the Council? "On leaving Constantinople, the Greeks [had] hoped to be able to persuade the Latins of their secession from the ancient doctrine of faith. Instead of this they were now obliged to avow the Latins in the right, and admit themselves to be in the wrong. . . . The Latins *acceded to nothing*; the Greeks were more or less obliged to accede to them in everything. The victorious party did not even try to soothe the sad feelings of their new brethren" (p. 157). Again, "The Pope . . . proposing to the Emperor to assemble a Council in Italy, was far from wishing that the causes of disagreement between the Churches should undergo lawful investigation by a Council. This was only the wish of the Greeks; to which, as he says himself, he acceded from *condescension*" (p. 185).

Further, the very definition accepted by the Greeks was beyond all question equivalent to the assertion that they had hitherto been external to the Visible Church. They declared that Christ has appointed the Pope "head of the whole Church, and father and teacher of all Christians." They

declared, therefore, in effect, that whoever had not submitted to that authority, had been external to the ecclesiastical organization which Christ set up ; or, in other words, had been (materially at least) a rebel and a schismatic.

After such facts as these, it is indeed a small matter that Eugenius IV. addressed to the Greeks such words of courtesy as those quoted by our opponent. For at last, what was the ecclesiastical society with which he treated ? She was the lineal descendant of that illustrious Eastern Church—the inheritor without rival of those august patriarchates—which in earlier days had taken so prominent and so glorious a part in the Church's history ; she possessed true sacraments and a true priesthood ; she imparted Christ's Body and Blood, with real spiritual fruit, to those among her people who were invincibly ignorant of the Pope's prerogatives, and were otherwise free from mortal sin ; she had preserved orthodox doctrine in almost every particular pure and undefiled ; and now (as appeared) she was animated by an eager wish of once more submitting herself to "Christ's true vicar." No language could be addressed to such a body too deferential, too affectionate, so long as the great doctrines of ecclesiastical unity and Papal supremacy were neither compromised nor obscured. That they were *not* compromised or obscured on this occasion, would be evident from one fact alone ; viz., that even at this day no stronger or more explicit definition can be cited of the latter doctrine, than this very Florentine decree.

So much on Eugenius IV. The other reference to ourselves which we mentioned at starting, is made by an unhappy Catholic priest, who writes in opposition to the law of clerical celibacy (pp. 574, 5). On this matter we will leave the Holy See to speak. In the "Mirari Vos" Gregory XVI. thus teaches :—

"But here we would have your firmness for religion aroused against that *most foul attack on clerical celibacy* which we see to spread more widely every day ; the *most abandoned philosophers of our age* being joined by some *even of the ecclesiastical order* ; who, *forgetful of their person and office, and seduced by the blandishments of pleasure*, have advanced to that degree of license, that they have dared in some places to address public and repeated requests to their princes for the overthrow of that *most holy discipline*. But we are unwilling to put forth many words *on these most foul endeavours* : rather we confidently leave it to your religious feeling to contend by every means that a law of the greatest moment, against which the attacks of impure men are directed on every side, shall be preserved, vindicated, and defended intact, as the sacred canons prescribe."

Pius IX. teaches the same doctrine, and has brought it forward again in the recent Syllabus. (See our July number, p. 148.)

It is such priests as this writer who bring shame and scandal on the Church ; and it is perhaps the worst among the many disgraces of the *Union Review*, that it gives currency to their revolting speculations. The unhappy man attempts to defend his heterodox opinion, by saying that the law of celibacy appertains merely to the Church's "disciplinary department" (p. 576). Of course this is true : but a certain *doctrine* concerning that law belongs to her *doctrinal* "department ;" as is shown by the Encyclical above quoted. All Catholics are bound to do what "Presbyter Catholicus" refuses ; viz., to accept with unreserved interior assent the Church's infallible teaching on

the matter. Such is the man who dares to speak (p. 576) of our "strange spirit and unusual theories." Is *his* spirit then *not* strange? Are *his* theories *not* unusual? We will venture to say that for one British Catholic who accompanies him in his heterodox course, there are ten thousand who heartily embrace those Ultramontane principles which it is our privilege and our glory to maintain.

Among the other contents of the number, the best (we think) is the article on Mrs. Seton; which gives a very interesting and (from a non-Catholic stand-point) an extremely fair account of a most pious American convert to Catholicism. The worst article beyond question is a communicated paper on "the sin of party spirit in religion;" a paper saturated with the spirit of indifference and heresy. We have observed nothing else which calls for special mention.

The Literary Workman; or, Life and Leisure. Part 8, August, 1865.

THE first part of *The Workman* was published on the 28th of January of the current year. At the commencement it appeared every week; but latterly it has come out in monthly parts, under the title of *The Literary Workman*.

This magazine has satisfied a want long felt by our Catholic population, and deserves the support of all who have at heart the education of the industrious order, and its preservation from the creeping errors of the day, which find their way with peculiar facility into the minds of half-educated men. Those who have not mixed with the working-classes of the country, have little notion how shrewd they are in picking up objections to scripture and religion; or how easily the poison of unbelief will sink into and saturate every crevice of their minds, almost as if their intelligences, like chloride of lime, were especially qualified for absorbing and retaining poisonous elements of thought.

This facility in the lower class, of being influenced by principles destructive of order and religion, has not been without its effect on conscientious men of all denominations. Men who have a morsel of dogmatic faith, or any one distinct religious tenet left, feel that they have reason to appreciate the danger. If the water is rushing in at the hold, and is not stopped, it will gradually rise, bursting deck after deck, till the whole ship founder into the sea. "Stop the leak," is the first idea; for unbelief has torn away far too large a piece of the ship's timber to give the pumps a chance.

For, first of all, the country, by its abandonment of the Church's life, having quenched the vital spark, must of necessity, out of its own corruption, generate ten thousand independent forms; each, because all feed upon the same food, striving and struggling for mastery and for life amongst the rest, in all the convolutions of inextricable confusion. From the very lowest forms of organic thought to the most complicated systems of infidel philosophy; from the rankness of open godlessness to the most refined essence of subtle misbelief; from the ragged mountebank on the side of a city slum

to the sublime philosopher arguing away the human species, or the personality of God, before the most fastidious audience in the world ;—in a word, from the first to the last degree of human aberration, all rush before the people through the public press, each one in its peculiar way cut and fitted and suited to the capacity or vulgarity of that order of intelligence which it was intended to inform. Then, in the second place, the human mind is so corrupt, that of itself it gravitates to evil ; and unless a counterpoise be placed against its evil dispositions, it will, almost with the certainty of a natural law, tend to moral dissolution. Imagine, then, the effects upon it of the public press of the present day ! The intelligence is upon an incline, and slowly moving down. The public press steams up, and with an overwhelming power completely carries it away by the force (1) of seductive argument held in solution ; (2) of immorality dressed in sensational costume ; (3) of the impress of an engaging style ; and (4) by the simple power of *print*. The stage has its power to affect the feelings for a time ; evil conversation and evil thoughts tame the intelligence and heart ; but print bears a certain moral weight about it which the others cannot vindicate to themselves. It possesses a species of personal influence with the under-educated class, and presents itself to their minds as a kind of oracle of truth. The very first thing a Protestant child is taught to reverence is print. The Bible is the Word of God, and there is no other method of conveying heavenly truth. The highest approach to holiness in tangible form is the printed book. The childish fantasy is set on fire, and the mind is left tinged with its effects long after the awe of infancy has been blotted out. It may be that the impress of early years extends itself unconsciously to every book or printed thing ; just as a timid man, having once been attacked by robbers at night, never hears the leaves rustle, as he walks home of an evening, without feeling a corresponding action at his heart. Whatever be the cause, there is no doubt about the fact—print is power.

This power, as we have hinted, conscientious men of all denominations have observed. Hence, each religious sect has its own proper organ. Each organ is the embodiment of a certain set of principles ; and these principles are administered in every imaginable form, in history, in drama, in tales, in anecdote, in scraps of curious information, in the news of the day, in articles, in religious and moral disquisitions, in puns, in odds and ends and facetiæ ; in fact, in every imaginable variety of method and of form. Some are started to oppose infidelity ; some to put down immorality ; others to bring into fashion a certain moral code ; others, again, to teach a modern set of doctrines ; but all, whatever their differences on other points, concentrate to one in keeping down and hustling into darkness or into infamy the Church of Rome ! Infidelity is an evil ; immorality is bad ; the opposite sect is a teacher of vain things ; but the worst of all is that Church, which is no sect, but a wide spread power throughout the earth ; which men would ignore if they only could, but cannot ; for it runs as the human race itself, back into the past, and speaks, whether it be in the glare of the nineteenth century, or through the halo of a thousand years, with the same lofty and constraining majesty, like a voice of thunder amid the babble of men. They cannot blink her presence. The small birds gather together and flutter about unmean-

ingly, and each, with its peculiar plaintive cry, pipes its vague fear as it feels the presence of a portent.

The fact is, that the evil and its attempted cure are offspring of the same parent. All are walking the same road, the only difference being that some have got farther on than others. Decay has eaten deeper here than there, and in places one may almost be deceived by a seeming healthy look. But this is all deception. Decomposition has set in, and complete disorganization is a mere matter of time.

Hence, the Church in this country has far more opposition to withstand than any other systematized belief. It is into her that every worm would work its way. She is common food for all. The infidel press, the immoral press, organs of all denominations—from the most rampant bigotry to the most languishing sentimentalism—all have spite enough to paint her black, and strength enough to hold her up in effigy. As far as she is concerned, there is not one, “qui faciat bonum, non est usque ad unum.”

It is, therefore, little matter for surprise that we hail the appearance of *The Literary Workman* with peculiar gratification. It carries the power of the press amongst the people, not in evil but in good. It offers them wholesome and palatable food at a very moderate price. From the first the editor has evinced an energy in the work, that speaks of a Christian zeal, and a full appreciation of the importance of the undertaking. “It is as workmen ourselves that we address you,” says the editor addressing the reader, “in your shops, in your manufactories, as you travel, in your houses after work, in your clubs and reading-rooms, we hope to find you out and to give you some intellectual entertainment which may be a relief to you after the strain and fatigues of the day. You will find nothing here to poison the minds of women and children. What you read yourselves you may leave to be read in your families. We propose to give you not only fiction, that is to say, stories of daily life familiar to us all, but details of trades and occupations; memoirs upon objects of art to which the South Kensington Museum has attracted every one; and accounts of proceedings bearing on our interests in religion and politics. But all will be done under the control of the unchangeable laws of Catholic faith and morals.”

To these we need add no more words of ours, we feel assured, to enlist the interest of our readers in this magazine. We may merely add that the programme has been rigidly observed; that each number has borne with it an increase of interest; and that when such writers as Dr. Northcote, F. Sweeney, Canon Hedley, Mrs. Parsons, Miss Bowles, and Oliver Crane contribute to its pages, there is little to fear on the score of intrinsic merit.

Lyra Liturgica. Reflections in Verse for Holy Days and Seasons. London: Burns. 1865.

THE author of this little volume has from time to time given evidence of poetic genius of no ordinary character, leading us to regret that he should have been so sparing in its exhibition; but he has also, and this in prose as in verse, proved himself to possess likewise those peculiar qualifi-

cations which are essential to the Christian poet. It is not every one, albeit a devout Catholic, and gifted with the talent of pouring forth the treasures of a rich imagination in melodious numbers, who can sing of heavenly things in strains which at once excite devotion and satisfy a pure Catholic taste. For although we detest the notion of limiting the expression of devotion by rules of artistic taste, it is quite another thing, when we would excite devotion, to neglect those rules of a higher taste which may be said to bear the same relation to simple artistic canons which genuine Christian charity, as the regulator of our behaviour towards our neighbour, bears to politeness, or true Christian heroism to a chivalrous sense of honour. We must confess to a sense of uncomfortable dissatisfaction with much of the religious poetry of our day, as well as with the poetic language of many of our devotional readings. They may often possess a beauty of their own, but they lack that first and most essential of beauties—appropriateness. Appropriateness is one form of truth. If there be one thing more than another characteristic of the mysteries of our faith, it is their sublime and absorbing unity. As God is one in essence, so the higher we rise and the deeper we plunge into the consideration even of the works of His material creation, we find this transcendent unity. There must, we conceive, be a tendency in religious poetry towards this simplification—this blending of the prismatic colours into the indefinable, simple purity of the white light; or, to take another illustration from the laws of the natural world, it should descend upon the scale of the multiple, only to rise anon to that simple ineffable note which seems to contain and combine within itself the root of all these inferior harmonies. Need we say that such an idea excludes the merely pretty, the sentimental, and the ingenious? In proportion to the loftiness of the subject, such exercises of the fancy will be felt to be unsuitable. We may have a redundancy of sweetness and beauty. These adventitious charms and graces find their place where the subject is slight, or where it has, at least, no necessary sublimity of its own but such as is imparted by the poet's treatment of his subject. The attempt to be very simple in such cases is perhaps almost as inappropriate as to be too ornate when the theme is inherently sublime. Of a mistake of the former character we think we have not a few instances in the pages of Wordsworth, and of the latter we make bold to say, we see frequently occurring examples in some of the productions of a distinguished living poet. We are among those who think that many passages of Longfellow's "*Hiawatha*" would have been esteemed simply ludicrous if they had proceeded from the pen of a poet who had a character to establish. We cannot—to take an instance at random—see any poetry in lines like these—

"On his head were plumes of swan's down,
On his heels were tails of foxes,
In one hand a fan of feathers,
And a pipe was in the other."

A little more elaboration of thought and fancy, where the hero is an imaginary being, owing all his greatness to the brain that produced him and the pen which paints him, might not have been amiss here. On the other hand, there may, perhaps, be not only too much adornment, but too much of

ingenious reflection, in religious poetry. Not too much thought, but too many thoughts. Such poetry, being designed as an aid to contemplation ought to partake, in its degree, of the simplicity of the contemplative act. This may be one reason why it is easier to be poetic in the realm of nature and of the natural feelings, than where the theme is the supernatural and the divine. Nature is parabolic, suggestive, and, as such, eminently poetical; but God, if we may so express ourselves, is Poetry itself, as He is essentially all Beauty. The Incarnate Word is His Image; and the Church, the Bride of the Lamb, does but copy and reflect her Lord. Down to the very skirts of her garment, to which the ritual and ceremonial which encompasses her may be likened, everything is but the manifestation of His beauty and love, who is the great Archtype and Pattern of all; and it is by this reproduction of Himself that her love and worship are expressed. It follows that religious poetry ought to be rather a mirror, in which all these beauties are imaged as they are—a vehicle, in which they may be conveyed afresh to the memory with the charm imparted by the music of verse—than a play of the imagination, or a graceful exercise of the intellect on religious subjects.

We do not recollect to have met with any manual of devotional poetry more thoroughly free from the faults to which we have alluded, while at the same time it abounds in beauties of no ordinary character. Without ever sinking below the poetic level, the writer knows how to preserve a chaste simplicity both of thought and diction; a rarity nowadays, except where the desire to *aim* at the simple has led to an exaggerated reaction, sure to result in baldness or affectation. Some lines have recalled instinctively to our memory the savour, as it were, of passages in Chaucer, where the poet is in his better mood, and speaks under the influence of the devotional spirit of mediæval times, when religion was too intimately bound up with all the natural, endearing human charities, for men to sing of it in artificial strains. We may notice, for example, the following stanzas in "Reflections on the Feast of the Purification of Our Lady:"—

"For years and years, prone on the Temple floor,
 Blest Anna spent her widowhood of hope;
 Unus'd, albeit expert in holy lore,
 To scan too close her meditation's scope;
 Content to woo in faith the Star of Day,
 And of its shining leave to God the time and way.

With ceaseless zeal she plied her daily task,
 Fearing by sin to spoil, or sloth to miss,
 The boon she dar'd to hope, yet dar'd not ask—
 Some word of comfort, or some sight of bliss;
 And God did of His grace her suit accord,
 So long she watch'd and wak'd, so lovingly ador'd."

We give this as the first example that occurs to us, not as more remarkable than many others. Another merit we observe, closely connected with what we have just noticed, is, that Scripture is more largely drawn upon than the unfettered imagination, and, chiefly, Scripture as imbedded in, and inter-

woven with, the Church's ritual. There could not, indeed, be a better guide in meditation on Divine Mysteries than the Church herself, who has the mind of the Spirit. We have only to refer to her beautiful Antiphons, Introits, Graduals, so delicately adjusted to the different festivals and seasons to which they belong, in illustration of a truth which scarcely needs proof. As an instance of the writer's way of following her guidance in the recurring solemnities of the ecclesiastical year, we may mention the beautiful meditation, or rather meditations, on Holy Saturday, from the "Lumen Christi," the first dawning of the day upon the night of sorrow in which the Church has been plunged, sung three times by the deacon after the Benediction of the Fire, to the all but full sunlight of joy when the bells ring out the Gloria, and her lips are ready to burst forth into the Alleluias of the Easter Morn.

We hardly like to specify where there is so much to admire, but as specimens of two different styles, each of appropriate beauty, we would instance "New Year's Eve," where the metre moves with a hurrying swiftness, which images well the rapid course with which the old year is running out; and the "Feast of St. Joseph," singularly beautiful also, where the rhythm of the lines has a calm meditative repose, which harmonizes excellently with the character of that patriarch of the Hidden Life, that "dearest of saints," because nearest to Jesus:—

"Who took Him when an infant in his arms,
And fondled Him as doting parents use;
And talked to Mary of His winning charms,
And on His grand perfections joyed to muse."

But we must not allow ourselves to quote or specify any further. We have said enough, we hope, to induce such of our readers as have not already given themselves that satisfaction, to see and judge for themselves.

Les Médiateurs et les Moyens de la Magie, les Hallucinations et les Savants, le Fantôme Humain et le Principe Vital. Par le Chevalier GOUGENOT DES MOUSSEAUX. Paris: Plon. 1863.

THE Chevalier des Mousseaux has been for some years a patient and scientific investigator of the phenomena of spiritism, which have come so inopportunistically to present an insoluble problem to our nineteenth-century philosophers, at the very time when they flattered themselves that the supernatural had been expunged from creation, or well fenced out from this visible order of things, by the triumphant discoveries of modern science. M. des Mousseaux is a good Catholic; it is needless, therefore, to observe that he has not entered on his researches from a spirit of unhallowed curiosity, but in order to serve the interests of religion, and with the due authorization of his spiritual advisers. It is well that there should be men of judgment, education, talent, and known attachment to the faith, able to venture on the delicate task to which he and his friend M. de Mirville have

devoted so much time and attention ;—men who, as Catholics, have the clue to explain the enigma which is so sorely bewildering the Protestant world, learned and unlearned alike, and are competent to lay the result of their observations before the public.

The disbelief with which all alleged instances of the preternatural—especially of Satanic agency—are regarded by the semi-infidel mind of the day, has, perhaps, in a measure reacted on not a few of ourselves, disposing us to be practically incredulous of any visible intervention of the evil spirit in this modern world of ours. On the other hand, the possession of the true faith, with its resultant tranquillity of mind, has undoubtedly had its share in producing a certain indifference amongst Catholics on the subject of spiritism, which is not to them fraught with the perplexity which naturally besets it in the case of Protestants. But this indifference would no longer be justifiable in the face of the portentous phenomena which surround us, and which compel the attention of every reflecting mind.

In France more interest has been awakened on the subject, owing in a degree to the more systematic proportions into which spiritism has developed, and to the bold and public position assumed by its disciples. There is already, amongst our neighbours, a whole body of literature which owes its existence to the rise of this new error, or, rather, of this old error in a new form. The present work may be considered as a continuation of a previous publication, "*La Magie au 19ème Siècle*," to which reference was made in a former number of this Review. That work was directed, as its title imports, to proving the identity of both spiritism and magnetism (for the latter, in its higher manifestations, blends too closely with the former to admit of separation) with magic and sorcery. In the present work, M. des Mousseaux takes up the subject where he left it, and necessarily goes over some old ground.

It is nothing less than a new religion which is establishing itself under our eyes ; or, like all false religions, it has already split into sects with their respective leaders—to wit, Du Potet, Regazzoni, Eliphas Lévi, Récat, Allan Kardec, and others. Some of these are transcendental magnetists ; others pure spiritists. The difference between the two may be broadly stated to consist in the admission or non-admission of the intervention of intelligent beings in the phenomena exhibited. The spiritists, as is well known, believe that they hold intercourse with the souls of the departed ; the transcendental magnetists that they deal with a kind of subtle, universal fluid, interpenetrating and emanating from all things upon which the soul of man acts, and is in its turn acted upon—a kind of "*mundane force*," an *anima mundi*, as it were ; and although the magnetists deny personal intelligence to the tremendous power with which they are familiar, and which they command at pleasure, yet they describe it in terms, to our ordinary common-sense notions, quite irreconcilable with such a denial. Du Potet himself, for instance, candidly admits in confidence to his friends, that he uses evocations, that he acts, in short, as conscious of dealing with *will*, and not with a blind force. Nay, he and his compeers are ready to confess that magic and magnetism are identical ; only, be it noted, with them magic is magnetism, rather than magnetism magic. Begging the question that the marvels they

witness and produce are explicable by natural causes, they apply this argument to all the recorded facts referred to supernatural agency.

The pontiffs or priests of this new religion are now commonly known to the world as *mediums*. Through them, a systematic intercourse with the invisible world is carried on, knowingly or unknowingly—a privilege, however, which they share with articles of furniture and with the brute creation.* This faculty in individuals is natural or acquired; while in others there seems a simple predisposition to the perception of spiritual beings, for which various natural causes may be, and have been, assigned. M. des Mousseaux considers this natural element to be perfectly admissible.† Whatever cause, political or moral, tends to develop the nervous dispositions of the individual, and to depress the sanguine portion of the system, produces magnetic sensibility, the empire of free will is thereby weakened—that power by which we have *possession* of ourselves—and we are given over disarmed to the assaults of invisible agents. Such a state, like other diseased conditions, may be inherited. In the ancient world, bad social and religious institutions must have combined with personal moral degradation to produce those physical and moral constitutions which are predisposed to demoniac possession so fearfully common in pagan times. M. des Mousseaux draws attention to the Scripture expression, *spiritus infirmitatis*, in connection with the recognised fact that lucid somnambulists are habitually physically in a diseased condition, and that immorality has been classed by experience amongst the predispositions to the clairvoyant state.

Our author, after describing the modern medium, introduces us to his counterpart in pagan lands,‡ and then carries us back to antiquity, in order

* See “La Magie au 19ème Siècle,” p. 310, for an account of M. Tréten’s magnetised birds. Compare, also, Tertullian, in his “Apologia,” 23, where he alludes to divination practised by means of *goats* and of *tables*.

† The author inserts, in connection with this subject, a letter of much interest from a learned religious. He is of opinion that there will always be an important deficiency in all treatises, whether of divine or diabolical mysticism, in which a clear distinction is not drawn between the subjective and the objective phenomena, which practically are closely associated. The objective and subjective impressions of an individual may be respectively compared to the direct sight of anything and its reflection in a mirror, the nervous system being here considered as the reflector. We may here understand how the two classes of impressions may become mingled and confounded. The same distinction throws a light upon the share which nature may have in *ordinary* magnetism. The disposition may be natural. Görres had a glimpse of this distinction; but, owing to his mania for explaining everything, he has generally rather increased than removed perplexity. There can be no greater mistake than to treat divine or diabolical mysticism as rational or physical sciences can be treated. We need the directing compass of the Church. Görres, with the best intentions, has often lost sight of this truth.

‡ Table-turning is a common amusement, and sometimes a more serious occupation, in China; but, with the curious inversion to be observed in the customs of the Celestial Empire—a peculiarity, it would seem, honoured by the spirits—articles of furniture commonly turn with their feet in the air. “There is not a Chinaman,” says Dr. MacGowan, from whom M. des Mousseaux quotes, “who does not fully believe that the motion is effected by

to point out this personage to us in his old classic garb. He proves that the worship of a plurality of gods is identical with magic, which is in fact nothing less than a turning from the true God to adore demons. The ancient pagans, it is true, drew a distinction between the white and the black arts, the worship of gods and the worship of devils; but no such distinction actually existed; the gods of the heathen were all demons. It has been too much the custom to regard all the prodigies of heathen times as so many frauds and feats of jugglery. Nothing, however, is better attested by historical evidence than the production of a number of marvellous portents by the adoption of certain processes or formule. Not only did myriads of men in all ages put implicit credence in the reality of these effects, amongst whom we must reckon men fully qualified to judge of evidence, such as Plato, Plutarch, Tacitus, &c.; but the early Christians themselves never deny the existence of heathen miracles. The Fathers of the Church do not speak of them generally as impostures in our common sense of the word, but refer them to the father of lies, alleging, nay, confidently boasting of, the superiority of that power imparted by baptism to the Christian. They confounded the heathen in the same manner that Moses confounded the magicians of Egypt.

M. des Mousseaux traces the close connection always subsisting between magic and the curative art; the reader will at once recal in modern times the "medicine man" of the North American Indians. In ancient times we meet with all the processes and phenomena of modern mesmerism; the magnetic passes producing somnambulism, with its various phases of clairvoyance and ecstasy; the entranced person prescribing for maladies when in that state. Religion, magnetic magic, and medicine, were one science in the hands of its sacerdotal practitioners. It was a science received by the Latins from the Greeks, and by the Greeks from Egypt and Chaldea, where the tradition had been preserved by the sons of Cham, himself, it is said, the transmitter to the new world of the secret of those black arts which Cain's descendants had practised in antediluvian times. M. des Mousseaux refers to various passages of Holy Scripture in which the divining sleep and interrogation of the dead is denounced (see, for instance, Deut. xviii. 11, and again, Isaias lvi. 2—4). The history of all times exhibits to us the idolatrous pontiff as the principal agent in the production of preternatural phenomena; but, above all, in the character of curative and divining medium. Besides the magnetic passes producing the divining sleep, the imposition of hands working cures, the divining-rod with its marvellous powers, we meet with all the other means now employed in our own day with like and analogous results, but of which the true author is denied or ignored. The parallelism between all these processes and the arbitrary (so to say) sacramental signs of the demoniacal art with those sanctified and consecrated by God in His true Church is very striking, and is well drawn out. Satan has his religion and

supernatural agency." A "formula of enchantment" is used by the medium previous to commencing operations. The Government, with singular wisdom, commonly discourages these practices, which experience has proved to have led to very evil results.

worship, the counterfeit and caricature of the divine. The medium even has his holy counterpart in those occasional ministers of God's healing mercy whom He has from time to time invested with powers above nature. Few of our readers are perhaps aware that there is a permanent example of this sort in the cures operated by S. Hubert's intercession on cases of the most incurable of maladies—for instance, cancer, insanity, but especially of hydrophobia. The priest of the church of S. Hubert, in the province of Luxembourg, in Belgium, has been the permanent "mediator" (we will not use the desecrated appellation of *medium*) for many centuries of these wonderful cures, and S. Hubert's shrine is still visited from all parts of Europe.*

Catholic miracles taking place in Catholic churches, Protestants, of course, can without difficulty ignore; but it is not so easy for them to remain in ignorance of the extraordinary phenomena occurring in the very drawing-rooms of their familiar friends, or by their own firesides. As facts, accordingly, these portents are accepted by thousands; as might be expected, the men of science are the last to give in. Amongst these, medical men, accustomed to grapple with material causes, are the stoutest in their obstinacy. Rather than admit the intervention of any spiritual agency, we find them having recourse to the most preposterous hypotheses. M. des Mousseaux has exposed the untenableness of the various theories adopted by medical and other scientific men in his former work. He again alludes to them, especially in that portion which treats of hallucination, and disposes of the absurd propositions of the learned Dr. Calmeil, the physician of the lunatic asylum of Charenton, respecting collective delusions. Such explanations are clearly inadmissible where the phenomena giving rise to the so-called delusion are altogether unexpected, and are perceived by a considerable number of persons simultaneously.

The most novel portion of M. des Mousseaux's work, and to us the most interesting, is that which refers to the human phantom and the vital principle. The author traces in the old heathen world the belief in the spectre or shadow, which was neither body nor soul, but bore the resemblance of the body, seldom becoming visible till after death, and when the corpse had not received the honours of sepulture. As soon as the body was consumed, the pure spirit ascended to heaven, while the spectre descended to the shades below.

"Et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago."—*Æneid*. iv. 654.

We have here the fetch and ghost of popular belief, and the spirits who hold converse with our modern magicians, only that we do not find amongst the spiritists any recognition of a superior soul which has passed into its celestial abode. We find them, however, yielding the most unquestioning

* It appears from an ancient document that, so early as the year 1055, the practice of recurring to S. Hubert's intercession in cases of hydrophobia was already ancient. See "*La Vie de S. Hubert*," par l'Abbé Bertrand, ancien vicaire de S. Hubert. Paris: Lethielleux. This little work has received the approbation of the Bishop of Namur.

credence to the account given of themselves by these shadowy beings. Yet moderns might have learned some mistrust from the ancients themselves. Homer appears to have been quite alive to the possibility of deceit, for he makes Telemachus tell the shade of Ulysses that he is not his father, but a demon, a spirit who flatters and deludes him (*Odyssey*, xxi. 194). In China there exists a similar belief in a spiritual or superior soul, called the *ling*, and an inferior or spectral, known as the *houen*. This *houen* is regarded with extreme horror, as it haunts the neighbourhood of its former body, of which it is the image in a fluidic state; and its intense longing after its old material dwelling renders it miserable and mischievous. Hence, every device is employed by the Chinese either to appease or rid themselves of this their departed friend's malevolent humanity.

M. des Mousseaux considers the doctrine of the Montpellier school of the duodynamists, as they are called, to have a close affinity with all these errors. Although its upholders would disclaim any such inference, this hypothesis of a principle performing all the functions of an animal soul, while it leaves to the reasonable and intellectual soul only the office of thought, is nothing less than to revive an old superstition, and virtually to attribute a kind of duality of souls to man, a doctrine which the Church has condemned. M. des Mousseaux believes, as being a Catholic, that there is in many one only soul, which informs the body, vivifying it by its union therewith. One soul and one body, this is the complete man, according to the Church, which knows nothing of luminous spectral bodies, human phantoms, or animal souls. There are some interesting remarks, in conclusion, on the germ of the resurrection body.

It is to be regretted that M. des Mousseaux's style should not be characterised by more sobriety, clearness, and method. He shares this fault with many good though not the best of modern French writers.

English Ultramontanism. Two Papers in *Fraser's Magazine* for June and July.

THE architecture of the Ultramontane opinions, or in other words (as we think) of those opinions which alone can be called genuinely Catholic, is very generally recognized by those who have taken the trouble to grasp them to be this. They are founded on a certain generosity of faith, which refuses to stop short with dogmatic definitions, but frankly goes on to accept whatever is of the spirit of the Teaching Church. They are reducible to three heads: the realization of the supremacy of the spiritual kingdom, not in the abstract merely, but in the concrete, over the temporal; of the essentially papal constitution of the Church; and of the necessity of faith for salvation. And they are uniformly conjoined in those who hold them with a reverence for that See which is by pre-eminence called Holy; a reverence which makes them very ready to cling to its decisions, to bow to its opinions, and to accept the customs and practices which it sanctions. But, nevertheless, a scientific appreciation of the theological, political, and social

aspects of Ultramontanism, of the theology which it supposes, the relations between Church and State which are its ideal, and its action on a society which should be unreservedly submitted to it, is still to a very great extent a desideratum. It would in any case be almost impossible, that such an appreciation should in the first instance come from an opponent; and at present the Protestant hatred and the Liberal hatred of the Catholic Church are centred and concentrated on Catholicism in action, as it appears in Ultramontanism, its one legitimate development. And for this reason there is perhaps no set of principles at present really acting on the world, which has been so much misrepresented, and by Englishmen so little understood, and which has in consequence necessarily assumed so much of a polemical attitude, as the Ultramontane. If, indeed, there be one class of men less likely than another to enter into and understand them, it is that class of Latitudinarians who now form so large a part of English society.

The essayist in *Fraser* has produced two sharp, confident, superficial, and occasionally scurrilous articles, which have made some stir in the world. But his title is a misnomer. He does not even attempt to show how far and in what manner Ultramontanism differs from other so-called Catholic schools of thought; or to examine the relation borne by the Ultramontane opinions to the defined theology of the Church, and the way in which they are correlated with each other; but mixes together odd and erratic remarks on doctrines which are *de fide*—*e.g.*, the infallibility of the Church and the authenticity and inspiration of the Bible*—and which are therefore held by all Catholics alike,—criticisms on the volume of Catholic Essays which apparently prompted him to write,—and a hash-up of the common Latitudinarian views about Christianity. The complexion of his theology is Latitudinarian or Rationalistic; and the extent and depth of his theological knowledge is about what might have been expected in a Protestant and a man of the world, who had not especially studied the subject. He can make a good controversial point; but he has no power of really grasping and appreciating the position of those to whom he opposes himself. This, indeed, our readers may see by referring, *e.g.*, to that part of his article in the July number, where he treats of the advantages possessed by Catholics in ascertaining the canon of Scripture. His two papers are an attack rather than a judgment; and his arguments, while they possess a certain feminine sharpness, generally miss the real gist of the matter.

As it would be impossible here to comment on the whole of what this writer has run over, we shall content ourselves with giving a few examples of his facts and of his criticisms. Of the reliance to be placed on his historical statements, some idea may be formed from the fact that he summarizes the history of the Popes, from Innocent the Third to the Reformation, by saying that they were "monstrously wicked." He steadily ignores the intimate mixture of political and religious *momenta* in the French and Flemish

* His remarks on the position toward physical science assumed by Catholics in defending the Scriptural Record are exceedingly unjust; their position is simply that of all who defend the inspiration and authenticity of the sacred writings.

religious wars, and the well known considerations which, even to a Protestant, make Protestant so much more repulsive than Catholic "persecution." He takes no note whatever of those abominable tenets and practices of the Albigenses, which drew on them a punishment of more than ordinary severity. He confounds the Roman Inquisition with the provincial tribunals; and in the teeth of all historical evidence, lays at the door of the Vatican the excesses of Spain and of Thoulouse. Balmez has said that the Roman Inquisition never shed the unbeliever's blood. Catholic writers have brought forward one or two cases showing that on this point Balmez was not quite accurate. Our author, however, stultifies the whole affair, by referring what Balmez had said of the Roman Inquisition to the Spanish, Flemish, and Provençal courts. Galileo, he says, was perhaps tortured. The Eastern Church was never subject to the Western. The drama was, even in its most innocent forms, proscribed by the Church. It was, on the contrary, condemned only *par accident*, because of the evils which were mixed up with it.* One of his most curious assertions is, that S. Augustine's celebrated interpretation of the beginning of the book of Genesis, "only proves that double dealing in controversy is not a new invention." But the force of misrepresentation really can no farther go, than when he asserts that the controversies, active or dormant, among the Roman Catholics, are just as deep and as numerous as those among the Protestants. Considering that the "Protestants" are at present disputing among themselves on (among other things) the dogmatic principle; the moral character of God; the admissibility of mysteries in religion; the inspiration and authenticity of Holy Scripture; the existence of supernatural grace; the doctrine of the Trinity; the Divinity of our Lord; the *sequelæ* of the Incarnation (if to say so be not to pay them too great a compliment); and, in addition, on nearly all the points controverted with the Catholic Church; this is one of the most utterly shameless assertions that we remember ever to have met.

On his criticisms we have already remarked as being superficial. One of them is simply ludicrous: it is really too good to pass by in silence. Mr. Lucas, a very able essayist in the Catholic volume remarks that when man fell in Adam every portion of his being became degraded. "Did it?" retorts his penetrating critic; "how is the sense of smell degraded? How has Christianity restored it in any single instance?"

We conclude with a few words on the dilemma which he proposes to us in his last chapter, "The General Position and Prospects of the Church of Rome, in comparison with the Church of England." You Catholics, he says, habitually write in a tone of exultation, and evidently anticipate great coming triumphs. At the same time science, politics, literature, and social life, are daily falling away from the Church, and every day leaves the Papacy weaker than it found it. Is this nothing to set against a few conversions? To all this we make a very simple reply—*concedo totum*; it is no dilemma at all; we rejoice in some things, and we lament others. We indeed rejoice in this, that our position with respect to infidelity is infinitely more logical than that

* As may be seen even in the treatise of Tertullian, *De Spectaculis*.

of Protestantism : but we do not rejoice in the state of continental Europe ; on the contrary, we contemplate it with feelings of the deepest pity. But the feelings with which we regard the anti-religious movement which is now passing over the face of European society, do not blind us either to the fact that it is passing over its face rather than has penetrated to its heart ;—that an immense number of deeply-rooted traditions remain to prevent the destruction from being complete, or even as great as it may seem to a superficial observer ;—or to any good which may accidentally be derived, from its destroying the vague and incoherent theories of Protestantism. Of the future we shall say nothing ; this is not an ideal world that the right and the truth should always prevail in it. Some may imagine that even amidst this tempest of our time they discern the signs of a happy calm which shall succeed the storm ; and some may think that they see in it only the beginnings of a long train of evils, and be rather disposed to ask themselves whether, when the Son of Man comes, he will find faith on the earth. But these are only guesses and conjectures ; and we shall all act well and wisely by living and working for the present, and leaving the future to the disposition of God.

Catholic Missions in Southern India to 1865. By REV. W. STRICKLAND, S.J., twelve years Military Chaplain in India, and T. W. M. MARSHALL, Esq., author of "Christian Missions." Longman. 1865.

THIS is a singularly seasonable book, as well as interesting and valuable in itself. A few years ago, the religious world in England imagined that missions to the heathen were the one thing in which Protestantism had really excelled. It was their strong point, and they believed that it was a glory practically confined to English Protestantism. Those, indeed, who were given to read anything out of the common line, knew something at least of the life and achievements of S. Francis Xavier. But they believed that Catholic missions had pretty much begun and ended with him. And even those who most admired him were conscious of one drawback to their admiration. For a great part of his history was clearly supernatural ; and as it was a first principle with them that that part at least could not possibly be true, they were in an unpleasant difficulty to decide whether they should say that he fancied the supernatural facts, or that they had been (how and by whom they could not well tell) smuggled into his history. The remarkable essay upon his life, republished from the *Edinburgh*, among the works of Sir James Stephen, curiously illustrates this state of mind. Of Catholic missions since his time the English Protestant world knew nothing ; and of the great success of Protestant missions it was fully convinced on two grounds. First and chiefly, because of the enormous sum of money annually spent upon them. Next, from faith in the reports of the missionaries. It would be easy, if we had room, to illustrate, from popular books, the spirit of triumph with which Protestant missions were regarded some thirty years ago. But all this has passed away. Very few, if any, educated Englishmen now venture to say anything at all about the success of Protestant missions. Money to maintain them is still raised as freely as ever, because it never

came from the educated classes. It has long been a favourite work with the clergy to collect it from their parishioners. The few educated men who contribute do it unwillingly and without real belief in its doing good: the poor are (to speak the plain truth) deceived into giving by false representations. This is no mere opinion of ours. The *Spectator* of August 26 has an article on Protestant missions. It speaks out—"Money must be had, and it is raised by a system of platform oratory which fosters lying as a hothouse fosters cucumbers. Nothing can be more disgusting than the way in which money is often raised from a provincial church, the outpourings of unctuous cloquence, the exhibition of dirty little idols, the relation of monstrous stories, coloured till they resemble the facts as children's 'guys' do the objects they are intended to represent. There is not a worse scene to a man who loves truth than a country missionary meeting, unless, indeed, it be a county meeting to hear the candidates for a seat in Parliament." Nor is the falsehood only in this country. Of the missionaries themselves the writer says, "The reports which the mass of them send home are, on the whole, untrustworthy. Not that anything is invented. In the course of an experience covering hundreds of missionaries in two quarters of the world, the writer has met with but two instances of wilful misrepresentation. But when an article is urgently demanded—demanded with threats—that article will be supplied even by honest men. Most of the stories of conversions are mythical legends. The majority of such stories are coloured unconsciously, till those who know the facts often become, in their disgust, the bitterest opponents of missionary effort."

Now, this testimony is important, because the *Spectator* does not (like the *Saturday Review*) scoff at everything. Far from it. Deeply as its conductors are sunk in error, it is impossible not to see that they are, in their way, earnest about religion; and the article before us is written expressly to prove that Protestant missions, with all their faults and shortcomings, do great good, and ought to be maintained and extended. Moreover, the writer claims no ordinary experience, "covering hundreds of missionaries in two quarters of the world." Let us hear, then, his testimony as to "missionary success:"—"The one patent effect of the missionary, about which there can be no doubt or question, is to break up the intellectual torpor which has, in all ages, fallen upon the majority of mankind. Very often the result of his teaching is the rapid spread of simple and somewhat lawless Deism. In some instances, particularly among Mahomedans, it absolutely intensifies belief in the faith which it is his object to destroy. In a few it produces simply the dissolution of all belief, an intellectual anarchy, amid which many of the external restraints, which enforce the cardinal morals of society, disappear."

This testimony really agrees with that of ALL competent witnesses whose accounts we have seen. Of the students in the Protestant Missionary Colleges, G. O. Trevelyan, M.P., says, they "almost inevitably become Deists." We could give a string of unquestionable Protestant testimonies to the same effect (see "Strickland," p. 187); but it is needless, for the fact was never questioned by any one competent to speak. The *Saturday Review* of the same day says, "ANGELIC MISSIONS HAVE FAILED," and proceeds to

account for the failure. It is not from the smallness of our invading army, but because it is not properly armed, that our little host does so little. Christianity began with only twelve invaders of the Roman empire." "What is the result in New Zealand? Not so much that the Christianity of the converted nations is only skin-deep [this is what the *Times* had called it], as that it is capable of evolving a wild and outrageous fanaticism, infinitely more mischievous than fetish worship itself. *This fact has to be accounted for.* We do not say that it is a reproach to the missionaries, but it is no answer to the difficulty to say that William Thompson, the king-maker, might have been worse had he not been a Christian, when the question is, why men who are Christians murdered their pastor, and developed from their own Christian consciousness a bloody religion, in comparison with which Mormonism is rational? The question is not, whether we are to go on doing more of what we have already done in New Zealand, but whether we ought not to face the difficult doubt, whether what we have done has been the right thing. So, too, about India. We should like to hear Bishop Cotton's opinion, and Dr. Kaye's opinion, whether they think the conversion of India would be a bit nearer, if, by the next overland mail, all the 20,000 clergy of the Church of England could be transported into Hindostan. What causes apprehension to thoughtful men about English missionary work is not so much its quantity as its quality. Bishop Wilberforce, we believe, sees this as well as we do. But when he comes to the remedy for the failure, which he cannot but acknowledge, we have only the time-honoured formula—unity and catholicity, as the marks of a true church, which, denying the usurpations of Rome, maintains the faith in its integrity. But this, as nine people out of ten will understand it, means only the exportation of Anglicanism as it stands. *Anglicanism, as it stands, has been tried in the Tropics and at the Antipodes, and with what results we all know.*"

We might transcribe more if there were need. But the fact is that, as far as this, all thinking men are agreed. Take, at a venture, any Englishman with a good coat, and if its colour is black, and it is surmounted with a white tie, he may very probably repeat what the *Spectator* calls "lies" about the Protestant missions. If not, he will tell you openly, that they have done more harm than good.

It is worth while to observe what the thoughtful writer, whom we have been quoting, proposes to do under these circumstances. The *Saturday Review* has, of course, a theory of its own. "Different races and languages have developed each its own type of religion. Christianity has in it (or it could not have been what it is) an assimilating and self-adapting power and function. This must go on. If we are to expect new and flourishing native churches in the four quarters of the globe, they will be very different in character, feeling, habits, and thoughts, from the churches of Europe. 'The colonial churches' must be independent of insular, and Anglican, and churchwarden, and family-pew traditions." No doubt. But, unfortunately, what the *Review* evidently means is, that the religion must be essentially different, not only from modern Anglicanism (which it must), but from that which the Church in all ages has taught—something developed by each country for itself. The notion is not new. The clever superficial Montes-

quieu wrote, long ago, "It is hardly possible that Christianity should ever be established in China. Vows of virginity, the assembling of women in the churches, their necessary intercourse with the ministers of religion, their participation of the sacraments, auricular confession, the marrying only one wife, all this oversets the manners and customs, and strikes at the religion and laws of the country" (*L'Esprit des Loix* (xix. 18), quoted by Alban Butler).

As a matter of fact, what Montesquieu and the *Saturday Reviewer* agree in thinking impossible, is exactly that which experience tells us has happened. What took place in the early Church is described in a few lines of Tertullian, familiar to everybody; and which prove that what astonished the world in his day was, that Christianity did, as a matter of fact, retain its own peculiar character and customs in all lands, however contrary they were to all that seemed to be the unalterable and ineffaceable characteristics of each country. Nothing, of course, could be more unlike the natural working of things; but then it must be admitted, nothing could be more like the working of a supernatural religion. As to China, the fatal impediment to its conversion in the last century was not in the heathen customs of the natives so much as in the anti-Christian labours of Montesquieu himself, and such as he, in France. By their writings was sown the seed of the great revolution—that mighty earthquake which rent open the earth, and for a time seemed to swallow up the Church and Christianity itself. But for this, it is believed by those who best know the East that Christianity might by this time have been predominant among the Indians and Chinese.

The line taken by the *Spectator* is still more curious; it is that though the religious effect of Protestant missions is only to produce infidelity, still we ought to maintain them, because that infidelity is accompanied by intellectual activity. "The first great function of the missionary body, the one which, competent or incompetent, honest or dishonest, silly or wise with a wisdom not of this world, they *must* perform, wholly escapes England's attention." And "this the missionary cannot help doing. Grant that he is a mere professional—a man who goes out to India, or Africa, or Polynesia, merely to earn his bread, to whom his salary is an object, and who looks to physical comfort as much as the barrister or the planter," and as a matter of fact he says that, "partly from the fact that missionary work has become a profession, but chiefly from the superior capacity of the half-educated for enthusiasm, the average of missionaries sink below the average of English clergymen." What religious good is to come of this he tells us, and his view in this respect curiously agrees with that of the *Saturday Review*. He hopes that among those heathen whom the Protestant missionaries have trained in total unbelief, some one may arise with a head like that of Luther and a heart like that of Loyola—"to be to his countrymen, with whom he can sympathize as no missionary can, the apostle of a faith which is of itself the equivalent of a high philosophy, and of a civilization rich in all the possibilities yet offered to man. One such Christianized Hindoo might change India, one such Arab reorganize Asia, or one such African bear upwards from the Cape the lesson which, more than all expeditions or army conquests, would throw open Africa. If Mahommed was

possible, why is that a dream? and if it be not a dream, the million a year we spend may be spent for a thousand years, and yet, to a population which believes that light is the greatest gift to be received by man, may be most amply repaid."

Speculations such as these force upon us the consideration that the writers would find nothing to alter in their systems, and hopes, and fears, and plans, if they should suddenly come to the conclusion that there is no God, no such thing as GRACE, no power superior to man's in the world. The more one considers it, the more deeply one feels that their whole system is as directly and absolutely the opposite, as anything conceivably could be, to his who, throwing himself naked and unarmed into the midst of a heathen world, wrote, "Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For, seeing that by the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe; for the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men."

Such, then, being the state of mind of thoughtful Protestants with regard to Protestant missions, nothing could be so exactly seasonable as the little volume before us. When all the efforts of man have failed to introduce *anything like Christianity into heathen nations, and when (after trying everything that can be done)* thoughtful believers in Protestant Christianity have come to the conclusion that, on the whole, the best thing is to make the heathen into utter unbelievers, in the vague hope that in some unknown way a man may spring out of this mass of infidelity, who may by human means do much what, by human means, Mahommed did before him, only that, unlike Mahommed, he may start a religion worthy to be called Christian, it is no small thing that it should be clearly proved by the strongest of all proofs—the proof of daily experience—that there is still upon earth a power able to change men's hearts, to overthrow even "the grand old paganisms," and to repeat the conquests of the primitive Church. This power now, as of old, has been found in the preaching of the Cross and in the Sacraments of the Church.

We have left ourselves no room to give extracts from Father Strickland's volume—little even for an account of it. Nor do we regret this; for the volume itself is so short and so small as to be within the reach of all our readers, and so deeply interesting that no one who cares about the great theme will find it easy to lay it down when he has once taken it up. It relates only to one district of India, but this district extends from Cape Comorin 800 miles northward, to the Godavery, and is about the size of France, including the territories last annexed up to the time we write. It is a most strange contrast to those reports by which the Protestant missionaries raise money—"the conventional dialogue," as the *Saturday Review* expresses it, "between 'Massa' and a docile darkie." There is a remarkable absence of detailed anecdotes, not because they could not be given, but because there is no room for them. It shows that the descendants of the native Christians, converted in this district by S. Francis Xavier and his successor F. de Nobili, have kept their faith from generation to generation, in spite of difficulties such as we can hardly imagine, left as they have been without missionaries, without instruc-

tion, without Catholic institutions, and for a considerable period actually discouraged by the British Government. And through all this they have retained not only the name of Christians, but the peculiar characteristics which distinguish Catholics from others who claim the Christian name. Theirs is not what the writers whom we have quoted consider the only Christianity possible in India—namely, one developed by the Indians themselves to meet their own habits of mind, and satisfy their own wants. It is the old-fashioned thing which the people of England call “Popery,” with the Pope, and the Blessed Virgin, and the Saints, and the beads. They have, of course, suffered much from the long neglect in which they have been left, still there are at least 355,000 native Christians in this district. It may very gravely be doubted whether there would now have been in England as many thousand nominal Christians, it is very certain that there would not have been as many score who still held the peculiarities of the Anglican system; if the members of the Church of England had been left to themselves as much and as long as has been the case with these Indian Catholics. But after many years of compelled abandonment, the Society of Jesus was able, in 1837, to resume the mission. It has been carried on under every conceivable difficulty. Above all, the poverty of the Fathers has been so extreme that they have been unable to procure, either for themselves, or for the holy religious who have been sent from Europe to assist in their labours, those comforts which are in such a climate the common necessities of life. By this, no doubt, the merits of the missionaries have been vastly increased, and the glory of God promoted, but what shall we say of those who, having the means, have left them to perish—we mean in the strict sense of the word, to perish for want of common necessities? We know that the members of the Civil Service live for years, and return to Europe often in a green old age. We know how enormously the mortality among the military was at once reduced, in India and every other tropical country, by the reforms effected by the lamented Sidney Herbert. The mortality among the Jesuit Fathers in South India, ever since they resumed the care of the mission, has been vastly greater than that which ever took place among the military, and the reason is simply the want of proper lodging, and proper food, and proper rest. Father Strickland gives a list of forty-five who have sunk there since 1840. The length of their service is given. It is full of such entries as these:—One year eight months; one month seventeen days; ten months; ten months; two years three months; seven days; two months twenty-four days (these five come together).

And with all this, what has been done? The fervour and piety of the ancient times has been restored, schools both of boys and girls have been opened far and wide—nothing except want of money prevents them being opened in every part of the country; and be it observed that, as far as it appears, not one of those educated in them has become a Deist or an Atheist. Above a thousand heathens have been converted in a year, and the number is every year increasing. A college has been opened for the higher studies, from which several native priests have already been ordained, and many more are now studying for the priesthood. It is calculated that in this college a student for the priesthood costs only £6 a year. Money being

invested in India at 12 per cent., £50 will make a permanent investment for such a foundation. Churches and schools are imperatively wanted. The work is in many places stopped for want of them (for the natives have an inveterate prejudice against open-air preaching), and "a small and decent village church could be raised for £40 or £50, a handsome one, capable of containing 3,000 persons, for £1,000, and so on in proportion." And if these sums seem very moderate, be it remembered they have hitherto been beyond the means of the missionary, however self-devoted and willing to accept all hardships at the expense of his health. Many European nuns have gone out, and under their auspices a number of native women have entered the religious state. "The number of these native religious is already sixty, and might be rapidly augmented, with immense fruit to themselves and to their pagan kinsfolk and neighbours, if the resources of the mission permitted such a development" (p. 166). To meet the peculiar difficulty of the widows (who were objects of universal contempt if they did not die on their husbands' funeral pyre), "a convent of widows has been established, under the direction of the religious of Marie Réparatrice, which, in 1864, contained twenty inmates, animated by the best dispositions, and universally respected. The widows seek admission, and poverty alone closes the door against them. Let the Catholics of Europe decide how long they shall seek an entrance in vain" (p. 167).

We must content ourselves with one extract more. It seems that candidates for baptism (owing to the small number of European Fathers) are chiefly instructed by native catechists. "From time to time numbers are baptized together; and those not accustomed to the sight, or of weak faith, would be astonished and almost awe-struck to see the wonderful effects produced by baptism upon the adult. The whole expression of the face is changed, and with it the dispositions of the heart, and the manner and bearing of the individual. In a word, so manifest is the change, that the heathens are struck by it, and the Christians see figured before them those wonderful effects of grace which faith would supernaturally lead them to expect" (p. 205).

So mighty is the work, that there is good reason to hope that Southern India, within little more than a generation to come, may be a thoroughly Christian country, if the work is not again stopped, as it was before; and if the want of money does not prevent its being effectually carried on in this acceptable season. And then there are Catholics who cannot afford to help in the work, although they spend upon their table, their dress, their pleasures, as much as would supply education for ten, twenty, perhaps a hundred, or more of native priests, or would lengthen for many years the lives of many of these European labourers. Can it be that they really expect to stand together with these natives and these labourers at the judgment-seat of Christ? After this question we dare say no more. Our exertions will have been abundantly repaid if we lead only one or two among our readers to study Father Strickland's book for themselves.

The Dolomite Mountains: Excursions through Tyrol, Carinthia, Carniola, and Friuli, in 1861, 1862, and 1863. By JOSIAH GILBERT and G. C. CHURCHILL, F.G.S. London: 1864.

AS the new Houses of Parliament are built of Dolomite, obtained from the quarries of Bolsover, in Derbyshire, many of our readers will be familiar with the name; but only a small number, we venture to say, of the non-scientific part of the world will have heard much of the Dolomite Mountains before the appearance of the volume sent out on this subject by the joint labour of Messrs. Gilbert and Churchill. It will not, therefore, be out of place to preface our remarks on the work itself by a short explanation of the subject treated of.

Dolomitic rocks received their appellation in compliment to a Frenchman named Deodatus Guy Silvanus Tancred de Gralet de Dolomieu,—we hope he seldom had occasion to write his name in full,—who, towards the close of the last century, first called the attention of men of science to this remarkable species of limestone. Other names have been given to it, such as bitter spar, rhombic spar, muricalcite, magnesian spar, and magnesian carbonate of lime, but they have now given place to a remembrance of the illustrious French *savant*. The rock is a magnesian limestone, its component parts being carbonate of lime and carbonate of magnesia. Many theories have been suggested as to the method of its formation, several of which require as a condition that the sea should at the time of formation of the Dolomite have been at the boiling point of heat. Mr. T. Sterry Hunt, of the Canadian Geological Survey, has, however, shown the possibility of its formation by *original deposition from the sea-water*. It has also been admitted that Dolomite might be the *result of subsequent action, through sea-water, upon the ordinary carbonate of lime*,—in other words, of *metamorphic action*. Richthofen, to whom we are indebted for a full account of the geology of the region where Dolomite chiefly prevails, gives, as his opinion, that the Schlern dolomite is a coral reef, and that the entire formation of Schlern dolomite has, in like manner, originated through animal activity.

The Dolomite region proper lies in the south-eastern portion of the Tyrol, a little to the north-west of the Gulf of Venice. It may be described as bounded on the north by the Pusterthal; on the west, by the valleys of the Eisach and Adige; on the south, by a line drawn from Trent to Belluno; on the east, by the valley of the Piave and a line extended northwards to the Pusterthal. The kernel of dolomitic scenery may be described as within the quadrilateral formed by the cities of Brixen, Trent, Belluno, and Lienz. The entire area would comprise about 3,600 square miles.

To this region, then, Messrs. Gilbert and Churchill, from whose work we have gleaned the above particulars, accompanied by their wives, who had made up their minds to share some part, at least, of the pleasures and pains of Alpine travelling, were attracted by passages such as the following, in "Murray's Handbook":—"The Dolomite Mountains are unlike any other mountains, and are to be seen nowhere else among the Alps. They arrest the attention by their singularity and the picturesqueness of their forms, by

their sharp peak or horns, sometimes rising up in peaks or obelisks, at others extending in serrated ridges, toothed like the jaw of an alligator; now fencing in the valley with an escarped precipice many thousand feet high, and often cleft with numerous fissures, all running vertically. They are perfectly barren, destitute of vegetation of any sort, and usually of a light yellow or whitish colour." A party planning an excursion to the Tyrol was likely to be attracted by such an enticing description. Indeed, the reality so far exceeded the description, that not one only, but several tours were made by them during a course of seven years, the results of which are penned in the volume before us.

Mr. Gilbert introduces his travels to the notice of the reader by the familiar lines :—

"Onward, where the rude Carinthian boor
Against the houseless stranger shuts the door ;"

but cannot for the life of him make out what was Goldsmith's reason for writing this couplet. The very contrary is the case, but *littera scripta manet*. The respect shown to strangers and travellers far exceeds anything that is either expected or experienced in the British isles. Speaking of the gangs of labourers engaged in repairing the road between Winklern and Heiligenblut, he says :—

As we passed they stood in rows bareheaded on each side of the way, an attention rather distressing to our modesty; and at one spot, where the level of the road was altered, they lifted us and our vehicles bodily over the difficulty with all the good-nature in the world. Nor were the peasantry of the valley less courteous in their way Returning to Winklern in the evening, we found our elegant hostess receiving the coppers from what might be called the ale-house bench at the door. Not the less a lady for all that, and we admired the simplicity of manners it betokened. A fortnight later she entertained the Emperor and Empress on their way from Heiligenblut to Klagenfurt. It was not, however, till the next day that all the singularity of this establishment was explained. After a cordial farewell to both master and mistress, we were slowly ascending the hill behind the house on our way to Linz, and conning the items of a bill so exceedingly modest in amount that we almost thought ourselves bound to return to have it corrected, when a passage in Murray, which had hitherto escaped us, let in unexpected light :—"The inn at Winklern is kept by a wealthy chevalier, whose most moderate charge of one florin *per diem* includes everything." Here was an explanation! We had, in fact, been almost on the footing of guests, and were heartily vexed not to have known it sooner. All we could do now was to feel much obliged to Chevalier Aichenegg of Winklern, and to dub him henceforth *par excellence* "The Boor of Carinthia."—(Pp. 28—32.)

Long life to the Carinthian boors! and may they ever continue in such sort to close their doors against the houseless stranger!

The whole volume teems with allusions to and anecdotes of the goodness, simplicity, hospitality, and true piety of the Tyrolese. The attention of travellers cannot fail to be arrested by the constant succession of crosses, niches with statues, shrines, road-side oratories, and other sacred memorials of religious worship, on passing which the good people never fail to show signs of respect. But the religion of the Tyrolese is no simply external religion; it is a religion that has spoken to the heart, and brought forth

abundant tokens of its persuasive eloquence. Morning and evening prayers are recited aloud in each house, and the deep tones of the chanted litany are heard proceeding from the hall of the inn as well as from the kitchen of the cottage :—

After a sweep round the basin of the lake [on the Brenner route], we drew up to the solitary post-house of the summit, and there was a rush of passengers in-doors for supper. The old coach supper! Yet not like those of yore, when the guard blew his horn, and the coach-lamps flashed in the sober streets of Bedford and Northampton. Here a low ground-floor room received the party to a rather oleaginous meal, and, before it was finished, a deep roar of voices, in measured recitation, issued from the vaulted hall adjoining, where the family and servants of both sexes were seen on their knees at evening litany. A large dog, sitting solemnly on his haunches in the midst, lifted up his mouth as we passed through, and growled at the interruption to divine service. Whoever saw English hostlers and chambermaids at prayers while the mail was changing horses?—(P. 102.)

Nay, at Botzen, when their host came to take leave of them on their departure, he dropped on his knee to each of the ladies, and taking a hand put it to his lips in true cavalier fashion.

With regard to the observance of Sunday, in which respect Continental customs shock English minds so much, Mr. Gilbert says :—“ Innsbruck on a Sunday morning looks to an Englishman very Sunday-like. All the shops are shut, and the churches crowded. From an early hour, as in all Catholic countries, the music of the mass is heard swelling from every church-door, and here the peasant voices add to its depth and fulness.”

We cannot refrain from giving another extract, again testifying to their religious feeling :—

The Berg Isel for the morning ; but for an evening, there is another spot dear to our recollection. As you look up from Innsbruck to that wonderful mountain-barrier on the north, whence, it is said, the wolves look down into the streets, and where, in honour of their Emperor, the peasants once wrote his name in miles of bonfires,—at about a third of their apparent height, occurs an unsightly scar, the result of extensive quarrying. Just below this, reached by a very steep footpath through orchards, grass, and underwood, is a narrow projecting crag, difficult to discover among the deep furrows of the hill sides, fringed as they are by trees and bushes. But, once attained, the visitor is startled to find the small area on its summit, some twenty feet by twelve, occupied by prayer-benches, and a large crucifix, before which burns a humble lamp. It is an oratory—perhaps for the use of the quarrymen above, perhaps the object of pious care to a cottage in the ravine below. From this solitary platform all Innsbruck and its arrowy river, and the valley up and down, are seen at your feet. Opposite, and lifted high, are the mountains of the Brenner and the Stubay Thal. . . . We had discovered this spot on a Sunday evening three years before, and could not spend another Sunday at Innsbruck without visiting it again. The storm was over, and the day closing in peaceful sunshine, as we took the winding, narrow road by which the stone-carts reach the quarry from the village of Hottingen ; and after some trouble, found again the lonely cross. From end to end the valley shone in yellow light, bursting from the west among clouds and snow-peaks ; while eastward the retreating storm relieved in gloom the golden hills—a solemn and beautiful sight. But the small light held no frame. Was the shrine deserted ? At the moment a shoeless lad emerged from below, and,

staring in silence at the intruders, began to trim the little oil-vessel; soon its flickering light shone among the trees, and as darkness fell, the bleached and blood-stained figure on the cross glimmered in its beams.—(Pp. 98–100.)

With many such like descriptions and stories, and here and there a legendary fragment attaching to an old castle, church, or monastery, nearly always redolent of the deep religious feeling of the inhabitants of the country, our travellers make the narrative of their journeys exceedingly interesting, which otherwise would, perhaps, have proved dull and tedious to the general reader. So much is this the case, that we are persuaded many who would at once turn from the scientific appearance of the title-page, could they only prevail upon themselves to peruse the first chapter, would be sorry to lay the book aside. The style is light and easy, removed from all flippancy and trifling. We are told nothing that we would not wish to know. The narrators are of genial temperament, uniting in their persons the artist and the man of science. The ladies are wholly unobtrusive; and from their tact and knack of accommodating themselves to others, prove no *impedimenta* in the way of either science or pleasure. The whole party, starting out with a fixed maxim, racy of the soil they spring from, that if you cannot sleep over difficulties, the next best thing is to dine over them, manage to make themselves happy and contented with the hard fare and absence of comfort, which every traveller in the Tyrol must be prepared to experience. They put a good face upon everything, and gain over the good will, as well of their host and hostess in their journeys, as also of the reader in their narration. They have the good sense to respect the religious observances of those who think otherwise than themselves, and form a marked contrast to the ordinary run of English travellers, who, by their unbecoming conduct when away from home, have gained for themselves an unenviable notoriety. But what, meanwhile of the Dolomites?

The work is split up into five narratives, each independent of the other. Of these, one was contributed by Mr. Churchill, part of another by one of the ladies, and the rest are from the pen of Mr. Gilbert. There is also added a physical description of the Dolomite region by Mr. Churchill. Suitable maps and illustrations render the book complete in itself. The narratives are—First Glimpses of the Dolomites; An Excursion to Val Fossa; A Tour through South Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carnolia; A Tour through Carinthia, Friuli, and the Venetian Alps; Out-of-the-way Spots.

The following will serve as a specimen of Mr. Churchill's descriptions:—
“The following day I botanized upon the Fedaia pass, on the north flank of the Marmolata. The ascent commences after the last village, Penia, is passed, and I soon encountered a kind of chaos like that near Gavarnie, in the Pyrenees, with fine trees growing upon many of the huge blocks, and dead stems standing here and there, slanting at different angles. Beyond, the ascent was divided into a series of sudden steps, ending in a basin immediately below the summit of the col. From this spot the desolate, whitened rock-slopes of the Marmolata, running steeply down below its three glaciers, were before me. The glaciers are parted from each other by lines of bosses, as smooth-looking as the slopes, and the whole face suggests the idea of a remorseless and most complete removal of every sharp edge or crag. Does this indicate a past extension of the glacier? The contrast between this

general smoothness and the jagged character of the Lang Kofel was remarkable. It was quite possible to conceive that the Marmolata glaciers, favoured by cloudy summers and snowy winters, might unite below in one sheet of ice, and fill the basin partly occupied by the tiny Fedaia-See, or, perhaps, even the upper valley of the Avisio, as far as Penia. This fine pass is full of contrasts. Here nature has reserved her fairer mood for the *sunny* side ; for the Alp pastures stretch in long, rich, green sheets up to the summit of the ridge of eruptive ash, bounding the pass to the north, and, in the Padon Spitze, attaining a height of 9,000 feet, or 2,000 feet above that of the pass itself. Nor is this all. The upper basin was a natural flower-garden, where every colour had its representatives, and even the larger blocks, scattered on its surface, became, through the luxuriance and variety of the plants growing upon them, miniature gardens in themselves."—(Pp. 70, 71.)

From our short remarks and the extracts we have made, our readers may gain a general idea of this interesting and instructive volume. The geologist, the botanist, and even the non-scientific reader, will find that such a work is not uncalled for.

The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe. By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. Two Vols. Longman, Green, & Co.

MR. LECKY is a very young man ; but his *History of the Spirit of Rationalism* is certainly one of the most powerful works of its kind that ever appeared in England. He traces the history, not of individual writers and arguments, but of that rationalising spirit which has since the Reformation assumed so prominent a position in Europe. He is himself a Rationalist, belonging to a section of the sentimental school : and he looks forward to a day when the moral and æsthetic influence of Christianity shall be elevated and purified by the elimination of its dogmas and its "superstitions" ; or, as we should say, of its intellectual aspect and its practical appliances. His delicate and toilsome task would probably have had but few attractions for him, had he not permitted himself every here and there to subjoin an apology for Rationalism, or an argument or reflection in its favour.

The method which he has very wisely, as far as the interests of Rationalism are concerned, adopted, is, taking advantage of the conception of Christianity now in vogue among English Protestants, to strive to carry it a few steps farther, by pointing out that positive doctrines still held, are bound up with other doctrines and methods of religious conception long since rejected. There are probably no opinions the profession of which at present raises such a storm of invective, and calls down such a flood of pity and contempt, as those on magic and witchcraft prevalent three hundred years ago ;* as the ecclesiastical miracles and the "fetishism" of the middle ages ; the principle that it is in itself right to inflict temporal punishment on heretics ; or that those only will be saved who hold orthodox doctrine ; or that religion should have the supreme direction of politics. But these are the very opinions and prin-

* We do not here speak of the extent, but of the fact, of magic and witchcraft.

ciples which Mr. Lecky passes in review, and which he endeavours to show to be connected with the *ethos* and positive doctrines of modern Protestantism. In an indirect manner, therefore, and by semi-historical reflections and arguments bound up with a disliked set of opinions, does he assist this modern Protestantism to its consummation. Careless men will be more ready to accept what is directed against what they oppose ; and, once accepted, its tendency will bear them on, even though they never distinctly realize that tendency to their own minds. If any scruples should, however, start up in the minds of his readers, our author directs their attention to some circumstances in the history of opinions, which we do not remember ever before to have seen either so distinctly brought forward or so adroitly used. Opinions which are "contrary to the spirit of the age" may be formally denied ; but, he reminds them, they may also cease to be realized, and to exert any influence on the minds of men. They may become mere verbal formulæ : to be, indeed, repeated as occasion requires, but of which no one any longer cares to investigate the meaning, or ponder the bearing. Have not, he asks, the opinions at the destruction of which you scruple, already entered into this dormant state which is the natural prelude to death ? Nay, are they not practically dead ? And if so, why should we not cast off their exuvie ? His historical investigations have, moreover, led him to some conclusions respecting the manner in which opinions are ordinarily formed, which enable him to state, as on several occasions he does with great force, the real nature and logical value of the reasons for which the old beliefs were discarded : and at the same time to offer a very powerful apology for the new. The general opinions of a community are, he says, produced, not so much by real argument, as by a process of adaptation, which seeks so to modify them that they may harmonize with the *ethos* produced by those especially prominent and energizing opinions, which form the centres of thought and action, and give the tone to the community. The obvious corollary is that if we are to have any opinions at all, we must in them follow the tendency of the age, and the tendency of the age is, as Mr. Lecky has but little difficulty in showing, clearly toward Rationalism. And lest any one should dread that a disintegration of dogmatic Christianity may result in consequences injurious to human happiness, he has at the end of his work a chapter on "The Industrial History of Rationalism," designed to prove that Rationalism has as much encouraged industry as Dogmatism has checked it.

But the style of Mr. Lecky's work is one not at all likely to raise scruples in careless readers. He is continually lauding the moral side of Christianity. What in Rationalism would be repulsive to his readers he does not bring boldly forward, but rather keeps in the background, and leaves silently to do its work. We do not blame Mr. Lecky for this ; our own controversialists, and all sensible and practical men, do the same ; but we give it as a reason for thinking that the book is likely to take, and to have an extensive, though, perhaps, in great measure, an indirect influence. There are other and very influential, though, apparently, minor reasons for thinking this. The two thoughtful and very suggestive volumes before us form a work in every respect elegant. The publishers have not been backward in their office, and the author has adorned the fruit of his labours with an easy and fluent style,

which, at first, seems redundant, but in which every clause really bears its part in there solution of an idea, which seldom fails to *impress* us. We observe a bigotry of view and a bitterness of tone when speaking of the Catholic Church, which is unusual in writers of his school ; and even the occurrence of words—*e. g.*, Mariolatory—and phrases which are both offensive and unnecessary. His method is far from being as perfect as might be desired. With respect to his *matter*, we shall have to speak of that on another occasion, when reviewing his work at length. This, indeed, we should have done at an earlier period had we not been prevented by press of matter.

The Spirit of the Curé of Ars. Translated from the French of M. l'Abbé MONNIN. Edited by JOHN EDWARD BOWDEN, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. London : Burns & Lambert.

THOSE of our readers who are already acquainted with the original life of the Curé of Ars, by M. Monnin, or with the smaller English work in which it is substantially reproduced, will gratefully welcome F. Bowden's translation of this beautiful little book ; whilst those who gaze for the first time in its pages upon the finished picture of the saintly priest, when ripe for heaven, and listen to his words of inspired wisdom, treasured up by one who lived by his side, and is now treading in his path, will be led to seek a fuller knowledge of the previous steps by which such a height of sanctity was reached, and by which the dull peasant boy, "the keeper," as he himself tells us, "of three sheep and an ass," attained such a mastery over the powers of nature, in the region of inanimate matter, and over the still more stubborn and hidden springs of the perverse and wayward wills of men.

There are two sentences in the little book before us, which contain the key to the life and the work of the Curé of Ars. "The priesthood," he says, "is the love of the Heart of Jesus ; when you see the priest, think of Jesus Christ." And, again, "It is only the first step that is difficult in the way of abnegation. When once it is entered upon, we go straightforward ; and when once we have acquired this virtue, we have everything." It was the path of self-abnegation, early entered, and trodden without faltering or flinching to the end, which led John Baptist Vianney to that state of sublime perfection which realized his own ideal of the priesthood, and wherein his whole being was so spiritualized as to become, to those who knew him best, only a thin veil, shrouding from their eyes the visible presence of Christ.

"The Spirit of the Curé of Ars" is published in so cheap and portable a form as will, we trust, make it the familiar pocket companion of most of our readers. It seems needless, therefore, to give extracts from what, to be appreciated, should be studied as a whole. We rejoice to read in Father Bowden's preface, that "the Holy Father has expressed great interest in the Beatification of the Curé of Ars, and has desired that his cause may be introduced to the Roman congregation as soon as possible."

It is surely not without a lesson for us, that the unerring hand which two centuries ago wrote on one day in her calendar the names of S. Ignatius,

S. Francis Xavier, and S. Teresa, names illustrious alike in the order of nature and of grace, has added to it in these days of overwrought intellectual excitement, and worship of mere intellectual power, that of Benedict Joseph Labré, and is preparing to place beside it the names of John Baptist Vianney and Anna Maria Taigi, the obscure village curé and the humble artizan's wife. It is to teach us what is the might of mere sanctity, in its narrowest and lowest sphere, rendered more intense by its very concentration, of the charity which begins, though it never (as the world reads the proverb) ends at home. The antichrist of our day comes forth big, brawny, and muscular, with brow of brass and hand of iron, to defy the armies of the living God ; and the Church, though she has stores of kingly armour in her treasure-house, wherewith in time past she has clothed her chosen champions, and arrayed S. Augustine, S. Anselm, and S. Thomas in panoply of proof, cares not to unlock them now, but stoops in her tranquil majesty for the pebble in the wayside brook, quells the giant once more with the shepherd's sling and stone, or pins him to the earth by the feeble hand of a woman.

In consequence of an accident, we are obliged, with much regret, to postpone until January our notice of Mr. Isaac Butt's truly admirable little volume on Irish National Education, and of Mr. Badeley's learned pamphlet on the legal questions concerning the Confessional.

ERRATA.—At page 421 of the present number, under the first sentence of the second paragraph :—"We are now, then, in a position to draw out somewhat more accurately the doctrine which we sketched in a former article on those doctrinal dicta of Popes, which are not definitions of faith"—the reader is requested to note that, of course, we are not speaking of those doctrinal dicta which a Pope may utter merely as a private doctor.—At page 298, note †, the quotation ought to be acknowledged as taken from "Maffei's Annals."

APPENDIX TO THE JULY ARTICLE ON PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION.

A PROTESTANT gentleman who has had much personal experience in Public School Education has kindly written to us to say, that he has read the first article of our July number "with great interest and considerable sympathy." "In the course of it, however," he says, "I came across one or two inaccuracies, which, perhaps, the author of the article would be glad to have corrected." We are only too delighted to seize the opportunity of receiving some correction from one, whose position entitles what he says to special deference and who expresses himself so kindly and so courteously.

"I have thought it best," says our correspondent, "just to jot down, in the order in which they occur, the few mistakes into which you have not unnaturally fallen, in your article on our Public Schools. Indeed, so complicated is our system, and so unintelligible is it generally considered to be to non-gremials, that the wonder is, not that there are some mistakes in your remarks, but that there are so few.

(a) "First of all, then, the novel 'Butler Burke' enjoys but little reputation at Eton, as it does not represent at all truly our Eton life. It seems to me almost a pity that you dignified it with such special notice.

(β) "Your allusion, in p. 3, to the silence of the Commissioners on the subject of morality, takes it almost for granted that it was not gone into by them. This was by no means the case; only evidence on that point could not with propriety be published.

(γ) "'On no other ground,' p. 26. Might you not add or substitute, 'because it saves trouble'?"

(δ) "The description of a flogging, the 'thuds and groans,' is overstated. The operation is not very formidable. Boys would often prefer submitting to it, to having a long imposition set them to write out. It is very seldom that even a word is heard from the victim.

(ε) "'The rest fag' (p. 32), except the V. form, who number over 300 : 200 of whom, or more, have the privilege of being able to fag 'lower boys' (i. e., boys below the V. form) : rather less than 100 being in an amphibious state, neither enjoying the power of fagging others, nor being liable to be fagged themselves.

(ζ) "'Cellar' is held, *not* at the 'Christopher,' as stated p. 20, but at 'the Tap,' which is a beer-shop in another house nearer the College.

(η) "P. 35. Considerable pains are taken by most tutors in preparing their boys for Confirmation, which is held once every year and a half in the College chapel by the Bishop of Oxford. During the few previous weeks the tutors give instructions on the subject to such of their pupils as are candidates, and see them two or three times separately; during which interview boys not unfrequently open out, and a tutor is able to speak plainly about points in a pupil's character on which he has never previously had an opportunity of dwelling. For myself, I think the training a defective one; still, the period of Confirmation is frequently a crisis in a boy's career. Many take a start

then both in work and conduct ; and it has been remarked that the general tone and discipline of the school is better in the school-times during which a confirmation takes place, than at other periods.

(9) "P. 36. 'Chapel once a week.' This is not the case. The fact is, *the school is attached to the college*, which is governed by a Provost and Fellows, who answer to the Dean and Canons of a Cathedral. They keep up what is called 'double daily service' all the year round, with the exception of part of the holidays. The boys are obliged to attend this once every half-holiday, or about three times a-week, at three p.m. ; and twice on Sundays or holy days at eleven and three. The service is partly choral on Sunday mornings, and the afternoons of Sundays, Saturdays, saints days and eves. On the other days it is simply read. Holy Communion is, I grieve and am ashamed to say, only celebrated once a month, and on some of the greater festivals. The Communions are numerous.

"These are the only points I noticed as requiring correction."

We hope that the reader, interested in the subject of Public Schools, will examine the article as thus corrected. He will find that the general argument is not in the least affected. Public Schools, on the whole, are not the less objectionable ; and the model on which men should be formed is not the pattern Englishman of the nineteenth century, any more than it was of any earlier generation. That it has happened that boys have passed through the ordeal without being burned, we have never thought of denying ; any more than we should be so bold as to assert that an express train, rolling over an embankment at the rate of sixty miles an hour, would, of absolute necessity, be the death of every single individual it contained. Some might escape with their lives. Many often have done so. But if a passenger, on the strength of his having got off with a contusion, were to write a book in defence of such amusements, or endeavour to prove to the simple-minded that after all they are not so dangerous as is imagined, we should certainly be inclined to look upon the author as a man who had been considerably more shaken by his accident than his friends thought it pleasant to believe. That a man should escape a railway smash, in spite of the accident, is intelligible enough ; but that he should escape destruction in consequence of the catastrophe, is a proposition which, to our perceptions, savours far more strongly of lunacy than of logic.

If the Public School system be intrinsically bad—if it be an evil tree—it will not bring forth good fruit. Why, then, not cut it down, and cast it into the fire ? Are not these days in which specially the voice should be strong, and the articulation clear, and the words incisive ; in which, without compromise, and with a shrillness which makes itself heard like a solitary voice above the din and clang of the world's music, the high principles of everlasting religion should be made to pierce willing and unwilling ears. Why blunder with uncertain sounds like the abortive attempts of a young bugler, making all the parade of speech with none of its effects ? Why not let God's note be heard that awakens, because it startles and contains within it a meaning which, like the Church herself, is One, Holy Catholic, and Apostolic ? Why not say clearly, there is but one pattern man, and it is Christ ! The character of Christ, and of an Englishman formed by

the Public School system, are very opposite. Will you sacrifice the Englishman to Christ, or Christ to the Englishman? On which will you model? The clay cannot be made to resemble both. They are utterly different subjects. Do you want to form your clay to meekness, humility, patience, chastity, love of enemies, forgivingness, long-suffering, sorrow, and the rest? Do you wish to be "meek and humble of heart"? Who would so mock you as to direct you to John Bull, or to the very quintessence of Public School refinement? But, it will be said, Englishmen are brave. And, let us ask in return—more brave than Christ? And truthful. More so than "the Way, the Truth, and the Life?" And honourable. More honourable than He who paid the last farthing of his creatures' debt? How grand, indeed, would it not be if men, if Englishmen, who have the gift of noble natures, would throw down the work of their own hands, their national ideal, and take up Christ crucified! They would not then be so sensitive to their nationality. They would not then be so restless till they had pitched upon some character which they imagined blacker than their own, that the contrast might show them off to advantage, and that they might thus, with a look of reason, nestle themselves together and chirrup each other into happy dreams of being birds of paradise with longer tails than all the rest.

All such childish follies would melt away. Men, measuring themselves with One infinitely superior to themselves, would not be tempted to think how great or true or right they were, but, rather, how far from their model they still found themselves to be. The great national virtues of Gog and Magog, honesty and courage, would recover their proportions in the minds of men, and give due liberty to the development of other perfections quite as high and quite as necessary to the proper balance of the human soul. Hence, each virtue finding its due location, and each its due subordination to the other, courage would exist without damaging humility; honour without encouraging pride; and truth would cease to be a word in the mouths of men, and become a reality pervading every gradation of the social scale, unrestrained by the artificial boundaries of expediency. In a word, the creatures of God would be in harmony with the supernatural law and heavenly ideal, and the world by degrees would mitigate its frightful clamour of discordant sounds, and day by day set itself more in tune with the harp which mystically plays above.

We have strongly felt that as long as Englishmen are suffered to pay a sort of dulia to themselves, and put it down as a kind of profanity to hint at the imperfections of the national ideal, little can be done to wean them away from simple flesh and blood. Break their idol to pieces, and, perchance, they may seek another god. That a sincere worshipper of a walking-stick should feel annoyed, were the object of his special adoration broken across his back by the profanity of an unbeliever, would be no matter of surprise. Probably he would not only lose his temper, but make shipwreck also of his faith. The former he might recover at his earliest convenience; while the latter would have gone, we imagine, never to return. A similar effect, we hope, may be produced, by boldly pointing out the true value of the Englishman's ideal.

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